Youths in non-military roles in an armed opposition group on the Burmese-Thai border by Brown, Sylvia
 
 
 
Brown, Sylvia (2012) Youths in non-military roles in an armed opposition 
group on the Burmese-Thai border. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of 
London 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/15634 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners.  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge.  
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. 
  
Youths in non-military roles in an armed 
opposition group on the Burmese-Thai 
border 
 
 
Sylvia Brown 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London 
Statement of Original Work 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in 
part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the 
published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work 
which I present for examination. 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines how and why youths participate in non-military roles in the KNU, an 
armed opposition group along the Burmese-Thai border which has been in conflict with 
the Burmese state for over sixty years. It analyses the ways in which the group’s internal 
youth policies and programmes, as well as external factors influence the construction of a 
youth category and the particular roles youths take on in the group. It also examines how 
youth participation redefines youth roles and influences inter-generational relations and 
hierarchies. Finally, it considers how the KNU’s changing political and strategic goals affect 
and are in turn affected by youth activities.  
This thesis addresses three main questions. First, how is ‘youth’ defined and understood in 
the KNU and why are they so defined? Second, why do youths take on non-military roles 
in the KNU and what factors influence their career trajectory within the movement? Third, 
what is the purpose of youth non-military roles in the KNU and how are these roles 
shaped by the KNU’s political and strategic goals?  
Whilst most writing on youth and conflict is concerned with the role of youth as armed 
belligerents, this study focuses on their non military roles. It adopts an actor oriented 
approach to show the interaction between the micro-level processes influencing youth 
mobilisation and participation, and wider contextual factors that shape and constrain 
individual decision making.  These include the changing nature of the conflict, processes of 
state formation, violent non state resistance, and evolving organisational adaptation by the 
KNU and its leadership, all of which frame youth political action.  A fine grained analysis 
of youth roles and activities provides a lens to examine broader changes in the armed 
group’s non-military operations and strategies as it adapts to changes in external 
geopolitical and local conditions and seeks to replace declining black market revenues with 
external INGO funding. This study aims to contribute to the emerging literature on youths’ 
engagement in armed opposition groups and the changing operations and political 
strategies of armed groups from the perspective of the youth cohort. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines how and why youths participate in non-military roles in an armed 
opposition group. It focuses on the case of the Karen National Union (KNU), which is 
active along the Burmese-Thai border and has been in conflict with the Burmese state for 
over sixty years. It analyses how external factors, as well as the group’s internal youth 
policies and political culture, influence youth roles in the group. It also examines how 
youth participation redefines youth roles, influences inter-generational relations and 
hierarchies within the movement and interacts with the KNU’s changing political and 
strategic goals. 
In contrast to the predominant literature on youth and conflict, which tends to focus on 
youths as armed belligerents, this study considers their non-military roles. It adopts an 
actor-oriented approach to examine the interaction between micro-level processes 
influencing youth mobilisation and participation, and wider structural and institutional 
factors shaping individual decision making. These broader contextual factors include the 
changing nature of conflict, processes of state formation, violent non-state resistance, and 
evolving organisational adaptation by the KNU and its leadership. A fine grained analysis 
of youth roles and activities provides a lens to examine broader changes in the group’s 
non-military operations and strategies as it adapts to changing external conditions and 
seeks to replace declining black market revenues with INGO funding.  
This study aims to contribute and add to the emerging literature on youths’ engagement in 
armed opposition groups by explaining youth participation patterns in non-military roles 
and the complexities of constructing a youth cohort in armed groups. It also seeks to 
contribute to the literature on conflict and armed groups by adding a perspective on the 
changing operations and political strategies of armed opposition groups from the youth 
cohort, rather than military or political elites. 
This introduction to the thesis begins by setting out the research rationale and the research 
questions. It then outlines the research design and explains the key influences on this study. 
Finally, this chapter outlines the structure and logic of the following chapters. 
1 Research rationale 
My interest in this subject stems from a twenty-month work placement in 2003-04 as an 
Organisational Development Adviser within the Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) (one of 
the KNU’s mass organisations and its youth wing) in Mae Sot, Thailand. This was 
organised by Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) as a result of a previous successful VSO 
volunteer placement with the Karen Refugee Committee. VSO aimed to build the 
organisational capacity of local organisations to manage the delivery of services to the 
refugees in the context of a large refugee case load on the Thai-Burma border. 
My period of employment with the KYO in 2003-04, and subsequently with the Karen 
Human Rights Group (KHRG) in 2006-07, illuminated a number of contradictions in the 
structure and operations of the KYO since it was simultaneously a mass organisation and 
youth wing of the parent political party, a social network for youths and a local community-
based organisation (CBO) involved in youth and child social work. Trying to understand 
the complexities of such a multi-faceted organisation drew me into numerous discussions 
with KYO staff about the variegated and multiple roles of the youth cohort within the 
KNU’s structures and the different routes in (and out) of the organisation that staff had 
taken. Reflecting the KNU’s multiple spaces of operation, some staff had come from 
conflict zones, had witnessed severe human rights abuses and had first joined as soldiers 
before moving in to a non-military role in the KYO, for example. Others had become 
refugees and joined the organisation after finishing high school in a refugee camp. Still 
others were urban activists who had made a conscious decision, sometimes against their 
parents’ wishes, to join the movement and voluntarily migrated in to exile for ideological 
reasons. There were clearly different reasons for joining the organisation and different ideas 
of what the organisation actually was, although there appeared to be a strong socialising 
discourse mediating differences. 
The most striking aspect of the KNU, from the perspective of an outside observer in 
Thailand, was its large non-military apparatus in the form of quasi-governmental 
departments and mass organisations. These had complex relationships with the parent 
party, other Burmese exile groups, Thai officials and international aid agencies and their 
activities appeared to be significant to the KNU and its political agenda. The relative ease 
of access to the KNU’s non-military structures in Thailand seemed to present an ideal 
opportunity to study the micro-dynamics of non-military roles and operations within an 
armed opposition group engaged in a protracted conflict with the Burmese state. My 
familiarity with the youth cohort also presented an ideal opportunity to study the internal 
operations of an armed opposition group from below, providing a counter-point to the 
many other studies of armed groups which focus on elite leadership. As Jabri (1996:21-22) 
notes, accounts of war tend to focus on “leaders as opposed to the led” and the causes of 
violent human action as opposed to non-violent support for armed groups. And as she 
goes onto argue, in order to understand war (and peace) better, there is a need to appreciate 
non-combatants’ willingness to support war. 
Key influences on this study and its position within the existing literature 
My interest in understanding youth mobilisation for non-violent forms of participation in 
an armed opposition group led me to a broad body of literature on youth participation in a 
variety of armed groups. My exploration of this literature revealed a variety of explanations 
for youth participation in armed groups and diverse conceptions of the term ‘youth’. While 
many scholars adopted the UN definition of youth (the 15-24 age range), this frequently 
diverged from local interpretations of the term in armed opposition groups. The idea of a 
fixed, universal definition of youth fails to capture processes through which ‘youth’ may be 
(re)defined and instrumentalised in different contexts; and how a ‘youth’ category may be 
created by political leaders for political expediency (Parsons, 2004:49; McIntyre and Weiss, 
2003). For instance, the reasons for why armed opposition groups create a political youth 
wing and construct a particular ‘youth’ category were not dealt with adequately in the 
existing literature.  
Writing on youth recruitment in to armed opposition groups tends to focus on military 
mobilisation rather than non violent or civil roles within armed groups. This literature 
identifies an array of external, organisational and individual factors influencing youth 
recruitment in to an armed group, but it is largely silent about youths’ non-military careers 
and why they may stay or leave an armed opposition group.  
This study draws upon Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit, voice and loyalty to examine why 
youths may stay or leave the KNU. Armed groups are forms of social actors that have 
processes for formulating and acting upon decisions, but they are understood here to 
emerge as a result of the interactions, negotiations and struggles that take place between 
elites, members and the supporting community, however imbalanced power may be. By 
taking Hirschman’s (1970) theory as its starting point, this study seeks to investigate why 
youths remain loyal or exit the group and when they may be able to negotiate in order to 
exercise greater political voice. 
This study also draws on Long’s (1992) ‘actor-oriented’ paradigm which considers 
individual action never to be the sole explanatory factor in human behaviour since all 
actions are authored within a particular set of external conditions. Likewise, while external 
conditions are important, Long (1992:20) argues that it is theoretically unsound to base any 
analysis of participation in armed opposition groups on the concept of external 
determination since human behaviour is not path dependant. In Long’s (1992) ‘actor-
oriented’ paradigm, human action  can neither be reduced to a generalisable model of 
rational choice nor explained only in terms of individual motivations, intentions and 
interests; rather it situates individual action within a socially bounded context (Long, 
1992:21). Jabri (1996:62) also argues that conflict is an inherently social phenomenon which 
is affected by social discourses and institutions. Thus, while individuals can be considered 
purposive actors, they also act within a framework of institutions which constrain and 
legitimate decisions depending on the dynamics of the situation (Jabri, 1996:70). 
By drawing on Long’s (1992) ‘actor-orientated’ paradigm, this study is situated within a 
social constructionist approach to armed opposition groups which emphasises the 
interactions between individuals, group and social structures in determining social and 
political phenomena.  This approach is argued to be well-suited to a study of youths in 
armed opposition groups because it takes in to account both individual motivations in 
human action and broader external factors, which are all found to be important factors in 
youth action in chapter two. 
As already noted, the literature on youths’ non-military roles and functions within armed 
groups is rather limited. However, a small number of studies highlight the key role that 
youth wings of political parties and armed groups play in training the next generation of 
leaders, mobilising new recruits, shoring up grassroots support, performing mundane tasks 
allocated by party elders and staging protests and processions (Leao, 2004; Burgess, 2002; 
McFaul, 2005; Seif, 1999; Van Kessell, 1993; Wickham-Crowley, 1992; Altbach, 1967; 
Velasco, 2005; Burgess, 2002; Parsons, 2004; Kuzio, 2006; Marks, 2001). This literature 
covers an extremely diverse range of armed groups operating in very different contexts, yet 
my research interest focused on a very particular kind of organisation.  
As explored later, the KNU is the product of a long running peripheral conflict, which is 
itself a reaction to post-colonial state-making practices (Grundy-Warr, 1993; Brown, 1994). 
The term ‘state-making’, is used here to encompass both state formation and state 
consolidation and is understood to be, “a historical process characterized by the creation of 
political order at a new spatial and institutional level” (Cohen, Brown and Organski, 
1981:902). The new spatial and institutional level referred to here is understood to be the 
state, which (often violently) redistributes political control of power resources away from 
subnational collectivities and polities in a centralisation of power (Ibid).  
The transnational character of the KNU and its support base is an important aspect of its 
operations, therefore a borderland perspective was adopted as part of this study. A 
‘borderland’ is understood to be a zone or region within which lies an international border 
(Van Schendel, 2005:44). Adopting a borderland perspective means studying the people 
involved, the flows, networks and perspectives of participants and how territoriality and 
transnationality are negotiated in everyday practices. It also means looking at what 
conditions draw certain objects and persons to certain segments of borderlands, how 
changing borderlands condition and reproduce flows and how these in turn shape and 
reproduce borderlands (Van Schendel, 2005:44). 
Understanding youth participation in this type of armed opposition groups requires 
understanding the nature of the group itself and the conflict that it is involved in. However, 
the literature on state-making and civil war often assumed that either the state commands a 
monopoly over the means of coercion or the limits of the state give way to a Hobbesian 
state of anarchy and disorder (Gates, 2002; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010); and that there is a 
binary distinction between the state and the non-state and political legitimacy (cf: Kaldor, 
2007; Reno, 2006). More promising from the point of view of this study, is a growing body 
of historical political economy literature on state-making which highlights the central role 
of coercion but also the symbiotic relationship with armed actors outside the state, blurring 
the lines of sovereignty and legitimacy (cf: Gallant, 1999; Tilly, 1985; McCoy, 1999, North 
et al., 2009). This approach situates armed groups within historical, contested, non-linear 
processes of state-making. Furthermore, the borderlands literature provides detailed 
accounts of the specific temporal and spatial processes of state-making and responses to 
these by populations located in the periphery of core states (cf: Scott, 2009; Grundy-Warr, 
1993). Together, these studies highlight the complex relationships between states and 
armed opposition groups over control of territory, coercive power, legitimacy and 
sovereignty in the Southeast Asian borderlands. 
Recent research on the non-military activities of armed opposition groups draws links 
between revenue streams and governance services provided by armed opposition groups 
and has sought to explain why armed groups may have extensive welfare wings under 
certain conditions (Mampilly, 2007, 2011; Naylor, 1993, 2004). These studies have 
challenged the normative assumption that the state is necessarily the sole provider of 
political and social order, and build upon anthropological observations that a variety of 
other individuals and groups outside the state may assume sovereign functions (Spears, 
2004, Lund, 2006; Metelits, 2010). Mampilly’s (2007, 2011) and Naylor’s (1993, 2004) 
studies point to a number of important non-military roles within an armed opposition 
group, however, neither explain how the group’s bureaucratic apparatus changes as it 
becomes militarily weaker and loses the territory it once had.  
This study, therefore, seeks to build on Mampilly’s (2007, 2011) and Naylor’s (1993, 2004) 
findings and investigate the linkages between non-military activities in a group with 
declining territorial control and military power and changing revenue streams. It seeks to 
understand the changing relationships, issues of agency and process of internal organisation 
that an armed opposition group is engaged in as it changes its goals and strategies, from the 
perspective of the youth cohort. The approach adopted in this study is an analysis of 
youths in non-military roles in an armed opposition group situated within a historical 
context of state-making and peripheral conflict. 
The primary aim of this study is to understand non-military youth activity in armed 
opposition groups, including their roles, the processes of construction of a youth category, 
their participation patterns and their career trajectories. However, this cannot be 
understood in isolation from the ways in which youth roles in turn affect armed opposition 
groups’ military strategies and means of reproduction, including how they gain access to 
external humanitarian assistance and development interventions delivered from across an 
international border. 
2 Research questions and definitions 
This thesis sets out to understand the patterns of, and rationale for, youth participation in 
non-military capacities in an armed opposition group by answering the central research 
question:  
How and why do youths participate in non-military roles in the KNU, and what are 
the effects of their participation? 
This question is broken down in to a set of three sub-questions: 
1. How is ‘youth’ defined and understood in the KNU and how are youth roles remade 
through their participation in the group? 
a) What is meant by the term ‘youth’ within the KNU? 
b) How does a youth category in the KNU intersect with other social categories? 
c) Why is there a specific youth organisation in the KNU? 
d) How are youth roles defined within the KNU? 
e) What are the effects on inter-generational relations, youth voice and participation in 
the KNU (intended and unintended) of creating specific youth roles? 
2. Why do youths take on non-military roles in the KNU and what factors influence their 
career trajectory within the movement?  
a) What influences youth mobilisation and recruitment in to non-military roles in the 
KNU? 
b) How are youths matched to non-military roles in the KNU? Which factors 
influence the type of role they take on? 
c) Which factors influence youth career progression in the KNU?  
d) Why do youths in non-military roles continue working in the KNU and why do 
they leave? 
3. What is the purpose of youth non-military roles in the KNU and how are they affected 
by the KNU’s political and strategic goals? 
a) Are there specific non-military roles which youths take on in the KNU? If so, what 
is the purpose of these roles to the KNU? Why are they specific to youths? Which 
factors make youths better suited to these roles? 
b) What factors constrain or enable youths’ non-military work in the KNU? 
c) How do youths’ non-military roles and the KNU’s political and strategic goals 
affect each other?  
a) Definition of key terms 
The term ‘youth’ is understood in this study to be a socially constructed emic term which, 
like all social constructions, is not static, but continually re-defined by society based on the 
social context of the time. The term ‘non-military’ is used here to refer to roles which are 
not located within army or militia structures. Since roles within military structures involve 
both combat and non-combat roles (army cooks, porters, signallers and engineers, for 
example), the term ‘non-combat’ can be used to refer to ancillary roles within a military, 
which are not the focus of this study. This study is concerned with participants outside the 
armed wing of an armed opposition group entirely, for instance, within its administrative 
apparatus or mass organisations. 
 The term ‘armed opposition group’ is contested and highly political, especially since the 
onset of the ‘war on terror’, with states prioritising domestic security and labelling many 
armed groups as ‘terrorists’ (Policzer, 2005:3). One of the problems of labelling is the 
discursive contestation over nationalist struggles, whereby a militant movement may 
alternatively be described as ‘freedom fighters’ or ‘terrorists’ (Stokke, 2006). The language 
of terrorism can deny political legitimacy to groups, such as the LTTE, for instance 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, in Stokke, 2006), yet the political transformation of former 
‘terrorists’ may see them subsequently sitting quite legitimately in government seats in 
parliament (the ANC in South Africa and Nepal’s Maoists, for example). Terms such as 
‘rebel group’ or ‘insurgent group’ are also normatively loaded with assumptions about the 
legitimacy of states and non-state groups. Normative labelling is considered unhelpful here 
since de-legitimising and de-politicising such groups does not further understandings of 
their behaviour. The term ‘armed opposition group’ is preferred here because it indicates 
the importance of a group’s military capability while also pointing to the key characteristic 
of its conflict: opposition to a central state. In the absence of a consensus, and recognising 
the complexities and great differences in groups engaged in intra-state conflicts, this thesis 
adopts the definition of armed groups proposed by Policzer (2005:8) as “challengers to the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force”. 
Legitimacy is a contested concept in social and political science, which this thesis cannot 
discuss in depth. This study adopts a Weberian perspective of legitimacy in social orders, 
elaborated on by Schlichte (2009) and the Armed Groups Database developed by the 
Micropolitics of Armed Groups research group at Humboldt University. This sees 
legitimacy as a necessary condition to stabilise relations and establish the domination of 
leaders of armed groups in the minds of staff members in order to last beyond the group’s 
initial formation phase. This is referred to as ‘inner legitimacy’ by Schlichte (2009). 
However, leaders of armed groups sometimes also aim to build their legitimacy among a 
broader local population, whom they may rely on for support, and occasionally also among 
external, international audiences. Thus, this thesis distinguishes between internal and external 
legitimacy. Internal legitimacy is used here to refer to the relationships between state and 
society and between different groups within society, all contained within the state. External 
legitimacy is used to mean the belief among other state leaders outside the state in question, 
codified in international norms and rules, that a public authority possesses the right to rule. 
In the current hegemonic Westphalian state system, external legitimacy is normally 
bestowed upon state governments who control the principal means of coercion within a 
country, usually the national army. 
3 Research design 
My initial interest in this subject stemmed from three years’ work with local Karen NGOs 
and CBOs along the Thai-Burmese border. This experience influenced my initial thoughts 
about youths working in the KNU’s apparatus, the nature of their roles and the contested 
state-making processes the KNU was involved in. However, it also influenced my 
methodological approach because three years of talking to my friends and colleagues 
highlighted the considerable difference between what organisations and staff say they do 
and what they actually do in practice. These contradictions were sometimes remarked upon 
and discussed, and at times they were un-noticed by the staff themselves and by me until a 
later date. I also found that asking the same questions and talking about the same issues on 
different occasions produced different answers, even from the same people, reflecting 
variations in the way ideas or events could be presented. These experiences demonstrated 
to me that an ethnographic approach was necessary to gain depth in understanding the 
micro-dynamics of youth participation in an armed opposition group.  
This study used an ‘instrumental case study’ approach whereby a single case is analysed in 
depth to reveal a situation ordinarily inaccessible to in-depth scientific observation (Yin, 
2003; Stake, 2003). An ethnographic approach is inherently ‘interpretivist’, thus my role 
was to read and interpret meaning in the observed actions of people, their explanations and 
the “tissue of everyday life” (Brewer, 2000:11; Herbert, 2000:551; Geertz, 1973). The study 
used a composite of methods including unstructured and semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, photographic discussion, participant observation, life histories and organizational 
analysis. A composite and flexible approach was deemed most appropriate because it 
provides methodological triangulation and best deals with the intense practical problems of 
research in highly politicized conflict zones, as well as going some way towards addressing 
the common problems of reliability, validity and access in conflict research (Barakat et al, 
2002:995).  This is discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
The Karen National Union (KNU) was selected as the research case in this study because it 
appeared to have a well-formed and extensive administrative apparatus which included in 
its ranks large numbers of youths. It also had a large and active youth wing, the Karen 
Youth Organisation (KYO) which, interestingly, was not militarised. Furthermore, the 
youth wing and welfare wings of the KNU appeared to be involved in a variety of 
governance functions in eastern Burma, which were changing their modes of operation as 
the KNU ceded territorial control to the Burmese state and lost control of the borderland 
economy. Thus, the KNU appeared to have a politically complex internal structure and a 
much wider agenda than purely military activities, thereby providing an excellent case for 
studying the non-military roles of youth participants in conflict. 
The KNU has been in conflict with the Burmese State since one year after independence 
from British colonial rule in 1948 and is possibly the longest-running intra-state conflict in 
the world. It is active along the eastern borderlands of the country, with its political and 
administrative headquarters located across the border in Thailand since 1995. Given its 
longevity and resilience, the KNU provided an excellent opportunity for the analysis of 
internal inter-generational relations, ongoing social category construction processes and 
issues of organisational regeneration. 
4 Thesis outline 
This thesis is presented in three parts. The first part of the thesis (chapters two and three) 
examines theoretical understandings of youths and armed opposition groups and highlights 
gaps in the academic literature. The second part (chapters four and five) lays out the 
methodology required to tackle this subject and provides background information to the 
Burmese context of conflict and state-making. The third part (chapters six, seven and eight) 
presents the empirical findings of the research. The thesis concludes in chapter nine with a 
critical discussion of the key findings and theoretical advances this research has made and 
the implications of these findings for policy and practice. 
Chapter two provides a critical review of the literature on youths in armed opposition 
groups. It starts by examining how the term ‘youth’ is constructed and what this means for 
studies of youths in armed opposition groups. It then examines explanations of youth 
recruitment, retention and exit in armed opposition groups. A framework for studying 
youth participation is generated from this analysis. 
Chapter three places youth roles and actions in armed opposition groups within a wider 
context by examining the literature which deals with the nature and structure of such 
groups and their historical emergence in contexts of state-making. Thus, it situates youth 
participation in conflict in the particular context of armed opposition groups engaged in a 
form of peripheral conflict with a post-colonial central state. It also examines why and 
when armed opposition groups may develop more extensive non-military structures. 
Chapter four sets out the methodology used in this study. A mixed methodology utilising 
ethnographic research methods and a case study was most appropriate to a deep study of 
the lives of youths in an armed opposition group because it sought primarily to generate 
new insights rather than test existing theory and because the highly politicised nature of 
conflict can marginalise youth voices and pose distinct methodological challenges.  
Chapter five shifts to an analysis of the KNU and its conflict with the Burmese state. It 
examines ethnic politics in the state and the rise of  ethno-nationalist forms of conflict. The 
chapter then examines the changing modes of state-making used by the Burmese state and 
the effects these have had on the KNU. Finally, it turns to an examination of the nature of 
conflict, control and youth political action in the complex mosaic of sovereignty in the 
borderlands.   
Chapter six proceeds to address the question of how and why a ‘youth’ category emerged 
in the KNU. It also analyses the impact that the creation of a youth category has had on 
inter-generational relations and youth voice in the KNU. 
Chapter seven continues the analysis of youth in the KNU by examining their 
participation patterns from recruitment to exit. It builds on the four different zones of 
governance and control identified in chapter five and the framework of participation 
factors developed in chapter two. 
Chapter eight examines the KNU’s changing strategies of contesting Burmese state-
making through the lens of youth programmes and activities. It highlights the interaction 
between internal organisational dynamics and shifting structural conditions at the 
international, national and local levels. It also shows how the growing significance of youth 
within the KNU has paralleled the growth of the welfare and humanitarian arms of the 
organisation, which in turn is a reflection of strategic adaptation in the light of shifts in the 
Burmese state’s state-making practices. 
Chapter nine concludes by reflecting on the broader implications of the thesis and 
locating its contribution to the existing literature on youth roles and participation patterns 
in armed opposition groups and the contemporary non-military strategies that armed 
opposition groups utilise to pursue their goals. 
Chapter 2: Youths in Armed Opposition Groups: Recruitment, 
roles and participation patterns 
When I started working in Thailand with the Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) as a 
volunteer, I thought I was working for a national youth charity, since this was how it had 
been portrayed to VSO, the intermediary volunteer agency. However, it quickly became 
clear that although the organisation was engaged in a large degree of social work for 
youths, it was also the political youth wing of an armed opposition group in exile from 
Burma. Some of my new colleagues had transitioned into the youth wing from the armed 
wing, which they had joined at a young age, and many had friends working in the extensive 
welfare departments of the organisation. Thus, all around me were youths working in a 
surprisingly broad range of non-military roles for an armed opposition group.  
This study seeks to explain why and how youths participate in the KNU and starts in this 
chapter by analysing research on youths in various forms of collective violence. It begins by 
unpacking the term ‘youth’ and considering how it is variably constructed. While a 
universal definition allows for cross-country comparison, I argue that if the objective is to 
understand how youth roles are used for political purposes in a particular armed group 
then it is more appropriate to investigate how the term ‘youth’ is understood and 
constructed by the group and by youths themselves.  
The chapter then turns to the question of why youths join an armed opposition group, the 
kinds of non-military roles they have taken on and why they exit. Although this study is 
concerned with youth involvement in a particular type of political armed opposition group, 
I draw on a broad body of literature concerned with youth participation in forms of 
collective violence, including social movement studies, the child soldiers’ literature, the 
youth gangs literature, terrorism studies, the civil war literature and revolution studies. This 
array is often quite dissimilar, since collective violence encompasses a range of 
coordination, targets, tactics, methods, objectives and perceived legitimacy. However, this 
eclectic mix of writing allows me to explore issues of youth action in conflict outside the 
confines of fixed academic disciplines. 
The academic literature on armed opposition groups has often focused on youths 
participating in military roles and less so on non-military and non-violent roles, such as in 
their youth wings and welfare wings. This reflects a broader bias in the complex emergency 
literature towards explaining why ordinary people participate in violence, rather than why 
they choose non-violent methods of resisting domination (Gilgan, 2001:7). 
This study considers youth participation within a historical, political and social context, and 
takes into account issues of individual choice and organisational culture. In addition to 
explaining the purpose of youth participation in an armed group, this approach may also 
shed light on the changing strategies an armed group adopts. Furthermore, the analytical 
gaze is extended towards analysing the effects that youth participation in non-military roles 
has on internal generational relations and the group’s non-military operations. 
1 Who is a ‘youth’?  
A fundamental concern throughout this study is with how youths are conceptualised by 
external researchers, by groups which employ them and by young participants in armed 
opposition groups. This first section examines how ‘youth’ is variously categorised before 
looking at how the term is used and adapted in conflict situations. 
a) Categorising ‘youth’: Emic vs. etic perspectives 
Conceptions of who is a ‘youth’ vary and it is clear from anthropological literature that 
societies demarcate ‘youth’ in different ways.  In the West the term usually refers to young 
people past adolescence but not yet with children of their own, encompassing both those 
in the legal category of ‘child’ and ‘adult’ (Ansell, 2005:14).  In other cultures people may 
leave the category of ‘youth’ upon completing a rite of passage, bearing children or getting 
married inter alia.  
Understanding how youth is categorised in conflict situations is important because it is a 
label with material effects; it shapes understandings of appropriate behaviour for people in 
that category, including political behaviour and violent action. For example, ‘youth’ has 
been used as a term for teenagers in situations of social conflict in order to avoid unwanted 
connotations of passivity and victimhood associated with the term ‘child’. Utas (2003), for 
instance, uses ‘youth’ to describe soldiers under the age of 18 precisely because it implies a 
degree of agency over actions which may have purpose and be a route to adulthood. The 
term ‘youth’ can also imply deviance; for example, in Britain, the category of ‘youth’ in 
conflict situations has often been accompanied by their representation as ‘troublesome’ 
(Griffin, 2001).  
Often, a false dichotomy of youth as perpetrators and youth as victims of violence is 
portrayed, most obviously in media reportage of child soldiers (Utas, 2003). The 
mainstream ‘humanitarian’ discourse on child soldiers is particularly vocal in drawing 
attention to the victimhood of young participants in armed groups (Brett & McCallin, 
1998; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994:93-120; Happold, 2005:26; Machel, 1996:13). This 
discourse is associated with human rights and humanitarian organisations and the Machel 
(1996) study on the impact of war on children. Yet young people in armed groups may fit 
neither of these pictures and there exist considerable differences even between young 
people in the same armed groups, let alone those operating in different countries and 
contexts. While there are particular concerns around how young people aged under 18 
participating in armed groups should be treated and conceptualised, this research is more 
concerned with the experiences of young people aged over 18 who, being considered adults 
in most countries and in the UN system, do not pose the same conceptual and practical 
dilemmas as those under 18. 
In the UN system, ‘youth’ is an etic term. ‘Children’ are defined as aged 0-17 while a 
further term of ‘young people’ is used to define those between the ages of 10-19. ‘Youth’ is 
defined as all people aged between 15-24 in order to allow statistical comparison between 
countries (Ansell, 2005:1; UNESCO, 2010:2). However, there is no legal standing to this 
definition and some regional blocs have very different categorisations; the African Youth 
Charter, for instance, defines youth as the 15-35 age group (UNESCO, 2010:2). External, 
chronological definitions of youth, such as that of the UN, enable academic comparison 
between countries and cultures and provide a basis for international agencies to formulate 
policies and programmes. Thus, UNDP, DfID, the World Bank, USAID and the ILO all 
routinely use the 15-24 age range as their definition of ‘youth’, whether formally or 
informally. However, there is recognition among these agencies that there are different 
understandings of the term around the world and that ‘youth’ may also be defined 
functionally (involving a process of transition from childhood to adulthood) and culturally 
(relating to social roles) (UNDP, 2006:15; UNESCO, 2010:2).  
Functional definitions, which consider ‘youth’ as a transitional life-stage, are limited by their 
presumed universal application to all youths everywhere and portrayal of youths as 
following a natural process of development (Christiansen, Utas and Vigh, 2006:16). Yet 
even within a society, people of a wide range of ages may claim the space of youth or be 
treated as such at specific times and in specific places (Durham, 2000:113). In South Africa 
and Sierra Leone, for example, ‘youth’ has at times seen an upper age limit of 35 years 
(Wessels & Kostelny, 2009:187; McIntyre, Aning and Addo, 2002:8).  
An emic perspective draws upon local conceptions of generational roles, which have more 
salience in local cultures. From this perspective, ‘youth’ is a term used to represent a social 
category rather than the simple characteristic of a defined age range or developmental 
stage. Anthropological studies of youth have long argued that youth categories are socially 
constructed and relational constructs which serve to regulate social interaction by age 
(Durham, 2000). However, this makes defining ‘youth’ very problematic, since, as Durham 
(2000:116) notes “the local nature, definition and experience of youth is everywhere and at 
all times quite different for different gender, class or occupational groups”. Durham 
(2000:116), therefore, suggests that the term ‘youth’ should be employed more as a 
discursive indicator of social relations, structures and categories than as an absolute 
reference to a fixed age group. Christiansen, Utas and Vigh (2006:11) similarly argue that 
the concept of youth should be explored in terms of how youths position themselves and 
are positioned within generational relations and categories. Adopting this approach, it is 
argued, illuminates the ways in which the category of youth is socio-politically constructed.  
b) Constructing a youth category in conflict 
McIntyre (2006:332) argues that the category of ‘youth’ in conflict situations is a political 
construct that does not adhere to any particular age, but is used “for rallying those 
members of societies who perceive themselves to be in states of transition”. Similarly, some 
scholars have argued that ‘youth’ categories are constructed by elites in conflict zones in 
order to mobilise young people’s labour for political purposes. A classic example is Sierra 
Leone where grievances among teenagers and young people in their twenties are argued to 
have been co-opted and traditional youth initiation ceremonies adopted by leaders such as 
Foday Sankoh to mobilise fighters for the 1991-2002 war, often for personal profit (Fithen 
& Richards, 2005). However, the politics of younger generations in Sierra Leone is 
considerably more complex than common depictions suggest (Fithen & Richards, 2005; 
McIntyre, Aning and Addo, 2002). Young people’s social marginalisation through declining 
education and work opportunities, as well as gerontocracy, were real grievances in Sierra 
Leone prior to the outbreak of civil conflict, with many who joined the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) expressing hope that their actions would bring about a more just 
social order in the country (Fithen & Richards, 2005).  
In the Angolan conflict, Parsons (2004:49) argues that ‘youths’ were constituted both as 
subjects of top-down discipline by elite leaders and as individual ‘subjects’ capable of action 
in their own right.  This particular construction aimed to mobilise fighters for both UNITA 
and Renamo and politicise young people to ensure their loyalty and support, as well as 
perpetuate the movement.  Youth movements were created to accomplish this through 
education and organisation of youth activities. Politicised younger generations (in their 
teens and twenties) have also been an important feature of a number of contemporary 
conflicts, including South Africa under apartheid (Marks, 2001) Afghanistan (de Berry, 
2008) and Nepal (Upreti, 2008).  
McEvoy-Levy (2006) argues that young participants in conflict have frequently been 
marginalised once the goals of conflict have been achieved. However, the political 
construction of Angolan youth also resulted in their establishment as political subjects in 
their own right, often with strong and coherent views (Parsons, 2004:45-46).  Nolte (2004), 
studying Nigeria, also argues that co-option of younger participants by elite political leaders 
is never complete since although they may be instrumentalised by local elites, the fluidity of 
shifting personal alliances and loyalties prevents the complete appropriation of younger 
members. 
It is clear from the civil war literature that ‘youth’ categories may be constructed or 
deconstructed for political expedience, often by political elites, but they may also be 
influenced by local cultural norms. For example, ‘youth’ is never a gender-neutral term, 
particularly when it is used in the context of conflict. In many cultures a female youth 
category scarcely exists because females transition directly from childhood into adulthood 
either upon menstruation, marriage or motherhood (Sommers, 2006:4). The ‘youth’ 
category is, therefore, often associated with and biased towards young men, rather than 
young women. Burgess’s (2002) study of youth participation in the Zanzibar revolution, for 
instance, found that women who sought greater political participation gravitated towards 
the women’s wing while youth organisations commonly served as spheres in which 
masculine identities were created.  
Some authors argue that younger generations may develop a collective consciousness that 
differs from a previously prescribed category as a result of their social, political or 
economic marginalisation and use this to challenge power structures and gain access to 
resources (for example, Fithen & Richards, 2005; Richards, 1996; Zack-Williams, 1999). In 
some cases, this has resulted in violent generational clashes over gerontocracy1. For 
instance, insurrections in the Sekhukhuneland area of South Africa in the 1980s were 
generation-based, and were formed around young people’s grievances concerning the 
conditions in rural schools and the use and abuse of chiefly power (Van Kessell, 1993:596). 
As a result, ‘youth’ movements in South Africa emerged both on generational lines (Van 
Kessell, 1993) and in conjunction and collaboration with adult elites fighting the apartheid 
state (Marks, 2001). Similarly, the Liberian civil war was primarily waged by younger people 
aiming to wrestle power out of the hands of local ‘big men’ and challenge the lack of 
opportunities in Liberian society (Utas, 2003:229). However, the problem with the idea that 
a youth cohort develops a collective generational consciousness and then engages in 
political violence as a result of a shared experience of marginalisation is that there are 
                                                 
1 See Argenti (2002) for more on youth conflict over gerontocracy in Africa and Fernando (2002) for a Sri 
Lankan example. 
considerable differences in the lives and experiences of young people, even within one area 
of a country (Boyden, 2006:4-5). 
Meanwhile, the literature on youth gangs demonstrates that in many places, including 
Western countries and particularly Latin American and Caribbean countries, the social 
marginalisation of younger members of society results in the emergence of collective gang 
subcultures rather than politically organised armed challenges to the state or local power 
holders.2 However, the study of youth sub-cultures in this literature risks portraying young 
people as socially and culturally detached from their surroundings, when in fact they are 
embedded and socially positioned in families and societies (Christiansen, Utas and Vigh, 
2006:16). Although it is important to analyse how youths position themselves and 
understand the world, Christiansen, Utas and Vigh (2006:16) argue that it is also important 
to analyse how external political and sociological forces seek to shape youths’ movements. 
In order to generate a deep understanding of the behaviour of younger participants in a 
particular armed opposition group engaged in conflict with the state, it is important to 
begin without prior assumptions and investigate how their roles and behaviour are framed 
from within their own environment. Few studies have done this, perhaps in part due to the 
methodological difficulties inherent in researching active armed opposition groups. This 
study is concerned with generating an in-depth understanding of a particular phenomenon 
in a defined social setting rather than drawing comparisons. It aims to investigate how the 
term ‘youth’ is created and used within the KNU both by those who self-identify as youths 
and elder political leaders, how it intersects with other social categories and how it affects 
generational relations. Thus, ‘youth’ is understood not as a universal, cross-cultural term, 
but as a dynamic social construction that is continually re-defined in complex and 
reciprocal ways shaped by the changing social context (Greene, 1994). ‘Youth’ is therefore 
understood as a relational term as well as a social effect of power (Durham, 2000:115).  
I propose investigating the construction of ‘youth’ from within the organisation, prioritising 
the viewpoints and lived experiences of those who self-identify as youths. However, as 
Christiansen, Utas and Vigh (2006) suggest, emic perspectives also need to be 
complemented by a consideration of how external political and sociological forces shape 
the way youths are positioned. Meanwhile, the terms ‘youth’ and ‘young people’ are used 
throughout the rest of this chapter to encompass a range of people included in a variety of 
studies from different disciplines looking at how younger generations participate in armed 
opposition groups. This does not intend to imply that ‘youth’ is a universal category; 
                                                 
2 For example, Spergel (1990); Huff (1990); Decker & Weerman (2005) 
instead it seeks to draw together the many different studies that explicitly use the term of 
youth or young people when discussing armed opposition groups. One of the main 
problems with this expanse of literature is indeed very different, often vague, 
understandings of who a youth is. 
2 Patterns of youth progression through armed opposition groups  
Young people enter armed groups in broadly three ways: forced recruitment, voluntary 
recruitment and compulsory conscription, although the lines between each category may be 
blurred (Wessels & Kostelny, 2009:188). This study is interested in why youths voluntarily 
join an armed opposition group. The literature on armed groups in which youths 
participate is very broad, spanning not only a variety of understandings of the term ‘youth’ 
but also multiple disciplines and research areas including revolution studies, social 
movements and collective action, the child soldiers literature, the extensive civil war and 
insurgency literature, peasant studies, psychology and the youth gangs literature.  
The literature on youth participation in un-armed but highly political organisations, such as 
those found in democracy or anti-colonial movements, is relevant too, since there may be 
similarities between a youth joining an armed group in a non-military capacity and a youth 
joining an un-armed group which is nevertheless engaged in a form of (non-violent) 
conflict with the state. Factors influencing youth participation are therefore likely to be 
wide-ranging. As Angela McIntyre (2003: 94-95) argues: “What motivates young people to 
co-operate with armed groups is as varied as the individuals themselves, and as the huge 
variety of educational, developmental and personal influences in their lives”. Theories 
addressing the mobilisation and recruitment of young people are examined first, followed 
by an examination of the much more limited literature on how recruits are retained and 
desertion or exit managed. 
A table summarising the factors that influence youth recruitment into armed groups is 
given below. Added to the table is a list of factors that may influence youth retention or 
exit from armed groups. This study draws upon Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit, voice 
and loyalty to examine why youths may stay or leave the KNU. This theory talks at length 
about when people, faced with a perceived decline in quality of a firm, organisation or 
polity, are more likely to leave and when they will instead remain loyal and seek to voice 
their concerns. It has been applied to a variety of human groupings but loyalty to an armed 
group is an amorphous concept which has received little attention in previous studies. In 
this thesis, armed groups are considered to be forms of social actors that have some 
processes for formulating and acting upon decisions, but are also understood to emerge as 
a result of the interactions, negotiations and struggles that take place between elites, 
members and the supporting community, however imbalanced power may be. By taking 
Hirschman’s (1970) theory as its starting point, this study seeks to investigate why youths 
remain loyal or exit the group and when they may be able to negotiate greater political 
voice. 
This table provides a framework for the analysis of youth participation in the KNU in 
chapter seven. 
 Participation 
stage 
Individual factors Political, economic 
and social structure 
factors 
Armed group 
organisation factors 
Recruitment Experience of a critical 
event (e.g. death of kin, 
experience of abuse by 
agents of the state) 
Physical insecurity 
Pursuit of private goals 
(e.g. personal feuds) 
Political convictions 
Ease of organisation 
Lack of family 
obligations 
Personal history of 
activism / conflict 
Pecuniary incentives 
Non-pecuniary 
incentives 
Psychological incentives 
(e.g. power, prestige, 
revenge, excitement) 
Pleasure in agency 
Friendship / kin 
networks to armed 
groups 
Political oppression / 
grievances over political 
injustice 
Authoritarianism / 
gerontocracy limiting 
youth political voice 
Resource exploitation or 
distribution biases 
Obstacles to youth 
transition to adult social 
status 
High youth 
unemployment / 
livelihood grievances 
Poverty / deprivation 
Social marginalisation 
Oppressive / 
threatening power 
relations 
Educational grievances 
Demographic pressures 
Indiscriminate state 
brutality 
Ideology 
Grievance framing 
processes 
Leadership skill and 
style 
Organisational ethos 
Organisational needs for 
youth (e.g. as a labour 
resource) 
Organisational needs for 
students / intellectuals 
(e.g. to set the political 
agenda) 
Links to pre-existing 
community networks 
and institutions 
Links to universities 
Education / 
propaganda discourses 
Utilisation of ethnic 
networks 
Retention Pecuniary benefits 
Non-pecuniary benefits 
Personal political 
convictions 
Level of integration in 
the armed group 
Opportunities for 
political participation 
Access to power 
Fear of state retribution 
Severed family / 
community links 
 
Force 
Ideology 
Grievance framing 
Punishment / high exit 
penalties 
Terms of service 
High entry costs 
Loyalty 
Participation 
stage 
Individual factors Political, economic 
and social structure 
factors 
Armed group 
organisation factors 
Exit Disillusion with / lack 
of pecuniary benefits 
Disillusion with / lack 
of non-pecuniary 
benefits 
Better opportunities 
elsewhere 
Changes in family 
circumstances 
Influence of family / 
friends 
Personal feuds within 
the group 
Disillusion with 
hardship and risky way 
of life / conflict fatigue 
Lack of political voice 
International / national 
DDR processes 
Improvements in local 
security and stability 
Better governance 
provision 
Changes in political 
opportunity structure 
Changes in resource 
exploitation / 
distribution 
Community pressures 
(e.g. through religious 
leaders) 
 
Changes in capacity to 
provide governance 
services / selective 
incentives 
Change in coercive 
behaviour 
Changes in leadership 
Table 1 Factors influencing youth participation in armed opposition groups 
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a) Mobilisation and recruitment: Diverse motivations, different experiences 
Theories concerned with the mobilisation and recruitment of youths into armed groups can 
broadly be grouped into three areas: theories which prioritise individual motivations; 
theories which emphasise political, economic or social structural determinants of youth 
behaviour and theories which consider the character of organisations and their leadership 
to be important mediators of youth action. 
Individual factors 
Push factors 
Individual factors propelling some young people to participate in armed groups have 
sometimes been argued to be related to personal political convictions. Students (usually 
understood to be men and women in their twenties) in particular in developing countries 
may have a strong history of political activism, be relatively easy to organise, have a strong 
ideological commitment (often nationalist and leftist), be unencumbered by family 
obligations and be articulate and politically conscious, all of which facilitate their 
participation in political opposition groups (Altbach, 1967:26). 
Young people may also be pushed into an armed group along with the broader civilian 
population through the experience of a ‘critical event’ such as the death of kin or personal 
experience of abuse, for instance by agents of the state (Ferguson et al., 2008; Parsons, 
2004). Threats of violence by armed groups were found to be a factor pushing young Sierra 
Leoneans to voluntarily participate in armed groups out of safety concerns (Humphreys 
and Weinstin, 2008:451). Excessive nationalist discourse, often adopted by newly-liberated 
states confronted with multiple heterogeneous populations has been argued to compound 
insecurity by framing ethnic minority people (often located in the borderlands) as ‘other’, 
illegitimate residents of the state (Scherrer, 2003). In addition, poorly trained and controlled 
state armies, together with weak local policing (a common feature of developing countries) 
results in inept counter-insurgency practices which fail to distinguish between combatants 
and non-combatants and drives previously neutral civilians into armed groups (Mason, 
2004). Viterna’s (2006) study of female participation in the Salvadoran Civil War, for 
example, found that many women joined armed groups as ‘reluctant guerrillas’ for 
protection. Therefore, relatively weak and capricious states, or ‘low-capacity’ regimes which 
repress incompletely and with unpredictable violence, encourage the rise of local rulers, 
given enough opportunity, who supply local protection against central state aggression and 
a rough justice in return for tax both for themselves and a wider cause (Fearon & Laitin, 
2003; Tilly, 2006:128).  
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Participation in an ethnic-kin armed group may then be understood as a rational choice in 
order to better manage the risk of annihilation, persecution, enforced resettlement, human 
rights violations, settler colonialism, forced assimilation or climates of psychological or 
physical terror (Scherrer, 2003; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). Most of Mao’s followers, for 
example, were driven to support the Chinese communist guerrillas by the promise of 
protection against indiscriminate violence and only became revolutionary after they joined 
the movement (Mason, 2004).  
Kalyvas (2003:475-476) argues that individual motivations for participating in armed 
groups are often  more about settling personal scores and taking advantage of armed 
groups to pursue local or private conflicts. In this way, the leaders of armed groups and 
their followers ally in a “joint production of action” to pursue different goals 
simultaneously (ibid.). Andvig and Gates (2006:9) also argue that motivations at the lower 
levels of organisations may be quite different from at the leadership level, which is most 
often the focus of studies of armed groups. Thus, not only may young people join an 
armed group to pursue private goals, but they may have quite different motivations from 
elite leaders. 
Pull factors 
Factors that have been argued to ‘pull’ individual youths into armed groups are incentives, 
especially financial incentives for youths otherwise living in poverty. It is argued from a 
rational choice perspective that poor youths have little to lose and potentially much to gain 
by joining an armed group. They make a calculated choice weighing up the perceived 
weakness of the state, the strength of the challenger group, the risks of engaging with the 
group and the potential payoff which may accrue. According to this perspective the 
economically poorest should choose to rebel (Mason, 2004). In Somalia, for example, 
Gjelsvik and Bjørgo’s (2012:7) research finds that young men and women in their late teens 
and early twenties joined pirate gangs primarily because of poverty and a lack of alternative 
livelihood options. In order to retain their masculine identity as breadwinners and gain 
recognition as an adult, these young people join armed Somali groups, gaining a sense of 
belonging and purpose along the way (UNDP, 2010 in Gjelsvik and Bjørgo, 2012:7).  
Similarly, Humphreys and Weinsten (2008) in a survey of 1,043 ex-combatants (ranging in 
age at the time of research from 15 to 79, of whom 67 per cent were male) in Sierra Leone 
found that poverty made participation more likely.  
In the child soldiers’ literature, material benefits available to combatants has been argued to 
be the primary driver of young people under age 18 into armed groups with around 60 per 
cent of demobilised soldiers under age 18 surveyed in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
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and East Asia citing poverty as their main motivation, while children who joined rebel 
groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone were variously promised diamonds, gold, regular meals 
and shelter (Conteh-Morgan, 2004:106-108; Brett & Specht, 2004:14; Cohn & Goodwin-
Gill, 1994; Singer, 2006:62).  However, Ghimire (2002) argues that family poverty can also 
be a reason for non-participation in agitation as the economic imperative may drive youths 
away from rebel groups and into migrant work to help support their family.  
Where youth participation is clearly not explained by pecuniary incentives, non-pecuniary 
incentives have been highlighted. These include educational opportunities, health care, 
social services and opportunities for political participation (McIntyre, 2003). For instance, 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army attracted around 3,000 young soldiers under 18 
motivated by basic survival needs, such as gaining access to food and protection, by the 
opportunity to take revenge on those who had killed their relatives and by the chance to 
feel a sense of identity and purpose (Furley 1995:36; Hick, 2001:114). Psychological 
incentives discussed in the terrorism studies and child soldiers’ literature include the chance 
to gain power, prestige, excitement and revenge (Rashid, 2000; Wessels & Kostelny, 2009; 
Brett & Specht, 2004). They may also experience an increased sense of belonging to the 
group and of personal identity; the release of fear, tension, frustration and grievance in a 
legitimate manner and the sense of fulfilment from occupying a useful role and learning a 
new skill (Mitchell, 1980). 
Many rational choice perspectives focusing on the incentives that pull young people into 
armed groups are based in Mancur Olson’s analysis of public choice using game theory. 
Olson (1971) argued that individuals must reap a personal reward, distinct from the public 
goods provided to all, if they are to commit themselves to public action, otherwise they 
would prefer to be ‘free-riders’.  This is described as the ‘rebel’s dilemma’ in Lichbach’s 
(1995) thesis. These theories are based on the assumptions and logic of neo-classical 
economics which holds that everything can be explained from the point of view of the 
individual and that individual behaviour is a function of choices rationally made in order to 
maximise utility (Cramer, 2002). 
There are a number of problems with a rational choice approach to studying the individual 
factors motivating youth participation in armed groups, not all of which can be addressed 
here. First, there are countless examples of youth participation which defy explanation 
through rational choice and selective incentives models, which tend to under-predict actual 
instances of political violence (Cramer, 2002). Qualitative research into the micro-level 
motivations for engaging in conflict has shown that participants often run high risks with 
little expectation of material reward, suggesting more complex motivations than the 
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rational actor model predicts (Wood, 2003b). For example, the pleasure in doing something 
to take control of one’s life, fight back against injustice and assert individual dignity and 
agency is a compelling motivator, even in situations where participation in an armed group 
would seem foolhardy or irrational (Wood, 2003a). Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) argue further 
that the collective action paradigm, which is based on the assumption that non-
participation is costless and free-riding is preferred, is not necessarily true in all cases. A 
Hobbesian interpretation of the lack of consolidated control over territory and populations, 
which is particularly common in the borderlands of developing countries, argues that 
participation in an armed group may offer better protection than non-participation. 
Second, rational choice-based theories problematically assume that individuals make 
mercenary calculations ignoring ideology and behave as rational individuals unaffected by 
social pressures (Mason, 2004). Thus, they tend to subsume ideology and ethnicity, which 
are argued often to play a key role in shaping compliance and enforcement, even with the 
most blatant loot-seeking group (Gates, 2002).  
Finally, methodologically, the econometric approaches used to model human behaviour in 
conflict are much criticised for their problematic operationalisation of variables and for 
lacking depth (Richards, 2005, for example). For instance, a high number of young males 
with low education is used as a proxy indicator for low opportunity cost to rebellion, but it 
could just as easily be a proxy for grievance (Richards, 2005). Moreover, quantitative 
correlations of indicators lack explanatory depth. For example, it can be difficult to 
determine whether actions and goals are political or for personal profit because political 
goals may be a smoke screen for avarice while opportunistic actions unsanctioned by 
leaders may occur on the margins of political actions (Wood, 2003b). Looting by soldiers, 
for instance, can be both a sanctioned tactic of war and an opportunistic action. 
Quantitative studies of conflict also do not explain how actors’ interests change over time, 
whereas the case literature on war shows that conflicts are very dynamic, evolving 
situations (Wood, 2003b).  
Weinstein’s (2005) comparative study of armed opposition groups goes beyond a narrow 
rational choice approach and attempts to tease out the relationships between individual 
calculations, resources and organisational structures. He argues that although motivations 
vary considerably, certain patterns may be seen based on the type of resource base a group 
has. If it is an economically-endowed group which relies on natural resource wealth, 
external support or crime as the primary source of support, then voluntary recruits are 
likely to be motivated by pecuniary rewards (Weinsten, 2005). On the other hand, if it is 
socially-endowed with the consent of the civilian population and distinctive identities and 
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interpersonal networks that provide sources of solidarity and moral commitment; for 
instance, in the form of strong communal relations, then voluntary recruits are more likely 
to be motivated by non-pecuniary rewards (Weinstein, 2005:48). Social ties have frequently 
been found to be important to armed group mobilisation with individuals joining because 
their family members or friends are involved (Sageman, 2004:178, in Gjelsvik and Bjørgo, 
2012:2; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008:449).  
Political, economic and social structures 
Drawing on a Marxian and Weberian tradition, scholars with a political economy and 
sociology background have considered the dynamic interplay between constraining 
historical, social, political and economic conditions and human action (for example, Moore, 
1966; Skocpol, 1979; Scott, 1990; Wolf, 2010). Factors rooted in the political, economic or 
social structure of society are summarised in the second column in the preceding table.  
In the social movements and contentious politics literature, political oppression, injustice, a 
changing political opportunity landscape or other grievances rooted in the political 
structure of the state have been theorised as key factors in mobilising participation in 
armed opposition groups (for example, McAdam, 1996; Tilly, 1978). For example, although 
youth movements were key to African independence struggles, the gradual curtailment of 
political space for younger generations since independence and perceptions of elite 
manipulation have prompted the mobilisation of ‘youth’ (an undefined term in these 
studies) into locally-organised, economically-driven armed groups (Mochizuki, 2009; Reno, 
2006; Hazen, 2009).  Scholars researching Nigeria, Sierra Leone, DRC and sub-Saharan 
Africa, find that an inability to engage in politics at all due to authoritarianism, gerontocracy 
or other powerful vested interests in the status quo results in more economically motivated 
participation among younger generations in armed groups, with the aim of getting a better 
share of local resources before others (Hazen, 2009; Sall, 2004; Reno, 2006).  
Other grievances that have been argued to drive participation in conflict include economic 
grievances and inequalities over the division of resources such as land ownership (in 
peasant studies (Huntington (1968) and Paige (1970), for instance)), other environmental 
resources (in the social movements’ literature (Clapham, 1998; Earle, 2011)) or the income 
from resource rents (in the civil wars literature (Cederman, 2008, for example)).  
For young people in the Middle East and North Africa in particular, studies of ‘waithood’ 
(a term used to refer to an extended stage between adolescence and adulthood) suggest that 
participation in armed opposition groups is motivated by grievances over high 
unemployment and restricted or costly access to land or marriage partners (Dhillon, Dyer 
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and Yousef, 2009:16). The 2011 North African and Middle Eastern revolutions, for 
example, were linked to high levels of unemployment among men in their twenties and 
frustrated transition to adulthood (and marriage) as a result (Knickmeyer, 2011). 
Unemployment and poverty have frequently been argued to drive young people into armed 
groups, especially in situations where armed actors are the first to eat (Stavrou, 2004), 
although it is unclear whether this is as a result of economic grievances, individual resource 
maximisation, a lack of other options or a greater vulnerability to political manipulation by 
elites (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008).  
Meanwhile, relative deprivation theorists such as Gurr (1970) argue that it is not the 
absolutely deprived who support armed groups but those who feel relatively deprived – the 
upwardly mobile, ambitious poor who have more time, energy and social resources 
(Mason, 2004). This theory assumes that when people’s expectations about what they 
should be achieving exceeds their actual level of achievement frustration occurs, resulting 
in aggression. However, inequality is far more common than instances of social unrest or 
engagement in armed groups, leading to criticisms that theories which are based on 
political, economic or social structures over-predict participation in armed groups (Cramer, 
2002; Kahl, 2002:262). Moreover, they rely too heavily on frustration-aggression logic when 
other responses to frustration are also possible including nonviolent as much as violent 
behaviour (Mason, 2004).   
Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that many groups follow a Marxist-Leninist theory of 
rebel organisation in which the population for recruitment does not initially realise it is 
oppressed, so they have to be made aware of their grievances to enable recruitment (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2000). Collier and Hoeffler argue from this that subjective grievance is 
consciously generated by armed opposition groups to enhance mobilisation efficiency, 
rather than being an objective cause of civil war. Where conflict occurs in ethnically diverse 
societies, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that the need for homogeneity in recruitment to 
aid military cohesiveness may result in a focus on ethnic grievances. Ethnic network theory 
also argues that ethnic group affiliation offers an efficient and reliable mode of organising 
group claims (also see Congleton, 1995), thus the reason why so many conflicts organise 
along ethnic lines (Sambanis, 2002). Given these findings, it is unclear whether it is the 
framing of grievances or grievances themselves that motivate participation. Moreover, this 
is difficult to study because participants may re-frame their motivations once group 
discourses are internalised. 
Studies of youth gangs and child soldiers have found that social marginalisation is a key 
factor in the mobilisation of some teenagers into armed groups (Utas, 2003; Gore & 
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Pratten, 2003, for example). Meanwhile, Hart (2008) argues that experiences of oppression 
and profoundly asymmetrical and threatening power relations among Palestinian children 
in displacement camps are also important contextual factors. Studies from Palestine and 
South Africa indicate that in war time, young people may also volunteer for armed groups 
out of social and political concern (Hart & Tyrer, 2006:9; Veerman and Levine, 2001). 
Educational structures in society have also emerged as a critical issue in the mobilisation of 
younger participants, either because of declining provision or standards (Sierra Leone), real 
or perceived bias in provision (South Africa and Sri Lanka), or inapplicability to the job 
market, resulting in thwarted aspirations (the Middle East and North Africa) (Fithen & 
Richards, 2005; Fernando, 2002; Dhillon, Dyer and Yousef, 2009; Stavrou, 2004).3 Notably, 
a number of armed opposition groups have provided significant educational opportunities 
to their youth cadres, UNITA and the EPLF, for instance (Parsons, 2004). 
Relative deprivation theories, combined with demographic analysis have led to an interest 
in the relationship between ‘youth bulges’ and conflict. It is argued, from a neo-Malthusian 
perspective, that demographic changes can cause instability and violent conflict. A 
correlation is found between a high percentage of youths (usually taken to be the UN 
categorisation as the 15 to 24 age cohort) relative to the adult population and political crises 
(Goldstone, 2002:11). The reasons for this may include a combination of over-urbanisation 
relative to income, lowering the ratio of capital to labour; over-education relative to 
employment prospects and inter-generational conflict (Urdal, 2004). This theory has 
proved to be enticing for policy-makers, with USAID including a youth population bulge 
and youth unemployment as fragile state indicators (Earle, 2011:20).  
If the age range of youths is taken to be 15 to 24, then youths number around 1.2 billion 
people and comprise roughly 18 per cent of the world population, 87 per cent of whom 
live in developing countries (UNDP, 2006:12).  
                                                 
3 Educational frustrations have also been noted in youth uprisings outside the context of war. For instance, 
South African students during apartheid became an increasingly political group, striking over teaching in 
Afrikaans in schools as well as frustration over the shortened school year and subsequent prospect of failing 
exams (Cruise O’Brien, 1996). 
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Region Total number of 
youths aged 15-24 
(‘000s) 
Youth as a percentage 
of the total regional 
population 
Africa 208,897 20% 
Asia 755,830 18% 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
105,457 18% 
Northern America 49,415 14% 
Oceania 5,495 15% 
Europe 95,976 13% 
Table 2 Selected youth demographic data (UN, 2010:95-101) 
The literature on youth bulges has become more nuanced since it was first proposed, with 
political and social grievances correlating more consistently than demographic factors with 
youth involvement in violent social conflict (USAID, 2010). Moreover, as Jabri (1996:8) 
argues, analyses of war based on notions of innate drives or basic needs fail to recognise 
the social and political origins of conflict and complex processes of group formation. They 
also do not adequately explain differences among the youth cohort. Boyden (2006:5), for 
instance, argues that demographic analyses of youths are not a sufficient indication of the 
motivations of all young people in conflict because “significant structural (or generational), 
experiential and developmental differences exist between different age cohorts, these in 
turn producing different motives and opportunities for fighting in war.” 
A briefing paper by USAID in 2007 recognised the complexity of the relationship between 
youth bulges and conflict, stating “while youth bulges can exacerbate existing societal 
tensions and conflict causes, a large youth population does not by itself lead to instability” 
(USAID 2007, in USAID, 2010:1). Thus, a relatively high youth cohort may constitute one 
contextual factor among others, which by itself is not a cause of conflict (Staveteig, 2005). 
A counter argument raised by Argenti (2002:146-151) is that not only is it remarkable how 
few youths in Africa have embraced violence, given the dire situations they are faced with, 
but the ‘youth bulge’ argument may in fact be seized upon more as a legitimator of State 
violence against youths than as an actual reflection of the actions of youths themselves.  
Autocratic regimes seeking to suppress dissent and silence youths may find a convenient 
pretext in the formulation of ‘youth’ as a social problem bent on destabilising the nation 
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(Argenti, 2002:146).  State violence against youths can then breed resistance, which is in 
turn used to justify further repression (Argenti, 2002:146).   
The case literature on civil wars finds that only a small proportion (estimates range from 
five to 33 per cent) of the population ever participate in armed opposition groups directly, 
even in cases of mass mobilisation (Lichbach, 1995:18 and Wood, 2003 in Mampilly, 
2011:54). Part of the problem in predicting support for armed groups is that the literature 
does not indicate whether it is national-level or more local inequalities that are more salient. 
More nuanced studies argue that a combination of factors drive participation in armed 
groups, such as state exploitation of rural resources combined with lack of political voice 
(Clapham, 1998) or lack of political voice combined with authoritarianism and 
indiscriminate targeting by state brutality (Goodwin, 2001).  
Individual motivations and factors rooted in political, economic or social structures may 
both be important but it is unclear what happens when an armed group operates in 
multiple geographic spaces, each with different local conditions, and how an armed group 
manages diversity in participants’ motivations. Moreover, participant motivations are 
affected by the polymorphous nature of conflict and often change over the course of their 
own participation (Henriksen & Vinci, 2008). Similarly, local political, economic and social 
conditions change over the course of conflict. For these reasons, my research approach will 
conceptualise young people’s action as being socially embedded and will situate their 
motivations within the local political, economic and social contexts of their lives.  
Organisational and leadership factors  
Resource mobilisation theorists argue that grievances rooted in political, economic or social 
structures are far too common in most societies and individual factors are too divorced 
from the social and political context of conflict to fully explain participation in conflict, 
therefore, they suggest that a number of other contextual factors must be at work 
mediating participation. These may be the nature of the organisation and the skill and style 
of its leadership (Clapham, 1998), summarised in the third column of the preceding table. 
For example, a compelling leader can articulate grievances, frame them in such a way that 
remedial action is clear and motivate participants to follow his or her lead. In Clapham’s 
(1998) study, the organisational culture nurtured by particular leadership styles resulted in 
startlingly different behaviour by young participants in armed groups in Africa despite 
often similarly traumatic backgrounds, suggesting that leadership and organisational ethos 
may be a critical factor. Social movements’ theorists have also argued that framing 
processes within organisations are critical to the construction of particular identities that 
drive collective action mobilisation (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994:185). 
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The case literature on armed groups, particularly those with a revolutionary aim, indicates 
that many are formed with a young leadership of ‘pariah intellectuals’ who formulate the 
political agenda. Weber’s term of ‘pariah intellectuals’ originally referred to revolutionary 
Jewish intellectuals marginalised by anti-semitic European state structures in the 19th 
century (Löwy, 1992), but it has also been applied more generally to any group of elites 
marginalised by the state. Skocpol (in Wickham-Crowley 1992), for instance, uses a similar 
term of ‘marginal political elites’ who, she argues, when excluded from full power, turn to 
revolutionary organisations and attempt to secure power through an alliance with peasants.  
Clapham’s (1998) comparative study of African insurgencies since independence supports 
this theory, arguing that most were rural rebellions led by urban intellectuals. However, this 
did not necessarily determine the organisational capacity of the movement; Museveni’s 
NRA in Uganda was highly organised while Charles Taylor in Liberia became a classic 
‘warlord’. A practical consideration is the organisation of a movement and its links to pre-
existing forms of public authority. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) argue that pre-
existing community networks and institutions are utilised by leaders who manage to 
convince the members or leaders of those community institutions to follow them. 
Scholars of revolution studies argue that young students are a common source of ‘pariah 
intellectuals’. Gouldner (in Wickham-Crowley 1992), for example, argues that revolutionary 
leadership has consistently been dominated by highly educated intellectuals who emerge 
from universities and urban centres and go to the countryside to mobilise the peasants. 
Universities are seen to be enclaves of resistance because of the autonomous organising 
space they often have as well as the freedom of thought and speech they nurture 
(Wickham-Crowley 1992). In the case of ‘pariah intellectuals’ then, the literature points to 
their roles in mobilising participation as well as being mobilised themselves. 
At the peak of the Latin American revolutions between the 1950s and 1970s, Wickham-
Crowley (1992) finds the average age of revolutionary leadership was between 25 and 40 
years, but not all groups are initially founded by an intellectual leadership with politically 
framed goals. What was noticeable about the RUF in Sierra Leone was its lack of 
intellectual foundation and developed political goals. It was fairly uniquely a movement 
formed from the ‘lumpenproletariat’ of disaffected, uneducated urban youth who shared 
no common ethnic origin or class, only a rebellious youth culture revolving around drugs 
and vague, populist machinations against the ‘system’ (Abdullah & Muana, 1998). 
University youth were brought in later once the movement had started, specifically to 
formulate a coherent political agenda and articulate grievances (Abdullah & Muana, 1998). 
However, Clapham (1998) argues that there has been no case of a disciplined movement 
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with clearly defined political projects arising without educated leadership; education is at 
least a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for organisational effectiveness. 
Education may be a critical mediating factor in the mobilisation of mass populations into 
support for armed groups. Boudreau (2002), for instance, argues that education is central to 
any effort to mobilise people to national action (whether for or against the state). In 
addition to formulating the political agenda, education is argued to play a key part in 
shaping individual and collective identity, as well as social and political realities, and 
adapting local perceptions and those of insurgents to each other (Boudreau, 2002; 
Winthrop & Graff, 2010:29).   
Education may play an important part in mobilising younger recruits for armed opposition 
groups for a number of reasons. Educational opportunities provided by the group can be 
an incentive for recruits; lack of education, poor quality education or over-education 
compared to available jobs can be sources of grievance; enlightenment, ideology and the 
organising space of educational facilities can prompt and facilitate student political 
activism; and education can orient youths towards particular forms of collective action. 
Furthermore, studies of ‘pariah intellectuals’ indicate that educated young people may be 
key to the creation of frames of reference and, therefore, to the mobilisation of other 
young recruits. This suggests that youths may be more important to an armed opposition 
group than mere pawns in elite power struggles. 
3 Retention of recruits: Participant exit, loyalty and voice 
There is a wealth of literature addressing the reasons why young people may join armed 
groups, however, aside from formal, externally driven processes of participant exit in the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration literature, there is little analysis of why they 
stay in or leave armed opposition groups. Building on the factors that have been found to 
influence youth recruitment, individual factors which might influence young people’s 
decisions to stay or leave an armed group might be disillusion with material benefits or the 
perception of better options elsewhere, changes in family circumstances of participants, the 
influence of family or friends, their level of integration in the group, personal feuds within 
the group, conflict fatigue or grievances over a lack of opportunities to voice opinions or 
influence policies within the group. These are summarised in the earlier table.  
Gjelsvik and Bjørgo’s (2012) recent study of young Somali pirates analysed the processes 
by which young participants voluntarily left armed groups as well as the reasons why they 
joined. They found that disillusionment with the hardships of pirate life and failure to make 
much money from piracy prompted many young participants to leave, while group loyalty 
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was hardly any barrier to exit at all (Gjelsvik and Bjørgo, 2012:16). Andvig and Gates’s 
(2006:8) review of the child soldiers literature finds that young members of a military group 
may be retained through three forms of incentives: force; non-pecuniary benefits (often 
linked to ideology, religion or ethnicity); and economic incentives. If an organisation can 
provide pecuniary benefits to recruits, then Hirschman (1970:80-81) argues that in 
situations where there is no real substitute for the provision of such benefits, participants 
will stay in the group anyway. However, Andvig and Gates (2006:9) argue that some form 
of punishment for leaving is also usually necessary.  
Youth exit from an armed group may in some cases be related more to the political, 
economic and social structures in society. For example, changing structural conditions, 
such as the initiation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes for 
members of armed groups, improvements in local security conditions, better provision of 
governance services, changes in the political opportunity structure, changes in patterns of 
resource exploitation and distribution and community pressures could all be important 
explanatory factors.  Meanwhile, young participants may be retained by the fear of state 
retribution should they leave or severed community/family links, making return home 
difficult.  
In Gjelsvik and Bjørgo’s (2012:17-18) study of young Somali pirates, a critical factor in the 
process of disengagement from armed groups for many youths was the influence of family, 
friends and community pressure, in which religious sanctions against theft and violence 
played a large part (Gjelsvik and Bjørgo, 2012:17-18). Also important was the duration of 
membership in the group and the level of integration, because the longer a participant 
stayed in the group the more they cut ties with friends and family outside and the more 
they were entrusted with secrets which made it more risky to disengage (Bjørgo, 2009 and 
Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009, in Gjelsvik and Bjørgo, 2012:17). 
It appears to be difficult to ignore the influence of organisational factors such as group 
ideology, the capacity to provide incentives or support the dependents of participations, the 
nature of the organisation’s internal coercive power and the style of its leadership when 
considering why young people stay or leave armed groups. Hirschman (1970:80-81) argues 
that in situations where an armed group cannot provide benefits, or they can be found 
elsewhere making the group vulnerable to participant exit and the withdrawal of crucial 
support, generating loyalty is critical, thereby raising the costs of exit. Meanwhile, 
Weinstein’s (2005) theory of the behaviour of armed opposition groups argues that groups 
which rely less on voluntary support and more on coercion have less need to focus on 
generating loyalty. However, the use of coercion in recruiting participants and extracting 
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civilian resources undermines popular support and generates a downward cycle of 
legitimacy, turning previously popular insurgents into unpopular, predatory warlords 
(Renamo, for example).  Therefore, groups that seek to maintain their local legitimacy try 
to avoid this cycle and maintain a system of voluntary support through loyalty. Group 
loyalty can be nurtured through the promotion of a cohesive ideology, the delivery of 
selective incentives and the creation of high entry costs (initiation rites, for example) and 
exit penalties (such as denouncement, social exclusion or punishment for desertion) 
(Hirschman, 1970). Research into the British Army’s recruitment and retention of 16-22 
year olds shows that recruits may also be prevented from leaving by the use of fixed terms 
of service, enforced through punishments for desertion (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers, 2011:3). 
The interaction of loyalty and voice in organisations 
A neglected area of research is the negotiation of generational relations and youth voice 
within an armed group. Although loyalty-promoting organisations may vocalise an 
ideological agenda, Hirschman (1970:92-93) argues that they are not necessarily interested 
in the opinions of their members (even though it is in their long-term interest) because 
their short-term interest is to act as they wish, unconstrained by complaints and desertions. 
Therefore, they often seek to repress members’ voices and aim to develop unconscious 
loyalty (Hirschman, 1970:92-93).  They can be aided in this by members themselves who 
may self-deceive, particularly if they have invested a great deal in their membership, 
however, many members may maintain a conscious, reasoned loyalty. Youth loyalty, 
retention and voice may be important issues to be negotiated within an armed group 
because, as Hirschman (1970:82) argues: “while loyalty postpones exit, its very existence is 
predicated on the possibility of exit.  That even the most loyal member can exit is often an 
important part of his bargaining power vis-à-vis the organisation”.  
To address the lacuna in the academic literature around youths’ continued participation, 
exit and voice within an armed group, this study will examine not only the factors 
influencing why youths decide to join the KNU, but also the factors which influence why 
they stay or leave. By taking Hirschman’s (1970) theory as its starting point, this study will 
also seek to analyse the effects youth participation has on opportunities to voice their 
political opinions within the group.  
Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty has previously been applied to social 
movements in Burma (Zaw Oo, 2004), focusing on the exit, voice and loyalty patterns 
among the exiled population at a national level, rather than at a group level. This model 
was used to analyse the exodus of political dissidents from Burma and the development of 
 49 
their political voice in exile. Zaw Oo (2004:234) argued that exile from Burma and the 
pursuit of revolution from outside the country is a historical pattern of political dissent 
when vocal dissent is suppressed inside the country (Zaw Oo, 2004). 
4 Youth roles in armed opposition groups 
The child soldiers’ literature as well as the extensive literature on young people’s 
participation in armed groups from a broad range of disciplines has done much to further 
understanding of the factors influencing recruitment. However, much of it is focused on 
recruitment for violent forms of collective action, reflecting a growing concern about 
violence perpetrated by young people in a climate of anxiety about terrorism and 
insurrection (Boyden, 2006:22). Yet youths are not necessarily mobilised into violent action 
in armed groups (Earle, 2011:6).  
The social movements literature points to non-violent youth involvement in democratic 
revolutions in Serbia in 2000, Ukraine in 2004 and Georgia in 2005 (McFaul, 2005). Indeed, 
youths’ collective protest has often been seen as the ‘vanguard’ of some important 
historical changes around the world (Jeffrey, 2012:247). In this literature, the type of 
collective action undertaken may be influenced by culturally learned ‘repertoires of 
contention’, based on a community’s history of contentious behaviour (Tilly, 1995). For 
example, stone throwing and suicide bombing are prominent actions by Palestinian youths 
in conflict with the Israeli state (both male and female) (Seif, 1999), while organising 
demonstrations and school closures were typical roles of South African youth during the 
apartheid struggle (Van Kessell, 1993).  
Even in armed groups, youth action may not necessarily be violent. Highly political armed 
groups with a self-determination or secession objective often have more complex civilian 
and political structures because they have to continue demonstrating their capacity for 
governance in order to build or retain legitimacy (Weinstein, 2007; Mampilly, 2011). Thus, 
there may be a greater range of non-military roles available to youths in this type of group. 
This study seeks to understand the function of non-military roles of youths in armed 
opposition groups. The relevant literature is grouped here into roles within the political 
party apparatus, particularly in student or youth wings; roles in the welfare apparatus of 
armed groups; and roles in external organisations which may be linked to armed groups.  
a) Student and youth wings 
A small number of studies highlight the key role that youth wings of political parties and 
armed groups play in training the next generation of leaders (who are often kin relations of 
incumbent leaders) as well as mobilising new recruits and shoring up grassroots support 
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(Twum-Danso, 2004; Leao, 2004; Nolte, 2004). Wickham-Crowley’s (1992) study of 
revolutions finds that the way in which armed groups often do this is by using 
‘phenomenological virtuosos’ who can move through many social worlds communicating 
with different people, thereby reducing the ‘social distance’ between guerrillas and peasant 
supporters. Youth wings and youth leaders in particular have been observed taking on this 
role. ‘Phenomenological virtuosos’ are usually rural born and bred people who have 
received an unusually high level of education and can therefore appeal more successfully to 
both mass peasant supporters and elites (Fidel Castro, for example) (Wickham-Crowley, 
1992).   
Student youth in particular occupy a critical intermediary position between poorly educated 
populations and elites in developing countries. Additionally, the social position of students 
as an ‘incipient elite’ themselves, is argued to make developing countries more sensitive to 
student agitation (Altbach, 1966:175).  As a group usually located in universities in urban 
areas and capital cities, students have been argued to be important catalysts for social 
change and national development in developing nations, though their influence tends to 
wane once change has been initiated (Altbach, 1967:26).   
Student groups and youth wings are not always catalysts for social change, though, they 
have also been used as tools of social control, policing the activities of dissident citizens. In 
the Philippines, for example, President Ferdinand Marcos’s Kabataang Barangay ‘Village 
Youth’ organisations were created to quell opposition to his dictatorship rather than 
provide genuine youth representation in community affairs (Velasco, 2005:87). For groups 
still engaged in active conflict, youth movements may also be intricately tied to the 
processes of conflict perpetuation, as Parsons (2004) found in Angola. Youth wings can 
variously be seen, then, as tools for elite manipulation, training grounds for future political 
and military leaders, catalysts of social change and an important link in the organisation of 
collective action between elites and peasants. 
Although political parties may form youth wings for particular goals, youth wings may also 
take on a life of their own. Their loyalty to and subjugation by the parent party is by no 
means guaranteed, since radical and politicised youth wings often split off from political 
parties4 (Wickham-Crowley, 1992). Thus, it is important to consider the influence that 
                                                 
4 The largest guerrilla group in the FMLN in El Salvador’s civil war, for example, was a blend of a 
Communist youth splinter group, youth dissidents from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and members 
of a left-wing student organisation known as El Grupo (The Group). Similarly, the origins of the Sandanistas 
in 1961 were in the Revolutionary Nicaraguan Youth (JRN) and Patriotic Nicaraguan Youth (JPN) – part of 
the Communist Party of Nicaragua (Wickham-Crowley, 1992). The Italian Red Brigade emerged in the 1970s 
from disillusioned members of the Communist Youth League who were disenchanted with the lack of 
activism in the Italian Communist Party (Siqueira, 2005:219). 
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organisations and leaders have on youth action while also considering the effects that 
youths themselves have on organisational dynamics. Burgess’s (2002) analysis of the 
Zanzibar revolution shows how this may be done. His study finds that political roles were 
defined along generational lines, with youth organisations taking responsibility for 
grassroots political organising, performing mundane tasks allocated by party elders and 
staging protests and processions. However, he also finds that the youth wing organised 
themselves politically across race, class and neighbourhood boundaries unlike the party 
elders, which shaped the eventual outcome of the political contests of the period. Thus, his 
analysis demonstrates how youth wings can have important, albeit unintended, 
consequences for a group and the conflict in general.  
Generational roles have historical significance in many countries and can change during the 
course of conflict. In war to peace transitions, youth movements may try to re-negotiate 
their roles in the new post-conflict political order. After the Zanzibar revolution, for 
instance, Burgess’s (2002) study found that youth continued to be articulated as a crucial 
resource in building the post-revolutionary Zanzibar state through their support for state 
agendas of national development, security and cultural integrity. In post-apartheid South 
Africa, the voting age for the 1994 election was lowered from 18 to 14 in recognition of the 
role of youth activism as the backbone of the anti-apartheid struggle (McEvoy-Levy, 
2001:13). However, more commonly, youths are marginalised and disenfranchised from 
national politics once the goals of revolution or independence have been achieved 
(McEvoy-Levy, 2006). In post-revolutionary Zanzibar, despite the continued importance of 
youth movements to the Zanzibar state, generational roles were reconfigured in terms of a 
return to traditional norms of respect and deference for elders as a means to encourage 
unity and discipline, and control and extract labour from young people (Burgess, 2002). 
The Youth League was constructed to exercise control over young people by sending them 
to labour camps or organising them into “voluntary” work parties and closely supervising 
their movements, associations, appearance and leisure practices (Burgess, 2002).  
For newly-independent state-builders in the pursuit of orderliness, youth may be 
considered a basis for a dangerous autonomy. De V. Graaf’s (1982) study of post-
independence national youth movements in Africa found that politically active youth, many 
of whom had participated in independence struggles as youth wings of the main nationalist 
movements, were directed into youth movements which originally aimed to de-politicise 
and/or demobilise them. This failed, though, as many African youths faced education and 
employment crises (De V. Graaf, 1982).  African youth movements then developed into 
centres for vocational training and national development, and aimed for political 
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socialisation of youths within a new, independent, multi-ethnic nation-building context (De 
V. Graaf 1982).  
Although De V. Graaf’s (1982) study highlights a transformation of politicised youth into 
positive social roles, much of the extant literature examined here stresses the lack of 
opportunities to do this in post-independence Africa and highlights youth transition into 
violent local gangs instead (Mochizuki, 2009; Reno, 2006; Hazen, 2009). As McEvoy-Levy 
(2001:3) argues, in post-conflict peace building processes, youths “pose at once potential 
threats to peace and peace building resources”. However, it is unclear under what 
conditions a positive transformation of youth roles in conflict can occur. Additionally, 
although youth wings of armed groups are quite common, more research is needed to 
understand how their political roles are negotiated within the group. 
b) Welfare roles 
Youths participating in armed groups are not always violent, and they may not always be 
very political either.  Ghimire (2002) notes that youth action in armed groups may also be 
directed towards tackling social problems such as gambling, drinking and spousal abuse; 
providing adult education to raise local awareness of issues and helping people to negotiate 
their way through complex state bureaucracies in order to secure their rights and 
entitlements. Joanna de Berry’s (2008) analysis of youth groups in Afghanistan also 
highlights their long history in social roles as well as demonstrating the political 
connections and strategies that youth groups utilise both with power holders inside the 
country and external funding agencies. 
In armed groups with welfare wings, it is reasonable to assume that youths may variously 
be employed as teachers, health care professionals and bureaucrats. In these roles and 
particularly in an armed opposition group which controls and administers territory as a de 
facto government, it may be more logical to view youth participation in a similar way to 
youth employment in a civil service or public sector job elsewhere. However, this 
perspective is not usually adopted because it implies a conception of armed opposition 
groups as local public authorities with a degree of legitimacy, whereas the dominant 
postcolonial and post-Cold War discourse finds opposition groups who were once 
supported by the international community as armies of national liberation frequently 
redefined as rebels or terrorists and their leaders as criminals (Rosen, 2005:14).  This is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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c) Roles in external partner organisations 
Youths may also work in community-based organisations or NGOs allied with or broadly 
supportive of armed opposition groups, publicising certain issues or representing particular 
interest groups.  Publicising the cause can be an important function for armed opposition 
groups, particularly if they face the prospect of military defeat, because securing external 
moral, financial or military support through international advocacy can be a decisive factor 
in their success (Byman et al, 2001).  Challengers confronting powerful opponents therefore 
seek support outside their home states from international organisations, NGOs, the media 
and the broad public (Bob, 2005:1-2).  NGOs can raise awareness about little-known 
conflicts, mobilise resources for beleaguered movements and pressure repressive 
governments. 
The social movements literature demonstrates that during the democratic revolutions in 
Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), youth NGOs were crucial to the 
mobilisation of protestors, provision of logistical support to protests and providing the first 
wave of protestors (early risers) Kuzio (2006:366).  Most members of civil society NGOs in 
these countries were under the age of thirty-five, and it is argued that they were able to 
overcome old divisions and group animosities, reach out to foreign supporters who gave 
training and support in deploying non-violent strategies, which enabled them to mobilise 
extensive civilian support (Kuzio, 2006).  
The social movements’ literature also points to some overlap between youth participants in 
armed groups and youths engaged in non-violent organised resistance in authoritarian 
countries. For example, Beatty (2011) finds some collaboration between the armed and 
non-armed groups which make up Burma’s opposition movement, while student and youth 
movements in South Africa worked alongside or in collaboration with armed groups 
opposing the apartheid state.5  
Not all youth action appears political when viewed from the outside, though. Argenti 
(2002:135) argues that in authoritarian countries, youths’ seemingly non-political activities 
are often overlooked by commentators on Africa’s youth leading their creative but 
necessarily covert methods of expressing a political voice, for example through religion, 
theatre or folklore, to be missed by academics, NGOs and governments.  As Nordstrom 
and Robben (1995:6-7) argue, “the lives of those who suffer under violence or are engaged 
in warfare are not defined exclusively in global political, economic, social or military terms” 
despite these being at the forefront of scholarly and popular attention, “but also in the 
                                                 
5 Youths were particularly prominent campaigning on education issues in South Africa during apartheid, for 
example (Van Kessell, 1993). 
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small, often creative, acts of the everyday”.  This argument echoes Scott’s (1987:xvi) 
‘Weapons of the Weak’ thesis which argues that most subordinate classes of people rarely 
have the luxury of open political activity, this being the preserve of the middle class and the 
intelligentsia. Instead they employ small acts of covert resistance to those who seek to 
exploit their resources and labour; acts which may multiply over time and across 
populations to have a significant political effect (Scott, 1987:xvii). 
The relationships which youths working in external organisations have with armed groups 
sharing the same geographic space may be very complex, especially if they are funded and 
accountable to other third parties, such as international agencies. However, there is 
currently little research which takes into account the relationships and networks between 
such groups. Research on the delivery of humanitarian aid in areas controlled by armed 
groups provides some indication of how donor agencies may negotiate humanitarian access 
and aid delivery, but there are very few studies which examine how armed opposition 
groups (or youth organisations linked to them) deal with international funding agencies. 
Given the relative lack of analysis of youths in non-military roles in armed groups, I 
propose an approach that examines the key non-military roles that youths are involved in 
through an armed opposition groups and analyses the functions these serve for the group. 
In addition to explaining the purpose of youth participation in an armed group, this 
approach may also shed light on the changing strategies an armed group adopts. It also 
aims to analyse the effects that youth participation in non-military roles has on internal 
generational relations and the group’s non-military operations. 
In the case studied here, the Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) operates simultaneously as 
the KNU’s political youth wing and an INGO-funded community-based organisation 
(CBO). As such, it provides an opportunity to analyse not only the roles and relationships 
youths have as youth wing members but also how organisations affiliated to armed 
opposition groups manage their relationships with external donors. Youths also work in 
the extensive welfare apparatus of the KNU, thus youth roles in the organisation and 
delivery of welfare services through an armed group are also included in this study. 
5 Conclusion 
In understanding the dynamics of conflict it is important to understand how and why 
young people participate in armed groups, the purpose of their roles to the group and the 
effects their participation have on inter-generational relations and hierarchies, ideas about 
youth roles and the armed group’s political and strategic goals. Prior research which has 
focused on youth activities in conflict zones, whether inside or outside armed groups has 
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allowed numerous micro-level studies to be conducted with small numbers of participants6, 
primarily focused on young people involved in violence. Yet debates on the involvement of 
young people in violent conflict have been criticised for being sensationalised and based on 
misperception about the nature of youth involvement in war (Boyden, 2006:22). Writing on 
child soldiers from a human rights and applied research perspective in particular has 
perpetuated the idea that young people’s actions in war are the result of acts of commission 
or omission by adults, paving the way for a universal notion of childhood and child rights 
to be advocated, but infantilising older youths’ actions (Boyden, 2006:8). Meanwhile, the 
literature on demographic ‘youth bulges’ considers older youths’ propensity to engage in 
violence but is conceptually and methodologically problematic and tends to induce an 
unwarranted ‘moral panic’ (Boyden, 2006:2-5).  
This thesis argues that differences in young people’s lives and experiences of conflict are 
too great for a universal understanding of ‘youth’ participation in armed groups to be 
usefully applied to policy prescriptions. To craft appropriate policies and programmes that 
address the actual situations of young people in a variety of armed groups, a deep 
understanding of social categories, generational relations and the experiences of young 
people themselves in different conflict contexts is needed. 
The literature on young people’s participation in armed groups, especially the extensive 
studies on child soldiers, has been very useful in exploring the dynamics that conspire to 
encourage participation in armed groups, but so far there is little understanding of the non-
violent actions of young people in conflict situations, especially outside Africa. Although 
several studies have highlighted the importance of welfare wings, youth wings and party 
structures to some armed groups, youth participation in non-military roles has in general 
received much less academic attention. In terms of how young people participating in 
armed opposition groups should be conceptualised, the literature on child soldiers is less 
useful when considering young people aged over 18 (unless they were recruited before age 
18) due to a general consensus that they are at the age of majority for independent 
decision-making. The micro-dynamics of non-military youth participation in armed groups, 
including youth mobilisation, recruitment, progression and exit, are, therefore, still poorly 
understood.  
This chapter proposed addressed this lacuna and the relative lack of research on youth 
involvement in armed groups in Asia by studying youths participating in non-military roles 
                                                 
6 For example, Parsons (2004) in Angola; Leao, (2004) in Mozambique; Stavrou (2004) in Uganda;  
Maclure and Denov (2006) in Sierra Leone. 
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in the KNU’s youth wing, as well as the non-military roles of other youth participants 
located outside the youth wing but in organisations affiliated to the KNU.  
An increasing number of scholars are calling for civil wars and other forms of organised 
violent conflict to be conceptualised as ongoing, dynamic processes which generate various 
incentives and constraints over time, rather than discrete events for which participation 
derives exclusively from expectations about outcomes (for example, Cramer, 2003; Kalyvas 
& Kocher, 2007). Since the KNU has been in conflict with the Burmese state for over sixty 
years, it is to be expected that the dynamics of the conflict will have changed over time. 
Therefore, this study assumes that youths’ participation patterns, generational relations and 
roles may be constantly in flux and seeks to understand the changing effects they may have 
by examining young participants’ life histories, the organisational history of the KNU and 
changing youth roles with the group. In addition, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) point out that 
the spatial and temporal logics of participation vary greatly so multiple logics of 
participation may coexist in a single war (as Humphreys & Weinstein (2008) also argue). 
This is particularly relevant to this study because the KNU operates in multiple 
geographical areas with differing contexts. The local conditions in each of these areas are 
discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
To address the lacuna in the academic literature around youths’ continued participation, 
exit and voice within an armed group, this chapter made the case for a study which 
examines not only the reasons why young participants decide to join the KNU, but also the 
reasons why they stay or leave. I advocate using the same approach as that proposed for 
studying recruitment, which considers individual factors; political, economic and social 
structure factors; and organisational factors that appear to influence participants’ decisions. 
I also assume, as Wickham Crowley (1992) argues, that the loyalty of youth wings to the 
parent party is by no means guaranteed. By taking Hirschman’s (1970) theory as its starting 
point, this study seeks to analyse why young members leave and the effects their 
participation have on their opportunities to express political voice within the group. 
The extant literature on the roles of youths in armed opposition groups indicates that 
youth leaders and youth wings may be important as mediators who negotiate the needs of 
the armed group and the grassroots population (Wickham Crowley, 1992). Youths can 
operate within or allied to armed group structures and youth wings have variously been 
viewed as tools for elite manipulation, training grounds for future political and military 
leaders or schools of citizenship and leadership (Del Felice & Wisler, 2007). However, this 
chapter argued that there is a gap in understanding the functions of youths’ non-military 
roles for the group and the effects (intended or otherwise) these have on the group, the 
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conflict and the youth cohort itself. Other issues which have been neglected are how 
youths are matched to particular roles, the dynamics of a young recruit’s career from entry 
to exit, and whether youths are more suited to certain roles. These questions are most 
suited to an in-depth study of youths which examines their life histories as well as the 
context of their employment in organisations linked to armed opposition groups. The 
precise methodology I propose to study these questions is elaborated on in chapter four. 
Armed opposition groups vary wildly resulting in a great diversity of explanations for youth 
participation, therefore, it is necessary to narrow down the focus on the group involved in 
conflict and the nature of the conflict itself. This study is concerned with politically-based 
armed opposition groups who are involved in a ‘peripheral conflict’ with the state in the 
borderlands. Understanding their aims, historical reasons for engaging in conflict with the 
state and modes of operation are fundamental to understanding how policies and 
interventions directed towards youths in the group can be successful, therefore, the next 
chapter situates political armed opposition groups within a broader literature on state-
making and peripheral conflicts in developing countries. 
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Chapter 3: Youths in Armed Opposition Groups: Understanding 
the micro-dynamics of  state-making from the periphery 
The central question of this thesis asks why and how youths participate in an armed 
opposition group, but given the great diversity of explanations for youth behaviour in 
various types of armed groups and conflicts found in the previous chapter, it is necessary 
to narrow the focus somewhat.  This study is concerned with a particular type of conflict 
between the state and armed opposition groups that is especially prevalent in the 
borderlands of Southeast Asian states. Borderlands are fundamentally “an area through 
which a boundary line runs” (Morehouse, 2004:29). Conventional borderlands are spaces 
through which an international border runs, where a borderland society is a social and 
cultural system straddling the border (Goodhand, 2005:193). They may also be internal 
spaces which do not straddle an international border but are characterised by weak state 
penetration, often difficult terrain (mountains, marshes, jungle or sea, for instance) and 
populations who have resisted the central state’s attempts to exert control over their labour 
and resources, as in James Scott’s (2009) study of the Southeast Asian borderlands 
(Goodhand, 2005:193).  Finally, borderlands may be entire countries which act as regional 
‘buffer zones’ or ‘shatter belts’ between empires (Goodhand, 2005:193; Morehouse, 
2004:29).  
This chapter seeks to understand the nature of ‘peripheral conflicts’7 in the borderlands of 
Southeast Asia and the ways in which armed opposition groups engage in conflict with the 
state. It asks why and how the state and armed opposition groups are embroiled in long-
running conflicts in the borderlands of Southeast Asia, what this type of conflict is 
fundamentally about and how they may be changing in the post-Cold War period. It then 
seeks to use a greater understanding of both the conflict and the group to elucidate the 
types of non-military activities the armed group is engaged in and suggest ways in which 
youths may be involved. 
The first part of the chapter examines the literature on state-making and conflict in order 
to understand the nature of armed opposition groups engaged in peripheral conflicts. By 
‘state-making’, I adopt Tilly’s (1985) use of the term to mean both state formation and state 
consolidation activities. State-making is understood to be, as Cohen, Brown and Organski 
                                                 
7 Fearon (2004:277) uses the term ‘peripheral insurgencies’ to describe “civil wars involving rural guerrilla 
bands operating typically near the state’s borders”. I prefer the word ‘conflict’ instead of ‘insurgency’ since it 
is less normatively-loaded with assumptions about the legitimacy of borders, armed groups and state 
governments. 
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(1981:902) describe, “a historical process characterized by the creation of political order at 
a new spatial and institutional level”. The new spatial and institutional level referred to here 
is understood to be the state, which (often violently) redistributes political control of power 
resources away from sub-national collectivities and polities in a centralisation of power 
(Cohen, Brown and Organski, 1981:902). State consolidation activities may also include 
activities now referred to as ‘state-building’, but I avoid using this term because in current 
parlance it refers to external interventions since the 1990s to establish key institutions and 
processes in order to form a particular kind of democratic, market-based state (Fritz & 
Menocal, 2007:16).  
Using Tilly’s (1978, 1985, 1992) and Gallant’s (1999) theories of the highly coercive nature 
of state-making and the complex roles that armed non-state actors have played in state 
formation processes, as well as North et al.’s (2009) theory of developing states as ‘limited 
access orders’,  it is argued here that armed opposition groups should be seen as part of the 
long and brutal politics of sovereignty and state-making, rather than actors outside or 
necessarily against the state. 
In Southeast Asia in particular, it is argued that local histories of state-making and the 
geographical conditions of difficult terrain and sparsely populated, remote areas, have 
favoured ongoing conflicts over state-making in borderland areas (Scott, 2009; Grundy-
Warr, 2006). Peripheral conflicts in this region are fundamentally about sovereignty and the 
spatialisation of power, but frequently they have taken on an ethno-nationalist character 
due to the nature of state-making and the particular logic of conflict employed by the state 
and armed opposition groups. Southeast Asian states have attempted to co-opt or crush 
local powerful individuals or armed groups, which has magnified the state’s interest in 
penetrating and consolidating its power in the borderlands, creating a ‘border effect’ that 
strengthens their capacities (McCoy, 1999; Gallant, 1999). However, it also creates highly 
fragmented patterns of sovereignty, legitimacy and coercive power as locally powerful 
leaders establish variegated relationships with the state. 
The second part of the chapter examines the relationship between armed groups’ conflict 
strategies and the development of non-military roles in their bureaucratic structures. I draw 
on Naylor’s (2004) analysis of the links between armed groups’ revenue streams and the 
development of bureaucratic capacity and Mampilly’s (2011) study of governance provision 
by armed groups to explore the types of non-military roles that emerge in armed 
opposition groups with more extensive bureaucratic structures. While these indicate some 
important non-military roles, I find that neither study explains how an armed opposition 
group’s bureaucratic apparatus changes as it becomes militarily weaker and loses the 
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territory it once had. Nor do they elaborate on other resources in the borderlands which 
armed opposition groups have to fall back on such as resources delivered to refugees or 
IDPs by INGOs. Conflicts are highly dynamic and armed opposition groups as well as 
states must continually find ways to adapt to a changing international, national and local 
environment. Moreover, changes within armed opposition groups imply changes in the 
roles and relations between participants, including the youth cohort. Thus, it is argued that 
understanding these changing processes may supplement studies of the military strategies 
of armed opposition groups, thereby providing a more complete picture of armed 
opposition groups in peripheral conflicts. 
1 Peripheral conflicts and state-making in the borderlands 
Modern states are territorial entities which seek to solidify their boundaries and assert 
control over their residents by monopolising violence, establishing legitimacy, controlling 
revenue and transforming social identities (Blanchard, 2005:694). However, the legitimacy 
of every single post-colonial Southeast Asian state has been challenged by armed 
opposition groups along the geographical periphery, ethnic or religious minorities, or those 
espousing a different political ideology (Tan, 2007:3-8). Where these have resulted in civil 
wars, they have lasted longer in Asia than anywhere else, displaying many similar dynamics 
(Fearon, 2004:283). They are often insurgencies in peripheral areas of the state populated 
by ethnic minorities who face a majority ethnic-dominated state, although they may also be 
organised by religious affiliation and, much less commonly since the end of the Cold War, 
by political ideology, usually communism (Tan, 2007; Fearon, 2004:283).  
In academic studies of the causes of conflict in developing countries, there is a growing 
interest in the connection between state making, state failure and violent conflict (Cohen, 
Brown & Organski, 1981; Tilly, 1985, Migdal, 1988; Posen, 1993; Gates, 2002; Reno, 2003; 
Hui, 2005, Kaldor, 2007; Fritz & Menocal, 2007). Some writers identify causal connections 
between state fragility and civil war because political instability generates a fragmenting of 
authority and rival ethnic or political groups face a ‘security dilemma’ and take pre-emptive 
action to secure an advantageous position (Posen, 1993). Conversely, civil war may lead to 
state collapse (Kaldor, 2007).  
Other scholars examine the actions of state leaders themselves and their relationship to 
conflict. In pre-colonial state-making practices, Hui (2005) distinguishes between ‘self-
weakening’ and ‘self-strengthening’ revenue extraction techniques used by states. ‘Self-
weakening’ methods included the use of tax farming and mercenaries (bandits and pirates, 
for instance), who tend to be very unreliable and violent state-making partners (Tilly, 
1985:173; Hui, 2005). ‘Self-strengthening’ methods included national conscription, national 
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taxation and development of a meritocratic bureaucracy. In analysing some of the world’s 
weakest states, Migdal (1988) and Reno (2003) both argue that many weak states are self-
weakening because they are engaged in the ‘politics of survival’, which are actions designed 
to prevent local strong men or rival factions within the state from becoming too powerful. 
‘Dirty tricks’ to remove leaders of powerful non-state organisations and shuffling officials 
around different state offices to prevent loyalties developing in potentially strong agencies 
are common tactics (Migdal, 1988). Such actions deliberately weaken the state’s coercive 
capacity and bureaucratic coherence in order to protect state leaders. Conversely, the state 
may weaken its opponents’ coercive capacity by attempting to fragment armed opposition 
groups (Heupel, 2009:65). 
The state-building literature argues that more effective state institutions will prevent civil 
war. The term ‘state-building’ refers to “the set of actions undertaken by national and/or 
international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where these have 
been seriously eroded or are missing” (Caplan, 2005 in Fritz & Menocal, 2007:13). It 
involves building security provision, the rule of law, delivery of basic goods and services 
through state institutions and the political legitimacy of the state Brinkerhoff, 2007 in Fritz 
& Menocal, 2007:13). Thus, it is assumed that state-building involves sweeping away feudal 
structures and replacing them with institutions based on individual freedom, market 
openness and democracy, with a Weberian ‘rational-legal’ bureaucracy. Much of the state-
building literature is pre-occupied with the technical aspects of international involvement in 
state-building, rather than its underlying logic, the type of state that is to be built and even 
whether existing states are worth preserving in their current format (Fritz & Menocal, 
2007). Moreover, development interventions and state-building projects aimed at 
strengthening the central state problematically ignore the long histories of centre-periphery 
relations, the impact of previous state formation attempts in periphery areas and the 
presence of local authority structures (Dobbins et al. 2007, in Scott, 2007). They also tend 
to take a normative stance that questioning current state boundaries and the legitimacy of 
centralised government will lead to a collapse in the sovereign state system.  
Contained within much of the literature on state-making and civil war are two assumptions 
and binary distinctions concerning the nature of the state. First is the assumption that the 
state commands a monopoly over the means of coercion (Gates, 2002). The failure to do 
so is then assumed to lead to a Hobbesian state of anarchy and disorder, especially among 
international relations theorists (Yannis, 2002:822). The presence of armed groups outside 
the state is then assumed to be both a product and a cause of state failure (Yannis, 2002). 
However, the territorial limits of the state do not necessarily give way to disorder, rather, 
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contemporary forms of political regulation, accumulation, investment and 
institutionalisation operating at the local level beyond the reach of conventional states are 
found in a diverse array of countries (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010:541). Moreover 
developing states very often do not hold a monopoly over the means of coercion, instead 
they enter into a number of agreements with other coercive agents which blur the 
boundaries of sovereignty. 
The second assumption is an implicit binary distinction between the state and the non-
state and political legitimacy. One of the problems with the hegemony of the sovereign 
state system is that when civil conflict is discussed, the state is often equated with law and 
order and political legitimacy, while other armed actors operating outside the state are 
relegated to the status of illegitimate, predatory rebels, who are engaged in a ‘privatisation 
of violence’ (Kaldor, 2007:97; Reno, 2006). Consequently, the problem becomes one of 
how to eliminate the rebels and extend the power of the state. These arguments have been 
criticised for overlooking the role of the state itself in fuelling intra-state wars through state 
violence towards members of the population, the promotion of nationalistic discourses, or 
other actions that do little to build and much to erode its own legitimacy (De Graaff, 2005; 
Scherrer, 2003).   
Gallant’s (1999) theory of bandits and state-making represents a corrective to both of these 
assumptions. His examination of brigandage and piracy around the globe over the last 300 
years demonstrates the complexity of the ‘legitimate’ wielding of coercive violence by both 
states and armed non-state actors. He points to a symbiotic relationship between non-state 
armed actors and state actors in state formation and consolidation, especially in the 
development of capitalist networks and the centralisation of a monopoly of coercion 
(Gallant, 1999:26). Gallant (1999:30) argues that as states have expanded and transformed 
local modes of production to capitalism, peasant smallholders have been displaced from 
rural land in the periphery to make way for commercialised agrarian regimes. As a result, 
poverty, servitude and social unrest have increased, providing fertile ground for violence. 
The poor integration of peripheries into a central apparatus still struggling to take form 
then provides an opening for armed intermediaries, whom Gallant (1999:43) terms 
‘military entrepreneurs’, to mediate between the centre and its margins (McCoy, 1999:130). 
In Gallant’s (1999:27) terminology, ‘military entrepreneurs’ are people who use arms to 
threaten or wield violence as their “stock in trade”. They have had varying degrees of 
legitimacy over time as weak states have supplemented their lack of a monopoly of 
coercive power in the periphery by engaging in informal local relationships with local 
armed and powerful actors (Gallant, 1999:41-43).  
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Gallant’s approach recalls Charles Tilly’s (1985) metaphor of ‘war-making and state-making 
as organised crime’ in which state and non-state actors, such as bandits, pirates and gangs 
all seek to consolidate their hold on power, often by acting as protection rackets, and 
therefore belong on the same continuum of organised coercion and extraction. The only 
distinction he then sees between them is their degree of legitimacy (Tilly, 1985). Tilly’s 
(1978, 1992) studies of European state formation point to the highly coercive nature of 
state-making in the European historical experience. In Europe, a variety of primarily 
coercive strategies were used by royal state-makers to extract men, materials and money 
from the population residing in their claimed territory (Finer, 1975, in Taylor & Botea, 
2008). These included conscription, contracts with mercenaries, extensive and multiple 
varieties of taxation on flows of goods or resources accrued by the population, and credit 
agreements with rich capitalists promising a dividend from the spoils of war (Tilly, 1985).  
Tilly (1978, 1992) also points to the development of capitalism and civilianisation of 
government as by-products of state-making. In many cases of European state formation, 
extraction of surplus production from the population was not lucrative enough to fund 
increasingly expensive military projects, because there was not enough surplus to extract in 
the first place. Therefore, state-making also involved the promotion of capital 
accumulation, the monetisation of the economy and the separation of direct producers 
from ownership of resources, enforced by contracts and property law (Mann, 1988). This 
history demonstrates that the pre-modern European state was not an objective, benign 
institution, it was coercive, repressive and biased towards elite interests. As Jackson 
(1990:22) argues: “The history of the modern state is in no small part a history of rulers 
who are illegitimate, governments that are disorganized or incompetent, and subjects who 
are indifferent, isolated, alienated, cowed, or in rebellion.” Despite this evidence, there is an 
assumption in contemporary state-building approaches that if state institutions were simply 
transformed into the kinds of impersonal, open-access institutions found in Western 
developed countries, then peace and stability would follow (North et al, 2009). Not only is 
this approach argued to be inappropriate to developing countries, it also tends to obscure 
the highly conflictive nature of state-making practices and the complex nature of 
developing states today. As a result, several scholars are calling for a re-think of the nature 
of the developing state. 
a) Re-thinking the nature of the developing state 
There is a growing dissatisfaction in the state failure literature with the dominance of 
Weberian concepts of the state, which have been argued to be too Western-centric to apply 
to post-colonial states (Kapferer, 2005, in Hagmann & Péclard 2010:541). North et al. 
 64 
(2009) argue that a Weberian concept of the state is, in fact, only a feature of modern, 
developed states with impersonal, ‘open-access’ characteristics. Far from being the kinds of 
rational-bureaucratic states found in the West with institutionalised bargaining processes, 
North et al. (2009) argue that developing states are more often ‘limited access orders’. In 
limited access orders, powerful leaders and privileged individuals cooperate to prevent 
violence. Political leaders in power limit “access to valuable political and economic 
functions as a way to generate rents” and use these rents to privilege powerful individuals 
who maintain order and solve the problem of violence for the state (North et al., 2007:3). 
The state then relies on external legitimacy to profit from international capital, and 
patrimonial legitimacy from non-state coercive groups incorporated into their patronage 
networks. 
A temporary balance of interests is argued to be more typical than a perpetually organised 
state (as in the Western model), with control of violence dispersed throughout multiple 
dominant players which only achieves stability if these dominant interests are given credible 
incentives not to use violence (Migdal, 1988; Lund, 2006; North et al. 2009:258).  Since 
dominant interests and country conditions are always changing, this kind of state is 
constantly shifting and attempting to accommodate changing interests, often resulting in 
state instability and conflict (North et al., 2009). In this model of political order in 
developing countries, civil war is seen as the result of an imbalance of rents to dominant 
players, who then mobilise the coercive resources they possess to seek a more favourable 
distribution. 
This model of the state is more appropriate to studies of peripheral conflict in developing 
countries because it does not assume that the state is an ontologically pre-given entity, 
instead it views the state as the product of complex processes of often conflictive 
negotiations that occur at the interface between the public and the private, the informal and 
the formal, the illegal and the legal (Hagmann and Peclard, 2010:552). Importantly, it takes 
into consideration that these processes may include negotiations with alternative forms of 
public authority outside the state. Where these forms of public authority are armed groups, 
it is more accurate to see states as being “deeply involved in the emergence and logic of 
armed groups” (Schlichte, 2009:248). It is not just armed groups that wield public authority 
though, Lund’s (2006) study of alternative sources of public authority outside the state, 
which he labels ‘twilight institutions’, highlights the range of different actors which may 
possess some degree of authority, including churches, neighbourhood associations and 
various types of armed group. Moreover, the literature on NGOs, international agencies 
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and multinational corporations (MNCs) highlights the assumption of sovereignty by these 
actors even while they do not seek to challenge state authority (Mampilly, 2007:243).  
Gallant (1999) and Tilly’s (1985, 1992) studies of the symbiotic relationship between states 
and bandits, and North et al.’s (2009) theory of developing states as ‘limited access orders’ 
make a clear case that armed non-state actors should be seen as part of the long and brutal 
politics of sovereignty and state-making, rather than actors outside or necessarily against 
the state. In Southeast Asia, sovereignty and state-making have been particularly contested 
as the following section demonstrates.  
b) The state and peripheral conflicts in Southeast Asia 
In Southeast Asia’s history, Scott (2009) argues that many of the same processes of land 
enclosure and pacification of the local population found in Tilly’s (1985, 1992) and 
Gallant’s (1999) studies are evident. Before the idea that the state should control all of the 
territory to fixed borders became hegemonic with post-colonial conceptions of statehood, 
pre-colonial texts show that state power in Southeast Asia revolved around economic 
centres and rarely reached the hinterlands (Walker, 1999:7). Moreover, Scott (2009) argues 
that non-state people in the Southeast Asian borderlands have long avoided central state-
making practices.  
Resistance to state-making among borderland people continued through the colonial 
period, with colonial rulers finding that borderland societies demonstrated a much greater 
capacity for opposition to foreign rule than centralised, lowland kingdoms did (Scherrer, 
2003:12). Although colonial rule forcefully curbed the powers of customary chieftaincies 
and pre-colonial political forms (Englebert, 2002:78), it did not always entirely eliminate 
them and indirect rule was common.  
In the post-colonial period, territorial control and the development of the state’s coercive 
power became more important as national boundaries were demarcated in independence 
transitions. Post-colonial state elites then overwhelmingly adopted the Westphalian idea of 
absolute state sovereignty to the edges of state borders and utilised the colonial structures 
of coercion to pursue a changed emphasis on penetration of the periphery, rather than 
radiance of power (Walker, 1999). As a result, absolute rather than multiple and 
overlapping national sovereignty, control of civil society, the constitutive monopoly of 
legitimate violence and the right to expropriate economic resources formed the objectives 
of post-colonial regimes (Scherrer, 2003). However, the claims of the central state to 
absolute sovereignty over the borderlands, although recognised in the international state 
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system, have often not been an empirical reality on the ground and have been violently 
contested (Jackson, 1990; Herbst, 2000).  
From the perspective of the civilian population in the periphery, Scott (2009) and Scherrer 
(2003:12) argue that the imposition of direct rule in the post-colonial period met with 
opposition from local populations who preferred to maintain their status as ‘acephalous’ or 
self-rule societies without centralised forms of governance. At this point, the desires of 
unarmed civilians in the borderlands have intersected with those of military entrepreneurs 
operating without the sanction of the law. Gallant (1999) argues that as the state expands 
its reach and coercive power, armed non-state actors are drawn and pushed into remote, 
inaccessible areas where the difficult terrain and their links to the rural population protect 
and shelter them from state pursuers. 
In semi-peripheral areas Gallant (1999:33-34) argues that armed groups or individuals 
outside the state had less freedom due to the more restrictive physical geography and had 
to rely to a greater extent on the cooperation and compliance of the local population: 
“social geography, as it were, had to take the place of the cover provided by the physical 
environment in the periphery”. In this situation, armed groups operated less as predators 
and engaged in alliances with local populations wishing to retain or regain local sovereignty 
(Gallant, 1999). As a result, the rise in power of armed non-state actors in the periphery 
and semi-periphery of states magnifies the state’s interest in penetrating and consolidating 
its power in the borderlands (Gallant, 1999; McCoy, 1999). Through a process of either co-
opting or crushing locally powerful individuals or armed groups, states experience a ‘border 
effect’ that strengthens their capacities and establishes the “writ of the state” as “the law of 
the land” in peripheral areas (Gallant; 1999:51-52).  
c) The rise of ethno-nationalist armed groups in Southeast Asia 
Frequently in Southeast Asia, borderland conflicts have taken on an ethno-nationalist 
character due to the nature of state-making and the particular logic of conflict employed by 
the state and armed opposition groups (Brown, 1994). Fundamental to ethno-nationalist 
forms of peripheral conflict is the articulation of national identities by both the state and its 
opponents. Following the end of colonial rule, it has been argued that the majority of states 
have adopted particularistic versions of nationalism based on an ethnic identity of the 
ruling group, which tends to exclude other groups, in an attempt to overcome the 
incongruence of state and society, legitimate the state and re-shape it in its own image 
(Englebert, 2002:98; Shultz, 1995). The principle of nationalism, which holds that the state 
and the nation should be congruent, therefore, has largely replaced the principle of dynastic 
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sovereignty on which agrarian empires were based in the pre-colonial period (Gellner, 
1983, in Cederman et al, 2010).  
In his studies of the European experience of state-making, Tilly (1992:101) found that 
cultural homogenisation projects often stirred massive resistance by unassimilated 
minorities, which occasionally resulted in mass rebellion. It also led to nationalism in the 
sense of the mobilisation of populations that do not have a state of their own to a claim for 
political independence (Tilly, 1992:116). Church networks were an important factor in the 
making or breaking of states; for example, in Northern European Protestant countries, 
state churches became major agencies for the standardisation of national languages and for 
the socialisation of the masses into unified national cultures. Conversely, in Southern 
Europe, the Catholic Church played a large part in the development of peripheral 
nationalisms and secessionist movements (Rokkan, in Flora et al. 1999:149). 
Although Tilly (1992) highlights the centrality of state-led nationalism to the European 
experience of state-making, it is much less evident in contemporary studies of civil conflict 
which tend to treat the state as an ethnically-neutral actor, rarely linking state nationalism to 
outbreaks of political violence (Cederman et al, 2010).8 However, Wimmer et al. (2009:317) 
argue that “the modern state is not an ethnically neutral actor or a mere arena for political 
competition, but a central object of and participant in ethnopolitical power struggles.” 
Quantitative studies of conflict support this argument. The Minorities at Risk dataset 
describes 200 groups, motivated by discrimination and threats to group identity, which 
openly resisted their incorporation into states controlled by other ethnic groups in the 
1945-89 period (Gurr, 1993, in Shultz, 1995). While many took the form of non-violent 
protest, around half initiated some form of armed conflict. More compelling evidence is 
found in Wimmer and Min’s (2006) dataset of civil war. Since the end of the Cold War, 
they find that ethno-nationalist wars count for 75 per cent of all wars with more than 1,000 
battle deaths.9  
In many post-colonial countries, the central state’s reliance on ethnically-based patrimonial 
politics as the basis for state political legitimacy has been argued to have prompted a large 
number of ethno-nationalist anti-regime struggles to emerge from below, especially in 
peripheral areas where minority groups are most often located (Brown, 1994; Scherrer, 
                                                 
8 State discrimination, however, not necessarily as a result of nationalism, has been linked to rebellion with 
scholars generally agreeing that discrimination against a minority group encourages rebellion (Okomoto & 
Wilkes, 2008).  
9 Scherrer’s (2003) study of ethnonational conflict finds that Africa has overtaken Asia since 1995 with the 
world’s largest share of violent conflicts by mortality and number of cases, although West Asia/Middle East 
and Southeast Asia account for over half of Asia’s share. 
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2003).  This has been especially marked in Southeast Asia (Brown, 1994). Relying on ethno-
nationalism for political legitimacy means holders of political office build their legitimacy 
by favouring ethnic kin when distributing public goods or services (Wimmer et al., 
2009:321). This is especially likely where there are weak civil society institutions capable of 
representing political interests along non-ethnic lines or inadequate processes for political 
inclusion prompting a disproportionate reliance on ethnic networks in politics and the 
marketplace (Habyarimana et al 2008; Sambanis, 2002; Congleton, 1995; Wimmer, 2002; 
Carment, 2003:29).   
State nationalism has meant that armed groups and peripheral conflicts in Southeast Asia 
have frequently taken on an ethno-nationalist character (Brown, 1994), but they are 
primarily conflicts over processes of territorialisation, especially the monopolisation of 
land, resources and coercive power, and conflicting claims to sovereignty. Fearon 
(2004:283) calls peripheral conflicts ‘sons-of-the-soil’ insurgencies and divides them into 
two types: conflicts over land where ethnic minority communities in peripheral areas face 
in-migration pressures from the majority ethnic group, and conflicts over resources where 
minority groups are concerned by the state’s monopoly over resource extraction from their 
areas. However, these are not distinct categories, peripheral conflicts may contain elements 
of both. 
In Southeast Asia today, peripheral conflicts and forms of co-existence between the state 
and armed opposition groups are ongoing as the state continues to strive to find ways of 
consolidating its power to the edges of its boundaries. As a result, the rise of the modern 
Southeast Asian state has created “interstices, zones within and between nations” where 
armed groups wield degrees of coercive power with shades of legitimacy, in some cases 
creating ‘shadow states’ which mimic the central state (McCoy, 1999:130). In Burma, for 
example, the ‘drug lord’, Khun Sa, “manipulated a variety of social, ethnic, economic, 
political and geographic situations” since independence and in the process created a 
shadow state in pockets of the borderlands that “on occasion threatened to emerge as a 
viable national polity in its own right” (Gallant, 1999:45).  
In summary, peripheral conflicts are understood here to be the result of incomplete state 
formation processes, whereby the central state has not yet penetrated or fully consolidated 
its control over peripheral areas (Migdal, 1988). As a result, post-colonial attempts to 
establish the state in peripheral areas are met by challenges from local power-holders who 
resent the establishment of direct rule, extraction of resources, projection of coercive 
power and/or marginalisation of minority groups’ cultural identities (Baud & Van 
Schendel, 1997:211; Fearon, 2004:283; Brown, 1994). These challenges are directed 
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towards the state’s processes of territorialisation and establishment of a monopoly of 
coercion over the resources contained within its claimed territory. As such, peripheral 
conflicts are fundamentally about sovereignty and the spatialisation of power. However, 
armed groups are often co-opted by the state, or effectively bought off through the state’s 
provision of rents, which they may then use to build their own patrimonial legitimacy 
locally (McCoy, 1999). Thus, patterns of sovereignty, coercive power, control of resources 
and local legitimacy can be highly fragmented. Understanding peripheral conflicts, then, 
requires a departure from state-centric studies towards “a view from the periphery” which 
looks at the historical effects of the imposition of a national border on social dynamics, 
conflicts over state formation in peripheral areas and how borderland dynamics affect the 
formation and territorialisation of states (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997:212).  
2 The micro-dynamics of armed opposition groups and peripheral conflicts 
Moving on from examining the nature of peripheral conflicts in Southeast Asia and the 
symbiotic relationship between the state and armed groups in coercive state-making 
practices, this section examines the micro-dynamics of armed opposition groups and 
peripheral conflicts from the political economy literature. In borderland areas, this body of 
literature points to a number of conditions that favour the development of armed conflict 
including; the physical geography of the land, especially difficult terrain (Fearon & Laitin, 
2003; Herbst, 2000); large states (possibly because of their lack of cohesiveness and history 
of indirect rule) (Fearon, 2004:287; Wimmer et al., 2011); in-migration resulting in land 
pressures (Fearon, 2004); sanctuary in a neighbouring country (Salehyan); outside support, 
usually from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but occasionally also from the USA 
(Kalyvas & Balecells, 2010); and weak, ethnically plural states (Carment, 2003:30). Studies 
of the micro-dynamics of violence perpetrated by armed opposition groups have found 
that competition between groups over an area, the internal organisation of the group, the 
types of revenue streams it relies on and rebel capacity are all important factors (Kalyvas, 
2006; Wood, 2003a; Weinstein, 2007). 
a) Revenue Streams and bureaucratic structures 
The type of revenue streams an armed group relies on has been a particular focus. 
Weinstein’s (2007) study distinguishes between two types of revenue streams, which give 
an indication of the coercive nature of an armed group. He argues that resource-rich 
groups which rely on lootable resources tend to behave predatorily and fall into a 
downward cycle of violence and loss of legitimacy (Weinstein, 2007). By contrast, groups 
which have to rely on the local population for support (which he terms ‘activist’ groups) 
need to continue to demonstrate their capacity for governance in order to build legitimacy 
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(Weinstein, 2007). Within an ‘activist’ group, entire administrative systems may be 
established in addition to the military, as the power-holders seek to prove their capacity for 
governance and provide collective benefits to their supporters (usually education, health 
and infrastructure) (Weinstein, 2007). 
While Weinstein (2007) focuses on the patterns of violence armed groups adopt and links 
this to the types of revenue streams they have, Naylor (1993) provides an in-depth analysis 
of the processes by which the development of bureaucratic structures takes place as 
guerrillas transform their revenues and methods of warfare. Using Mao’s three stages of 
guerrilla warfare as a guide, Naylor (1993; 2004:45) argues that in the first stage, small 
bands of guerrillas rely on sporadic and predatory activities in ‘zones of contention’ 
mimicking those used by organised criminals, such as kidnapping and bank robbery. 
Olson’s (1993) category of ‘roving bandits’ would also be in this stage. At this stage there 
are no non-military activities to speak of as the group is small, loosely connected and 
relatively un-hierarchical. 
In the second stage, Naylor (2004) argues that insurgent groups more openly dispute or 
attempt to undermine the state’s political legitimacy and extract capital for themselves by 
destroying the formal economy or taking advantage of the government’s own inept 
handling of the economy. The population’s subsequent reliance on the black market 
economy further discredits the government’s legitimacy, shrinks the fiscal resources 
available to the government and expands the relative size of the black markets from which 
armed opposition groups can draw material support through taxation on black market 
trade through territory they control (Naylor, 2002). In this stage, an insurgent group 
develops a ‘parasitical’ relationship with the local population, much like mafia groups, but 
also faces increased pressure to care for the dependents of militants and provide some 
assistance to the supporting population in its ‘zone of expansion’ (Naylor, 2004:45). 
Olson’s (1993) ‘stationary bandits’ category fits here. Rudimentary welfare systems may be 
developed as well as some basic administrative functions to manage the group’s more 
complex revenue streams. Armed opposition groups may also receive outside support in 
the form of political backing, military assistance and/or humanitarian aid. Kalyvas and 
Balcells (2011) argue that during the Cold War, it was primarily the Soviet Union that 
supported opposition groups, which usually professed a leftist agenda, with the United 
States only providing occasional support to opposition groups, such as the Contras. 
However, Naylor’s (2004:80-81) study of the financing of insurgent groups argues that 
communist funding to left-wing insurgent groups was actually very minimal, while US, 
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British, French and Saudi support to right-wing opposition groups was much more 
voluminous.  
In the final stage, where the group succeeds in establishing extensive ‘zones of control’, 
revenues tend to come from indirect taxation (on trade flows and user fees for social 
services) and are symbiotic with the emerging parallel economy controlled by the group 
(Naylor, 1993). This stabilises the funding base, but the group also faces more extensive 
governance obligations, including the provision of welfare services to the general 
population and the building of necessary infrastructure (physical, administrative and fiscal) 
(Naylor, 1993). The EPLF, Hesbollah, the Lebanese Forces and Palestinian Authority, for 
instance, reproduced most of the functions of the formal state (Naylor, 2004, Pool, 2001). 
The Palestinian Authority even set up its own factories to produce consumer goods and 
established arrangements with all Arab governments with Palestinian populations to remit a 
fixed tax of five to seven percent of wages earned by Palestinian workers (Rubenberg, 
1983). Some groups may go so far as to outlaw state currency and issue their own currency 
instead, the Biafran pound for example (Uche, 2007). At this stage, and possibly even 
before, the group needs to overcome problems of asset management and interface with the 
formal and international economy to process (or launder) its revenue flows (Naylor, 1993). 
This situation implies the need for a number of non-military activities to manage complex 
revenue streams and processes, more extensive administrative departments and broader 
governance services. Without fiscal management and effective administration, armed 
opposition groups are liable to collapse, as the Biafran experience demonstrates (Uche, 
2007). 
Naylor’s (1993, 2004) analysis provides a framework for understanding how an insurgent 
group’s revenue streams typically change as it advances through the stages of guerrilla 
warfare, but it does not explain how revenue streams change as a group declines or goes 
through the reverse stages of guerrilla warfare. It cannot just be assumed that the reverse 
pattern happens, for instance. Naylor’s (1993, 2004) analysis also does not explain how the 
internal behaviour of a group changes, although he indicates that it comes under increasing 
pressure to provide services to both group members and the local population as it grows in 
power and increases territorial control.  
Kalyvas & Balcells (2011) and Heupel (2009:69) argue that the end of the Cold War has 
reduced external funding to both governments and their challengers which has led armed 
groups to turn to criminal activities to compensate their reduced revenues, assisted by 
globalisation and transnational criminal networks. However, Byman et al. (2001 in Kalyvas 
and Balcells, 2011) highlight a shift in revenue sources for armed opposition groups after 
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the end of the Cold War from external government patrons towards diasporas, refugees 
and neighbouring states. Although an armed group usually lacks consolidated control over 
diaspora populations, diasporas from besieged minority groups have in several cases been 
identified as a source of support for armed groups10, particularly larger diaspora groups in 
America (such as Irish Americans who funded the IRA) (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Naylor, 
2004:49). The presence of transnational ties has also been identified as a key factor in 
determining outside support (Salehyan et al., 2011:727).  
Implications for non-military roles 
Depending on the type of revenue streams an armed opposition group relies upon, there 
may be a greater or lesser bureaucratic structure with administrative staff. For example, 
generating voluntary remittances from diaspora groups requires communication, marketing 
and grievance-framing to prompt emigrants to remit a portion of their earnings. 
Maintaining bureaucratic structures and operations requires fiscal management as well as 
negotiations and agreements with external economic partners (Naylor, 2004). They also 
require security and stability, either through firm territorial control, or sanctuary elsewhere. 
Thus, communication and marketing, tax and customs and resource management and 
extraction are all important non-military roles to stabilise revenue steams within an armed 
opposition group. However, there is a lacuna in the literature about who takes on which 
role in an armed group and why. 
While analysis of an armed opposition group’s revenue streams gives some indication of 
the types of bureaucratic functions it may develop, this approach tends to neglect the roles 
that legitimacy and political authority plays in stabilising revenue streams. Groups reliant on 
a form of local taxation and support (whether cash or in kind) must build both their 
legitimacy and a public fear of penalties should people refuse to pay their taxes, just as 
governments do (Naylor, 2004). Furthermore, they have to distinguish their legitimacy 
from that of the state because armed opposition groups of this type directly compete with 
the state for territory, populations and resources while undertaking expenditures for 
everything from warfare to welfare (Naylor, 2004). 
b) Legitimacy and bureaucratic structures 
An armed opposition group in a peripheral conflict primarily seeks to maintain the conflict 
over a long period of time because rather than aiming to decisively overthrow the state 
government, it aims to force the government to the negotiating table either by military 
might or inflicting high costs (Fearon, 2004:289). The internal organisation of armed 
                                                 
10 See Demmers (2007), for example. 
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opposition groups, including the skill and style of its leadership have been found to also be 
important factors in determining when armed groups can mount and maintain an effective 
challenge to the state (Guevara, 2001; Weinstein, 2007; Clapham, 1998). However, 
relatively few studies focus on the internal management, organisational structure and 
problems of agency in such groups (Gates, 2002). Furthermore, there has not been enough 
consideration of the connections between an armed opposition group’s non-military 
operations and the group’s strategies of contesting state-making in peripheral areas.  
More recently scholars have attempted to grapple with this issue by analysing armed 
opposition groups through a Tillian state formation lens, viewing armed groups with 
territorial control to some extent as ‘states within states’, for example (Spears, 2004; 
Metelits, 2010). However, Tilly (1985) himself argues that the European experience of 
state-making is probably not applicable to developing countries today. As Mampilly’s 
(2007) analysis argues, the issue in armed opposition groups is not one of state formation, 
but rather one of the formation of political order outside or against the state. Though 
armed opposition groups may mimic the form of the state, they are not analogous to 
nascent states as in the Tilly idea (Mampilly, 2007). 
What is the relationship, then, between ethno-nationalist armed opposition groups’ non-
military structures and peripheral forms of conflict? Olson’s (1993) analysis of stationery 
bandits argues that the provision of selective incentives through welfare services allows an 
armed group to more efficiently stabilise its funding streams through taxation. Mampilly 
(2007, 2011:8) on the other hand, argues that the bureaucratisation of an armed group and 
the provision of governance is a strategic decision to garner civilian consent for rebel rule, 
which results in increased security for the group and gives the group the opportunity to 
signal their strength to the incumbent state in order to force it to the negotiating table. This 
study understands ‘governance’ in armed opposition groups as “the process by which rebel 
leaders develop both the structures necessary to provide goods and the practices that 
enforce their legitimacy” (Wood and Dupont, 2006:2 in Mampilly, 2011:55). These 
processes involve monopolisation of the social, political and economic inter-relations of a 
defined community such that the armed group improves its ability to foster voluntary 
participation (Mampilly, 2011:237). 
Internal Legitimacy-building 
Legitimacy can be built by communicating the goals of the group to the local population 
and building support for the group’s political agenda. Both Mao and Guevara viewed 
educational outreach with the civilian population as important for inculcating appreciation 
of a rebel group’s revolutionary agenda (Mampilly, 2011:13). An armed opposition group 
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may also raise its standing by offering external protection from state counterinsurgency 
action. However, local people are often aware that it can provoke an increase in 
counterinsurgency operations and atrocities. This may of course be a tactic of armed 
groups seeking to generate new voluntary recruits (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007:189). Thus, 
local mediators may be needed to negotiate the group’s presence and mediate its needs and 
actions with those of the local population.  
In addition to inculcating awareness of the group’s political agenda, secessionist and ethno-
national armed groups intent on securing regional autonomy are particularly likely to 
establish governance systems in order to build internal legitimacy because they have to 
convince their target population that they offer a better alternative than the state and 
because they rely on the support of a specific ethnic, regional or national population 
(Mampilly, 2007:31; Weinstein, 2007). In this, they are similar to national liberation 
movements which sought to achieve independence from colonial rule not just by inflicting 
military losses on the enemy, but also by undermining the legitimacy of the central 
government and establishing a rival regime (Mampilly, 2007:64). Furthermore, it is 
important for armed opposition groups reliant upon local support to ensure the passive 
majority do not turn against them as a result of their negative behaviour or better 
conditions offered by rivals (Mampilly, 2011:54). The style of governance they create is 
influenced by the armed group’s ideology (socialist, communist, Islamist etc.) and by pre-
conflict cleavages in the local populations (along ethnic, religious or regional lines, for 
instance), but it aims to generate broad support and legitimacy beyond individual 
participants (Mampilly, 2011:54). 
Mampilly (2011) argues that the development of governance services by armed opposition 
groups can happen as a result of civilians used to making demands of a public authority 
adjusting the focus of their demands to a rebel group; or rebel group reliance on a specific 
ethnic, regional or national population empowering civilians to force the group to provide 
governance. Complex networks of civilian support groups may, therefore, be created to 
govern and control the population; provide social services, such as health, education and 
security and maintain political legitimacy. The provision of effective governance by an 
armed opposition group is contingent upon territorial control and periods of relative calm 
in conflict, as well as the ability of the group’s leadership to impose discipline throughout 
the organisation (Mampilly, 2007:245). 
Leftist guerrilla movements during the Cold War aimed to acquire and govern territory by 
building a highly structured political organisation with a disciplined armed wing and 
effective administration in their ‘liberated areas’ Kalyvas and Balcells (2011:421). For years 
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the LTTE aimed for self-government for the Tamil nation and homeland (Tamil Eelam) 
through armed struggle and in the process created a de facto state structure in areas under its 
control in the north and east of Sri Lanka (Stokke, 2006). Other groups with significantly 
developed administrative structures include the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah and 
UNITA in Angola from the 1970s to 2002 (Bakonyi & Stuvoy, 2005). The creation of 
welfare wings can build both internal and external legitimacy. The EPLF, for instance, used 
their distribution of international famine relief in Eritrea to raise their international 
standing as a ‘quasi-state’ while garnering loyalty from recipients in aid camps (Pool, 2001). 
Complex networks of civilian support groups may, therefore, be created to govern and 
control the population; provide social services, such as health, education and security and 
build political legitimacy by ‘out-governing’ the state. Welfare wings therefore contain a 
number of important roles for an armed opposition group’s participants, such as teaching, 
health care and bureaucratic management. 
Several studies of education provision by armed groups have shown that they are often an 
important means by which ideological indoctrination and grievance-framing are conducted. 
For example, it has been argued that Hamas, the LTTE and Hezbollah have exploited the 
terms of the social contract and the methods of its provision to mobilise recipients of 
social services for violence, including suicide bombings (Grynkewich, 2008; Flanigan, 2008; 
Laitin & Berman, 2008). Hamas, for example, includes a battery of mosques, schools, 
orphanages, summer camps and sports leagues integrated into its apparatus and uses these 
for incitement, recruitment and logistical and operational support for military activities 
(Levitt, 2004). Furthermore, providing alternative messages through education structures 
can undermine the messages the state seeks to promote in order to socialise the population. 
Education is a tool for socialising the population, creating an educated workforce for 
industrialisation projects and building both state and nation (Gellner, 1983 and Weber, 
1976, in Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Thus, the provision of alternative messages through 
armed groups’ own education services undermines the state’s promotion of its own 
particular messages. 
Socialising the local population in the culture of the armed opposition group is also argued 
to be important for building the group’s internal legitimacy. In addition to providing 
welfare services, many groups adopt symbols of state sovereignty (Mampilly, 2011:56). As 
Lund (2006:677) puts it, some organisations outside the formal governmental apparatus 
“strut in borrowed plumes”, imitating the state in its visual displays of statehood. In their 
attempts to govern, they may articulate notions of the state varying from their source of 
power to their antithesis. An important component of this articulation of statehood is 
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argued to be the construction of cultural and political representations, discourses and 
activities that give meaning to state practices and form the idea of the state in the social 
imaginary of the population (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010:543).  
As the previous section discussed, the development of bureaucratic structures is often 
associated with territorial control and the stabilisation of revenue streams. However, 
groups that manage to secure external funding have less need to develop internal revenue 
streams. Zahar (2001, in Mampilly, 2011:89) argues that armed opposition groups with a 
more limited resource base have a strong incentive to develop external funding streams 
through transnational actors and take advantage of the credibility such associations may 
generate. Developing external revenue streams requires a degree of external legitimacy, 
though. 
External Legitimacy-building 
Many armed opposition groups rely to an extent on external aid for the funding of their 
governance services, though the characteristics of aid vary, and seek to incorporate 
transnational non-state actors into their political project (Bob, 2006, in Mampilly, 2007:37). 
Some groups quietly influence international flows of aid to match their own development 
programmes while others are more open and effectively ‘tax’ international aid delivered to 
communities under their control (El Salvador’s FMLN in the 1980s, or the SPLA in South 
Sudan, for example) (Naylor, 2004; Wood, 2003). In this case, aid has a further benefit as it 
allows more of the group’s own funds to be diverted to the military (Naylor, 2004; 
Loescher et al, 2007; Terry, 2002). In order to attract international aid revenues armed 
opposition groups require external legitimacy (Zahar, in Mampilly, 2007:37). This can be 
derived through their association with refugee populations. 
Refugees have previously been argued to provide “international legitimacy, a shield against 
attack, a pool of recruits, and valuable sources for food and medicine…in essence…rear 
bases for rebels who attack across the border” Lischer (2005:2).  The term ‘refugee warrior’ 
has been coined for refugees engaged in armed campaigns against their country of origin. 
Refugee warriors include Palestinian refugees based in camps in the occupied territories 
who launch cross-border attacks against Israel and Liberian armed elements who used 
Guinean refugee camps as a base while they pursued a campaign against Charles Taylor 
(Lischer, 2005:12, Loescher et al, 2007). However, in Terry’s (2002) analysis of 
humanitarian aid, the primary benefit of a refugee population to an armed opposition 
group is the external legitimacy function they serve, raising the profile of a ‘victimised’ 
population and attracting both sympathy and aid.  
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INGO support can lead to the development of complex structures to extract more INGO 
capital (the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Authority, for instance) (Flanigan, 2008), 
but although much is known about how INGOs and donor governments manage the 
distribution of resources and their relationships with armed opposition groups11, the way in 
which armed opposition groups manage external donors and their legitimacy is much less 
clear. Managing external funding relationships implies a very different skill set from that of 
the average foot soldier in an armed opposition group. At the very least, it requires English 
language skills, computer familiarity and knowledge of project proposal writing, monitoring 
and reporting. It also requires a different set of political negotiation skills than those 
needed for communicating with the local population as well as skills in ‘marketing the 
rebellion’ (Bob, 2005). In this, armed groups can learn a lot from local and national NGOs 
in the country, in which youths may have a prominent role. 
In terms of the external political negotiations an armed group is involved in, engaging with 
armed opposition groups in the provision of humanitarian aid has frequently been argued 
to confer external legitimacy on the group, which then has the potential to undermine the 
hegemonic status of state sovereignty in the international community (Steinhoff, 2009). As 
a result, there is often a bias towards the state rather than towards armed opposition groups 
in current humanitarian aid practices (Mampilly, 2011:243). However, external welfare 
assistance can also be considered as another form of ‘rent’ which has the potential to 
undermine the social contract between an armed opposition group and the local population 
(Svensson, 2000). Its de-legitimising potential is often overlooked, though. Mampilly 
(2007:38-42) identifies ways in which NGO provision of services in rebel-controlled areas 
can both undermine and lend support to the group’s legitimacy among the local 
population. NGOs may be seen as a competitor to an armed opposition group if they are 
unable to exert any control over the distribution of services (which may then reduce the 
perceived legitimacy of the group among the local population) or as a supporter if they 
manage to position NGOs between themselves and the local population and continue to 
be seen as providers of governance.  
The effects of humanitarian action and cross-border refugee camps on armed opposition 
groups have been studied in depth in the humanitarian literature, due to the difficulties aid 
agencies have faced in managing the delivery of aid in areas with armed opposition group 
activity. However, there is little examination of armed opposition groups from within (due, 
no doubt, to the secretive nature of such groups and the difficulties in gaining trust and 
access), so there is currently far less knowledge about how actors within such groups 
                                                 
11 See Hofmann (2006), for example. 
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mediate policy objectives and aid delivery within their own structures. Part of the lack of 
analysis is because studies of armed opposition groups have often been dominated by 
examinations of the causes of conflict, recruitment of participants and the use of violence 
at the expense of understanding their non-violent activities. 
As Mampilly (2011:239) argues, more research is needed to understand the distinct political 
challenges that armed opposition groups face as they attempt to provide social and political 
order through governance. In addition, research on political concepts of legitimacy, 
authority, representation and governance with regard to armed opposition groups is needed 
(Mampilly, 2011:239). This study seeks to build upon Mampilly’s findings by investigating 
the relationship between armed opposition groups, political legitimacy and governance 
from the perspective of the youth cohort working in an armed opposition group in non-
military functions. 
3 Conclusion 
In seeking to understand the nature of peripheral conflicts in Southeast Asia and the 
relationships between state and armed opposition groups this chapter began by examining 
the literature on state-making and civil war. It argued that there are often two assumptions 
and binary distinctions concerning the nature of the state in much of the literature on state-
making and civil war. First is the assumption that either the state commands a monopoly 
over the means of coercion or there exists a Hobbesian state of anarchy and disorder 
(Yannis, 2002:822). Second is that the state is often equated with law and order and 
political legitimacy, while other armed actors operating outside the state are relegated to the 
status of illegitimate, predatory rebels (Kaldor, 2007:97; Reno, 2006). However, as Tilly’s 
(1978, 1985, 1992) studies of the European experience of state formation and Gallant’s 
(1999) theory of bandits and state-making argue, state-making has overwhelmingly been 
conducted in a highly coercive manner in a symbiotic relationship with armed actors 
outside the state, blurring the lines of sovereignty and legitimacy. Therefore, in 
understanding peripheral conflicts in developing countries, it was argued that it is necessary 
to understand the actual nature of the state, its processes of state-making and the inter-
relationships between state actors and armed actors outside the state. 
The symbiotic relationship between states and non-state armed actors that Tilly (1985, 
1992), Gallant (1999) and McCoy (1999) identify, combined with North et al.’s (2009) 
theory of developing states as ‘limited access orders’, makes a clear case that armed 
opposition groups should be seen as part of the long and brutal politics of sovereignty and 
state-making, rather than actors outside or necessarily against the state. In Southeast Asia in 
particular, it was argued that a relative lack of state penetration and the geographical 
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conditions of difficult terrain and sparsely populated, remote areas, have favoured ongoing 
conflicts over state-making in peripheral, borderland areas as local communities 
accustomed to self-rule have sought alliances with local armed actors in order to retain 
local sovereignty (Scott, 2009; Scherrer, 2003; Grundy-Warr, 1993). However, the nature of 
these conflicts has changed as armed opposition groups and states have influenced each 
other’s actions, which in turn may have shaped the nature of youth involvement.  
Frequently peripheral conflicts in Southeast Asia have taken on an ethno-nationalist 
character as minority groups have opposed post-colonial states’ uses of cultural 
homogenisation techniques to articulate the idea of the nation in their citizens’ minds 
(Brown, 1994). They have also involved the fragmentation of sovereignty, legitimacy and 
power as the state has sought to crush or co-opt local power-holders (McCoy, 1999; 
Grundy-Warr, 1993). In some cases, this has resulted in the rise of ‘shadow states’ 
controlled by armed groups with varying shades of legitimacy operating outside, alongside 
or in collaboration with the state and seeking to mimic displays of statehood (McCoy, 
1999). Fundamentally, though, peripheral conflicts are primarily conflicts over processes of 
territorialisation, especially the monopolisation of land, resources and coercive power, and 
conflicting claims to sovereignty. 
In the second part of this chapter, analysis shifted to a more detailed consideration of the 
non-military activities of armed opposition groups and the linkages between the 
development of armed groups’ bureaucratic structures and their revenue streams and 
processes of legitimacy-building. Naylor’s (1993, 2004) studies highlighted the links 
between revenue streams and the creation of administrative functions in an armed 
opposition group, suggesting that as an armed group develops more complex and stable 
revenue streams, it becomes more stationary and builds territorial control. It then faces 
demands both from its internal members and the local population to provided at least 
rudimentary welfare services, while it also needs to develop non-military bureaucratic 
structures for income and fiscal management (Naylor, 1993; 2004). 
Meanwhile, Mampilly’s (2011:239) study of forms of governance provided by armed 
opposition groups challenges the normative assumption that the state is the sole provider 
of political and social order, and builds upon previous anthropological observations that a 
variety of other individuals and groups outside the state assume sovereign functions 
(Spears, 2004, Lund, 2006; Metelits, 2010). Mampilly (2011) argues that the provision of 
governance services aims to shore up local support and demonstrate the group’s legitimacy 
and strength both to the state and internationally. However, it may also be that the 
provision of alternative messages through armed groups’ own education services aims to 
 80 
undermine the state’s promotion of its own particular messages. Socialising the local 
population in the culture of the armed opposition group is also argued to be important for 
building the group’s internal legitimacy, hence the reason why many armed opposition 
groups display symbols of sovereignty. Complex networks of civilian support may be 
created to govern and control the population; provide social services, such as health, 
education and security and build political legitimacy by ‘out-governing’ the state. This 
implies that armed groups’ welfare wings contain a number of important roles for youth 
participants, such as teaching, health care and bureaucratic management. 
Both Naylor’s (1993, 2004) and Mampilly’s (2007, 2011) studies point to a number of 
important non-military roles within an armed opposition group.  However, neither study 
explains how an armed opposition group’s bureaucratic apparatus changes as it becomes 
militarily weaker and loses the territory it once had. Nor do they elaborate on other 
resources in the borderlands which armed opposition groups have to fall back on, such as 
resources delivered to refugees or IDPs by INGOs. Therefore, this study seeks to add an 
alternative perspective to the literature on INGO engagement with armed opposition 
groups by showing how youths within an armed group deal with INGOs. Currently, there 
is much less understanding of the micro-processes by which armed opposition groups’ 
bureaucratic cadres develop the very different types of skills necessary for dealing with 
INGO funding and the effects this revenue stream has on internal relations within the 
group and the armed group’s modes of contesting the state’s political authority and/or 
state-making practices. 
Conflicts are highly dynamic and armed opposition groups as well as states must 
continually find ways to adapt to a changing international, national and local environment. 
Moreover, changes within armed opposition groups imply changes in the roles and 
relations between participants, including the youth cohort. This study, therefore, seeks to 
build on Naylor’s (1993, 2004) and Mampilly’s (2007, 2011) findings and investigate the 
non-military activities in a group with declining territorial control and military power and 
the relationships and internal organisation that an armed opposition group is engaged in 
from the perspective of the youth cohort. The approach adopted in this study is an analysis 
of youths in non-military roles in an armed opposition group situated within a historical 
context of state-making and peripheral conflict. Understanding these processes aims to 
supplement studies of the military strategies of armed opposition groups, providing a more 
complete picture of armed opposition groups in peripheral conflicts. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter argues that a mixed methodology utilising ethnographic research methods and 
a case study was most appropriate to a deep study of the lives of youths in an armed 
opposition group for two main reasons. First, the purpose of the study was primarily to 
generate new insights from the perspective of participants themselves and new theoretical 
interpretations, rather than test existing theory. Second, it is particularly useful for studying 
youths in conflict zones because the highly politicised nature of conflict can marginalise the 
views and experiences of less powerful actors such as youths while research in conflict 
zones poses distinct methodological challenges.  
A mixture of data collection methods was used in this study to provide methodological 
triangulation of evidence and mitigate some of the weaknesses of the ethnographic 
method. These are reviewed in depth in section three before the chapter discusses the 
methodological issues faced in this study in section four. As chapters two and three argued, 
the actions of participants in an armed opposition group appear to be affected by the 
historical, political and social contexts in which they are situated, as well as the culture of 
the armed group as an organisation, but actors themselves replicate and transform these 
contexts through their actions. An actor-orientated approach is, therefore, argued here to 
be critical to gaining in-depth insight into the activities of participants in the social 
structures of armed opposition groups. The rationale for this methodology and research 
strategy are outlined next.  
1 Research Design 
a) Rationale 
This study aimed to uncover the micro-dynamics of youth participation within an armed 
opposition group located in the Burmese borderlands. The research adopted an 
interpretivist research philosophy because it prioritises the world of lived experience, 
perceptions and social meaning. A positivist ontology was deemed unsuitable for this study 
since it leaves little room for the consideration of multiple realities. In the interpretivist 
philosophy, the research domain is considered to be a social construction relative to the 
situation and the researcher a ‘relativist’ who interprets meaning in a situation where many 
realities exist, not just one (Travis, 1999; Ellen, 2008). The interpretivist ontology is not 
without its critics though; in recent years it has suffered from a ‘crisis of representation’ in 
that the written text emerging from this philosophy is alleged to be subject to the 
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vicissitudes of interpretation (Flaherty et al, 2002:480). This criticism and other weaknesses 
to methods relying on an interpretivist ontology are expanded further in section two. 
b)  Research Strategy 
Case study approach 
Yin (2003:13), one of the main exponents of the case study approach, defines a case study 
as an empirical inquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context. It is both a process of inquiry and a product of that inquiry (Stake, 2003:136). 
Stake (2003) further specifies that an ‘instrumental case study’ is where a specific case is 
examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalisation. This 
research used a single case study approach precisely to facilitate understanding of the 
broader issues of youth involvement in armed opposition groups. 
A single case study is justifiable under certain conditions, one of which is when the case 
serves a revelatory purpose (Yin, 2003:46). In this case, little is known about the extent, 
function and effects of non-military youth roles in an armed opposition group. The 
advantages of utilising a case study approach here were that contemporary youth action in 
the group could be studied in their natural setting; “how” and “why” questions covering 
the nature and complexity of the processes taking place could be asked; and a deep insight 
into the micro-processes of youths everyday actions could be generated.  
A frequent criticism of the external validity of case studies is that their dependence on a 
single case renders the method incapable of providing a generalising conclusion (Tellis, 
1997). However, Yin (2003) suggests that case studies, if properly constructed, can enable 
analytical generalisation, though not statistical generalisation to populations. The purpose 
of this study was to generate theoretical and practical insights into a phenomenon, rather 
than test the validity of existing theories, so a single case study is perfectly compatible with 
this aim. For the test of ‘construct validity’, Yin (2003) suggests using multiple sources of 
evidence, establishing a chain of evidence or having report drafts reviewed by key 
informants. He also suggests rigorous documentation and operational research procedures 
to improve reliability. These tactics were adopted for this study. The test of ‘internal 
validity’ is only a concern for causal case studies, so it is irrelevant here.  
Selection of the case 
The previous chapter highlighted gaps in knowledge of the internal workings of armed 
opposition groups, in particular the roles of non-elite members and the non-military 
activities of certain types of armed opposition group. The Karen National Union (KNU) 
was thought to be ideal as a research case for addressing this lacuna precisely because it 
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appeared to have a fairly well-formed and extensive administrative apparatus which 
included in its ranks large numbers of non-elites. It also had significant numbers of 
grassroots cadres in mass organisations. Furthermore, the constituent organisations of the 
KNU appeared to be involved in a variety of governance functions in eastern Burma. As an 
armed opposition group with a long history of territorial control (though this is declining), 
it appeared to have a politically complex internal structure and a much wider agenda than 
purely military activities. 
It was also a useful case for examining how social roles are formed and generational 
relations managed in an outstandingly tenacious armed opposition group. Running for over 
sixty years, the KNU’s conflict with the Burmese state is the longest-running intra-state 
conflict in the world. Few groups exist long enough to provide such a good opportunity for 
the analysis of generational relations, social roles and group regeneration processes.  
Finally, this case lent itself well to academic study for three practical reasons: first, there 
exists a small body of ‘Karen studies’ literature which allowed this study to build on the 
excellent anthropological and historical work of other researchers12. Secondly, the 
familiarity the KNU’s leaders have with previous academic and journalistic research, as well 
as the location of many of its bureaucratic offices on the Thai side of the border with 
Burma, made it conducive to an involved, lengthy study without too many of the security 
and access problems found by researchers in other conflict zones. Finally, my prior work 
experience and good relations with youth actors in the movement enabled advantageous 
access to informants. 
Actor-orientated approach 
Although individual youths and their experiences will form the basis of my enquiry, the 
extant literature on youth participation in conflict indicates that the wider contexts in which 
youths live are highly significant in shaping their actions. In order to take this range of 
potentially important factors into consideration, I will adopt Long’s (1992) ‘actor-oriented’ 
paradigm which considers individual agency never to be the sole explanatory factor in 
human behaviour since all actions are authored within a particular external context. An 
actor-orientated approach begins with the idea that different social forms develop in the 
same or similar structural circumstances reflecting variations in the ways actors attempt to 
                                                 
12 The earliest studies of the Karen were ethnographic manuscripts by missionaries, for example Mason 
(1865) and Marshall (1922), then later by colonial administrators, particularly Scott (1922). Later studies have 
focused on Karen ethnicity, identity and ethnic adaptation, particularly Keyes (1979), Rajah (2002, 2008) and 
South (2007); Karen history, particularly Renard (1980) and Karen ecology, for example, Kunstandter (1969). 
Most recently, South (2011) has conducted a study of the KNU for TNI and Keenan (forthcoming) has 
written a detailed history of the KNU. 
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come to grips with the situations they face (Long, 1992:27).  Thus, youth action in conflict 
situations may depend to some extent on differing actors’ strategies and rationales, 
however it also depends on structural conditions such as the socio-economic context, 
actions of the state and actions of armed opposition groups, as well as family and 
community pressures. 
Adopting an actor-orientated approach means studying the social by studying the actors 
and studying people by studying the social (Hilhorst, 2003:214). This is an ideal way to 
understand processes of social change since it involves analysing individual actions and 
decisions within a social context that both influences and is recreated by the individual 
(Seur, 1992:119). It starts from the understanding that people are social actors whose 
agency is shaped by their experiences, social networks and lives, among other factors 
(Hilhorst, 2003:5). These structural constraints are understood to be of a dual nature, 
though, with actors constantly recreating and reinterpreting them in their everyday actions 
(Giddens, 1984).  
In the past, there has been little synthesis of individual-level studies focusing on 
motivation, behaviour and participation patterns in war with national-level processes such 
as the structural determinants of war or elite decision-making processes (Wood, 2003).  As 
chapter two argued, however, the type of armed opposition group, its organisational style 
and the behaviour of its leadership may mediate structural and individual factors of youth 
participation. An actor-oriented approach is sensitive to individual differences, cultural 
frames of reference and social structures, but it faces a problem identifying where the 
emphasis between individual agency and broader structural factors should lie. This is a 
common problem in social explanations, but Clapham (1998) argues it is particularly the 
case in armed opposition groups where it is difficult to attribute events to leadership or 
structural features. Furthermore, human action can itself reinforce or recreate social 
structures as well as being influenced by them (Jabri, 1996) Thus, the social practices, forms 
of meaning, discourses and institutional frameworks which reproduce and legitimate the 
condition of conflict should also be investigated in an actor-orientated approach. 
The assumption in this study follows one of the key components of Giddens’s (1984) 
theory of structuration, that social agents are knowledgeable in the sense of ‘practical 
consciousness’ and ‘discursive consciousness’ (Jabri, 1996:179). ‘Practical consciousness’ is 
“invoked in the routine processes of daily life but remains inarticulated” while ‘discursive 
consciousness’ is “what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social 
conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action” (Jabri, 1996:179). The 
practical consciousness of youths can be studied through observation of their daily 
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activities while their discursive consciousness can be revealed through discussions about 
their actions and the social conditions around them. While there may be a difference in 
practical and discursive consciousness, studying the two can uncover the daily modes of 
representation and imagery which are drawn upon to generate and legitimate exclusionist 
identities and support for specific forms of group action (Jabri, 1996:180).Thus, this 
ontological assumption is well suited to the study of youth roles and action within an 
armed opposition group. 
The methodological implications of this approach were that the research must 
simultaneously study the structural and organisational context while observing youth action 
and decision-making processes. An embedded, rather than holistic, design using multiple 
units of analysis was adopted because it is a useful way of focusing case study inquiry on 
particular units of analysis, thereby avoiding research of an overly abstract nature (Yin, 
2003:45). The primary unit of analysis was the individual, but several organisations in which 
youths predominantly feature within the KNU and its affiliated organisations, and the 
structure of the KNU, formed secondary units of analysis. The following table illustrates 
the issues studied and methods used for each unit of analysis: 
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Unit of Analysis 
 Individual 
 Staff Leaders 
Organisations 
within the 
KNU 
Parent 
Organisation 
(KNU) 
 
Issues 
studied 
- Motivations 
for joining, 
adopting work 
roles and 
leaving a group 
- Processes 
which affected 
recruitment 
and the type of 
role they took 
on 
- Opinions 
about work 
tasks 
- External 
context of 
decisions 
- Construction 
of social 
categories 
(particularly 
‘youth’ and 
‘Karen’) 
- Relationships 
with parent 
party leaders 
- Motivations 
for joining, 
adopting work 
roles and 
leaving a group 
- Processes 
which affected 
recruitment and 
the type of role 
they took on 
- Opinions 
about work 
tasks 
- External 
context of 
decisions 
- Construction 
of social 
categories 
(particularly 
‘youth’ and 
‘Karen’) 
- Organisational 
history 
- Recruitment 
tactics 
- Work patterns 
- Human 
resource 
management 
practices and 
policies 
- Income 
streams 
(quantity, 
sources and how 
they are 
managed) 
- Purpose of 
youth roles for the 
organisation and 
its political aims 
- Conceptions of 
youth categories 
- Tactics of social 
construction of 
categories 
- Political agenda 
and how this has 
changed over time 
- Management of 
generational 
relations 
- Management of 
different interest 
groups within the 
organisation more 
generally 
- Youth 
recruitment tactics 
 
Methods 
used 
- Life histories 
- Participant 
Observation 
- Semi-
structured 
interviews 
- Life histories 
- Participant 
Observation 
- Semi-
structured 
interviews 
 
- Participant 
observation 
- Focus groups 
- Semi-
structured 
interviews 
- Examination of 
online 
information (e.g. 
Facebook page 
and 
organisation’s 
website) 
- Internal 
documents and 
archives 
- Physical 
artefacts 
- Focus groups 
- Grey sources 
- Previous 
academic studies 
- Semi-structured 
interviews 
- Examination of 
texts published by 
the organisation 
- Examination of 
online information 
(e.g. Facebook 
page and website) 
Table 3 Units of analysis, issues studied and methods used 
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2 Ethnographic Research Method 
Much recent conflict research has emanated from econometrics, whose theories of civil 
conflict are based on the assumptions and logic of neo-classical economics. This holds that 
everything can be explained from the point of view of the individual and that individual 
behaviour is a function of choices rationally made in order to maximise utility (Cramer, 
2002). Paul Collier’s work is the most prominent exponent of this approach. He argues that 
grievance discourses are utilised to generate international and local support but that 
economic factors are the only true measure of motivations in conflict (Collier, 2006). 
However, economic approaches to studies of conflict are also methodologically flawed, as 
chapter two noted, and careful qualitative research has done much to generate the theories 
and indicators upon which quantitative studies are based.  
Anthropologists argue that views such as Collier’s assume they naively take what people say 
for granted, whereas in reality, they examine how different untruths are told in different 
ways and cross-reference stories and interests constantly (Richards, 2005). In addition, they 
observe what happens first hand in war by being there; as Richards (2005:11) argues: 
“Reading a balance sheet from afar is simply no substitute for well-grounded attempts to 
grasp the inherent complexity of war”. However, Richards’s (2005:11) real disagreement 
with econometric work such as Collier’s is about the labelling of the variables: “Once the 
alienation of the young unemployed, or the millenarian dreams of diaspora groups are seen 
for what they are – political variables – Collier’s proposed conceptual division between 
‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ disappears”.  
Previous academic studies of youths in conflict situations have used quantitative methods 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, for example), PRA or other survey methods together 
with interviews and life history mapping (Fernando, 2002; Chatty, 2007, for example) or a 
mixture of ethnographic methods including participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews, life-history mapping and use of internal documents (Marks, 2001; Sommers, 
2001, for example).  A problem with many previous studies is the lack of participant 
observation of the actual activities of youths in armed opposition groups. Relying on 
interview techniques to extract highly political information and accounts, with no 
participant observation, introduces bias as there is a discrepancy between what people say 
they do and what they actually do.  My previous experience working within the KYO 
highlighted the considerable difference between what organisations and staff say they do 
and what they actually do in practice. These contradictions were sometimes remarked upon 
and discussed, and at times they were un-noticed by the staff themselves and by me until a 
later date. I also found that asking the same questions and talking about the same issues on 
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different occasions produced different answers, even from the same people, reflecting 
variations in the way ideas or events could be presented. These experiences demonstrated 
to me that an ethnographic approach was necessary to gain depth in understanding the 
micro-dynamics of youth participation in an armed opposition group.  
The studies that have achieved the most depth and rendered the most intricate 
explanations of the complex issues involved in youth participation in conflict situations are 
those that have prioritised ethnographic methods, are a result of significant time spent 
immersed in the field and have included a significant amount of contact with participants in 
their own language.  Given that the object of this research was also to achieve depth in a 
small, relatively unknown area and unravel the complex issues of youth participation in an 
armed opposition group, an ethnographic approach was taken in this study. Additionally, 
with the research setting being highly politicised, even though it was located in the relative 
safety of Thailand, it was thought that overt information gathering could be quite a 
sensitive and difficult activity. As Goodhand (2000) argues, information can become part 
of the conflict economy and is frequently politicised, manipulated and suppressed, leading 
some people to seek a strategy of silence to avoid risk. The nature of ethnographic enquiry 
is in many ways more suited to these kinds of research issues than other methods for a 
number of reasons explored here.  
Megoran (2006: 627) makes the case for ethnographic methods to be used more in the 
study of political geographies and studies of borderlands because understanding the state in 
borderland areas involves examining how it is experienced in everyday life (Wilson and 
Donnan, 1998, in Megoran, 2006: 627). It is particularly relevant for a study of trans-
boundary political conflicts with a central state because it can illuminate “how power is 
demonstrated, projected and contested in the social, economic and political practices of 
quotidian life at international borders” (Donna and Wilson, 1999:155 in Megoran, 
2006:628). 
Ethnography aims to understand the social meanings and activities of people in a given 
setting by being closely involved in the setting and exploring the “tissue of everyday life” 
(Brewer, 2000:11; Herbert, 2000:551). For researchers interested in human action, attention 
to the symbolic systems that endow action with meaning, through detailed ethnographic 
investigation, is an important element (Herbert, 2000). It is based on a phenomenological 
paradigm that accepts that there are multiple realities and that the subjective reality an 
individual sees is no less real than an objectively defined and measured reality (Fetterman, 
1998:5).  Its ontological position is therefore interpretivist and the role of the researcher is 
to read and interpret meaning in the observed culture (Geertz, 1973). 
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The interpretivist nature of ethnographic analysis leads to the first criticism of the method 
– that it is overly idiosyncratic and subjective (Rengert, 1997 in Herbert, 2000). It has been 
argued in ethnography’s defence that “interpretive practices are central to all science” 
(Herbert, 2000:558, italics in original) and ‘objectivity’ is itself a social construction 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1994 in Herbert, 2000). Objectivity is not only conceptually 
impossible, but research in conflict zones it is often practically impossible too. As Clapham 
(1998) argues “it is difficult for academic observers to remain indifferent to the human and 
moral dimensions of the events that they study, and a measure of sympathy for victims of 
these events and tacit support for those who are seen as less guilty than their opponents is 
an inescapable part of the exercise”.  
As a result of my previous three years living and working with Karen refugees in Thailand, 
I had developed sympathy for those whose lives had been affected by the ongoing conflict 
in Burma and the parlous state of human rights in the country. This had turned my prior 
assumptions about armed opposition groups and state behaviour on their head since 
Burma was clearly nothing like Britain. I had also found myself completely rethinking my 
previous ideas about childhood and social roles. Where previously I had viewed a distinct 
line between adult and child at the age of 18, after working with many young people who 
had been participants in a KNU organisation since puberty, sometimes even in its armed 
wing, I now saw the differences in conceptions of appropriate social roles for young people 
in Burma compared to their counterparts in Britain. I saw the complexity of defining what 
is ‘appropriate’ behaviour for a youth in situations where they have little opportunity to go 
to school or play and are needed for family work, community defence and group survival.  
These insights and many more gained over my previous three-year period working with 
Karen refugees in Thailand enabled me to challenge my own preconceptions, which then 
allowed me to challenge many similar ideas among other Western observers. However, my 
goal is not to judge the merit of each party to the conflict or advocate for any particular 
course of action, it is merely to explain as honestly as possible what is happening within an 
armed opposition group and how and why youths in the KNU participate. My purpose is 
to use this case to provide a better understanding of the lives of young participants who 
work outside the confines of military roles in an armed opposition groups. From this, my 
hope is that more nuanced policies and programmes directed towards armed opposition 
groups or that otherwise affect young participants within armed groups will be developed. 
This study conceptualised the practice of ethnography as:  
“iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through the study), drawing 
on a family of methods, involving direct and sustained contact with human 
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agents, within the context of their daily lives (and cultures), watching what 
happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, and producing a richly 
written account that respects the irreducibility of human experience, that 
acknowledges the role of theory, as well as the researcher’s own role, and that 
views humans as part object/part subject” (O’Reilly 2005:3).   
While the fieldwork for this research was planned at a high level prior to entering the field, 
the course of the fieldwork, the interview subjects and the issues which came out emerged 
naturally as the research progressed. The design and key issues were therefore inductively 
derived and re-conceptualised iteratively. A number of methods were used over the course 
of ten months living and working with the research participants. They are elaborated 
further in the next section. 
Qualitative studies of conflict such as this face a distinct challenge compared to quantitative 
studies. As Wood (2003) argues, such studies are “usually analyses of a single case that 
typically describe multiple causal processes that are so complex and interrelated that it is 
difficult to sort out which processes are primary and, further, whether they are primary 
because of their inherent salience or because of conditions particular to that case”. This is 
clearly a challenge, but the intense difficulties of the task do not negate the need for in-
depth research. A complex interplay of factors is argued to be a more accurate explanation 
of the vast majority of social conflicts than mono-causal explanations, despite the 
difficulties this throws up for quantitative analysis and comparative studies (Kalyvas, 2006). 
The task of deep qualitative research is precisely to uncover, where possible, the 
connections between very complex processes, their relative importance in conflict 
situations and the factors that may be replicated elsewhere in other conflicts. I believe that 
any good qualitative research is likely to yield a better understanding of the very complex 
behaviour of social actors and groups in conflict zones, which can be built upon by policy 
makers. 
Poststructuralists and postmodernists pose serious challenges to the qualitative research 
endeavour by arguing that any gaze on the life of individuals is always filtered through the 
researcher’s own lenses of language, gender, race and social class. Thus, there are no 
objective observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of the observer and 
the observed (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005:27).  Ethnography has also suffered from a post-
colonial criticism. Spivak (1988, in Nordstom and Robben, 1995:11), for instance, argues 
that Western scholars studying non-Western people are so blinded by their own cultural 
beliefs and assumptions that their attempts to ‘speak’ for others are little more than post-
colonial discourse.  
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These critics do not dismiss ethnography as a methodology entirely, rather they call for a 
transformation in its practice to a more self-critical and reflexive awareness of the 
conditions under which ethnographers are producing knowledge (Herbert, 2000). 
Nordstom and Robben (1995:13) suggest that while “truth and understanding are…always 
conditional and situated”, the degree of distortion can be minimised by remaining close to 
the subjects of the study through direct experience rather than working through second 
hand accounts. Herbert (2000) more explicitly suggests that ethnographers be forthright 
with those whom they study and with the audience of their written work; reflexive about 
how their own cultural and intellectual position shapes their apprehension of data; and 
modest about their explanatory claims. As already discussed, my own preconceptions had 
already been extensively challenged as a result of my previous three years work with Karen 
refugees in Thailand. My work with the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) in particular 
gave me an invaluable insight into the perceptions of rights, justice and sovereignty among 
rural villagers in eastern Burma. KHRG’s detailed accounts of villagers’ lives amidst 
conflict over 16 years of painstaking research offered a wealth of information and insight 
which I used to gain a better understanding of the lives, values and ideas of Karen youths 
in Burma. However, as Megoran (2006:627) points out, the insights from ethnographic 
research can only ever be partial, thus it is a useful tool that should be used to complement 
other research methods. These practices were carefully adopted in this study. 
One of the main problems with this method is the researcher’s own limitations, whereby 
their inevitable incompetence in the language and culture being studied limits 
understanding (Ellen, 2008). This issue is commonly dealt with by turning it into a research 
tool: as the researcher learns about the social reality of the environment through successful 
and failed encounters, they document the revelations they experience (Ellen, 2008:32). This 
study had built upon three years of previous work within the movement. This was 
beneficial to the fieldwork period because several years of misunderstandings, reflection 
and revelations allowed me to jump in at a good level of understanding. Since native 
familiarity was certainly not reached, though, and since I had been absent for a year, my 
interpretations and explanations are modest. 
A final drawback to utilising an ethnographic method is that by its nature, ethnographic 
research is un-replicable and un-generalisable to populations, so general theories about the 
subject cannot be derived without significant difficulty (Barakat et al, 2002:996).  However, 
when ethnographic research is combined with a conscious awareness of what existing 
theory suggests, the findings can be used to improve upon that theory (Herbert, 2000). The 
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next stage in research of this phenomenon would be to conduct higher-level and 
comparative studies to examine how tentative theories apply in other situations. 
3 Data collection methods and the fieldwork period 
This thesis seeks to understand the patterns of youth participation in non-military 
capacities in an armed opposition group by exploring the central research question: How 
and why do youths participate in non-military roles in the KNU, and what are the effects of 
their participation? This question is divided into three sub-sets of questions. First: how is 
‘youth’ defined and understood in the KNU and why are they so defined? Addressing this 
question involved identifying what ‘youth’ means in the KNU context and how it intersects 
with other social categories such as gender, ethnicity, regional origin and religion. Since this 
study was interested in emic perspectives of the term ‘youth’, adopting an ethnographic 
approach was more suitable because it remains more sensitive to emic than etic categories 
and meanings (Megoran, 2006: 626). 
I examined previous ethnographic studies of Karen society, colonial records and academic 
studies of the conflict in Burma which mentioned both politicised Karen youth in the 
formation of the KNU and traditional structures of social control in Karen villages in 
Burma. I also asked many youths and some older Karen people about their own 
experiences of life as a youth in a Karen village in Burma. By comparing oral answers and 
written evidence, I was able to identify the particular characteristics of a ‘youth’ category 
that were distinct to the KNU as well as how its construction of a youth category built on 
pre-existing social roles for youths. 
My own understanding of the term ‘youth’ was as a vague, undefined group of young 
people, more or less inhabiting their teenage years. However, the term tended not to be 
employed that much as far as I was aware in my home country, Britain. It was more 
common for people to use the term ‘young people’ or ‘young adults’ as a term of respect 
for teenagers who were yet to reach the legal age of maturity but who were differentiated 
from younger children. Among the refugee community in Thailand, however, the term 
‘youth’ was more frequently used and the KNU had a distinct youth wing, the KYO. I was 
surprised to learn of the high upper age range of youths in the KYO (youths were formally 
defined as people age 15-35) but my understanding was that ‘youth’ is not a fixed category, 
it varies between societies in different places and times.  
The negotiation of power across generations within the KNU was occasionally made 
evident in discussions with groups of youths about their input in the KNU’s decision 
making processes, the demands they made on the KNU’s leadership and the results of their 
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negotiations. It was also partially evident through observation of youth leaders’ interactions 
with the elder KNU leaders who came to visit the youth wing’s headquarters. I observed 
these interactions, documented them in my field notes, then asked participants about them 
at later stages to get an understanding of their perceptions of the interaction. These 
discussions were also documented. 
My second question (Why do youths take on non-military roles in the KNU and what 
factors influence their career trajectory within the movement?) required a broad 
investigation of how youths had been recruited into various roles. Conducting life histories 
with youths revealed the social connections that facilitated a young recruit’s engagement 
with the KNU. Prior to the fieldwork period, I identified a number of variables from the 
academic literature on youth recruitment into armed opposition groups. I then tested these 
with specific questions during the life history interviews as well as letting interview 
participants talk more broadly about their lives. These were very revealing as the 
participants themselves elaborated on a range of factors that they believed influenced their 
eventual route into the KNU. Often their routes in were surprising, sometimes they 
seemed very mundane and occasionally occurred more by accident than by design. What 
was often very surprising, however, was the completely different attitude to armed 
opposition groups and the state among youths in Burma, compared to my own ideas based 
upon life in a Western country. Almost universally, the Burmese government was derided 
and military agents of the state feared and hated, while the KNU, though not immune to 
criticism, was regarded far more highly as a legitimate public authority among youths from 
both rural and urban areas of eastern Burma. This appeared to be of great significance to 
youths in this study. 
Through participant observation, I saw how the KNU and the KYO reproduced and 
promoted youth participation in the KNU among Karen youths within its areas of 
influence, for instance through speeches at commemorative events exhorting youths to 
work for the ‘revolution’. I took part in several commemorative events during the 
fieldwork period. The speeches made by KNU leaders, scheduled events and visible 
displays of the KNU’s symbols of sovereignty were very revealing of the culture of the 
KNU as an organisation. There was a strong emphasis on Karen nationalism and culture 
while Karen soldiers paraded and were decorated with flower garlands in honour of their 
personal sacrifices to the Karen ‘revolution’. I photographed and documented the events 
and my own reactions in my field notes. I also discussed the events with young participants 
and documented their comments about the occasion. I noticed many youths were eager to 
have their photo taken with military leaders and some even dressed up in their friends’ 
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soldier uniforms and proudly had their photos taken while brandishing a gun. Finally, 
where possible I made a copy of the speeches made at these events and retained them with 
my field notes along with a rough translation. 
My third question (What is the purpose of youth non-military roles to the KNU and how 
are these roles shaped by the KNU’s political and strategic goals?) was addressed by talking 
to youths and elder leaders with the KNU about their perceptions of the purpose of 
youths’ non-military roles. From my prior work researching children’s rights at the Karen 
Human Rights Group, I knew that there were certain social and livelihood roles allocated 
to youths in rural Karen society, but it was clear that these were distinct from the more 
politicised youth roles within the KNU that I had observed while working at KYO as a 
VSO volunteer.  
Researching this question required understanding clearly the exact nature of the KNU’s 
goals and operations, how these had changed over the course of conflict and the 
importance of non-military roles. I found the existing literature on the KNU’s conflict with 
the Burmese state inadequate here because it tended to be focused on the military angle of 
operations rather than the extensive non-military side of operations. In this way, the 
existing literature mirrored the deficiencies in the broader conflict and armed opposition 
groups literature. The changing nature of the KNU’s political and strategic goals and the 
way this has affected youth roles was often difficult to talk about with participants because 
there was a tendency to talk about officially stated KNU policies and strategies rather than 
newly-emerging practices, uncertain tactics and unclear or changing goals.  
I built up a clearer picture of the KNU’s political agenda and operations by interviewing 
political leaders in the KNU and triangulating this information with the internal 
constitution of the KNU, the new constitution of Karen State (written by the KNU) and 
the constitution of Burma written by the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), within which 
the constitution of Karen State sits. The ENC constitution rivals that produced by the 
Burmese state but provides a good indication of the KNU’s political agenda in theory and 
its formal political agreements with other Burmese opposition groups. These documents 
were easily available and already translated into English. 
I then interviewed youths in a number of groups forming the KNU as well as in groups 
affiliated to the KNU but not a formal part of it. I also interviewed KNU leaders 
themselves about their perspectives on youth roles within the movement. The KNU’s 
senior leaders were surprisingly open about answering my questions and since they were 
fluent in English there were no problems with translation. Much revealing information 
came from observing the actual actions of youths within the KYO, talking with people 
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about the daily work and planning they were doing and talking about the effects of this 
work on the KNU. This revealed some differences between stated roles and actual work 
(which on occasion were a result of my own lack of understanding of statements made and 
at other times were the result of certain activities being deemed inappropriate to mention 
to a Western outsider). These differences were talked about as I noticed them, with 
participants usually elaborating or clarifying as necessary. 
The actual research methods used are discussed in more detail next. All of the research 
questions were addressed using mixed methods, but the defining feature of qualitative 
research with an ethnographic component such as this is participant observation in which 
the researcher gains un-replicable insight through an analysis of everyday activities 
(Herbert, 2000:551). It is normal in ethnographic research for additional methods such as 
interviews, and other data, such as photographs and videos, also to be drawn upon.  This 
ability to use multiple methods and sources, as well as retain flexibility over the conditions 
of the research, is particularly advantageous in dealing with the intense practical problems 
often found with research in conflict areas and goes some way towards addressing the 
common problems of reliability, validity and access in conflict research (Barakat et al, 
2002:995).   
a) Participant Observation 
It was deemed essential at the outset to study this topic in its natural setting to see the 
actual actions that people take, therefore, participant observation – observing as one lives 
in and participates in the community setting – was one of the primary methods for 
collecting data. The key benefits of participant observation are that it can clarify what 
actually happens in a social context rather than what informers say happens and it can 
enable rich accounts of complex situations to be gleaned (O’Reilly, 2005:10).  
This ability to contrast deeds and words endows ethnography with an unparalleled 
advantage over other methodologies, including open-ended interviews (Herbert, 2000). 
However, one of the drawbacks, according to Haniff (1985 in Labaree, 2002:101) is that 
participant observation by an outsider is inevitably limited in terms of understanding 
hidden meanings and achieving a deep level of trust with informants. This may be an 
inadequate assumption, though (Deutsche, 1981 in Labaree, 2002:102). The perspective 
adopted here is that ‘insiderness’ is an ongoing process related to the researcher’s social 
location and knowledge which continuously moves back and forth between the positional 
boundaries of insiderness and outsiderness (Griffith, 1998 in Labaree, 2002:102).    
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Ferguson and Whitehead (1992) argue that ethnographic studies of conflict must be 
situated in their real political context, including wider regional or even global processes. For 
them, the researcher must acknowledge not only their intrusion on the events they observe 
but the impact they have too. This may be very little, or it may be great, but a study that 
does not take into account the researcher’s impact is weakened in their view. In this study 
the organisations and people under analysis were not just located in Thailand as a result of 
their forced exile from Burma, they were deliberately located in a town which had good 
communication links which facilitated contact with outside sources of support. Moreover, 
foreign volunteers and, to a lesser extent, researchers, were seen as potential sources of 
support, whether financially or as advocates of the cause.  
My initial contact with the organisation and its staff was the result of the organisation’s 
leadership lobbying VSO for a foreign volunteer to assist with the development of their 
administrative practices. My two year placement with the organisation from 2003 to 2005 
then facilitated the acquisition of external sources of support, though it did not greatly 
transform the fortunes of the group. Returning to the organisation as a researcher in 2008 
also had an impact, though it could not be considered great. Partly the presence of a 
foreigner legitimates the group to other foreigners, sometimes helping to build trust 
between external supporters and the group. A foreigner can also act as a mediator or an 
interpreter between the two.  
Participant observation in this case entailed working and living at the headquarters of the 
youth wing and mass organisation of the rebel movement under study - the Karen Youth 
Organisation (KYO).  The organisational work that I undertook for the KYO aimed not 
only to allow me to adopt an ‘insider’ social role within the organisation under study, but to 
compensate the organisation for the time given to interviews by participants and the effort 
staff took to facilitate the research process.  Specifically, work tasks that I took on after 
negotiations with the KYO leadership over the fieldwork period included designing and 
scripting a website (though not deciding on content); editing English language in funding 
proposals, reports and emails, though not inputting new material; driving staff on the office 
motorbike around the town to meetings and building a Powerpoint presentation for a four-
yearly review of the organisation’s activities. On a number of occasions I was asked to 
interpret in funding meetings with international agencies since some staff were not 
confident with their communication abilities in English. I agreed to interpret between the 
group and their foreign contacts (whether in a face to face meeting, by email or through 
editing the English in their funding proposals and reports), but did not advocate for the 
group or add any of my own opinions into their work.   
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Some ethnographers aim for full immersion into the social world of their study to 
comprehend better the world view of those studied while others strive for a more detached 
relationship. Most, typically, attempt to balance between these two extremes, adopting the 
perspective of the actors under study while also remaining a theoretically detached and 
logically rigorous social scientist (Van Maanen, 1988 and Clark, 1998 in Herbert, 2000). 
The benefit of this approach is that an empathic understanding of a social world is 
practically impossible without living that world too, hence I became involved in the ups 
and downs of everyday life in the organisation and its staff accommodation.  Involvement 
in this case recognised that my presence unavoidably disturbed the research environment 
by introducing new social relationships and making it easier for the organisation to do 
some of their current tasks, but it consciously did not influence work policy or change 
current organisational practice. Daily note-taking and reflection on observations and 
discussions were conducted from an academically detached perspective, alone in a private 
room. 
The length of the study, eleven months from September 2008 to August 2009, combined 
with my previous two-year history from 2003 to 2005 working as a volunteer at the 
organisation helped the participants and myself become familiar with each other and build 
trust and rapport. Living in the office worker’s accommodation also helped this process as 
the day to day activities of living together dramatically reduced the barrier between 
participants and myself and the self-consciousness of action while under observation. Some 
participants also knew me from another one year spell during 2006-2007 working at an 
independent human rights NGO in the same town. 
Unstructured interviewing took place frequently throughout the period of participant 
observation and was not a separately defined activity. The two methods go hand in hand in 
ethnographic research because much of the data gathered in participant observation comes 
from informal interviews (Lefland, 1971 in Fontana & Frey, 2000:652). In addition, more 
structured individual interviews and focus group discussions were conducted throughout 
the fieldwork period. 
b) Interviews and discussions 
Semi-structured interviews, open-ended discussions and focus group discussions were all 
used frequently during the field work. There are specific problems with the validity or 
reliability of informants’ statements in interviews including involuntary error, lying, 
personalities of participants, interview dynamics and various cultural and social constraints 
(Ellen, 2008:235). Accepting participants’ stated motivations for engaging in conflict 
against the state is methodologically problematic for quantitative-orientated scholars in 
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particular. Collier and Hoeffler (2000), for example, argue that preference falsification is 
common in rebellion, therefore the stated objectives of rebels cannot inform us about the 
true aims of a rebellion. However, these problems can be mitigated by using internal 
triangulation (eliciting the same data in a different way from the same informant), probing, 
validating statements with other evidence and triangulating from other sources (Ellen, 
2008).  
Before the main fieldwork period commenced in Thailand, I took a trip to America to 
attend a Burma Studies conference and conduct interviews with friends who were previous 
participants but had left the movement on a refugee resettlement programme. These 
responses were internally triangulated by asking similar questions again over the phone on 
later occasions.  
Upon arrival in Thailand for the main fieldwork, informal discussions with key informants 
and close friends were carried out during the settling in period to re-familiarise with the 
context and map out likely candidates for interviews. A passive approach, using very basic, 
non-intrusive questions, was adopted for the first month, as Ellen (2008:232) suggests, 
while friendships were forged and re-discovered, in order to familiarise participants with 
the research process and content and break down barriers. Interviews then took place 
frequently, normally as informal discussions.  
Sometimes a particular topic was broached either because it was lingering in the fieldwork 
plan, or because observation of activities prompted further questions. These conversations 
took the form of open-ended interviews with techniques such as ‘playing devil’s advocate’ 
or ‘ignorant but eager student’ openly used with participants to gain a deeper understanding 
of each issue. They were almost always informal and I usually followed the participants’ 
lead when they led conversations on to other topics, aborted the discussion when 
distracted or tired or used tactics to avoid talking about anything they were not comfortable 
or interested in. This method allowed me to observe the issues the participants themselves 
felt were important, non-negotiable or too sensitive to talk about, as Agar (in Ellen, 
2008:231) suggests.  
Occasionally, participants would spontaneously recommend another participant to 
interview because they were deemed to have a particularly good knowledge of a subject 
under discussion. I enthusiastically pursued these suggestions. Participants also presented 
to me a range of documentary (in English and S’gaw Karen languages) and photographic 
evidence which they deemed relevant to the study. These were all photocopied and 
translated where necessary then analysed, filed and retained with the field notes.  
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My requests for information outside the realm of knowledge available at the KYO were 
carefully considered by the KYO leaders and effort made to facilitate access to interview 
sources. On several occasions meetings were arranged by the KYO leaders for me to 
interview participants in other groups within the movement. This reduced the problem of 
access greatly, but significantly raised the potential for selection bias and participant 
censoring of information. To counter this problem, I also made use of my own, 
independent sources of information from friends, neighbours and acquaintances in the 
research location and networks built up during a year’s work with an independent human 
rights group (Karen Human Rights Group). Information and opinions were therefore 
triangulated from different sources. Internal triangulation was also utilised regularly by 
asking the same informants the same, rephrased questions on later occasions. 
Focus groups 
Throughout the fieldwork, as particular issues presented themselves for analysis during the 
daily write-up of field notes, semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions were 
carried out to explore the dynamics of these issues. Interview participants were sometimes 
purposefully selected based on my knowledge of the Karen network in the research area. 
While this was partially successful, as a research method it was inevitably limited by my 
perceived understanding of participants’ knowledge of certain issues and outside 
knowledge of a large number of actors and networks. To counter this limitation, additional 
recommendations were sought from KYO leaders, key informants and the participants 
themselves about other appropriate interviewees for each topic, based on the specialist 
knowledge required. The result was that each subject was discussed with at least two 
separate groups of participants to triangulate information from different interview sources.  
The advantages of using this method were that rich data was produced with participants 
stimulating each other’s recall and thoughts, and that it was a flexible format which was 
easy to carry out whenever people were sat around with not much else to do. 
Disadvantages to the method in general are that results cannot be generalised; group 
culture may interfere with individual expression, perhaps even with ‘group think’ 
developing, and one person may dominate (Fontana & Frey, 2000:652). As Merton et al. 
suggest (1956, in Fontana & Frey, 2000:652), care was taken to ensure one person did not 
dominate the group and that all participants felt able to voice their opinions. Also, the 
focus group discussions always took place among groups of friends who knew one another 
exceptionally well so differences of opinion were quite common and already well known, 
and debate was good-natured. Fairly contentious topics were discussed, but subjects 
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personal to the lives and histories of individual participants were not, due to their 
sensitivity. These were discussed more in individual interviews or life histories. 
c) Life Histories 
Life histories are a distinctly useful method for gaining a deep, historical perspective, 
revealing internal analytic connections and providing direct access to informants’ own 
words (Ellen, 2008:252). As Hilhorst (2003:175 found in her analysis of NGOs in the 
Philippines, they can “give us a window through which to unravel how people are 
constituted as social actors”. They are important primary documents in research because 
the finished product is almost entirely a first-person narrative with the researcher as much 
removed as possible (Atkinson, 1998:2). The life history method provides advantageous in-
depth insight into individual lives over time and how the individual plays various roles in 
society and interacts with that society (Atkinson, 1998), therefore it was deemed 
appropriate for understanding the depth and multiple roles of youths within the KNU. It 
also fits well with a focus on the duality of agency and structure because individuals can 
explain the choices they made in their lives as well as the context of the time. How 
individuals then interpret their lives and construct their own histories is revealing in itself 
(Atkinson, 1998).  
One of the issues when studying youths, particularly youths in conflict in developing 
countries, is taking care not to marginalise their opinions, since they are often already 
marginalised locally and internationally due to hierarchical structures of power and 
imbalances in wealth. The life history method places participants’ voices in the foreground, 
whilst leaving room for wider contextual factors to be taken into consideration. Thus, it is 
particularly appropriate to use in a study of youths in armed opposition groups.  
Life histories also have the advantage of giving insight into the social networks behind a 
person’s life because they “make it possible to look at actual decisions and actions, and to 
perceive behind these practices the network of social relations which allowed them to take 
place” (Bertaux-Wiame, in Hilhorst, 2003:175). The social networks which influence youth 
participants in the KNU were therefore studied through life histories with young actors. 
Life history interviews were used in this study to gather information about how participants 
came to be working in the Karen movement, the social status of participants, and the 
reasons they either remembered propelling them into the movement at the time of their 
recruitment, or subsequently chose to emphasise to justify their choice. This was an 
important area to study for two reasons: first, motivations for joining armed opposition 
groups are a key academic and practical issue and second, many prior studies of the Karen 
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movement had taken place during the 1970s and 80s when, unlike the current situation, the 
KNU controlled large swathes of territory and received external support as an anti-
communist force in the region.  
There are clearly many ways of recounting a life history so some care was taken to probe 
the participant in order to clarify the particular version of their life they were recounting. 
For example, if the individual said that they joined the Karen movement because they 
hated the Burmese soldiers, questions were asked about how the participant knew about 
the Burmese soldiers, the type of interaction they had experienced with them prior to their 
recruitment and whether hatred was formed prior, or subsequent, to participation in the 
Karen movement. The broader contexts of participants’ lives were also explored in life 
history interviews to compare the social status and social origins of participants. Issues of 
memory recall were not too problematic since all informants were youths, so their 
recruitment into the movement had taken place usually within the last ten years, and often 
within the last five. 
Life history interviews were conducted in a quiet location at the participant’s office with 
the use of a notebook or laptop to record the conversation. A set of general questions and 
a checklist of standard biographical data required were used as memory aids (see 
Appendices A and B), but the interviews were primarily conducted using open-ended 
questions which invited the participant to elaborate on the choices they had made and the 
broader context surrounding their participation in the KNU and affiliated organisations. 
These were more formal than the ad hoc interviews which took place around participant 
observation, and they inevitably touched on sensitive issues regarding individuals’ lives. 
Therefore, they were conducted in a more private environment and care was taken to 
ensure accurate understanding of responses, often by using a trusted interpreter. 
In the first six months of the study life history interviews were either conducted in English, 
which participants were speaking as a second, third or fourth language, or through an 
interpreter. A number of different interpreters were used depending on their availability 
and the location of the interview. Relying on interpreters makes research vulnerable to 
added layers of meaning and biases, thereby increasing the potential for misunderstandings 
(Ellen, 2008:235; Fontana & Frey, 2000:655) so triangulation was key to mitigating this 
issue. As my S’gaw Karen13 language skills improved over this period, understanding 
                                                 
13 S’gaw Karen is just one of at least eight mutually unintelligible Karen languages, however it is the dominant 
language in the KNU and affiliated organisations. Many participants also spoke another Karen language as 
their mother tongue or Burmese, particularly if they had been educated in a Burmese-speaking school. I also 
spoke conversational Thai and basic Burmese, which were occasionally used in conversations with Thai-
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increased dramatically and interpretation was relegated to a clarification tool. In the second 
half of the study, my S’gaw Karen language skills had improved to the extent that most 
conversations were understood in general (although nuances and subtleties often were not 
grasped without clarification) and interviews could be conducted in Karen language with 
clarification thrown in using English or Thai words. 
A great weakness of the life history method is that informants have variable abilities in self-
expression and may emphasise different versions of their history given different prompts 
(Ellen, 2008). Narrators have their own agenda, just as the researcher does too, and both 
may influence the final narrative (Miesher, 2001 and Weiner 1999, in Yarrow, 2008: 336). It 
is clearly a dubious method to use on its own, but methodological triangulation mitigates 
this weakness. 
d) Organisation Studies 
Since participants in the Karen movement operate within political and social organisations, 
the specific structure and organisational culture of those organisations is of interest to a 
study which is grounded in Giddens’s (1984) notion of a ‘duality of agency and structure’. 
Youth participants were understood to predominate in the Karen Youth Organisation, 
Karen Women’s Organisation, Karen Students Network Group and Karen University 
Students Group14, therefore brief analyses of these four organisations were conducted.  
The aim was to understand the organisations’ histories, operations (including how 
decisions are taken), activities, the number and types of members, political affiliations and 
sources of funding/support. These organisations are themselves situated within the 
broader Karen movement, primarily identified with the Karen National Union (KNU), 
which was also analysed in terms of policies, structures and organisational culture affecting 
the youth cohort within its ranks. 
e) Photographic Discussion 
Photographic discussions took place in the KYO office, primarily with the organisation’s 
own photographs. These discussions took place in four different contexts. The first context 
was the organisation’s preparations for a photographic exhibition of the parent party’s 
political leaders at the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the Karen ‘revolution’. For 
                                                                                                                                               
speaking Karen people or those using Burmese as their preferred language of communication due to lack of 
S’gaw Karen language skills. 
14 The Karen Youth Organisation and Karen Women’s Organisation formally form part of the Karen 
National Union (KNU) as mass organisations. They therefore were the focus of the organisational studies. 
The Karen Students Network Group (KSNG) and the Karen University Students Group (KUSG) are 
formally independent, but are heavily sympathetic to the KNU and contain significant numbers of youths. 
These reasons suggested a brief organisational study of KSNG and KUSG may be advantageous. 
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a month prior to the anniversary, the office staff were engaged in printing, framing and 
mounting the selected photographs. This was a collaborative task conducted as a group 
each evening with much discussion and story-telling (see photos below). This preparation 
and the actual event itself provoked a lot of discussion about the relative merits of each 
leader pictured, the ethnic identity and subsequent political affiliations of the leaders and 
reflections on the sixty-year course of the conflict.  
 
Photo 1 Photographic discussions at the KYO 
house during preparations for an exhibition 
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the 
Karen revolution.  [Photo: author, 27th Jan 
2009] 
 
Photo 2 Part of the finished photographic 
exhibition which provoked significant 
discussion of past and present KNU leaders.  
[Photo: author, 31st Jan 2009] 
The second context was my assistance to the organisation in preparing a website. 
Discussion ensued among myself and the office staff present at the time around each 
photo chosen to represent the organisation and its work, as well as why particular photos 
were deemed inappropriate. I then showed the staff how to resize and colour photos 
before laying out the photos and accompanying text on the web pages. 
The third context for photographic discussion was my assistance with preparation of a 
large PowerPoint presentation summarising the activities of the central level of KYO over 
its four-year leadership term. The final context was more general; throughout the research 
period, new and old photographs were shared around the organisation and discussed, 
revealing participants’ feelings about a range of issues, as well as the activities KYO was 
involved in. 
4 Methodological Issues 
a) Rigour 
Traditional empirical research uses the qualities of validity, reliability and objectivity to 
describe the rigour of a study. However, case studies, and the circumstances of their 
analysis, are unique so traditional notions of objectivity and reliability are unattainable 
(Scholz & Tietje, 2002:334). They are also evaluative criteria derived from a positivist 
ontology, so are inappropriate for research adopting an interpretivist paradigm (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989).  
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Hammersley (1992) argues that validity and relevance are more appropriate criteria for 
evaluating ethnographic research. He suggests that an account may be judged valid if the 
claims are sufficiently plausible to readers (including sufficient evidence), central claims are 
supported with more convincing evidence and the evidence is convincing for the type of 
claim made (Hammersley, 1992:70-72). Relevance means the importance of the topic to a 
substantive field and demonstration of a significant contribution to the literature 
(Hammersley, 1992:72-73). It is intended that this study will live up to evaluations using 
these criteria. 
Triangulation 
One of the difficulties with ethnographic research is researcher bias (Barakat et al., 
2002:995). The practice of conducting research while becoming an involved participant 
brings the issue of researcher bias to the fore, however, ethnographers are never merely 
observers, they are always an integral part of the field with allocated identities and a social 
character imputed to them, and often considered an important figure in the locality (Ellen, 
2008:227).  
In a highly politicised context such as this, one of the potential problems was that I could 
be perceived as less open to expressions of alternative opinions by youths within the 
organisation, who may ordinarily be discouraged by appeals to loyalty or actively 
suppressed. To reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation of the situation, multiple 
perceptions were sought to triangulate and clarify meaning, which is a generally accepted 
triangulation process in qualitative research (Stake, 2003:148). I also sought opinions 
independently from participants located outside the primary organisation being studied.  
Indeed I often found that many participants in the Karen movement also maintained 
relationships with non-participants and with participants in rival politico-military groups. 
Thus, participation, in this case, did not necessarily preclude personal friendships with rival 
groups.   
b) Ethical considerations 
Informed consent 
I contacted the headquarters of the organisation at which the participant observation part 
of the study was to take place, the Karen Youth Organisation, by phone and email prior to 
the research commencing. Many of the organisation’s members were already familiar with 
me from a two year period of previous voluntary work at the same office, through 
Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) during 2003 to 2005. A written explanation of the 
purpose, scope and methods of the research was sent to the Central Executive Committee 
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of the KYO, which discussed the research request at one of their quarterly meetings. Once 
permission had been granted and approved by the parent organisation (the KNU), further 
explanations of the research and the reasons for requesting interviews were given on each 
occasion a new participant was met.  
On each occasion participants were given a choice to participate in the research and I 
clearly explained that any decision not to participate, or not to answer a question, would 
entail no repercussions. On several occasions, people did indeed choose not to participate 
in the study and no further discussion about the research ensued. Moreover, although non-
participants were present in the organisation at times during the research period, 
observation of their activities and discussions was not recorded or in any way included in 
the study. Participants indicated their willingness to participate with oral consent, but at 
times they also indicated that certain activities or discussions were not to be recorded. 
Sometimes I understood the reasons for their decisions and at other times I did not, but 
taking the issue of ethical research seriously, I did not question their decisions or put 
pressure on them to change their minds, I simply noted their preferences and followed 
their wishes. 
The life history method used in this study was particularly appropriate for discussing issues 
which were at times painful for participants to recall. As Ghorashi (2007:120) argues, it 
gives more room for recollection of past experiences while remaining sensitive to painful 
memories. For instance, some youths had witnessed violent or otherwise traumatic events 
that prompted their migration to Thailand as refugees. Life history discussions allowed 
participants to proceed at their own pace, change the topic of conversation, take a break or 
abort the interview process entirely, according to their own preferences. At the outset these 
possibilities were made clear to participants to minimise their inhibitions about disturbing 
the flow of conversation. 
Fine (1993) in his discussion of the underside of ethnographic research, argues that 
researchers often conceal their true objectives and portray themselves as more sympathetic 
to research participants than they actually are. In this case, having already ‘sounded out’ 
likely reaction to the topic prior to requesting permission, full details of the research 
questions and strategy were revealed to the research participants. The issue of the 
researcher’s portrayal of their sympathies, or even loyalty, is indeed a sensitive one in 
conflict situations because participants are unlikely to be enthusiastic about a researcher or 
research project that they perceive as being unsympathetic to their plight. The participants 
in this study deduced some sympathy to their cause from my previous willingness to work 
voluntarily in the organisation and for a local human rights group. However, it was made 
 106 
clear that the study did not aim to advocate a particular political standpoint or garner 
support for the group, its aim was to develop a more holistic understanding of the actions 
of the youth cohort in a rebel movement, and would document all activities, whatever these 
may be. 
Proponents of ethnography argue that material gathered in the field should be returned to 
the community of origin (Wood, 2006:383) and in this case two of the organisations I 
studied (KYO and KWO) requested an electronic copy of the final thesis. This is easily 
achievable, although the academic language in a foreign tongue unfortunately makes it less 
accessible to lay-readers than I would like. Of course no field notes or full interview texts 
will be made available since they were obtained under the condition of anonymity. 
Anonymity 
For all participants, anonymity was granted even where participants were happy to use their 
real name. Participants are therefore referred to by their coded name in the data analysis in 
chapters six, seven and eight. Each interviewee was given an initial from A to Z, then 
subsequently from AA to AZ. The gender of the interviewee is indicated in the 
participants’ own language honorific preceding the initial. Most participants identified 
themselves with a S’gaw Karen honorific, so males are referred to as Saw A or Saw B, for 
instance, and females as Naw D or Naw E etcetera. Where a participant identifies 
themselves in Pwo Karen or Burmese, their honorific is explained in a footnote to the text. 
Occasionally an indication of the official position of the interviewee is also given, to give 
contextual detail. Although this allows the identity of the participant to be narrowed down 
somewhat, it does not go so far as enabling them to be identified. Furthermore, the 
research data and participants’ identities are securely kept on my computer and back up 
drives and only I have access to these.  
The decision for blanket anonymity was made to protect participants from potential 
repercussions arising from politically sensitive information given and assumptions or 
analysis drawn and published from this information. Repercussions were most likely to be 
encountered among the Karen community and parent political party. The only real names 
used were those of the political leaders in the parent party, the KNU, who were 
interviewed in their official capacity and as such were formal representatives of the party 
and its policies. 
c) Research in conflict zones 
While this study primarily took place in the sanctuary space used by the Karen national 
liberation movement in Thailand, it was subject to some of the same issues as research in 
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actual war zones, such as contradictory perspectives and accounts; security for myself and 
the research participants and issues of information control by parties to the conflict and the 
Thai host.  Research in conflict zones involves particular methodological and ethnical 
challenges including the absence of unbiased data, sampling difficulties, logistical 
challenges, political challenges to the ‘do no harm’ principle, the presence of armed actors, 
security risks for most residents, general unpredictability and higher levels of trauma among 
the population (Wood, 2006:373).  
Researching in an environment where information is highly politicised means making 
political and ethical choices about which voices are heard and whose knowledge counts 
(Goodhand, 2000:12). Wildly different testimonies can result from vested interests, 
personal histories, ideological loyalties, propaganda and a dearth of first hand information 
(Nordstrom and Robben, 1995). This study aimed to overcome these problems by 
adopting a composite approach as Barakat et al. (2002:992) suggest: triangulating oral 
testimonies with other sources, building a good deal of trust with research participants and 
remaining flexible during the research process.   
Partisanship 
Conducting research within highly politicised settings is also problematic because the 
politicised world views of the participants may generate challenges to the research project 
and the role of the researcher (Grills, 1998:91).  Neutrality can be viewed with hostility and 
participants may seek to both influence the research and convince the researcher of the 
legitimacy of their cause.  My own emotional involvement gave me some empathy for the 
often difficult lives that my research participants had either in Burma or in exile in Thailand 
and my previous work with organisations in the Karen refugee community gave me much 
more understanding and sympathy for these people and organisations than for others in 
Burma. However, my personal position was of course quite different from those I studied 
because I was there by choice, I could freely travel and leave and I received a certain 
amount of protection from the vagaries of local power-holders due to my British passport.  
The position I took with my research participants was that while I have some sympathy for 
individuals’ plights, political views of my own and indeed political opinions on the conflict 
in Burma and the goals and activities of the KNU, my research role was that of a non-
partisan, interested observer and my working role was that of a volunteer, not a member.  I 
did not join the organisation or advocate any particular political stance or course of action 
and in return I did not face any pressure to censor or reveal the information I received. 
Furthermore, this study does not intend to advocate any particular political stance or 
course of action. Thus, while working within the organisation under study entails a degree 
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of partisan involvement, as Grills (1998:77) argues, non-partisan ethnographic research is 
not necessarily incompatible with this as long as the goal is to produce a balanced, detailed 
rendering of the social world rather than advocate for the group. With this in mind, this 
study does not attempt to inflate its claims, it merely seeks to explain glimpses into the 
KNU at a particular point in time and in a specific place. 
d) Limitations  
In ethnographic fieldwork, it is necessary to observe a wide range of perspectives and 
subgroupings so as to be able to sample the entire distribution of topics studied (Stewart, 
1998), however in conflict situations this is often difficult because certain subgroups are 
inaccessible due to their location and others may be marginalised in the society being 
studied.  This study could not, in general, access populations living in Burma due to 
security issues, so very little participant observation took place in Burma. The only 
exceptions to this were the small number of commemorative occasions in KNU-controlled 
territory which I attended. However, a number of interviews took place with participants 
located in Burma who were temporarily in Thailand for meetings, and with some 
participants in IDP sites in KNU-controlled territory in Burma.   
Other people, such as those with dissenting views, those opposing the KNU in Burma or 
people from minority groups in the areas under consideration, were likely to be 
marginalised by the KNU and their voices suppressed.  These views were actively (though 
discreetly) sought out in Thailand, where the KNU has less control over the Karen 
population. However, since this study was interested in explaining participation in the 
KNU, it was largely concerned with those who were already members. Assertions and 
findings from analysis of the data were then tested for credibility with foreigners residing in 
the area who are familiar with the situation but removed from many of the political and 
cultural pressures of the society. This was extremely useful for validating my analysis and 
assertions. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has made the case for an ethnographic, case-study based approach to 
researching the issue of youth involvement in an armed opposition group. It argued that 
this was the most appropriate methodology to use in a situation where little about the issue 
is previously known, the research setting is highly politicised and the research aims to be 
sensitive to issues of marginalisation of participants. Since the study was grounded in an 
actor-orientated approach which is itself informed by Giddens’s (1984) theory of the 
duality of agency and structure, an embedded case study approach was utilised which 
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examined the political and social structures surrounding individual action. Moreover, it 
argued that a mixture of methods best deals with the issues of research in highly politicised 
conflict zones, as well as providing methodological triangulation. 
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Chapter 5: Contested State-Making: Changing technologies of  
state-making and conflict between the KNU and the Burmese 
military 
This study seeks to investigate the non-military activities of youths in the KNU from the 
perspective of the youth cohort. The approach adopted in this study is an analysis of youth 
participation situated within a historical context of state-making and peripheral conflict. 
This chapter provides a background to the case by examining the nature of the KNU and 
its conflict with the Burmese military state15. 
Burma does not fit the Western model of statehood as a clearly defined territory with the 
state wielding a monopoly of violence and legitimacy (Meehan, 2011:384). Its boundaries, 
political structure and/or state-making approaches have been contested to the point of 
violence by a range of actors, including but not limited to, ethno-nationalist armed groups 
and the democracy movement. This chapter examines the changing nature of conflict and 
control in the east of the country between the Burmese state and one of the armed 
opposition groups, the Karen National Union (KNU) and points to the implications this 
has for youth roles in the group. The chapter is structured in four parts.  
Part one examines the outbreak of the KNU conflict with the Burmese state and explains it 
as a result of ethnocratic state-making practices in the centre and unease over the transition 
to direct rule by borderland peasant populations used to self-rule. These central and 
peripheral forces, which were a legacy of pre-colonial and colonial patterns of governance 
and agrarian relations, enabled marginalised Karen elites excluded from state power to 
enter into a strategic alliance with Karen communities in the centre and peasants in the 
borderlands in order to create a separate state.  
The chapter then turns in part two to look at the rise and fall of the KNU as the Burmese 
military have attempted to form the state and consolidate power. The KNU was the most 
powerful of the secession groups at its height (Harriden, 2002:84) and has been in a 
protracted, low-intensity conflict with the Burmese state for over sixty years. While it 
                                                 
15 In this study I use a variety of terms to describe the Burmese state and its military apparatus. In general I 
use Burma Army to describe the armed forces (called the tatmadaw in Burmese), including its leading generals. 
The terminology of the unitary party structures that the military have created over the decades of its rule (the 
BSPP, SLORC, SPDC and USDA/P) are not used to avoid confusion. In addition, they are essentially 
military parties, thus, for the purposes of this study, their activities and policies are essentially considered to 
be under the control of the military.  I also at times refer to the Burma Army as the Burmese state and the 
Burmese government. This does not presume that the military has legitimacy as rulers of the state, it merely 
points to their de facto occupation of state power at the time of research. Nor does it presume that the Army is 
monolithic in the state and in government, more that for the purposes of this study, they were so intertwined 
in 2008-09 as to be inseparable. This remains the case after the 2010 elections. 
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largely succeeded in building up an extensive de facto state in the eastern borderlands of the 
country, its fortunes have been locked in a dialectical relationship with the Burmese state. 
With the advent of military rule in 1962, the post-colonial Burmese state has gradually 
extended its control to the borderlands and, since the 1990s, the KNU has declined in 
power.  
Two distinct phases in the Burmese military’s approach to state-making are identified and 
discussed with reference to the KNU: the pre-1989 phase and the post-1989 phase. Prior 
to the democratic uprisings in Burma in 1988 and the end of the Cold War in 1989, the 
Burmese military was focused on counterinsurgency warfare in an attempt to disarm the 
armed opposition groups (Lintner, 1990; Smith, 1999). After 1989, however, it has used 
strategies of accommodation and military-economic agreements with armed groups to 
extend the reach of the state in the borderlands (Woods, 2011; Grundy-Warr and Dean, 
2011:94). The aim is not only to quell armed opposition, but, perhaps more importantly, to 
control the land and the resources contained within it (both natural and human) and use 
these to build legitimacy through patrimonial politics and internal security through 
militarisation. The Burmese state is, therefore, more accurately an example of North et al.’s 
(2007:3) ‘limited access order’, whereby the ruling regime limits “access to valuable political 
and economic functions as a way to generate rents” then relies on these rents to privilege 
powerful individuals who maintain order and solve the problem of violence for the state. 
Following the creation of alliances in the 1980s with other armed opposition groups and 
exiled democracy activist groups from the Burmese centre, the KNU re-formed its political 
goals and focused instead on fighting for political reform at the centre. However, while the 
KNU’s political leadership has held out for substantive political concessions, elements of 
its military wing have splintered and entered into military-economic agreements with the 
Burma Army. This has resulted in a complex mosaic of sovereignty and governance in the 
eastern borderlands, with multiple groups claiming public authority, often across 
overlapping territory. The third part of this chapter identifies four different spaces of 
governance in Karen State and examines the nature of conflict and control in each, 
including how these relate to youths. It argues that while the KNU has lost territorial 
control and coercive power, its governance services to the civilian population in eastern 
Burma have received new, external funding sources. This indicates the availability of a 
number of non-military roles for youths as chapter three discussed. 
The chapter concludes in part four by arguing that Burma’s recent history of state 
formation strongly suggests that the dominant discourse around civil war and state-making 
is empirically weak. Civil war has not eroded the Burmese state and the limits of the state 
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do not give way to chaos and disorder. Alternative forms of public authority have long 
been present, influenced by pre-colonial hill-valley relations and the country’s experience of 
colonial rule. However, ethnic politics and violent practices of state formation have 
displaced competing power-holders, traditional agrarian relations and peasant control of 
land and contributed to conflict. While Burmese state-making strategies have involved 
ceasefires with armed groups after 1989 and reduced the number of armed group at war 
with the state, civil peace has not followed. Multiple, overlapping spaces of sovereignty 
with a tenuous balance of interests has resulted in greater insecurity for youths while 
penetration of the borderlands and consolidation of military control over land and 
resources has increased displacement and impoverishment.  
1 Outbreak of conflict between the KNU and the Burmese State: Self-rule and 
ethnocratic state-making 
Burma’s peripheral conflicts are complex and dynamic and they cannot be understood 
without reference to the country’s recent history. Burmese pre-colonial kingdoms in the 
lowlands were severely disrupted by colonial rule leaving a legacy of separate governance 
arrangements in the central zone and borderlands; ethnic divisions with highly antagonistic 
relations between ethnic groups and a capture of the central state by ethnocratic, 
authoritarian military dictators. The politics of ethnicity played a central role in conflict in 
Burma after independence, which is complicated by the very high levels of ethno-linguistic 
diversity in the country. 
Ethno-linguistic diversity in Burma 
Burma is a large country in which the central lowlands and delta in the south are 
surrounded by a horseshoe-shaped ring of highlands, largely populated by ethnic minority 
people. The government identify 135 national races. Ethnic Burmans comprise roughly two 
thirds of the population with the ethnic minority groups making up the remaining third. 
The following map gives an indication of the distribution of ethno-linguistic groups around 
the country. The majority Burman group tend to reside in the central lowlands while the 
minority groups in general live in the hills surrounding the centre of the country. The 
roughly 4.5 million (8-9 per cent of the population in Burma)16 Karen-speaking people 
                                                 
16 Estimating the number of Karen people in Burma is highly problematic, not least because no trustworthy 
census has been taken in Burma since 1931. Extrapolating from the 1911 census16 undertaken by the British 
colonial enumerators yields a lower estimate 16 of 4.7 million Karen language speakers out of a Burmese 
population of 53.4 million in 201016 (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1922; PRB, 2010). This is considered a 
lower estimate because the border areas of the country have never been subject to a census. In areas outside 
state control now there are known to be around 83,700 Karen people living in hiding in the eastern jungle 
and around 145,713 Karen refugees in Thailand (TBBC, 2008 and 2010).  The number has been a sensitive 
political issue since decolonisation, when the number of seats reserved for Karens in parliament was based on 
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(shaded in brown on the map below) have tended to inhabit the eastern edge of Burma and 
its peninsula as well as parts of the Irrawaddy delta and areas around Rangoon/Yangon.  
 
Map 2 Map of Ethnolinguistic groups in Burma (CIA, 1972) 
                                                                                                                                               
the estimated Karen population. In 1911 Karen language speakers formed 8.8% of the population, but 12% 
of the country was not included in the census, most likely the remote areas populated by predominantly 
ethnic minority people, so the numbers of ethnic minorities are likely to be significantly under-estimated. 
Extrapolating from this data is fraught with problems, because the ethnic composition of the country has 
changed with the departure of native English speakers and the expelling of Bengalis, Hindis and Chinese 
(although there has more recently been a significant in-migration of Chinese). A chart of the ethnic 
composition of Burma in 1911 is available in Appendix C. 
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a) Self-rule in the borderlands 
The hilly borderlands surrounding the Burmese kingdoms in the lowlands have a long 
history of self-rule. As a general rule, Scott (2009:54) argues that areas higher than 300 
metres were not part of Burma proper. Furthermore, pre-colonial Burmese kingdoms 
tended to be self-liquidating; oppressive exploitation of peoples’ labour and resources 
forced them to flee away from the state Scott (2009). In this analysis hill people chose to 
live in the hills as a strategic livelihood decision to avoid the vagaries of state exploitation, 
the epidemics and crop failures of population concentrations and mono-cropping in the 
lowlands and to avoid slave-raiding and military plunder as well as army requisitions (Scott, 
2009). However, different communities had different degrees of separation from the 
Burmese state. Some hill communities lived in symbiosis with the core state, connected by 
trade, patronage and cultural practices, while other communities fought to defend their 
autonomy, fled out of the reach of the state or sought to make themselves difficult to rule 
by scattering and dividing (Scott, 2009:209; Michaud, 2010; Reid, 2000; Brown, 1994; 
Kunstadter, 1967).  
The political limits of the Burmese kingdoms did not necessarily give way to disorder or 
anarchy, peripheral powers also existed in the borderlands, in some cases mimicking the 
social hierarchy and cosmology of the centre (Wyatt, in Reid, 2000; Scott, 2009:262). The 
Shan princes imitated the Burmese and Thai kings and Karen millenarian pretenders 
claiming to be princes imitated the Shan model, creating the Karenni states (Scott, 
2009:262). At certain times, however, hill people also adopted oppositional identities which 
challenged the political legitimacy of the nearest valley state, or reinvented their identity 
through millennial movements (Lehman, 1979:313; White, 2000; Scott, 2009:319-328). As a 
result, the extensive hill areas surrounding Burma have long been refuges for fleeing 
peasants, rebels, bandits and royal pretenders, but have also represented a symbolic and 
practical space of subversion to the central monarch (Scott, 1998:187). 
Colonial sources indicate that the colonial government “never had authority over any of 
the tribes living more than a day’s journey from the city and river” (Smeaton, 1887:193). As 
a result, different governance arrangements were put in place for populations in the 
mountainous ‘Frontier Regions’, which also happened to be dominated by ethnic-minority 
groups, and those in the lowlands, termed ‘Ministerial Burma’, which were primarily 
dominated by the majority ethnic-Burman group (Thawnghmung, 2008). 
The impact of different governance arrangements meant that at independence, while the 
new Burmese government nominally took control of a country stretching up to newly-
defined borders with Thailand, in practice its reach was very limited, like many large post-
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colonial states (Jackson, 1990; Herbst, 2000). Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009:317-323) 
argue that large states are less likely to have penetrated areas on the periphery and as a 
result, populations in these areas are less accustomed to direct rule and more likely to be 
mobilised for secession in order to avoid the danger or reality of alien rule. Their objective, 
according to Scherrer (2003) and Keal (2007) is to seek a strategic alliance with armed 
opposition groups to challenge ‘internal colonisation’ in borderland areas and regain their 
autonomy through secession and/or self-determination. In the post-colonial Burmese 
borderlands, traditions of cultural and political independence have continued to be claimed 
by minorities (Smith, 1999:31), with some Karen communities joining or supporting the 
KNU in order to achieve this goal. More fundamental, however, is that the central state has 
sought to establish control over peasant resources and derive profit from them, thereby 
undermining traditional agrarian relations and social forms of sovereignty. 
b) Colonial divide and rule policies and the rise of ethno-nationalism 
In the case of the KNU, the majority of the Karen-speaking communities were not located 
in the periphery of the country, they were dispersed around Ministerial Burma, including 
the capital in Rangoon17 (Thawnghmung, 2008:5). Thus, although support for the KNU 
among the borderland Karen people can be explained as a rejection of the transition to 
direct rule at independence, for Karen communities used to direct rule in Ministerial 
Burma, the emergence of conflict is better explained as a result of ethnocratic state-making 
practices in the centre. 
Christian Mission records indicate that before colonial rule, the diverse groups of people 
speaking one of the Karen languages were never united and there was no memory of a 
historic Karen kingdom or state (Christie, 1996:53). In the hills east of Toungoo town (an 
area of more than 2,000 square miles), the Karen tribes were engaged in frequent 
internecine warfare with multiple splintering and no sense of unity at all (Bunker, 1910). In 
pre-colonial lower Burma, which had been ruled under the Burmese monarchies for a long 
time, Karen people generally had a subordinate, tributary and hostile relationship with the 
Burmese state and were well on their way to being assimilated into the dominant Burman 
culture (Christie, 1996:53-55).  
From non-ethnic self-identification and considerable assimilation between lowland Karens 
and Burmans in the pre-colonial period, a new definition of ‘Karen’ emerged in the mid-
                                                 
17 British colonial rule in Burma identified five distinct zones of community and identity among Karen-
speaking people: Karen villages in the Shan States; Karenni (Red Karen) statelets tucked away in a remote 
corner by the Thai border; a Karen heartland surrounding the strip of hills which divided Thailand from 
Burma; a parallel strip of Karen villages in the lowlands from Pyinmana down to Tenasserim, intermingled 
with Burman and Mon villages; and the Irrawaddy delta Karen people (Christie, 1996:54). 
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1800s severely impeding assimilation, based on the concept of an ethnic group as a racially 
distinct group of people with a set of shared customs and ancestry (Renard, 1990:95). 
Influenced by American Baptist missionaries, the Karen National Association (KNA) was 
founded in 1881 out of a series of Baptist district and provincial conventions to represent 
all of the Karen clans, allow them to meet on a common political platform and advance 
education, agricultural improvements and access to credit (Smeaton, 1887:201; South, 
2007a; Christie, 1996:57). From the start it was an attempt to unite all of the Karen tribes, 
regardless of religion, although it was dominated by Baptist Christians (Smeaton, 1887:201). 
A Buddhist KNA was not formed until 1939, but in 1947 it merged with the KNA, Karen 
Central Organisation and the Karen Youth Organisation to form the Karen National 
Union. The KNUP was later set up as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party of the KNU in an 
imitation of the Communist Party of Burma (Smith, 1991). 
During colonial rule in Ministerial Burma, a loyalist relationship developed between the 
ethnic-minority Karen people and the British colonialists (Christie, 1996), which had a 
long-lasting influence on Karen-Burman relations. The policy of favouring ethnic minority 
recruits in the armed forces and bureaucracy, in order to prevent Burman nationalist 
advancement, stoked antagonism between the Burmans and the favoured ethnic minority 
people (Renard, 1990; Ghosh, 2000:155). Political alignments in Burma during colonial rule 
then increasingly became increasingly on perceived ethnicity and communal identity 
became consciously ethno-nationalist (Brown, 1994:35).  
Communal relations between the Karen and Burman people deteriorated as lowland and 
highland Karens supported the British rulers, who used significant armed force in the 
governance of colonial Burma and came into violent conflict with Burman nationalists 
(Renard, 1990:96; Callahan, 2002:522). British colonial rulers promised their ethnic-
minority allies that the Frontier Areas would not be subsumed under the control of 
Burmans in the centre of the country at independence, thus the KNU’s secessionist goals 
originated in its ongoing discussions with the British government about the future form of 
the Burmese state and its boundaries. However, in the rush to independence, British 
officials reneged on their agreements to the ethnic minority groups in the Frontier areas 
and handed power to Aung San and a new Burman-dominated Executive Council in 1948 
in order to expedite their withdrawal from the country (Christie, 1996:71-79). 
The development of a Karen national consciousness during British colonial rule had been 
mirrored by the reification and fixing of self-consciously separate ethnic identities among 
other ethnic minority groups, as well as a parallel development of nationalism among 
Burman elites (Christie, 1996:58; South, 2008:12). The post-colonial Burmese state then 
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followed the pattern of other Southeast Asian states with its alienation and marginalisation 
of the other indigenous groups in the shift to an exclusive, Burman-dominated national 
identity (Rahin, 2001; Brown, 1994).  
The KNU rejected the Burmese constitution and a federal union form of state and the 
KNDO formally took up arms against the Burmese state in 1949 18 (Renard, 1990:102; 
Christie, 1996:77-78). KNDO forces, boosted by mass defections of Karen units from the 
Burma Army, then took control of large parts of the areas they were demanding (Renard, 
1990:104; Christie, 1996:77-78), followed soon after by armed Mon, Arakenese and 
Karenni groups (South, 2008:27). By 1962 there were twenty-four different armed 
opposition groups fighting the Burmese government, most of them separatist rebellions in 
the borderlands organised along ethnic lines (Smith, 1999:97-98). 
In the case of the KNU, the exclusion of Karen elites from state power in the transition to 
independence, poor communal relations between Karen and Burman communities in the 
lowlands, and Burman-Karen military clashes in the borderlands during World War Two, 
which resulted in egregious abuses against the local Karen population, led to the 
mobilisation of disparate Karen communities around a common goal of secession. As such, 
it is best understood as a strategic alliance of peasants and elites from both lowland and 
upland areas of central and eastern Burma, articulated around a vision of Karen nationalism 
and independence. Thus, the outbreak of the KNU-Burmese state conflict is best 
understood as an outcome of ethnocratic state-making at the centre and fears over state 
penetration in the borderlands where there was a legacy of self-rule. Crucially, the 
mobilisation of disparate Karen communities was achieved by educated, middle class 
Karen elites who formulated the political goals of the KNU.  As Skocpol (in Wickham-
Crowley 1992:41), argues ‘marginal political elites’, excluded from full power, turn to 
revolutionary organisations and attempt to secure power through an alliance with peasants. 
This is consistent with Kalyvas’s (2003:476) findings that actors seeking power at the centre 
ally with peripheral actors fighting more localised conflict, resulting in the “joint 
production” of action. 
Youth political activism in the transition to independence 
Even before the KNU rebellion formally erupted in 1949, the KNU was riven by internal 
divisions. Youth leaders19 from the KYO in the delta region undermined the KNU’s 
                                                 
18 The Karen revolt eventually erupted shortly after the massacre of 30-40 Karen worshippers at a church in 
Mergui District on Christmas Eve (Renard, 1990:102) 
19 Critical to the political direction the KYO took was the leadership of Mahn Ba Khaing and San Po Thin 
(Keenan, 2008) 
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political stance by usurping power during Burma’s shaky transition to independence from 
colonial rule. They encouraged the KCO to withdraw from the AFPFL’s transition 
government in protest at the lack of negotiation and compromise with Karen politicians 
then replaced the KCO with their own leaders in the AFPFL cabinet (Keenan, 2008). This 
effectively split the KNU into two factions: those who were for compromise and 
negotiation with the AFPFL and those who were not (Keenan, 2008).  The KYO then won 
some of the seats set aside for Karens in the parliamentary elections in the new 
independent period and renamed itself the Union Karen League, while the KNU did not 
contest the elections at all  (Renard, 1990:101; Christie, 1996; Smith, 1991). For more than 
forty years after this, the KNU operated without a youth wing. Although this split primarily 
concerned leaders of the KYO, it was more of a tactical division than a generational one as 
the KNU and KYO were both led by men in their early thirties to mid forties 
(Thawnghmung, 2008:8).  
2 Changing patterns of Burmese state-making and the KNU conflict 
The KNU-Burmese state conflict has experienced two distinct phases over the last sixty 
years. Until the end of the Cold War, the Burma Army conducted a counterinsurgency 
campaign through warfare, using ‘scorched earth’ tactics learnt from British colonial rule. It 
started in the central areas and progressed outwards, aiming to turn all of the ‘black zones’ 
outside its control into ‘brown zones’ then ‘white zones’ (areas firmly under its control). 
However, as this case demonstrates, the ‘black zones’ of Burma are spaces where the 
political limits of the law and geographic limits of the state do not give way to state 
disorder, but sovereignty at the village level and in the form of ethno-nationalist armed 
opposition groups (Malseed, 2008). Several of the armed groups built up politically and 
territorially extensive de facto states in the borderlands of the country (Kramer, 2009:6), 
which in some ways mimicked the central state and in others opposed it. The KNU 
employed the language of statehood and understood the symbolic value and strategic 
importance of its borders when building its state structures (Rajah, 1990:116 in Grundy-
Warr & Dean, 2011:98). 
After the end of the Cold War in 1989, assisted by changing geopolitical priorities among 
Burma’s neighbouring countries, the Burmese military pursued a different strategy of state-
making in the borderlands. It sought separate military and economic agreements with the 
armed opposition groups (continuing the colonial ‘divide and rule’ tactic), and used these to 
gradually establish military systems of control and resource exploitation in a form of state-
making that Woods (2011) terms ‘ceasefire capitalism’. This strategy has been much more 
effective in establishing centralised state control over the borderlands and has enabled it to 
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devote more of its military forces to the elimination of armed opposition groups which 
refuse to co-operate with its new state-making processes and structures of dominance. 
Thus, just as Gallant (1999) argues in his theory of the symbiotic relationship between 
states and bandits, state-making in peripheral areas involves either co-opting or crushing 
armed actors outside the state, resulting in shades of legitimacy and sovereignty.  
As a result of the state’s magnified interest in penetrating the borderlands, the KNU has 
lost territorial control and greatly declined in military power. However, since it has not 
been decisively co-opted or crushed like many of the other armed groups in Burma, the 
KNU remains in conflict with the Burma Army in an ‘equilibrium of instability’ (Christie, 
1996:78) but its goals, revenue streams and strategies have changed over time, in a 
dialectical relationship with the Burmese state. These are summarised in the following table 
and examined in more detail in this section. 
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Political period Burmese state-making 
strategies 
KNU state-making / state 
reform strategies 
Immediate post-
colonial, 
democracy 
period, 1948-1962 
- Consolidation of control 
in the centre 
- Conflict in the centre and 
retreat to the east 
- Attempted secession for 
‘Kawthoolei’ state in the 
eastern borderlands 
Military, socialist 
rule (Cold War 
period), 1962-1988 
- Penetration and 
consolidation of control 
in the lowlands 
- Elimination of threats in 
the centre (CPB, KNU, 
democracy activists) 
- Failed defence of lowland 
areas and retreat eastwards 
- Build-up of ‘Kawthoolei’ 
state apparatus 
- Capitalisation of the border 
and borderland resources 
Military 
capitalism (post-
Cold War) period, 
1989 onwards 
- Transition to capitalism 
and seizure of capitalist 
resources and networks in 
the borderlands 
- Increasing penetration of 
remote borderlands 
- Co-optation and 
collaboration (ceasefire 
groups and business 
people) in military-
economic agreements 
- Attempted transition of 
ceasefire groups into state 
military (BGF) 
- Land confiscation, 
resource exploitation and 
militarisation of space 
- Declining territorial control 
in  ‘liberated areas’, retreat 
eastwards 
- Formation of alliance 
agreements, abandonment of 
secession, promotion of 
political reform in the centre 
- Guerrilla warfare and 
undermining of state 
mechanisms of control 
- Increasing reliance on 
external support for welfare 
services 
- Increasing discourse of 
democracy, human rights and 
humanitarian intervention 
Table 4 Summary of Burmese and KNU state-making / state-reform strategies from 1948 
a) 1949-1988: Civil war, secession and KNU state-making 
An important component of the articulation of statehood is argued to be the construction 
of cultural and political representations, discourses and activities that give meaning to state 
practices and form the idea of the state in the social imaginary of the population (Hagmann 
& Péclard, 2010:543). By 1949, the KNU had articulated a vision of Karen nationalism and 
independence around which it sought to mobilise diverse Karen communities. The goal 
was secession for a large part of eastern Burma (the Salween Hill Tracts, Tenasserim 
Division and the eastern part of Pegu District) (Thawnghmung, 2008).  In the years 
immediately following independence, the Burmese state was weak and controlled little 
territory, with the KNU occupying territory just nine miles from the capital in Rangoon 
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(Thawnghmung, 2008). By contrast, the KNU controlled large parts of the delta and 
eastern Burma20 and established itself as a government within a de facto state, declaring its 
independence in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1953 and 
seeking external recognition as the ‘Kawthoolei Free State’ (the name chosen for the new 
Karen state)21 (Grundy-Warr et al., 1997:84).  However, the Burma Army quickly regained 
control of the delta areas of Burma and from the 1960s and 1970s, as the Burma Army has 
gained in strength, the KNU has retreated ever eastward into its ‘liberated zones’ in the 
borderland mountains and jungle, taking with it migrant Karen communities from around 
the delta, Yangon and Insein (Cusano, in South, 2011:14). 
The Burma Army fought the KNU and other ethnic armed groups with a military strategy 
termed ‘Pyat Lay Pyat’ (‘Four Cuts’), which involves moving the entire civilian population of 
an area into enclosed, heavily guarded relocation sites where armed opposition groups 
cannot access the food, funds, intelligence and recruits they need to survive (Smith, 
1991:259). The army also conducted annual dry season military offensives against the 
KNU’s fixed positions, eventually succeeding in breaking through the KNU’s front lines in 
1984, sending around 10,000 refugees into Thailand for the first time (TBBC, 2007). The 
SIPRI dataset records this low-intensity conflict as claiming the lives of 13,600 people at a 
minimum since its inception from deaths directly due to battle (Melvin & Koning, 
2010:74). 
                                                 
20 In its early years, the KNU had three distinct operational zones. First, the Irrawaddy delta area, which was 
entirely Pwo or Sgaw Karen villages sat side by side with Burman villages, more than 80 per cent Buddhist, 
with many villages entirely Burmese speaking. There were some large towns under KNU control and irrigated 
wet rice was cultivated. Second, the lowlands of eastern Burma, which were mainly rural with some small 
towns, Pwo Karen, Mon and Shan ethnicity, and Buddhist. Third, the hill areas of eastern Burma which were 
sparsely populated with small villages of Sgaw, Paku, Bre, Bwe and other sub-ethnic groups, who were 
Buddhist, Animist and Christian, and practiced slash and burn agriculture (Smith, 1991:280-281).  The 
Irrawaddy delta areas were first hit by the ‘Four Cuts’ counterinsurgency campaigns under General Ne Win 
and were first to fall entirely under Burma Army control (Smith, 1991:259). Afterwards the KNU dropped its 
claim to the Irrawaddy delta area and focused on establishing the Kawthoolei state in the eastern borderlands. 
21 American analysts in Bangkok at the time considered the declaration part of a giant communist strategy 
orchestrated by China and refused to assist the KNU (Smith, 1991:213). This was not an unfounded 
accusation, the KNUP was the first major conduit for communist ideology to other ethnic armed groups in 
Burma, all of which took up strongly left-wing positions (Smith, 1991:173). 
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Map 3 Map showing divisions and states in Burma as defined by the 2008 constitution (TNI, 2011). 
A rough outline of the KNU’s claimed area has been added to the map in grey shading using KNU-
produced maps. 
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Map 4 Map showing KNU-designated districts (in red) in its claimed territory (TNI, 2011:9). State 
boundaries as designated by the 2008 constitution are visible underneath (in black). 
 
Creation of the Kawthoolei State: Internal legitimacy, structure and divisions 
The KNU divided the territory it claimed to represent into seven districts, each led by a 
governor, administered by a district committee and defended by a brigade of soldiers run 
along British lines using conventional (fixed positions) warfare (Smith, 1991:383). In the 
KNU’s legal system, children are people under the age of 16 (Geneva Call, 2010:22). Young 
people (including some under the age of 16) were, until 2003, conscripted (and 
volunteered) into the army, but after 2003 young people under age 18 were completely 
banned from enlisting in the army and in 2007 the KNU signed a deed of commitment 
with UNICEF regarding the use of child soldiers (Geneva Call, 2010:22). At its height in 
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the 1980s, the KNU was the most powerful and influential politico-military group 
opposing the Burmese state with a standing army of 10,000 troops (Harriden, 2002:84; 
Smith, 1999:394).  
Mampilly, (2007:244) argues that rebel groups which rely on a specific ethnic, regional or 
national population face pressure from civilians to provide governance. Armed opposition 
groups which control significant territory are then more likely to provide governance 
services to the local population specifically to buttress their claims to represent a targeted 
population and indicate their strength to the central state (Mampilly, 2007:244). Within 
their extensive ‘liberated zones’ the KNU built up a ‘pseudo-government’ with a 
bureaucratic apparatus including ministries, taxation and revenue systems, education, health 
and relief services, and a ‘national’ language (Grundy-Warr & Dean, 2011:98). It was not 
the only ethno-nationalist armed opposition group to do this, the Kachin Independence 
Organisation, Shan State Army, Karenni National Progressive Party and New Mon State 
Party also built up extensive bureaucratic structures in the territory they controlled 
(Grundy-Warr & Dean, 2011:98; South, 2003).   
The nature of the alliance between the KNU and local hill people follows that articulated 
by Kalyvas (2003:486) whereby supralocal actors supply locals with the military muscle to 
gain a local advantage (in this case continued control of peasant land) while in exchange 
supralocal actors rely on local conflicts to recruit and mobilise supporters and obtain local 
control, resources and information. For both parties, the alliance is the means rather than 
the goal, which Kalyvas, (2003:486) argues is typically the case in peripheral conflicts. Thus, 
local support for the KNU does not necessarily imply agreement with its goals. The 
creation of the KNU’s de facto state was not always supported by hill Karen people more 
used to self-rule, especially its agrarian reform ideas during its socialist period (Smith, 1991; 
Keenan, forthcoming). However, the KNU attempted to establish direct control over the 
civilian population by incorporating their village councils into its governance structures. As 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) argue, pre-existing community networks and institutions 
are often used by leaders to convince people to follow them. The KNU retained the local 
village council structures, within which local sovereignty had long been based, but created 
township, district and central governance structures and a Karen penal code22 above the 
village leader’s authority which mimicked the Burmese state. However, other forms of 
                                                 
22 The Karen penal code was drawn up in 1955 by a Karen lawyer and is based on the colonial legal system of 
India (Smith, 1991:170).  
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collective organisation outside KNU structures, particularly any which challenged the 
KNU’s claim to public authority, were not tolerated.23  
Like the BSPP in central Burma, the KNU saw itself as above class, ethnic or regional 
interests but from the start it contained divisions along regional, religious, ideological and 
strategic lines, reflecting the great variety in communities ascribing to a Karen identity 
throughout the country. Not all of the people within its claimed area were Karen, the 
majority of Karen people lived outside Karen State and there were wide differences 
between those who did subscribe to a Karen identity.24 Moreover, since its creation by 
Karen Baptist elites with American Baptist missionary influence, Christian, S’gaw speaking 
older Karen males have dominated its leadership, though not exclusively so (South, 2007a). 
Between the 1950s to 1970s, the KNU contained ideological divisions with KNUP leaders 
becoming more closely allied to the CPB while the KNU’s military leaders remained more 
conservative, especially since their sources of external support were anti-communist (Fong, 
2008). The KNUP was formed as the vanguard party of the KNU and followed Marxist-
Leninist and Maoist theories of mobilisation and village organisation, seeing itself as the 
leadership of the working class with peasants as the backbone of the revolution (Fong, 
2008:118; Smith, 1991). Moreover, the socialist state-making ideology of the KNUP was in 
many respects different from the desires of the autonomous, agrarian Karen hill population 
of the Salween district who were used to self-rule and failed to resonate with villagers 
(other than the removal of feudal landlords) (Smith, 1991; Rajah, 1990).  
When General Bo Mya became the KNU’s leader in 1974, the KNUP and its communist 
ideology was subsumed under the KNU and the more complex principles of class struggle 
in socialist ideology were abandoned in favour of a simpler, ethno-nationalist ideology25 
(Smith, 1991; Fong, 2008).  Bo Mya then claimed that the KNU was the sole representative 
of the Karen people and established a one-party ruling system like the BSPP (Smith, 1991). 
Until 2000, Bo Mya mimicked the central Burmese state and military feudal historical 
patterns of rule in Burma by developing a military patronage form of authority in the KNU 
                                                 
23 Millenarian Karen sects such as the Telakhon, Likae and the Soldiers of the Holy Mountain (dubbed ‘God’s 
Army’ by the international media) which continued a tradition of emerging in the hill areas in times of crisis 
and re-organising collective political groupings, were at times harshly dealt with and are now either no longer 
active or no longer contest political authority in eastern Burma (South, 2007). 
24 Linguistic, socio-cultural, religious and political differences among the twenty-odd ethnic sub-groups 
collectively termed ‘Karen’ are so varied that ethnic homogeneity and a unified ‘Karen’ representation has 
been called a myth (Harriden, 2002:85-86).  
25 One of the founders of the KNU, Saw Ba U Gyi, came up with four political demands in 1950 which 
continue to form the bedrock of the KNU’s political position with regard to the Burmese state today: “There 
shall be no surrender; the recognition of the Karen State must be complete; we shall retain our own arms; we 
shall decide our own political destiny” (KNU, 2000). 
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(Keenan, forthcoming). Bo Mya refused to transfer power to new leaders according to the 
rules in the KNU’s constitution and established a battalion of special forces in 
economically important areas, personally loyal to his family (HRW, 2005:21).  
Hirschman (1970:92-93) argues that organisations with an ideological agenda are not 
necessarily interested in allowing opportunities for their members to voice their opinions 
(even though it is in their long-term interest) because their short-term interest is to act as 
they wish, unmolested by complaints and desertions. Although the KNU sought to 
promote participant and civilian loyalty through its ideological agenda, under Bo Mya’s 
leadership, the KNU allowed little dissent, especially from younger members (Keenan, 
forthcoming, p.349). Nepotism and political patronage along religious networks, as well as 
personal enrichment by powerful leaders then fostered internal divisions (Smith, 1991; 
South, 2011:41). Some of the other ethnic armed opposition groups have had similar 
problems to the KNU in terms of the way they use and incorporate youth. For example, 
many bright Mon youths exited the New Mon State Party in the 1990s, especially after the 
1995 ceasefire agreement, viewing the organisation as inflexible, undemocratic and prone 
to corruption (South, 2003:174). 
External legitimacy 
After 1976, the right-wing KNU played a significant geo-political ‘buffer’ function in the 
region preventing the communist parties of Burma, Thailand, China and Malaya from 
linking-up (Smith in Grundy-Warr et al, 1997:84). In Thailand’s western borderlands in 
particular, the KNU effectively operated as a ‘Foreign Legion for Thailand’, according to 
Bo Mya, by disarming Karen villagers who joined the Communist Party of Thailand so that 
the Thai Army was free to concentrate its troops in the east where wars were raging along 
the Laotian and Cambodian borders (Smith, 1991:299; McCoy, 1999:146). This was not a 
small role; in 1982-83 there was a mass surrender in Tak province of over 6,000 communist 
sympathisers and their dependants, along with over 700 heavily armed Karen and Mon 
guerrillas (Smith, 1991:299).  
In return for policing Thailand’s western borderlands, the KNU was treated as a de facto 
state and used as a proxy for Thai power, enjoying military, financial and moral support as 
well as a safe haven in Thailand until the fall of the Soviet Union (Grundy-Warr et al, 1997; 
McCoy, 1999). However, even at the height of its power, the KNU never managed to 
achieve formal external recognition and make the transition to actual statehood. 
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Revenue streams 
The KNU’s revenue streams during 1962 to 1988 boomed as a result of the Burmese 
military government’s disastrous economic policies and lack of control over the borderland 
resources. Termed ‘the Burmese way to socialism’ and marked by extreme isolation, 
nationalisation of industry, xenophobia and obstructive bureaucracy, the Burmese military’s 
introspective policies destroyed the official economy and the black market ‘shadow 
economy’ flourished under the control of the KNU for the majority of the eastern border 
with Thailand (Grundy-Warr et al, 1997:85; Harriden, 2002:119; Lowe, 2009:16; Silverstein, 
2001:120). With the nationalisation of businesses as well as a policy of non-alignment then 
isolation, Burma peculiarly became a left wing army dictatorship (Lowe, 2009:124) 
challenged by a right wing Karen rebellion.  
The KNU took advantage of the destruction of the official economy by levying a five to 
ten per cent tax on the increasing black market trade (rice, gems, tin ore, textiles, teak, 
gems, cattle and manufactured goods) flowing through its quickly established customs gates 
in the eastern borderlands (Grundy-Warr et al, 1997:84; Naylor, 2004;68).26 At its height, 
the black market cross-border trade was estimated to be providing over 80 per cent of 
Burma’s consumer goods and was worth between one and two million baht (US$40,000 to 
US$80,000) per day (Renard, 1990; Global Witness, 2003:71). The most important part of 
this income was the teak trade, including a tax on saw mills (Naylor, 2004:68). Burma 
contains 70 per cent of the world’s teak forests, which are rapidly depleting, but for many 
years this trade helped to finance the arms needed to defend the Kawthoolei state, 
providing up to 80 per cent of the KNU’s revenue (Naylor, 2004:68; Global Witness, 
2003:62).  As a result, the KNU’s forestry minister, Padoh Aung San, became the second 
most important person in the KNU after Bo Mya (and the most corrupt, siphoning-off 
large profits from teak sales before defecting to the Burmese state in order to avoid facing 
corruption charges in the KNU) (Global Witness, 2003:62-63).  
Though their strict Christian-influenced morals meant that the KNU were never involved 
in the large drugs trafficking operations in the region, the border trade remained highly 
lucrative as the black market flourished (Grundy-Warr et al, 1997:85; Harriden, 2002:119). 
The KNU clearly relied heavily on teak resources for income which suggests it may be 
considered a ‘rentier’ rebel group, but it actually had multiple revenue streams (including 
                                                 
26 The KNU established its first new customs gate at Phalu, south of the Myawaddy-Mae Sot border crossing, 
in 1964, soon after the start of socialism, quickly followed by another at Kawmoorah-Wangkha. By the peak 
of its trade in 1983 there were a further ten gates, each with a garrison of up to 200 troops protecting the 
black market revenue stream (Boucand & Bouncand, 1992, in Chen Wei Ching, 1992). Each customs gate 
remitted 40 per cent of its revenue to KNU headquarters and used the remainder to maintain the army units 
in its sector (Boucand & Boucand, 1992, in Chen Wei Ching, 1992). 
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mines, businesses, plantations and a rice tax on farmers) and was also dependent on local 
support for intelligence information about roving Burma Army troops. From 1949 to 1989, 
the KNU clearly went through Naylor’s (2002) three stages of guerrilla revenue raising 
strategies as it stabilised its funding base and developed extensive bureaucratic structures. 
Exploitation of the border trade and resources transformed Burma’s eastern borderlands 
into a central economic space on the margins of the country and facilitated processes of 
capitalism in the borderlands, provoking intense speculation by the Burmese and Thai 
states (Meehan, 2011:385). At its peak in 1983, the KNU’s eastern division customs gates 
were raising around GBP 50 million per year, according to the KNU Finance Minister, Pu 
Ler Wah (Smith, 1991:283), although this could be an over-statement as Burmese 
government figures said that the KNU earned around US$2.6million from teak sales in 
1993 (Global Witness, 2003:61). The Burmese economy during this time was thus 
characterised as a “poor center and rich periphery” (Kurosaki et al in Kudo, 2007:14). As 
Rajah argued at the time (1990:122, in Horstmann, 2002), in terms of the Karen conflict 
“what is at stake is the capacity of the state to control and maintain its boundaries and what 
is contained within these national boundaries.” Essentially, the KNU’s control of the 
borderland shadow economy granted it a degree of external legitimacy, while concurrently 
undermining central state economic policies in the Burmese heartland, the state’s socialist 
ideology and, therefore, its state-making programme. However, it also created a ‘border 
effect’ (Gallant, 1999) which magnified the state’s interest in its borderlands. The Burmese 
military had built its forces in the 1950s and 60s to counteract the threat it perceived from 
the CIA-backed Kuomintang in Burma’s northern border with China, thus a precedent had 
already been set that prioritised military control over territory and state-making in the 
country (Callahan, 2003:172).  
By 1988, the Burmese military had consolidated its control over the state and most aspects 
of life in the centre of the country, while civil services and non-military political parties had 
withered away (Callahan, 2003). In an attempt to bankrupt the black market trade and the 
cash profits it generated, General Ne Win demonetised the Burmese economy, which 
sparked the 1988 urban uprisings (Fong, 2008:146). Between 1988 and 1990, the Burmese 
military brutally suppressed democracy protests in the centre of the country and over 
10,000 political activists fled to the ‘liberated areas’ of the armed opposition groups in the 
hills, roughly half of them to KNU-controlled territory (Smith, 1999:371; South, 2011:17) 
mimicking pre-colonial patterns of escape from oppressive central rule. The KNU 
headquarters at Manerplaw hosted thousands of fugitive students, MPs and numerous 
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political groups, functioning as the capital of the entire eastern periphery of Burma, not just 
Kawthoolei (Lintner, 1989, Falla 1991, Goodden 1996).  
The KNU became more of a direct threat to the Burmese state after 1988 when the ethnic 
armed opposition groups created a powerful alliance with the democracy groups.  At 
Manerplaw, twenty-three of the armed opposition groups including the KNU, united to 
form the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) in 1988 27. Subsequently, the NLD and 
Members of Parliament Union (MPU) also joined the alliance and it transformed into the 
NCUB. The alliance members agreed to fight for a change to the political form of the 
country from a unitary state to a federal union and greater autonomy for the ethnic armed 
groups as public authorities in the ethnic states. The goal of outright secession had already 
been dropped by the ethnic armed groups in 1984 in a major policy shift which no longer 
repudiated the outright existence of the state of Burma (South, 2011:50). This was a potent 
alliance which seriously threatened the control and legitimacy of the Burmese military 
regime because it combined ethnic fire power with the largely urban–based, and mostly 
ethnic Burman, democracy movement (South, 2011:17).  As a result, it further magnified 
the Burmese state’s interest in controlling the eastern KNU-held borderlands.  
Following the suppression of dissent in the centre, the Burma Army underwent an internal 
reorganisation and Ne Win was ousted in favour of a new generation of Generals more 
interested in the benefits of capitalism and the exploitation of the borderland resources and 
cross-border trade (Meehan, 2011:385). They pursued a different strategy of state-making 
in the borderlands, prompted by the end of the Cold War and the unexpected success of 
new military-economic agreements with armed remnants of the Communist Party of 
Burma (CPB), such as Khun Sa’s United Wa State Army (UWSA) (McCoy, 1999). 
b) 1989-2011: Decline of the KNU and rise of Burmese state-making in the 
borderlands 
The alliance of the urban democracy groups with the ethnic armed opposition groups at 
the KNU headquarters made the destruction of the KNU and its territory a high priority 
for the Burmese military (Rajah, 1998:144), but it was not until the break up of the CPB 
following the end of the Cold War that the Burmese military had the resources to devote to 
seriously contesting the ethnic armed opposition groups’ territorial control in the 
borderlands (Grundy-Warr & Dean, 2011:98).  
                                                 
27 A previous alliance, the National Democratic Front (NDF) had been created in 1976, but the DAB was 
wider-ranging, including more of the armed opposition groups than the NDF. 
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After the end of the Cold War, China sought greater access to Burma’s natural resources 
and border trade to fuel its fast-growing economy and stimulate economic development in 
Yunnan Province (Meehan, 2011:386). It withdrew funding from the CPB, which quickly 
resulted in the Wa, Kokang, Shan, Akha and Kachin armed members leaving the party 
(Raw, 2001:160). Meanwhile, the Burmese military embarked on a breakneck expansion 
from around 180,000 soldiers in 1988 to over 400,000 soldiers in the mid 1990s (levelling at 
around 300,000 in 2007) as well as ambitious arms production and procurement 
programmes with the assistance of the Chinese government (Callahan, 2007:36; Maung 
Aung Myoe, 2009).  
With unexpected success creating local military-economic agreements with splinter groups 
from the CPB, the Burmese military embarked upon a changed state-making strategy, 
termed ‘ceasefire capitalism’ by Woods (2011), in which the newly-capitalist Burmese 
military regime pursued military-economic ceasefire agreements with the ethnic armed 
opposition groups and used these to establish territorial control and re-calibrate the 
political economy of the borderlands. The term ‘ceasefire capitalism’ refers to the “intricate 
interplay between military force, resource-rich peasant land, and (trans-) national finance 
capital” (Woods, 2011:751). In essence, this strategy represents North et al.’s (2007, 2009) 
‘limited access order’. The Burmese regime confiscated land and natural resources in the 
borderlands to limit access to valuable natural resources such as mines, prime agricultural 
land and strategic sites for hydropower and gas pipeline construction projects in order to 
generate rents. It then distributed these rents to powerful individuals, groups and 
neighbouring governments willing to enter into an alliance with the Burmese military and 
solve the problem of violent resistance to its rule in the borderlands (McCoy, 1999). 
Burmese-Thai bilateral agreements 
With the elimination of the communist threat in the region after the end of the Cold War, 
the KNU were no longer needed as a proxy force for Thailand and throughout the late 
1980s and 1990s, “Bangkok and Rangoon collaborated to end support for the borderland 
power-holders in the ‘buffer zone’” (McCoy, 1999:146-147). In a new Thai government 
policy to transform battlegrounds along its borders into marketplaces, the Thai government 
under General Chaovolit broke the international boycott of Burma (formed after the 
Burmese military re-asserted power in 1988) and recognised the Burmese regime’s 
legitimacy in exchange for logging28 and fishing rights (Smith, 1991:408). Its trans-boundary 
resource access deals with the Burmese state fundamentally changed control of the 
                                                 
28 Thailand had established a national logging ban in 1980 due to extensive deforestation, thus, its companies 
were eager to find new markets (Global Witness, 2003) 
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borderland economy;29 as trade became legitimised (and taxed by both the Thai and 
Burmese governments), roads were built and Thailand gradually became Burma’s biggest 
foreign investor and trading partner with official bilateral trade valued at US$3.577 billion 
in 2009-10, most of it due to gas exports, which are the primary ‘rent’ for the Burmese 
military rulers30 (Renard, 1996:108; Xinhua, 2010; Turnell, 2008; Grundy-Warr et al, 
1997:87). In this way, powerful Thai military and business leaders have engaged in 
patrimonial politics with the Burmese regime. In return for access to rents, they have come 
under pressure from the Burmese regime to limit Burmese exile political activism and the 
activities of the KNU on Thai soil.  
Burma's exports by destination country
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Figure 1 Burma’s exports by country, 2003-2008 (Graph created from data in Turnell, 2008) 
The decline in the KNU’s revenues is directly related to the Burma Army’s seizure of 
border trade and establishment of bilateral economic agreements with Thailand (Global 
Witness, 2003). Although border trade and the importation of foreign goods were 
prohibited under the Burmese government’s socialist policies (Set Aung, 2009:6), after 1996 
some of the trade became legalised, though much of it continues to be undocumented. 
Officially, border trade between Burma and Thailand was US$295 million in 2009-10, 
representing seven per cent of Burma’s total trade value, but undocumented trade (not 
including illegal/illicit trade) in 2006 reached over US$1 billion, which would make border 
                                                 
29 From December 1988 to May 1989 the Burmese regime granted 42 logging concessions to 36 Thai 
companies, many of them linked to Thai military interests rather than specialist forestry firms (Brunner et al., 
1998). The concessions doubled the area being exploited and gave the Burmese regime 20,000 baht per ton of 
teak extracted, although the Thai companies were also forced to pay the KNU 5,000 baht per ton in 
compensation (Smith, 1991:393).  
30 Taxation accounts for 26 per cent of the financing provided to the Burmese state by the Central Bank of 
Myanmar and a mere four per cent of GDP (Turnell, 2008:6). The lion’s share of Burmese state income 
comes from its gas exports which, since 2003, is the primary source of foreign income for the Burmese state 
and is expected to bring in around US$2 billion per year at current production rates and prices for the next 30 
to 40 years (Turnell, 2008:15). 
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trade around 25 per cent of Burma’s total trade value if it were taken into account (Set 
Aung, 2009:6; Xinhua, 2010).31  
With new logging roads and tacit Thai support, the Burma Army were able to launch a 
series of large-scale attacks on KNU military strongholds and customs gates, leading to the 
loss of significant KNU territory, including the lucrative border customs gates (Grundy-
Warr and Dean, 2011:98). During 1984 to 1994, as the Burmese military attacked the entire 
eastern borderland areas, the number of refugees fleeing to Thailand increased to 80,000 
people (TBBC, 2007). However, since it could not breach the KNU’s heavily fortified 
headquarters by itself, the Burma Army also initiated ceasefire agreements with individual 
military leaders within the KNU.  
KNU splinters and ceasefires 
Since the collapse of the CPB, the Burmese military have pursued military-economic 
ceasefire agreements with a number of ethnic armed groups as a state penetration and 
consolidation strategy (Woods, 2011). Between 1989 and 1995, over twenty-five of the 
armed opposition groups pursued a strategy of negotiation with the Burma Army rather 
than continuing armed hostilities, often out of military necessity, humanitarian 
considerations or economic inducements (Callahan, 2004:110). They have served an 
important function by reducing the number of war fronts for the Burma Army and 
facilitating greater military control over the borderlands through the use of the ethnic 
armed groups as proxies. In return the armed groups have received economic concessions 
and a degree of territorial control, with shades of legitimacy. Thus, as Gallant (1999) and 
McCoy (1999) argue, armed actors outside the state have supplemented the state’s lack of a 
monopoly of coercive power in the periphery in return for access to rents. 
Burma Army leaders pursued ceasefire agreements with the KNU in 1963-64, between 
1995 and 1997, and between 2003-05, but with the KNU holding out for substantive 
political reform, while the Burmese military was only interested in pursuing the same 
military-economic agreements it had reached with other armed groups, the talks failed to 
reach agreement (South, 2011:16-17). Partly the lack of agreement was a result of pressure 
from the Burmese democracy movement overseas, who were pressing for international 
action through the UN instead (Taw, 2005, in South, 2008:60). However, Burmese military 
leaders were more successful at fostering splinter groups from within the KNU’s armed 
wing. The most significant was the creation of the DKBA in 1994, which splintered from 
the KNLA as a result of grievances over corruption, authoritarianism and religious 
                                                 
31 Trade in 2009-10 was down from US$327 million in 2008-09 due to border closures (Lawi Weng, 2010). 
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discrimination within the KNU (South, 2011:19; Keenan, forthcoming). The Burma Army 
then managed to seize the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw in 1995 with DKBA 
assistance.  
The Burma Army broke the KNU’s territorial control and coercive power in its eastern 
borderlands by cutting off local support with its ‘Four Cuts’ operations; cutting off external 
support by creating its own bilateral agreements with Thailand; and dividing the KNU 
internally by inducing individual KNLA units with economic concessions.  
During the three years from 1995 to 1997, the Burma Army over-ran all of the KNU’s 
remaining military bases along the border, as well as those of the KNPP, SSA and ABSDF 
resulting in the refugee caseload in Thailand increasing to around 115,000 people (TBBC, 
2007). The Burma Army subsequently fostered two more KNU splinter groups: the KPF 
in 1997 (from the KNLA’s sixth brigade32) and the KNU-KNLA Peace Council in 2007 
(from the KNLA’s seventh brigade), both of which signed ceasefire agreements. However, 
despite collaboration between the Burma Army and ethnic armed groups, ethnic distrust 
remains high (Irrawaddy, 2010; Global Witness, 2003:72). As a result, in 2010 a large 
contingent of the DKBA (around 1,500 soldiers) refused the order to join the Burmese 
military’s BGF and allied itself back again with the KNU.  
Nowadays, the KNU’s armed wings are not united, according to a news interview with 
David Taw, one of the KNU’s senior leaders, in 2009 (Irrawaddy, 2009). David Taw 
identified two kinds of troops: those stationed in the district central command base and 
those stationed in outlying areas; and reported that the KNU has difficulty controlling 
them all and deciding whether to discipline or make concessions to military commanders 
(Irrawaddy, 2009). 
Changing modes of KNU legitimacy-building 
As the Burma Army have become stronger and established greater control over the eastern 
borderlands, the KNU has become correspondingly weaker. After the DKBA split in 1995 
and the KNU’s loss of territory, the organisation suffered a severe challenge to its internal 
legitimacy and particularly, the authoritarian leadership of Bo Mya. After the fall of the 
KNU headquarters at Manerplaw, the KNU held its first congress since Bo Mya took 
power in 1976. The elections resulted in General Tamlabaw replacing Bo Mya as chief of 
staff of the KNLA.33 At the next congress in 2000, the civilian KNU leader, Saw Ba Thein 
Sein, replaced Bo Mya as President and a second generation of leaders, some of whom had 
                                                 
32 The KPF now has around 230 soldiers active in Kawkareik Township of Dooplaya District (FBR, 2010a).   
33 News reports indicate that Bo Mya refused also to step down as President despite the election results (for 
example, Aung Zaw and Moe Gyo (2000)). 
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participated in student politics in urban Burma34, were elected into the Central Executive 
Committee. With a new leadership, the KNU sought to solidify internal support and 
present a more sophisticated view to the outside world (Aung Zaw and Moe Gyo, 2000). 
From 2000 to 2008, Ba Thein Sein and the KNU’s General Secretary, Mahn Sha (another 
civilian leader), were the most important leaders in the KNU, overseeing a significant shift 
in the KNU’s organisational culture and practices away from military autocracy.  
Under the new leadership, the KNU began emphasising the ideology of a democratic 
federal union in Burma above ethno-nationalism, both externally and internally. It also 
continued to reform its links with the other opposition groups in Burma. In 2011 the KNU 
joined forces with eleven other armed opposition groups (several of whom had broken 
their ceasefire agreements with the Burmese military) and established the United 
Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) (South, 2011:44). The KNU’s external alliances have 
occasionally been a source of tension among Karen communities in Burma who question 
whether the KNU should be following the agenda of pro-democracy groups in exile 
(South, 2008:61).  
Finally, the KNU attempted to strengthen its internal organisation in a new ‘politics before 
military’ policy in which the KNU aimed to be led and controlled by the policies of its 
younger political leaders and its formalised decision-making structures, rather than by its 
military leaders and their unilateral decisions (Aung Zaw and Moe Gyo, 2000). It also 
attempted to restructure the organisation and put the needs of the civilian population first 
(Keenan, forthcoming p.389). However, according to David Taw, the KNU faces problems 
conducting public meetings and communicating with villagers inside Burma, due to the lack 
of territorial control, and has financial and recruitment difficulties (Irrawaddy, 2009). 
Although the KNU political leadership continue to have problems with factionalism in its 
military ranks and discipline among its military commanders, some of which results in 
sporadic human rights abuses, the KNU today is in many ways very different from the 
KNU at the height of its power when its military wing ruled autocratically (Keenan, 
forthcoming). Since 1995 it has held regular, four-yearly internal elections and civilian 
leaders pre-dominate at the highest levels of the organisation. According to a leader in the 
KNU’s Organising department, the main divisions in the KNU at the 2008 conference 
were strategic, rather than regional, religious or personal, with some KNU leaders 
                                                 
34 Mahn Sha believed in leftist revolutionary politic, worked for the KNU underground while at university in 
Rangoon and was involved in the student protests against Ne Win’s coup in 1962 (Cho, 2008). 
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preferring to work towards a ceasefire with the Burmese military while ‘hardliners’ were 
unwilling to concede any territory in return for a ceasefire.35  
3 Sovereignty and control in the Karen borderlands 
In the Karen borderlands today, four different, but overlapping, spaces of sovereignty are 
identifiable: government-controlled ‘white zones’; partially-securitised areas with multiple, 
overlapping forms of public authority (previously called ‘brown zones’ in the Burma 
Army’s counterinsurgency terminology); small pockets of KNU-controlled areas 
(previously termed ‘black zones’); and exile spaces in Thailand, including, but not limited 
to, the refugee camps.36  
a) Government-controlled ‘white zones’: Militarisation of land, labour and social 
control 
In the military-controlled ‘white zones’ of Karen State, army camps have become notorious 
for extorting money and materials from the surrounding population to provide for their 
needs, prop up paltry salaries and establish structures of military control (Callahan, 2007:47; 
Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma, 2010). However, the most 
significant and fundamental challenges to local people have been changes in the control of 
land and extensive exploitation of local labour.  
In Karen State, much land has been confiscated from villagers by the Burma Army to make 
way for a variety of political and economic projects including military business ventures 
with Burmese companies (for example, rubber plantations with Max Myanmar Group of 
companies), the enlargement of towns, construction of the new capital at Naypyidaw, 
hydro-electric dam projects, biofuel cropping and gas pipelines (KHRG, 2011; KHRG, 
2009:1; KHRG, 2006; BEWG, 2011; COHRE, 2007:12). Moreover, local forced labour has 
systematically been used in the construction of macro-development projects, roads and on 
military-controlled private enterprises, such as plantations (KHRG, 2006). Thus, the 
Burmese regime’s attempts to make the state by reordering land and society for commercial 
production has institutionalised the primacy of armed coercion, just as it did under British 
colonial rule, and follows a similar pattern of coercive changes to capitalism and 
patrimonial politics found in many other countries (Callahan, 2002:533-534; Gallant, 1999). 
                                                 
35 Interview with Saw B, Mae Sot, 23rd June 2009 
36 This differs from Grundy-Warr and Dean’s (2011:97) classification of space in the borderlands by including 
exile spaces in Thailand. Grundy-Warr and Dean (2011:105) also identify ceasefire areas as a distinct space, 
which are areas under the control of a ceasefire group that the Burma Army cannot enter without permission. 
However, since these are primarily areas under the control of the KIO, NMSP and UWSA, they are outside 
Karen State. 
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The main macro-development projects implemented by the Burmese military in eastern 
Burma (in partnerships with neighbouring countries) are shown in the following map. 
 
Map 5 Development Projects in South East Burma/Myanmar (TBBC, 2011) 
The Burmese state’s coercive strategy of state-making in the white zones has resulted in the 
entire landscape being militarised to enforce power and control over land (KHRG, 2008; 
TBBC, 2011). This has directly led to the impoverishment of local people and has resulted 
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in a massive and increasing exodus of an estimated 3.5 million people to neighbouring 
countries, most of whom live as unregistered migrant workers (KHRG, 2009:2-3).37 Young 
people between the ages of 15 and 17 (both male and female) are thought to comprise 20 
per cent of the migrant workforce in Thailand, partly as a result of customary practices of 
family labour in Burma which view young people over the age of 13 as being capable of 
work outside the home (Burma Human Rights Yearbook, 2006 in CPPCR, 2009:12). Thus, 
just as pre-colonial Burmese kingdoms tended to be self-liquidating as local populations 
fled to avoid oppressive and exploitative rule (Scott, 2009), so the pattern continues with 
Burma’s military rulers.  
Politically, the Burmese state has been labelled a totalitarian regime with a legitimacy deficit, 
the characteristics of which are rule “based on fear, force and coercion rather than on 
consent or voluntary compliance” (Holsti, 1996:84), but despite overwhelming dislike for 
the military regime among ordinary people and general support for armed and/or political 
opposition groups, most people do not protest (Beatty, 2011:248). According to Beatty 
(2011:254), Burmese citizens believe that the declining economy and forced labour policies 
of the regime prevents political opposition as people become totally focused on merely 
surviving. Moreover, fear of punishment and heavy restrictions on information prevent 
widespread protest (Beatty, 2011:248). 
Areas under consolidated Burma Army control are now only lightly influenced by the 
KNU through underground organising and recruiting networks.38 However, despite the 
minimal lack of political space in government-controlled areas of Burma, Karen civil 
society organisations outside the armed groups have attempted to carve out spaces for 
social and political activities (Saw U, 2007:226). In the delta area and around Yangon 
especially, Karen activists linked to Christian church networks have formed political 
parties, acted as mediators between the Burmese military and the KNU and set up groups 
such as the Karen Development Committee with a youth wing (Rising Sun Group) and a 
women’s wing (Karen Women’s Action Group) (Saw U, 2007:226).  
In government-controlled areas of Karen State, three Karen parties contested the 2010 
elections in addition to the USDP (the Burma Army-backed party): the Karen State 
Democracy and Development party, the Karen People Party and the Plone-S’gaw 
Democratic Party (KIC, 2010). Outside Karen State, the Union Karen League and Karen 
                                                 
37 A report by KHRG (2009:4-7) finds that 78% of migrants cite exploitative abuses by Burmese state 
authorities as reasons for their economic impoverishment and subsequent migration, with regular forced 
labour the single most common abuse. 
38 Parts of the Delta around Bogale and Laputta are still considered areas of insurgent activity (classified as 
‘brown zones’) by the SPDC because of a failed armed action there in 1991 by the KNU (HRW, 2010:70) 
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National Congress for Democracy contested the elections. Young people in the white 
zones are also involved in opposition politics, as well as being used by the Burmese 
government to consolidate its power. 
Young people and politics in the ‘white zones’ 
Youths (categorised according to the UN definition as males and females between the ages 
of 15 and 24) are estimated to number around nine million, or 18 per cent of the 
population in Burma, which is comparable to other Asian countries (UN, 2010:97). Within 
urban areas of lowland Burma, overt political protests frequently stemmed from Burmese 
students, who have a history of political activism since colonial rule. Student politics started 
when Rangoon University was formed in 1920 and was focused on reform of education 
which was geared towards the needs of the colonial state to one which was more Burmese 
focused (Aye Kyaw, 1993). University (and occasionally high school) students then became 
prominent campaigners for national independence and, after the 1962 military coup, 
democracy, resulted in the military blowing up Rangoon University’s Student Union 
building (Steinberg, 2007:126).  
In urban areas of Burma today, many of the current democracy groups are student or 
youth-based, such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions or, in the case of the ’88 
Generation Students Group, cohort-based. Some are organised by ethnicity, often as the 
youth wings of ethno-nationalist armed groups, such as Kayan New Generation Youth, 
Mon Youth Progressive Organisation and Karen Youth Organisation (re-formed as the 
KNU’s youth wing in 1989); some are youth wings of political parties, such as NLD-
Youth; some are umbrella groups, such as Students and Youth Congress of Burma, 
Nationalities Youth Forum and Forum for Democracy in Burma; and others are organised 
around specific interest groups, such as hip hop music (Generation Wave). Despite the 
forming of alliance and umbrella groups, ethnic divisions continue to have an impact on 
the organisation of collective political action. For example, the umbrella youth group, 
SYCB, organises underground political activism training for its member organisations, but 
has had to conduct separate trainings for each organisation due to ethnic distrust between 
the members over security for their underground activists.39  
The Burmese Buddhist Sangha (monkhood) has also long been influential in Burmese 
politics. Young monks in particular have been outspokenly critical of military 
misgovernance resulting in increasingly desperate living conditions throughout the country 
                                                 
39 Conversations with a KYO leader in July 2008, Mae Sot 
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and the All Burma Young Monks Union was a leading force in the 2007 ‘Saffron 
Revolution’ (HRW, 2009:47-49).  
Many of the youth groups are involved in similar activities including political activism; 
awareness raising among youth in Burma around HIV/AIDS, narcotics and politics; ethnic 
culture and literature promotion; finding or providing educational opportunities for youth; 
and human rights abuse documentation and international advocacy. The vast majority are 
compelled to work ‘underground’ since their organisations and activities have been banned 
by the military government. As a result, many youth groups have seen some of their 
members imprisoned or killed for political activism in Burma. One of the largest wave of 
youth arrests in recent years was of around 70 youths in 2010, most of whom were 
members of Education and Economic Development for Youth (EEDY), the youth wing 
of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), following the Myitsone dam bombings 
(Phanida, 2010). The KIO had founded EEDY in 2003 and conducted basic military 
training for more than 2,000 youth members (Phanida, 2010).  
The following table summarises the main youth groups known at the time of research 
which state political opposition to the military regime: 
Politically active youth opposition groups in Burma 
Youth wings of armed groups 
Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) - youth wing of KNU 
Education and Economic Development for Youth (EEDY) - youth wing of KIO 
Ta’ang Students and Youth Organisation (TSYO) – youth wing of PSLF 
Youth wings of un-armed political groups 
National League for Democracy – Liberated Areas (NLD-LA) (youth wing) 
National League For Democracy (NLD) (youth wing) 
Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) (youth wing) 
Armed youth/student groups 
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) 
Independent youth groups with political affiliation (based in neighbouring 
countries) 
Mon Youth Progressive Organisation (MYPO) 
Pa-O Youth Organisation (PYO) 
All Arakanese Students and Youth Congress (AASYC) 
All Kachin Students and Youth Union (AKSYU) 
Kuki Students Democratic Front (KSDF) 
Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY) 
Arakan Youth Network Group (AYNG) 
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Chin Students Union (CSU) 
Shan Youth Power 
United Lahu Youth Organisation (ULYO) 
Zomi Students and Youth Organisation (ZSYO) 
Karenni National Youth Organisation (KNYO) 
Karenni Students Union (KSU) 
Myanmar Future Generations (MFG) 
Student/youth political parties (based in neighbouring countries) 
Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) 
Independent youth groups with political affiliation (based in Burma) 
Generation Wave 
88 Generation Students 
All Burma Young Monks Union (ABYMU) 
All Burma I.T Students Union (ABITSU) 
National Youth Network 
Umbrella student/youth groups with political affiliation 
Students and Youth Congress of Burma (Thailand-based) (SYCB) 
All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) 
Nationalities Youth Forum (Thailand-based) (NY Forum) 
Table 5 Politically active youth opposition groups in Burma 
The Burma Army has long had an interest in mobilising young people’s support through its 
civilian and military structures. Most prominent in international reportage is its extensive 
use of child soldiers. Much of the expansion of the Burma Army has been as a result of 
coerced recruitment of male youths, often under the age of 18, which has become even 
more intensive as desertion rates have increased (HRW, 2007:30-34; UN, 2011). As a result, 
Burma is believed to have the highest number of child soldiers (under age 18) in its state 
military out of any country in the world, numbering around 70,000 in 2002 (HRW, 2002). 
Neither the Burma Army nor the ethnic armed groups have sought to militarise and recruit 
female youths, though (Fink, 2008:454). 
In terms of mobilising civilian youth support, the military regime’s primary strategy to quell 
domestic opposition has been to bring all aspects of life under military control and extend 
the number of people formally tied to its structures of patronage. To this end, it established 
a number of government-organised NGOs (GONGOs), the most substantial of which was 
the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), established in 1993 along the 
same lines as the GOLKAR party in Indonesia, with a membership of more than 20 
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million (South, 2011:24; NDD, 2006:71). The USDA became a military-sponsored political 
party in 2010 and won the national elections.  
Young people aged upwards of 15 are often coerced into joining the USDA and other 
GONGOs including the Volunteer Firemen, Civil Militia, Myanmar Red Cross Society, 
Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association and the Myanmar Women’s Affairs 
Association (KHRG, 2008; NDD, 2006).  Students in particular, including school students, 
are heavily pressured to join the USDA and as a result, the vast majority of students in 
Burma are members (NDD, 2006:19; KHRG, 2008). Youths also join voluntarily, 
especially in areas where membership results in exemption from conscription for forced 
labour, extra taxes and incentives such as low cost housing (NDD, 2006:24).  Youth in the 
USDA are used to create spectacles of support during mass rallies for the government and 
are also used in its militia groups, civilian surveillance and intelligence operations, 
harassment of NLD activists and activities, street sentries and violent political attacks 
(NDD, 2006:48-67). In 2010, youths between the ages of 10 and 18 were also reportedly 
coerced into joining two new youth groups associated with the USDP (New Blood Youth 
and Pioneer Youth) set up to mobilise youth votes in the national elections (Khonumthung 
News, 2010).  
b) Partially-securitised areas: Multiple, overlapping forms of sovereignty 
With the re-insertion of Burma into the global economy after its socialist period, and the 
deregulation of the world financial system since the 1980s, Burma’s military rulers have 
reaped the rewards of globalisation in the borderlands by drawing ‘rents’ from the sale of 
gas, rubber, teak, hydro-power and a variety of other extraction concessions (Callahan, 
2007:45; Woods, 2011). Since they have then limited access to these rents and used them, 
as North et al.’s (2009) ‘limited access order’ suggests, to build geographical and political 
structures of control in the borderlands, Woods (2011:753) characterises this as 
‘appropriating the market to do battle’. 
Mary Callahan (2007) identifies three types of political authority in partially-securitised 
areas: devolution, occupation and coexistence.  In areas where the State’s power is very 
limited, power is devolved to networks of traditional leaders; where power is strongly 
contested, state agencies constitute a dominant and oppressive occupying force and in 
ceasefire areas, the ceasefire groups coexist with state forces (Callahan, 2007:3). Until 2010, 
the ceasefire groups were allowed to retain their arms while the Burma Army pursued two 
other goals in the borderlands instead of disarmament: control of land-based resources to 
build power through patrimonial political networks, and conquering and controlling a 
restive ethnic population (Woods, 2011:753-754; Raw, 2001:160). In effect, the ceasefire 
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groups were used as ‘military entrepreneurs’ as Gallant (1999) terms it, or proxy forces as 
an extension of the Burma Army in areas where it was unable to impose a monopoly of 
violence. After the 2010 elections, however, there was a resurgence of conflict throughout 
the borderlands of Burma as many of the ceasefire groups refused to transition into Border 
Guard Forces under the command of the Burmese military (TBBC, 2011:12). As Grundy-
Warr and Dean (2011:97) point out, the ceasefires have, therefore, been very dynamic, 
contingent upon the actors and political geography of the moment. 
The ceasefire agreements have led to a situation of multiple, overlapping forms of 
sovereignty as the Burma Army and multiple Karen armed groups vie for control. As 
Grundy-Warr and Dean (2011:105) argue, this opens up new aspects of insecurity for local 
people as they have to contend with the demands of double, or even triple, authorities. 
Moreover, the increased presence of the Burma Army has deepened antipathy towards the 
state by ethnic minority people and prompted some young men to join the armed 
opposition groups to avenge abuses committed against their families and communities 
(Fink, 2008:460). 
Extensive militarisation by multiple armed groups, as well as the same patterns of land 
confiscation and exploitation of local resources in the transition to military-capitalism 
elaborated on in the previous section, have become major issues in partially-securitised 
areas. For young males, the expansion of the DKBA prior to joining the BGF in 2010 
proved particularly threatening as it resulted in a spike in forced conscription, forced 
portering of military supplies and/or heavy fines in lieu of either (South, 2011:19).  
Control of land rights and natural resources has been central to the political economy of 
conflict in Burma (COHRE, 2007:10). Over 90 per cent of villagers in Karen State depend 
on farming for their livelihoods, so they are entirely dependent on what they can produce 
from the land (KSEAG, 2011:5). Moreover, farming is not just an occupation, but a way of 
life with land-related rituals comprising a major part of hill villagers’ traditional animist 
beliefs (Marshall, 1997:75-81). In Burmese law, the state owns all land, reflecting its 
socialist legacy (Hudson-Rodd & Myo Nyunt, 2001), but in the Karen borderlands 
customary law predominates. Land rights are given and adjudicated by village elders 
appointed by consensus from among the villagers (Malseed, 2006:8), thus few people hold 
government land documents,40 which makes them more vulnerable to land confiscation. 
                                                 
40 In a study of displacement in eastern Burma by TBBC, only 23% of farmers held government land 
documents, while over 70% held land rights through customary ownership or assigned by village elders 
(TBBC, 2005:45, in Malseed, 2006:8). 
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With the Burmese military using its Socialist-era laws to displace farmers from land and 
then use the land for profit-making enterprises as part of its military-controlled capitalism, 
peasant land displacement is high in these areas. A study by TBBC (2006:22) found that the 
majority of internally displaced people in eastern Burma (287,000 people) live in temporary 
settlements in areas controlled by armed groups with a ceasefire agreement with the Burma 
Army. Gallant (1999:30) argues that as peasant smallholders are pushed off rural land in the 
periphery to make way for commercialised agrarian regimes, poverty, servitude and social 
unrest often increase providing fertile ground for violence. As a result, in these areas, 
dispossessed peasants may then seek alliances with ‘military entrepreneurs’ (Gallant, 1999).  
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Map 6 Militarisation and Contested Areas in South East Burma/Myanmar (TBBC, 2011) 
c) KNU-controlled areas (black zones) 
The Burma Army has attempted to penetrate the last remaining areas of the north-eastern 
borderlands under the control of the KNU by depopulating the hills and forcing the 
villages into enclosed relocation sites in a continuation of the ‘Four Cuts’ strategy (Malseed, 
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2008:9). This strategy primarily targets the civilian population in areas under the influence 
of armed opposition groups and, while not directly killing people, causes massive 
displacement, impoverishment and increased mortality due to increasing health and food 
insecurity (Keenan, 2010). Villagers who refuse to move are assumed to be rebels and may 
be shot on sight as the land outside the relocation sites is designated a ‘free fire zone’ 
(Grundy-Warr and Dean, 2011:99). Furthermore, the resources which villages use to 
sustain themselves are attacked, including food stores, medical supplies and crops (KHRG, 
2010b). Given that forced relocation of villagers is very often targeted towards land the 
Burmese military wants to use for profit-making enterprises, local patterns of conflict are 
not just about insurgency and counter-insurgency, but also about territoriality, sovereignty 
and the monopoly of coercive power.  
In northern Karen State, conflict has become more militarised in recent years not because 
of KNU activity in the black zones but as a result of civilians resorting to increasing use of 
arms due to the lack of KNLA soldiers able to provide protection (KHRG, 2010b). Many 
hill villagers organise their own security with some establishing ‘home guard’ armed 
protection to mitigate the impact of Burma Army attacks, enhance physical and food 
security and resist forced relocation (KHRG, 2010b:89), although this depends on a variety 
of factors such as their political views, connections to local power-holders and the logistical 
viability of evasion as a strategy (KHRG, 2010b:48). Despite these activities, however, 
TBBC (2011:18) estimates (conservatively) that at least 112,000 people were forcibly 
displaced in Southeast Burma between August 2010 and July 2011.  
One of the results of the Burma Army’s greatly increased penetration and consolidation of 
the borderlands is that state-led impoverishment and the reality of generalised violence 
over power and ownership of resources have caused large-scale displacement (Lanjouw et 
al., 2000). There are now estimated to be at least half a million internally displaced people 
in eastern Burma alone (some of whom remain in hiding in an attempt to avoid military 
control). Since the forced relocations started in 1996, over 3,000 villages have been 
destroyed, affecting over one million people (UNDP, 2009; TBBC, 2008). Meanwhile, the 
refugee caseload in Thailand has increased to over 148,000 people in 2011, despite the 
departure for resettlement from the camps of over 57,000 refugees during 2004-2009 
(TBBC, 2011; IOM, 2009).  
Another result is an imbalance in young male-female demographic ratios. In conflict zones, 
it is common to find an imbalance in the male-female ratio due to increased male mortality 
and male absence due to conscription (Lee et al., 2007:44-45). Between 1999 and 2004, 
BPHWT found male-female ratio had increased from 89 per cent to 94 per cent in 
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opposition areas (by comparison, the male-female ratio was 88:100 among Afghan refugees 
in Pakistan) (Lee et al., 2007:45). However, the continuing imbalance indicates that women 
have had to take on greater economic burdens and decision-making responsibilities (Fink, 
2008:453). 
Despite its loss of territory in the hills and lowlands, the KNU continues to retain a 
presence in the eastern borderlands of Burma through covert civilian support and civilian 
non-cooperation with state forces (Malseed, 2008:493). In many areas of Karen State, 
displaced civilians continue to see the KNU as a more legitimate authority than the 
Burmese state as a result of their personal and repeated experiences of Burma Army abuses 
(Hull, in KHRG, 2010:85); ardent Karen nationalism; or calculations about which group is 
perceived to least threaten individual, family or community livelihoods (KHRG, 2010:85; 
Callahan, 2007:36). They view the central state as predatory and consider Burma and the 
national government to be synonymous with the Burma Army (Fink, 2008:460). However, 
support to armed groups is conditional; local and individual priorities motivate villagers’ 
choices of protection strategies to a greater extent than individual political allegiances 
(KHRG, 2010:87). Moreover, villagers do not necessarily see the KNU as a government or 
desire a form of state sovereignty under the KNU’s leadership, rather, they perceive 
sovereignty at the village level and aim for a return to their villages and way of life without 
political or military interference (Heppner, 2005 and Rajah, 2002, in Thawnghmung, 
2010:160). 
As a result of its loss of territory, areas which the KNU still defends have been much 
reduced, in some districts just to base camps along the border, while the remaining jungle 
areas host villagers hiding from roving Burma Army troops. Furthermore, within its armed 
wings, the KNLA has decreased to a force of no more than 3,000 poorly equipped soldiers 
according to David Taw, Foreign Minister of the KNU (Irrawaddy, 2009a) plus around 850 
KNDO forces41. 
According to the Zipporah Sein, KNU General Secretary, the role of the KNU in these 
areas is now largely to provide armed guards to fleeing villagers and humanitarian relief to 
villagers attempting to remain outside state control and living in hiding in the jungle (KNU, 
2009). A small number of other organisations also provide humanitarian assistance in these 
areas, often working in co-ordination with the KNU. One of these is Free Burma Rangers, 
which is a large, armed, Christian relief group backed by substantial funding from 
                                                 
41 Interview with a KNDO soldier / KYO district leader / Karen State Coordinating Body member on 11th 
July 2009 
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American Christian communities, continuing a tradition of transnational support to the 
Karen people by American Christians. 
 
Map 7 Displaced Villages in South East Burma/Myanmar (1996-2011) (TBBC, 2011) 
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d) Exile spaces 
Following the loss of its headquarters at Manerplaw and large parts of its ‘liberated zones’, 
the KNU’s headquarters and central departments followed the refugees into Thailand and 
established themselves in the vicinity of the border town of Mae Sot. While Karen people 
have lived in the Thai borderlands for at least several centuries, the KNU and its 
supporters are differentiated from long-established Thai-Karens by their level of ethno-
national political organisation (Buadaeng, 2007:86). Thai-Karens have not developed a 
distinct national consciousness, history, written language, delineated territory or political 
organisation. Instead they aim to assert their ethnic identity while claiming equal rights to 
other citizens of Thailand (Buadaeng, 2007:86). However, more recent settlers in the Thai 
borderlands (outside the camps) may have some links to the KNU depending on their 
region of origin, community links and personal political convictions. 
In Thailand, the KNU exercises public authority over its member organisations, mediates 
their presence with local officials and strategises with and leads the exiled alliance groups 
(Lee, 2008). However, its influence and power with regard to Thai officials has greatly 
declined as it has lost control of the border trade and access to borderland resources. 
By 2010, the KNU’s central treasury budget had declined to a mere US$133,300.42  Each of 
the KNLA’s seven brigades continued to be responsible for raising their own income from 
local businesses, tax, some border trade and the sale of natural resources such as gold, zinc 
and hardwood to Thailand (Yan Naing, 2009), but the amount raised is reportedly too little 
to support even a small guerrilla force and a news interview with a KNU leader in 2009 
revealed that the KNU was facing financial difficulties Irrawaddy, 2009b). For example, the 
KNU’s fourth brigade income was only around US$40,000 in 2009.43  
Facing vastly superior military strength, the KNU cannot possibly hope to gain a military 
victory and its significance as a military actor has greatly declined. However, armed 
opposition groups primarily seek to maintain the conflict over a long period of time rather 
than decisively overthrow the state government, in order to force the government to the 
negotiating table either by military might or inflicting high costs (Fearon, 2004:289). Thus, 
as a KNDO soldier interviewed in this study stated when asked about the KNU’s military 
                                                 
42 Although the KNU does not reveal its financial situation, the five per cent of the KNU’s annual budget 
allocated to the education department was reported to be 200,000 Thai Baht in an interview with a KSEAG 
co-ordinator on 19th November 2010, indicating that the KNU’s central budget is around four million Thai 
Baht, or US$133,300 as at December 2010. 
43 Interview with a KNU Fourth Brigade township officer on 10th November, 2010, Suan Pueng 
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goals: “We are fighting to gain time not to occupy the space.”44 One of the problems with the 
maintenance of the armed struggle is that improving Thai-Burmese relations since the 
1990s have resulted in Thailand putting increasing pressure on the KNU and, since 2009, 
has led to a ban on the KNU commanding their troops from Thai soil or bringing weapons 
across the border (Irrawaddy, 2009b). The loss of Thai military support and the end of the 
war in Cambodia have also curtailed the flow of weapons to the KNU such that nowadays, 
despite having funds available, KNLA commanders reportedly find it difficult to purchase 
guns, though they often seize weapons in ambushes (Yan Naing, 2009; Keenan, 
forthcoming).  
As the KNU loses its revenue streams and territory, its bureaucratic apparatus has shrunk. 
Some of its non-military departments are now defunct (mining, for example), while others 
continue on a much smaller scale (for example, the forestry, customs and justice 
departments). However, not all of its bureaucratic departments are in decline, provision of  
health, education and humanitarian relief services to the civilian population in eastern 
Burma has continued with new, external revenue streams through INGO humanitarian aid. 
Aid patterns in eastern Burma 
Official development assistance (ODA) to Burma has historically been very low since the 
military coup of 1988, but after Cyclone Nargis hit the country in 2007, ODA more than 
doubled,45 as the following graph demonstrates.  
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Figure 2 Net ODA Disbursements to Burma, 2000-2009 (OECD/DAC in World Bank, 2011) 
                                                 
44 Interview with Saw V (M, 32), a KNDO Officer, district KYO leader, KSCB staff member and KSCDC 
officer, 11th July 2009, Mae Sot 
45 ODA in 2006 was US$3 per person, but after Cyclone Nargis hit the country, it spiked at US$10 per person 
in 2008. It then fell to roughly US$6 per person by 2010. However, the UK and Australia governments, as 
well as The Global Fund, announced increases in aid budgets for Burma in 2011. By comparison, Laos and 
Cambodia received aid worth US$47 and US$51 per capita respectively (Kean, 2011). 
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ODA does not reach populations in borderland or conflict areas since international 
agencies are not permitted access to those areas by the Burmese military. Since the early 
1990s, local Karen, Mon, Chin, Shan and Karenni groups have been providing 
humanitarian relief and some community development and education work from across the 
Thai border in what had once been ‘liberated zones’ but are now conflict zones or ceasefire 
areas (South, 2007b). Aid delivered across Burma’s land borders rather than through the 
centre (and therefore without the permission of the Burmese government) is termed ‘cross-
border’ aid. Since these areas are often under the control of multiple armed groups, cross-
border aid is delivered with their permission and often also with their armed guards and 
through their networks (South, 2008:17).  
As a result of the increasing humanitarian crisis in the Karen borderlands there has been a 
more vocal campaign by aid activists46 for increased funding of cross-border aid. Much 
cross-border funding is given through TBBC, which is a consortium of agencies working 
with Burmese refugees in Thailand, and Mae Tao clinic, a Burmese clinic and hospital in 
Thailand. Both have cross-border programmes, but donors have often been reluctant to 
fund cross-border projects. For example, the European Commission has refused to allow 
its funding to be used for cross-border aid since 2009 (Irrawaddy, 2010). TBBC reports 
that the current trend is for donors to give funding to less politically sensitive areas in 
central Burma and, as a result of funding restrictions, its budget for emergency relief was 
much lower in 2011 than in previous years (TBBC, 2011:11, 73). The following graph 
shows TBBC’s expenditure on Burmese refugees in camps in Thailand.  
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Figure 3 TBBC Expenditure on Burmese refugees in Thailand (Graph created from data in TBBC, 
2011:87) 
                                                 
46For example, the Burma Campaign USA, UK and Australia 
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Around 10.8 per cent of the total of TBBC’s expenditure in 2011 comprised cross-border 
aid (TBBC, 2011). The following table show cross-border aid figures provided by TBBC, 
Mae Tao clinic (Backpack Health Workers Team) and Free Burma Rangers (FBR), who are 
three of the biggest cross-border aid providers. This does not represent the total cross-
border aid figure, but probably covers the majority. Specifically, it does not include funding 
to the KNU’s welfare wings. 
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Figure 4 Selected Cross-Border Aid (Graph created from data in TBBC, 2011:82; BPHWT, 2010, 2011 
and FBR, 2010b:21) 
The activities of the KNU’s education and health departments in Burma are co-ordinated 
with the National Health and Education Committee, which is an umbrella group set up in 
1995 for the health and education departments within the (mostly ethnic) armed opposition 
groups in Burma. In 2010, the KNU’s education department received the entirety of its 
US$365,000 annual budget from external INGO funding (KSEAG, 2011). The KNU’s 
IDP assistance organisation (CIDKP) also received its approximately US$25,000 annual 
budget from external funding, as did the KNU’s Health department’s approximately 
US$230,000 health budget.47 All of these organisations have separated their operational 
work from the KNU in order to qualify for donor funding. Compared to the US$6.7 
million cross-border aid delivered by the three main NGOs detailed above in 2010 and the 
US$371 million in aid delivered through central Burma, the approximately US$620,000 
total funding to the KNU’s welfare wings is a very small amount, representing less than ten 
per cent of the cross-border aid delivered by the three main NGOs. However, it dwarfs the 
KNU’s approximately US$133,300 central treasury income from natural resource rents, 
small businesses and household tax. Perhaps reflecting the new importance of external 
funding to its welfare wings, in 2008 the KNU elected Zipporah Sein, formerly a top leader 
                                                 
47 Interview with Saw AG, (male) a young CIDKP leader, Mae Sot, 27th May 2009 
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in the women’s wing and a prominent figure in the Burmese women’s rights and 
humanitarian aid community, to the position of General Secretary.  
KNU welfare wings approximate funding
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Figure 5 KNU welfare wings approximate funding 
Finally, an additional spatial element of the KNU conflict is the Karen diaspora which has 
been identified as a growing source of remittances and political lobbying (Brees, 2009).  As 
Hall and Swain (2008:113) argue, diasporas form an important aspect of new, globalised 
war economies, as well as providing political support to opposition groups and propagating 
exclusive ideologies. From 2004 to 2009, 57,000 Karen and Karenni people left the Thai 
refugee camps for resettlement in a Western country, over 80 per cent of them to America 
(IOM, 2009). This is a small percentage of the Karen population and the KNU have yet to 
develop strong diaspora revenue streams, but some overseas Karen organisations, such as 
Australian Karen Youth give a small amount of funding to humanitarian aid projects 
delivered by KNU-affiliated organisations. More recently, Karen Youth Organisation have 
set up overseas branches in the UK, USA, Canada, South Korea and Japan. Although these 
branches of KYO primarily work on social projects helping Karen youths with 
resettlement, they also engage in a small amount of political lobbying.  
A small number of diaspora Karen are very active in political lobbying, for example, Zoya 
Phan, the 29-year old daughter of the assassinated KNU leader Mahn Sha, who works for 
the Burma Campaign UK. Her sister, Bwa Bwa, is the KNU’s UK representative. The 
KNU also has representatives in the USA and Germany. While the broader Burmese 
diaspora have been influential in European government policies towards Burma, there have 
been no reports that the Karen diaspora have influenced the KNU’s policies. The only 
report of significant diaspora influence came from leaders of the Burmese democracy 
movement in New York during the KNU’s 1994 ceasefire discussions (Taw, 2005, in 
South, 2008:60). 
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4 Conclusion 
The KNU’s conflict with the Burmese state is understood here as a strategic alliance of 
peasants and elites from both lowland and upland areas of central and eastern Burma, 
articulated around a vision of Karen nationalism and independence. As Skocpol (in 
Wickham-Crowley 1992) and Kalyvas (2003:476) argue, ‘marginal political elites’ excluded 
from power, may turn to revolutionary organisations and attempt to secure power through 
an alliance with peasants fighting more localised conflict, resulting in the “joint production” 
of action. Following the outbreak of conflict, this chapter argued that  
In the first phase of the conflict, while the Burmese military sought to consolidate its 
control in the centre of the country in the immediate post-colonial period, the KNU 
attempted to secede from the Union of Burma and built up a de facto state in its ‘liberated 
areas’, providing extensive governance services and deploying the language and symbolism 
of statehood. As Mampilly (2007:31, 244) argues, secessionist and ethno-national armed 
groups intent on securing regional autonomy or secession are more likely to establish 
governance systems because they have to convince their target population that they offer a 
better alternative than the state and buttress their claims to represent the population. As 
such, this case indicates that where there is a weak central state which has limited territorial 
control, especially in the periphery, the limits of the state do not necessarily give way to 
anarchy and disorder. Alternative and competing political authorities may be present, often 
co-existing with customary authorities in a ‘hybrid’ order (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010:541; 
Boege et al., 2008). In this case the KNU attempted to incorporate self-rule hill villages into 
its structures by forming a hybrid order which incorporated customary village leaders into 
its governance structures. 
The KNU managed to achieve a certain amount of hegemonic status along Burma’s 
eastern border despite great diversity and little prior history of unification among the Karen 
people, though mimicking the BSPP in the Burmese centre, it also effectively became a 
military dictatorship under the leadership of General Bo Mya. This stifled opportunities to 
voice grievances, especially among the youth cohort, and allow the organisation to reform, 
which, after the disastrous DKBA split from the KNLA, resulted in Bo Mya losing 
legitimacy and being sidelined in the KNU’s leadership.  
After the Cold War ended the geopolitical changes that ensued had enormous 
consequences for the KNU. Thailand sought bilateral agreements with the Burmese state 
instead of the KNU and China ended its support for the CPB, prompting its collapse and 
eliminating the most resource-sapping war front for the Burma Army (Kramer, 2009). The 
Burma Army then changed its strategy of state-making and control by pursuing military-
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economic ceasefire agreements with the ethnic armed opposition groups and using the 
provision of limited access to rents to establish territorial control and re-calibrate the 
political economy of the borderlands. The new Burmese regime’s seizure of the KNU’s 
capitalist networks in the eastern borderlands heralded a period of rising strength for the 
Burma Army and the decline of the KNU, resulting in the exile of the organisation’s 
headquarters to sanctuary in Thailand. 
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) argue that peripheral conflicts and intractable civil wars have 
markedly decreased in Southeast Asia following the end of the Cold War. In the Burmese 
borderlands, while conflict between opposing armed groups has declined with the 
establishment of military-economic ceasefire agreements, civil peace has not followed. In 
government-controlled areas, patrimonial politics and an obsession with military control 
over all aspects of life leads to impoverishment and has resulted in a mass exodus of the 
population to neighbouring countries (KHRG, 2009). Youths are part of the general 
exodus into migrant work and are active in underground political opposition activities in 
government-controlled areas of Burma. They are also coerced into supporting the Burmese 
regime’s violent and non-violent methods of social control, through their recruitment into 
its militias, armed forces and GONGOs. 
In partially-securitised areas, the presence of multiple armed groups with overlapping forms 
of sovereignty has heightened levels of insecurity for local people and, in DKBA-controlled 
areas, resulted in increased risk of conscription of male youths for the military or portering 
duties, and/or heavy fines in lieu of either. Understanding how this has happened requires 
a departure from Weberian models of the state which imagine the state to have sole 
monopoly over the means of coercion in a defined territory. Instead, it is necessary to take 
North et al.’s (2009) conception of developing states as ‘limited access orders’ which limit 
access to rents and use these to co-opt locally and regionally powerful armed actors, 
thereby reducing the threat of violence in the periphery. The state then relies on external 
legitimacy to profit from international capital, and patrimonial legitimacy from non-state 
coercive groups incorporated into its patronage networks.  
Until the Burmese military attempted to integrate the ceasefire groups into its military 
structures with the establishment of the Border Guard Force (BGF) in 2010, the ceasefire 
groups were used as ‘military entrepreneurs’ as Gallant (1999) terms it, or proxy forces as 
an extension of the Burma Army in areas where it was unable to impose a monopoly of 
violence. Bandit-derived models of state-making argue that this is a common tactic; as Van 
Schendel and Abraham (2005:7) argue, “historically the boundary of illicitness has shifted 
back and forth as bandits helped make states and states made bandits”. North et al. (2009) 
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argue that this type of state is unstable and often results in conflict because a temporary 
balance of interests is argued to be more typical than a perpetually organised state (as in the 
Western model), with control of violence dispersed throughout multiple dominant players. 
Thus, while the Burma Army have effectively consolidated its direct control or co-opted 
the coercive power of other armed actors in the ‘white zones’ and ‘brown zones’, the result 
is, as Kramer (2009) puts it ‘neither war nor peace’.  
In areas of Karen State still under nominal KNU control, conflict has increased as the 
Burmese state has further penetrated borderland areas and forcibly established its control 
over land and resources (Fink, 2008:447). This has resulted in increased internal 
displacement as villagers seek to hide in the jungle to avoid state reach, and increased 
refugee flows to Thailand.   
For the KNU, while its loss of territorial control, revenue streams and depleted military 
capability means that it cannot possibly hope to gain a military victory, its non-military 
activities continue to be an important mode of contesting or undermining Burmese state-
making practices. In order to do this, the KNU has transformed the way in which it 
delivers its welfare services, developed during its period of de facto statehood. The way in 
which this has been managed and delivered by youths in non-military roles in the KNU is 
discussed in more detail in chapter eight. A large part of its current activities are political 
and governance operations, thus there are potentially a number of important non-military 
roles for youths in the group. The following chapters explore the participation of youths in 
these roles, beginning with their mobilisation and recruitment. 
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Chapter 6: Constructing ‘youth’ in the KNU 
 
Representing KYO 
Observation of a meeting between KYO and INGO donor representatives 
In 2003 I was working as a volunteer at the Karen Youth Organisation’s (KYO) 
headquarters in Thailand when the organisation participated in an INGO funding 
evaluation meeting. During the meeting a fervent argument ensued about the political 
affiliation of KYO. The foreign evaluators were probing the impact of KYO’s affiliation to 
the Karen National Union (KNU) on its activities, but the KYO leaders in the meeting 
denied any political affiliation and presented themselves as merely a social organisation, 
despite a poster on the wall declaring one of the organisation’s objectives was “self-
determination for the Karen people”. In fact, the KYO is the youth wing of the KNU, 
which the INGO evaluators were fully aware of, but KYO representatives consistently 
attempt to de-politicise their activities in discussions with INGOs, having found in the past 
that INGOs are wary of funding a youth organisation with links to an armed opposition 
group.  
During the course of the argument, both sides took increasingly strident and opposing 
positions. KYO insisted they only dealt in social work with refugee camp youths which the 
INGO evaluators, being very well versed in Burmese opposition politics, clearly 
disbelieved. Meanwhile the evaluators suggested that KYO was effectively a political tool 
of the KNU and their activities with youths, including which youths got to access them, 
were controlled by the KNU leadership - an accusation the KYO leaders vehemently 
denied. The argument ended in deadlock and as the evaluators left the office, we all 
wondered if the organisation would ever get funding from the INGO again (it did).  
The argument itself was about two interconnected issues which INGOs working along the 
Thai-Burmese border are very conscious of: the political affiliation of the organisations 
they fund and how this impacts upon their activities. Yet although the political affiliation of 
the KYO is obvious to anyone who does some background research (despite their denials), 
what this means for power and control over the organisation’s activities is less clear and 
this is where the INGO evaluators lacked understanding. Being a youth wing does not 
necessarily mean that the parent party is pulling all the strings. In practice KYO operated 
with a lot of autonomy and the rejection by the organisation’s leadership that they were 
merely a political tool of the KNU reflected at least a partial truth. However, the degree of 
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autonomy KYO has, and the power that youths have within the KNU more broadly raises 
interesting questions about generational relations in an armed opposition group.  
The argument in that meeting also raises the issue of representation of a youth wing. While 
the KYO’s various actual roles resulted in multiple interpretations of its activities, its 
represented role is purposely constructed in multiple ways for different audiences. As this 
chapter examines, discussions with KYO leaders over subsequent years and during the 
course of the fieldwork reveal three main representations of KYO’s role. 
Figure 6 Representing ‘KYO’: Observation of a meeting between KYO and INGO donor 
representatives 
This chapter seeks to address the question of how ‘youth’ is defined and why a specific 
‘youth’ cohort was created in the KNU. It aims to understand issues of generational 
relations and social construction of age cohorts in an armed opposition group, as well as 
how the group organises itself internally to respond to different audiences and 
stakeholders. This analysis is based on a social constructivist approach that armed 
opposition groups are forms of social actors engaged in a continual process of re-creating 
social categories, norms and codes of action according to various factors, such as the 
exigencies of conflict and cultural climate of the time and space in which they operate. 
Understanding the social processes ongoing within an armed opposition group is an 
important part of understanding why and how they engage in conflict.  
Section one examines why the KNU decided to re-create a specific ‘youth’ category at all 
after forty years of ongoing conflict with the Burmese state. It finds that a focus on youth 
political leadership regeneration became important to the KNU as a dearth of politically 
skilful young leaders became apparent and its authoritarian leadership suffered a crisis of 
legitimacy.  
Section two examines the KNU’s construction of a ‘youth’ category and finds that it is 
based on a pre-existing social category for young people in Karen villages. As the KNU has 
politicised this category, youth positions have been transformed from a narrative of 
‘serving the community’ in rural Karen society to ‘serving the revolution’ in KNU 
institutions. Its youth category has also been influenced by the KNU’s organisational 
history and leadership, gender norms and, since the exile of its headquarters to Thailand, 
contact with Thai and Western political culture. While the creation of a specific youth 
category for the achievement of an armed group’s goals has been noted before in other 
studies, this study illuminates the factors which affect how a youth category is created and 
why it is deemed necessary. It also shows how youths present their organisational positions 
in different ways according to the political orientations of different stakeholder groups.   
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Section three analyses the effects of creating a youth category in the KNU on opportunities 
for youths to voice political opinions and influence KNU policy. It argues that a decline in 
the KNU’s coercive power resulted in greater political voice for the youth cohort and 
opened up the civilian leadership structures of the KNU to younger generations. Sanctuary 
in Thailand has been a key factor in these changes. 
1 Why did the KNU create a ‘youth’ category? 
Before examining how a youth category has been created in the KNU, this section briefly 
reviews how the need for a youth wing emerged in the KNU. It explains the multiple 
reasons that participants in this study voiced during interviews and focus group 
discussions, which were probed then tested and confirmed in interviews with other 
participants on separate occasions.  
In brief, the background to the re-formation of the KYO is that during 1976 to 1995 when 
General Bo Mya led the KNU there was no leadership transition according to the rules in 
the KNU’s constitution (Smith, 1999). The mass political uprisings in the Burmese centre 
in 1988 brought Burmese national politics back to the KNU and highlighted the 
weaknesses in the KNU’s development of political leadership among the youth cohort. 
According to the KYO vice-chairperson at the time of research, the flight of large numbers 
of students and political dissidents to the KNU’s ‘liberated zones’ in eastern Burma 
highlighted the relative lack of political knowledge and skill among Karen youths in the 
borderlands. 48 This view was supported by older KNU leaders interviewed in this research. 
Another reason, voiced by many of the participants who talked about why KYO was re-
formed, is illustrated by the following quote from a young leader in the Karen University 
Students Group: 
“In the future we will have to sit around the table with the Burmese and talk politics so we 
need educated leaders who know about politics to protect our Karen people at that time.”49 
This view demonstrates that in an ethnically polarised political context developing political 
leadership is considered important by participants for safeguarding the interests of the 
Karen people in Burmese political negotiations. An additional reason, admitted later in the 
fieldwork by several KYO leaders, was that the KNU was facing criticisms of gerontocracy 
from among Karen youths, since, by 1988, Bo Mya and other senior KNU leaders were in 
their sixties. Criticism of KNU leaders is frowned upon in KNU-affiliated institutions, 
thus, it took many months of discussion and trust-building with KYO leaders before some 
felt able to even implicitly criticise deceased leaders.  
                                                 
48 Interview with KYO central vice-chairperson on 23rd June 2009, Mae Sot 
49 Interview with a KUSG representative, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
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The KNU re-convened the KYO in 1989 to act as its political youth wing and leadership 
development space: 
“The people working in KNU used to be young but then they got old and realised that the 
younger generation wasn’t prepared to take over. At the same time the youths started to ask 
for their rights. Also the students came up from Burma50 and the KNU wanted to put more 
Karen youth at the same level as the Burman youth to work with them. Some districts had 
founded KYO before this in the 1980s because they realised they needed to work with the 
youths.”51   
The current Joint Secretary 2 of the KNU, Saw Dot Lay Mu, was one of the first KYO 
leaders at the time it was re-formed. His view is a particularly useful illustration of the 
perceived rationale for the reformation of KYO at the time. It also begins to indicate the 
institutional culture of the KNU: 
“When Manerplaw was established the leaders thought they should organise KYO to take a 
role to train and recruit more youth to become capable and have qualifications to take leading 
roles in the future. The leaders conducted education and political training for KYO. At that 
time I was KYO and I was sent by leaders to attend that political training. Our leaders 
wanted youths to have training and education and knowledge of our history so we will have 
spirit to love and serve our people in the next generation.”52 
The standing KYO chairman at the time of research added that the KYO was also re-
formed to act as the KNU’s liaison with other youth wings of Burmese opposition groups 
on alliance politics. This was another reason that was supported by other KYO and KNU 
leaders. Alliances with other armed opposition groups had become an important political 
strategy for the KNU after 1988 because the organisation had taken a leading role in newly-
created alliance groups:  
Saw Z: “KYO was re-formed because the KNU saw that they needed the new generation to 
come up. Also it is for linking with other ethnic youth groups.” 
Interviewer: “Why is this important?” 
Saw Z: “It is important because if we stay in the village and there is another house we have 
to have friendship with them. Also KYO has to have friendship with other groups and if they 
work together the ethnic leaders will understand and if we are leaders in the future with peace 
they will understand our work.”53 
In summary, recollections and oral histories recounted by KYO and KNU leaders 
indicated that KYO was re-formed to meet a number of the KNU’s political and 
organisational regeneration goals. First, the KNU had been struggling to incorporate 
younger generations into its political project and was facing youth criticisms that it was 
becoming gerontocratic.  Secondly, the KNU’s legitimacy is built on its claims to protect 
                                                 
50 People from the highlands often refer to visitors from the Burmese lowlands as ‘coming up from Burma’, 
indicating their conception of the highlands as being a physical and political space distinct from the lowlands. 
51 Interview with KYO central vice-chairperson on 23rd June 2009, Mae Sot 
52 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
53 Interview with KYO central Chairperson on 29th July 2009, Mae Sot 
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the Karen population from Burmese subjugation, but its future political leadership looked 
weak compared to the politically skilled Burmese student leadership. Thirdly, the KNU 
leadership was ageing and realised it needed to establish leadership regeneration processes. 
Fourthly, given the age difference between the KNU leadership and the Burmese student 
groups, as well as the workload the KNU leadership faced leading the alliance groups, it 
needed a youth wing to work alongside the younger generation of other opposition groups 
as their peers.  
2 Who is a ‘Karen Youth’? Factors influencing the construction and representation 
of a ‘youth’ category in the KNU 
When the need for a youth wing emerged in the KNU, a particular ‘youth’ category was 
created. This section examines the factors that contributed to and continue to influence 
‘youth’ actions and representations in the KNU.   
a) Pre-existing ‘youth’ categories, gender norms and the influence of ethno-
nationalism 
The category of ‘youth’ in the KNU was not created anew, this study found that it was 
influenced by a pre-existing youth category in rural villages, gender norms in the wider 
society and the KNU’s ethno-political construction of a ‘Karen’ identity. 
Village youth category 
“Youths organise festivals, celebrations and social work in the village. They share 
responsibilities together. Men and women have different responsibilities. For a happy 
celebration at night time they go and read a poem. For sad times, when someone dies, they go 
and stay with the family the whole night on a rota and read something, sing songs…If the 
community need help to build a house they go and help. Especially they have a youth leader, 
one for women and one for men and they organise the groups. For religious celebrations they 
go to the church or temple and cook, carry water, feed the visitors. Generally they do social 
work.”54 
Despite differences in the cultural practices of different Karen sub-groups and changing 
social roles over time, participants in this study said there is an identifiable youth category 
in many Karen villages, based around social work in the village. As the quote from Saw C 
above explains, young villagers organise themselves into work parties for the preparation of 
cultural ceremonies in their villages, such as weddings, funerals and festivals, and for the 
construction of new houses. Saw C referred to this cohort as bwah tha sah (in S’gaw Karen 
dialect) which participants in this study translated as ‘young people’ or ‘youth’.  
                                                 
54 Interview with Saw C (Male, age 29), a Burma Issues staff member and KYO member, Mae Sot, 28th 
January 2009 
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According to one of the participants in this study, tasks for bwah tha sah are usually 
distributed according to cultural norms about gender roles, but some are conducted by 
males and females together, such as preparing the decorations and site for celebrations, and 
leading the singing, mourning or poetic recitals.55 During the year, young people also 
organise themselves into work parties for the harvesting and planting cycles and tending of 
common areas such as school, church and temple buildings. An older leader in a trade 
union affiliated to the KNU described how in rural Karen villages in Burma parties of 
youths may also travel together on market expeditions to purchase their families’ annual 
supplies of salt and other products.56  
When asked about the age range of the term bwah tha sah, participants said they were unable 
to say exactly, going on to explain that the term was not age-defined. When probed for an 
explanation of who might be considered bwah tha sah one of the participants in this study 
explained that there is no upper or lower age limit but the term is usually used for 
adolescents and people in their twenties, although it may be applied to anyone up to the 
age of forty if they have youthful features, even if they are married.57  
“When I talk about ‘youth’ it is a teenager from about 13 to about 30, but it depends on the 
country, constitution, organisation and how they determine. For KYO it is 15 to 35. In 
Karen language ‘bwah tha sah’ usually depends on age, when the features look not too old 
but [the person is] already past puberty. If [someone is] married [they] can still be bwah tha 
sah because you look young. We usually call over 40 adults ‘bwah tha bwah’ or ‘luu gyi’ 
in Burmese.”58 
In essence, a Karen village youth category is based on social roles focused on community 
service. However, while young people’s work in the KNU is very different from the social 
work of young people in Karen villages described above, young participants in the KNU 
participants were frequently observed using the terms ‘serving the community’ and 
‘working for the revolution’ synonymously. This positioning of youth work in the KNU as 
a ‘community service’ is a linguistic tool that was also frequently seen in speeches to the 
local population by KNU leaders on special occasions. While it was not directly stated by 
participants as such, it may be interpreted as a way in which pre-existing social categories 
and communitarian ethos among young people are utilised to frame political or military 
‘service’ in KNU-affiliated organisations. When a senior KNU leader was asked about this, 
                                                 
55 Interview with a Burma Issues coordinator and KYO member, Mae Sot, 28th January 2009 
56 Discussion with a KEWU leader, Mae Sot, 4th December 2008 
57 Interview with Saw C (Male, age 29), a Burma Issues staff member and KYO member, Mae Sot, 28th 
January 2009 
58 Interview with Saw C (Male, age 29), a Burma Issues staff member and KYO member, Mae Sot, 28th 
January 2009 
 162 
he forcefully defended exhorting the local population to ‘serve the community’ by working 
for the KNU, arguing that it was vital for the survival of many Karen communities.59  
This linguistic tool framing youth work was also seen to have another benefit in this study 
because it effectively mitigated claims for pecuniary benefits by emphasising the 
voluntaristic nature of ‘community service’. The nature of young participants’ financial 
recompense for their work within KNU-affiliated organisations was discussed both in 
focus groups and in individual interviews. Participants explained that when the KNU was 
based in rural Karen State, its treasury supported its staff and their dependents with basic 
necessities, but it did not institute a wage economy within its structures. However, when 
the KNU’s headquarters moved to Thailand after the fall of Manerplaw, the staff and 
organisations that moved with it became located in the highly capitalist wage-earning 
society of Thailand and some of its most able cadres became increasingly sought after by 
increasing numbers of INGOs operating in the refugee camps. This became a problem 
because the KNU’s income greatly declined after it lost control of the borderland 
economy, so it could even less afford any kind of pecuniary remuneration of its staff.  
Participants talked openly about the problems that the KNU’s lack of financial recompense 
posed to themselves and their families, but they also stressed how voluntary participation in 
the KNU was vital to ‘serving the community’ and ‘winning the revolution’. What was 
particularly noticeable was that there was a remarkable consensus among participants with 
almost every interviewee stating that they were proud to be serving their community 
through the KNU. Furthermore, they compared their participation positively with those 
who ‘sold-out’ and went to work for INGOs or left for resettlement, though this could also 
reflect feelings of jealousy and even, as Hirschman (1970:92-93) argues, self-deception 
among members who have invested a great deal in the organisation. 
Although it can be argued that the KNU effectively adapted pre-existing norms in many 
Karen villages of ‘serving the community’ for political purposes, the social roots of the 
youth category that it built upon have continued to shape its youth wing’s activities. Thus, 
while KYO partly acts as the political youth wing of the KNU, it also engages in a 
significant amount of peer group social work. The KYO Vice-Chairperson at the time of 
research estimated that 80 per cent of KYO’s activities were ‘social’ (meaning social welfare 
activities like support to boarding house students, or peer group activities such as sports 
competitions), while only around 20 per cent were ‘political’ (mostly political education and 
training activities inside Burma),60 although as chapter eight will argue, an examination of 
                                                 
59 Interview with Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
60 Interview with Saw AD (Male, age 32) KYO Vice-Chairperson, Mae Sot, 19th May 2009 
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the actual activities of KYO at the central level indicates that at the time of fieldwork in 
2008-09, political activities formed a greater proportion of the KYO’s work than this. 
Regardless of the actual proportion of political and social work, the political activities of 
the KYO may not always be their primary activities and youth leaders themselves state that 
their political affiliation is not always clear to new recruits joining the KYO, who may base 
their understanding of the organisation on its social work in local communities. At the time 
of fieldwork, one of the leaders of the KYO at the central level had parents who both 
worked within the KNU, yet he said that even he did not perceive KYO as a political 
organisation at first: 
“When I was a teacher I thought only KNLA worked for Karen freedom - I thought KYO 
was just only a social organisation.  When we stayed in Huay Galoke (refugee camp), when 
people did a wedding many youths served and worked together to help - also when the people 
died. I thought it was just social work, not about politics. Then I worked for many years (in 
KYO) and I knew.”61 
Influence of gender norms 
In the KNU, female political participation has been especially promoted by its women’s 
wing, the Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO). However, the success that the KWO has 
had in incorporating young women into its structures and work appears to have had a 
detrimental influence on the construction of a gender-neutral youth category in the youth 
wing. During the fieldwork, KYO leaders argued that both young men and young women 
are encouraged to participate in political activities in the KNU, but the youth wing is 
dominated by young men because young women are diverted into the women’s wing by 
KNU leaders. For example, when a leader decides where to send a new young recruit who 
is interested in a political position within the organisation, Saw U said: 
“If they are interested in politics the leaders send them to KWO if they are a woman and 
KYO if they are a man.”62 
A predominance of young males in the KYO then discourages young women from joining, 
either because they see no female role models in the organisation or because of 
misunderstandings about the division of labour in the KNU. As one young female former 
KYO staff member describes: 
“When I was in camp (Mae Ramoe Luang refugee camp) I thought that most of the KYO 
[staff] members are male. I think people in the camps also thought that most of the KYO 
staff should be male.”63 
                                                 
61 Interview with a KYO central level leader, Mae Sot, 18th May 2009 
62 Interview with Saw U (Male, age 29),  a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
63 Interview with Naw G (Female, age 27),  a former KYO central staff member, Mae Sot, 24th July 2009 
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During the course of the fieldwork the issue of female representation in KYO arose several 
times because it was an ongoing source of concern for KYO leaders. Constitutionally, the 
KYO should have at least 25 per cent of its leadership positions occupied by young women 
at all levels of the organisation and various efforts were clearly made to encourage and 
support young women joining KYO. For example, young female KYO leaders travelled to 
KNU-controlled areas of Burma and the refugee camps in Thailand to promote KYO and 
encourage other young women to join the organisation. Young female recruits, including 
those who were married with children, were observed being very well supported and 
trained at the KYO headquarters, where there was little evidence of a particularly masculine 
culture. However, both male and female KYO leaders said that although they have some 
success, the organisation competes for female recruits with the KWO, which, being 
financially better-off, can afford to offer its staff a small stipend. Although voluntary 
service is highly promoted in KNU organisations, in Thailand participants live in a 
capitalist society and many participants explained their desire to earn money for personal 
use. Almost all participants were keen to seek income to support struggling siblings and 
parents, especially those remaining inside Burma, so positions that come with some kind of 
financial stipend are highly desirable. This was a constant source of frustration for KYO 
leaders because they felt that the KWO was undermining their efforts to include more 
young women in the organisation, while at the same time criticising them for being 
dominated by young men. 
Influence of ethno-nationalism in the KNU 
Interviewer: “Very few non-Karen seem to join the KNU. Why is this?” 
Saw D: “The weakness is that the KNU doesn’t organise well for non-Karen people, they 
just focus on Karen people. They focus most on awareness among Karen people.”64 
The ‘youth’ category in the KNU is not ethnically-neutral; as the name of KYO suggests, 
the organisation specifically works for and with Karen youth. Being Karen is fundamental to 
individual and organisational identity in the KNU and can be seen as the result of ethnic 
politics in Burma and the promotion of ethno-nationalism by the KNU (especially during 
Bo Mya’s leadership from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s). As chapter five argued, 
American Baptist missionaries influenced the construction of Karen identity as an 
oppressed, suffering and victimised population, the continued promotion of which, by 
evangelical Christian cadres in particular, aims to bind disparate Karen communities 
together and build loyalty to the KNU (Horstmann, 2011). For Karen youths educated in 
Christian Mission schools in Karen State or in the refugee camps, this particular identity 
                                                 
64 Interview with Saw D (Male, age 28),  a KYO district leader, Mae Sot, 24th January 2009 
 165 
remains a powerful narrative in Karen identity. Karen nationalism and narratives of 
oppression in Burma and forced migration as a result of their ethnicity were extremely 
prominent discourses among participants prior to and during the fieldwork. Although the 
majority of Karen people are not Christian and do not receive their education in Mission 
schools, as the next chapter discusses, patterns of education in Karen State results in 
Christian educated, S’gaw speaking participants dominating the political leadership of the 
KNU. As such, among the participants in this study there was a clear over-representation 
of Christian (usually Baptist), S’gaw-speaking youths. 
Ethno-nationalism remained heavily promoted in KNU-affiliated organisations at the time 
of fieldwork. During KNU ‘national’ days, a Karen national identity was observed being 
explicitly promoted and visibly linked to the political goals of the KNU by the its mass 
organisations. At the 2009 celebration of Karen Revolution Day, for example, the Karen 
Women’s Organisation (KWO) sold T-shirts with a Karen flag on the front and Saw Ba U 
Gyi’s Four Principles of the revolution on the back as well as traditional Karen clothes. 
Speeches by KNU leaders then exhorted the attending population to continue fighting for 
the ‘revolution’, while KNLA soldiers paraded around the parade ground and were 
honoured with garlands. Following the formal part of the ceremony, a series of Pwo Karen 
‘Done Dance’ troupes performed dances which showcased Pwo Karen culture.  
 
 
Photo 3 KNLA soldiers parading during Karen 
Revolution Day ceremony, January 2009 [Photo: 
author] 
 
Photo 4 Traditional Karen dancing display 
during Karen Revolution Day ceremony, January 
2009 [Photo: author] 
Keeping the flame of Karen nationalism burning 
Observation of KYO activities during the 60th commemoration of Karen Revolution Day 
The exhibition which KYO prepared for commemorations to mark the sixtieth anniversary 
of the Karen conflict was its biggest yet. For a month prior to the ceremony, everyone at 
the KYO headquarters in Thailand participated in preparing a photographic display of past 
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and current KNU leaders, including ‘martyrs’ who had died during the struggle for Karen 
self-determination. KYO’s exhibition also included physical examples of traditional Karen 
artefacts which showcased Karen culture.  It was displayed in a makeshift bamboo museum 
in the KNLA’s seventh brigade headquarters, across the border from Mae La refugee 
camp, on 31st January 2009, and provoked a lot of debate among the visitors. As well as 
showcasing Karen cultural artefacts, which may be interpreted as way to promote the KNU 
as a defender of the Karen’s cultural identity, the exhibition showed photos of Karen IDPs 
and human rights abuses committed against Karen villagers. These aimed to remind the 
museum’s visitors what the KNU is fighting for and attempting to protect Karen villagers 
in Burma from.  
Most significant on the day were the images and brief biographies of former leaders of the 
KNU, including some non ethnic-Karen leaders, such as Dr. Singh. I spent some time 
observing the reactions of the (primarily Karen) visitors to the exhibition and saw that 
many seemed to have forgotten that the KNU also includes some non-Karens, including 
ethnic Burmans. I saw much debate among visitors to the exhibition about loyalty issues 
regarding former leaders who had splintered off from the KNU and signed ceasefire 
agreements with the SPDC. The photo of the most recent splinter group leader, General 
Htain Maung, was particularly contentious among visitors, being a hot topic in KNU 
politics at the time.  
By preparing this exhibition, youths in the KNU may be seen as conduits of a particular 
‘Karen’ identity, recreating ethnic identity and the KNU’s ideology on a continuing basis. 
The chairperson of the KYO at the time of research was a very vocal proponent of this 
view stating that: “The KYO job is to make sure the Karen don’t disappear.”65 However, keeping 
the flame of Karen nationalism alive also appears to entail cultural assimilation practices. 
The KYO chairman went on to say:  
“The KYO have a duty. The other ethnic people, if they want to join we can make them to be KYO or 
Karen. If they join KYO it is better if they decide to be Karen so that the Karen don’t disappear. If the 
Karen marry with English, if the children are English the Karen will disappear. We have to try not to 
disappear.”66 
                                                 
65 Interview with KYO central Chairperson on 29th July 2009, Mae Sot 
66 Interview with KYO central Chairperson on 29th July 2009, Mae Sot 
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Photo 5 Part of the KYO exhibition of KNU 
leaders during Karen Revolution Day 
ceremony, January 2009 [Photo: author] 
 
 
Photo 6 KYO exhibition of traditional Karen 
artefacts during Karen Revolution Day 
ceremony, January 2009 [Photo: author] 
 
In reality, not everyone who joins the KNU immediately identifies with the KNU’s 
articulation of a Karen identity, while some do not join precisely because they do not easily 
fit within the particular identity propounded. During fieldwork at the KYO headquarters a 
number of new recruits passed through the office, often spending several months there 
before finding a permanent position in one of the exile (not necessarily KNU-affiliated) 
organisations. One, a young male, was born of Karen parents but did not speak the 
language well as he had been brought up in a predominantly Burmese speaking town. He 
often talked about his frustration at the way other participants in the KNU sometimes 
looked down on him for speaking Burmese (considered the language of the oppressor by 
some) and how he felt at a disadvantage while working at KYO for not being able to read 
and write S’gaw Karen, the primary language of the KNU. However, he stayed in KYO 
and continued to work for the organisation. Another new recruit from a state-controlled 
area of Burma was born of Karen and Mon parents so had a mixed ethnicity. She felt that 
others in KNU institutions did not trust her because she was not completely Karen. 
Ultimately she found a training position at an exile organisation outside KNU institutions 
entirely, where she appeared to be happy mixing with people from multiple ethnic groups. 
b) Organisational history and leadership 
As chapter five discussed, KYO was initially formed as the youth wing of the Karen 
Central Organisation (KCO) and was one of the five founding members of the KNU. 
However, in the transition to Burmese independence, KYO leaders undermined the 
KNU’s political position and aligned themselves with Aung San and the AFPFL in a 
strategy of compromise instead of confrontation. According to current KYO leaders, this 
organisational history has influenced the way in which KYO was constructed when it was 
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re-formed and continuing inter-generational relations. They explained in a focus group 
discussion that some of the elder KNU leaders continue to mistrust the KYO, fearing a 
youth revolt because of its prior split from the KNU and alignment with the AFPFL. As 
the KYO Chairman said:  
“One problem for the KYO work is that they joined with the pah sah ba lah 
[AFPFL]”67.  
By the time KYO was re-formed in 1989, the KNU had experienced several more power 
struggles between different factions and had either disbanded or brought under direct 
control all other organisations in the union. Probably as a result of this history, the KNU 
has never militarised its youth wing. The ‘youth’ category constructed by the KNU in 1989 
was one of a nascent political leadership who were essentially the ‘children’ of the parent 
party.  By this time, the KNU’s leadership was in its sixties so there was a much greater age 
difference between KYO and KNU leaders than there had been at independence. Saw D, 
supported by interviews with other participants, explained that this positioning of youths in 
the KNU builds on generational relationships in Karen society:  
“The Karen culture is that young people are inexperienced so when you are younger than an 
old man you have to listen to him and follow him.”68   
However, it could also be interpreted as a tool for political control of the youth cohort. 
More authoritarian leaders in the KNU often used this metaphor of a hierarchical and 
subservient parent-child relationship to explain how they see the position of the youth 
wing, indicating that control of the youth cohort is considered important by some, 
including the Chairman of the KYO at the time of research: 
“In one family, if the parents die the children will organise the family. If KNU elders die 
then KYO will take over. So at this time the KNU control KYO and KYO will become 
KNU leaders in the future. KNU train KYO in the future to be leaders… The Organising 
department support and guide KYO according to the guidelines. If KYO don’t agree with the 
Organising department it’s like they don’t listen to their parents so [I tell them] don’t work 
in KYO.”69 
It is important to recognise, though, that the KNU contains diverse opinions. While some 
leaders appear to view the KNU as a unitary party under which all other groups are 
politically and operationally subordinate, others view it as a union of different interest 
groups which aims to balance disparate ideas. Saw Hla Ngwe, the KNU’s Joint Secretary 1 
on its Central Executive Committee is an example of the latter, stating that:  
“KYO and KWO are not under KNU control, they [KNU] only guide them to be the 
benefit of all Karen people, not to blindly follow the Karen [KNU] leadership. They [KYO 
                                                 
67 Interview with KYO central Chairperson on 29th July 2009, Mae Sot 
68 Interview with Saw D (Male, age 28),  a KYO district leader, Mae Sot, 24th January 2009 
69 Interview with KYO central Chairperson on 29th July 2009, Mae Sot 
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and KWO] have a role and constitution laid down by their own congress. The KNU never 
dictates KYO do this do that, we only invite and discuss how to do and how do you assume 
this issue.”70  
Of course this statement could easily have been made simply to appeal to a Western 
researcher. Saw Hla Ngwe is very familiar with representing the KNU to Western 
organisations and is aware of the difficulties that KYO and KWO have with Western 
donors because of their affiliation to the KNU. However, other young leaders working in 
independent organisations also see the KYO demonstrating some operational 
independence from the KNU on a day-to-day basis. For example, a KSNG leader said: 
“Some people think that KYO is under the control of KNU but I see that KNU did not 
come and make decisions for them and they have to make by themselves. They work very 
hard and use their knowledge and make decisions themselves.”71 
This research found that the KNU’s youth wing was specifically re-formed as a leadership 
development space for youths in their twenties and thirties, to meet the organisational 
needs of the KNU. For the first time, ‘youth’ was given a defined age range and was 
intended to cover all males and females from age 15 to 35. From this point on, when the 
term ‘youth’ is used in this thesis, it refers to this KNU-defined category. Initially, the 
upper age limit was 40, but according to a KYO leader, after further criticism from younger 
Karen people that the KYO was dominated by people in their late thirties, whom they did 
not consider to be ‘youths’, the upper age limit was reduced to preserve the youth wing for 
younger cadres: 
“In the past the definition was older than 35 but people saw that older leaders had positions 
and younger people didn’t have positions. KNU want to have a youth wing who can be the 
strength of the KNU so they gave them some space.”72 
In practice, at least among participants based in Thailand, youths working within KNU-
affiliated organisations appear to be constituted both as politically subordinate to KNU 
elders and as individual subjects capable of action and operational decision-making in their 
own right. However, since this research was unable to study the activities of KYO staff in 
Burma this may only be a feature of youth participation in Thailand. 
c) INGOs and the KNU’s lack of coercive power in exile 
The KYO was re-formed in 1989 at the KNU headquarters in Manerplaw, but after the fall 
of Manerplaw in 1995 to the Burma Army and DKBA, KYO’s central headquarters moved 
across the border to the vicinity of Mae Sot in Thailand, along with the other KNU central 
organisations. The location in Thailand appears to have profoundly changed the structural 
                                                 
70 Interview with Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
71 Interview with Saw AB (Male, age 29), a KSNG and KHRG leader, Mae Sot, 29th July 2009 
72 Interview with a KYO district Chairperson / KNU district level organising department leader on 30th 
November 2008 
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context of KYO’s operations, having important effects on its work and relationship to the 
KNU. From the perspective of an outside observer, the most important aspects of the 
changed structural context appear to have been a decline in the KNU’s coercive power and 
the influence and protection of INGOs working in the refugee camps. An in-depth 
interview with Naw H, a KWO leader, explained how this happened: 
“When we moved to Mae Sot the CBOs started growing. Before, it was just KYO and 
KWO but when we moved to Thailand…NGOs came and volunteers came and gave 
training, then our minds opened… In the beginning some (KNU) leaders were so strong in 
their power and when the CBOs started up there was some misunderstanding between the 
leaders…So they (the new CBOs and the KNU) had a meeting and explained and the 
leaders accepted (the CBOs)…They can do (CBO activities) if it does not affect the Thai law 
or KNU.”73 
The opening of political space for Karen youths resulted in the founding of the Karen 
Students Network Group (KSNG) and Karen University Students Group (KUSG), which 
although strong supporters of the KNU, are constitutionally and operationally 
independent, apparently causing some anxiety among KNU leaders. It also resulted in 
greater voice for the KNU’s own mass organisations without retribution.74 Naw H 
explained further: 
“Now we are in Thailand the KNU cannot be active on their policy, they cannot do 
anything…Some old leaders are not up to date and cannot accept the situation, but some 
leaders support the young people.”75  
While the KNU held sole coercive power and could effectively protect villagers from 
external aggression it commanded authority, but with rapidly shrinking liberated areas, an 
exiled headquarters and executive power increasingly curtailed by Thai authorities, its 
authority seems to appear to be more vacuous to exiled youth. Kuroiwa and Verkuyten, 
(2008:395) argue that the elder KNU leadership struggle to appease educated Karen youth 
in particular and convince them of the army’s defensive military strategy. There is 
subsequently more criticism of the KNU leadership among young Karen people both in 
Burma and Thailand. As Naw H again explains: 
“In practice, they (youths) can complain but not against the KNU policy. They can complain 
about leaders and put information on websites or in the media. Some Karen young people 
may criticise and the KNU are angry but they don’t give any punishment because it’s not 
against KNU policy.”76 
It was clear from participant observation that Karen organisations based in Thailand at the 
time of research implemented some projects neither mandated nor approved by the KNU, 
essentially by receiving protection from their Western INGO patrons, whom, as chapter 
                                                 
73 Interview with Naw H (Female, age 34),  a KWO central leader, 25th July 2009, Mae Sot 
74 Interview with Saw AB (Male, age 29), a KSNG and KHRG leader, Mae Sot, 29th July 2009 
75 Interview with Naw H (Female, age 34),  a KWO central leader, 25th July 2009, Mae Sot 
76 Interview with Naw H (Female, age 34),  a KWO central leader, 25th July 2009, Mae Sot 
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eight argues, the KNU increasingly relies on for material support to their welfare wings. As 
Saw B, a district level KYO leader, explained, although organisations like KYO are still 
compelled to follow KNU policies, they can also initiate their own activities and have a lot 
of operational autonomy. This view was supported by many young leaders both within and 
outside KYO. After the election of a new KYO leadership in 2000 in particular, KYO 
developed a range of new peer group social projects in the refugee camps in Thailand, 
building on the social roles of youths in Karen villages and working as implementing 
partners for the INGOs who supported the refugee camp population. Not all of these 
(especially HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns) were popular with more conservative 
elements of the KNU elder leadership. In effect, then, the INGOs appear to have usurped 
some of the KNU’s coercive power over its youth cohort because the KNU-affiliated 
organisations they fund are now partially accountable to their INGO patrons, who in turn 
defend their operational neutrality, at least in Thailand.  
d) Representing ‘KYO’ to different audiences 
The KNU’s organisational history, pre-existing social categories for youths, ethno-
nationalism in the KNU, and the changed structural context of exile in Thailand were all 
instrumental to the creation of a youth category in the KNU. However, these multiple 
influences on the construction of a youth category have resulted in multiple, overlapping 
representations of what the youth organisation actually is. Through observation of the day-
to-day interactions between staff at the KYO central headquarters in Thailand and their 
NGO patrons, KNU elders and local clients in the refugee and IDP camps, it became 
apparent that KYO staff at the central office in Thailand offer different representations of 
the organisation to different audiences based on the particular relationships they have. For 
instance, in interactions with the KNU, KYO staff assume the position of subordinate, 
politically-committed civil servants and emerging leaders. When KYO staff work with 
youths during the implementation of their socially-based projects, their work builds on a 
pre-existing village youth category and KYO staff portray themselves as community 
volunteers. With INGO donors, KYO staff adopt the position of project implementers 
with their political relationships very much downplayed and even deliberately obscured at 
times. This is because most of the INGOs working in the refugee camps and across 
Burma’s eastern border are wary of engaging in Burma’s complex and fractured political 
scene and strive to deliver projects based on operating principles of political neutrality. This 
representation was often also seen used when KYO leaders liaised with Thai security 
officials.  
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All three representations were used frequently throughout the fieldwork period and KYO 
staff slipped between them as they met people from each of the different audiences.  The 
adoption of multiple representations was clearly a pragmatic response to the different 
mandates and expectations of each group KYO had a relationship with, but it also 
represented actual variations in KYO’s operations; the representations were not entirely 
fictitious. A summary of the KYO’s multiple representations is given in the table below: 
Representation Audience Political 
representation 
Relationship Territory 
KYO as a CBO INGOs Neutral Implementing 
partner of 
INGOs 
Thailand 
KYO as a KNU 
mass organisation 
KNU, alliance 
groups and 
Karen youths 
Political 
supporter of 
KNU 
‘Child’ of  the 
‘mother’ KNU 
Thailand and 
Burma 
KYO as a social 
work group 
Karen youths Neutral Peer/elder 
sibling of 
Karen youths 
Thailand and 
Burma 
Table 6  Summary of three KYO representations to different audiences 
3 Effects of creating a ‘youth’ category in the KNU 
This section analyses the effect the construction of a youth wing and a youth category in 
the KNU has had on opportunities for youths to voice political opinions and influence 
KNU policy and generational relations in the KNU. 
a) Negotiating hierarchies and social categories in the KNU 
This case demonstrates that while an armed opposition group may be militarily strong, 
weaknesses in political leadership skills, including the regeneration of political leadership, 
may be exposed as a result of critical events. The group may then seek to create a youth 
wing for political and organisational purposes. However, armed opposition groups may 
perceive politicised youth groups as posing a potential threat and purposely construct their 
position as politically subordinate to the elder leadership. In a group like the KNU which 
already contains cleavages and has experienced numerous military splits, it is important not 
to create the potential for a further cleavage along generational lines, thus the KNU’s youth 
wing was not militarised. 
As Parsons (2004) found in the Angolan conflict, youths may be constituted both as 
subjects of top-down discipline by leaders and as individuals capable of independent action. 
This case found that a pre-existing youth category in broader society as well as increasingly 
independent youth wing relations with external funders gave the KNU’s youth wing a 
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degree of operational autonomy, though they remained politically controlled by the parent 
party.  
Although the KNU created a specific youth category, it was not created anew. This case 
shows how social categories are built on pre-existing social norms. Furthermore, like many 
politicised ‘youth’ categories elsewhere, ‘youth’ in the KNU is not always a gender-neutral 
term. Although many young women do appear to identify with the term ‘youth’, the youth 
wing itself is dominated by young men despite efforts to incorporate more women in 
KYO. Paradoxically, though, this case indicates that a strong women’s wing in an armed 
opposition group can reinforce gender biases because it diverts politicised young women 
out of institutionalised youth transition processes. At the time of fieldwork, the youth wing 
and armed wings of the KNU remained the primary feeder organisations with successful 
leaders from the KYO, KNLA and KNDO transitioning into the Standing Committee and 
eventually the Executive Committee of the KNU. From discussions with KYO leaders, it 
appears that KYO leaders at the township, district and central levels also work very closely 
with KNU leaders. A KYO leader explained in a discussion about KYO’s operations one 
evening: 
“KYO works closely with KNU leaders. Some district KYO are also on the KNU 
committee. At the township level and district level they work closely with KNU leaders. [For 
example] some KYO members work for KED (Karen Education Department) and also 
take responsibility for the KNU organising and publications department. In fourth, fifth and 
sixth brigades, most KYO committee are also on the KNU committee.”77 
The women’s wing, by contrast, does not as regularly transition its leaders into the KNU’s 
central leadership structures; they tend to remain in the women’s wing (with a small 
number of exceptions). Thus, while the women’s wing is now large, well organised and 
financially stable, especially compared to the financially insecure youth wing, its success 
draws female recruits away from the youth wing and therefore away from the main 
transition point into KNU leadership roles. The institutionalised separation of women 
from the KNU’s political leadership is exacerbated by the diversion of new female recruits 
into the KWO by KNU and KYO leaders inside Karen state. A KYO central leader 
explained how this occurs: 
Interviewer: “Why don’t many young women join KYO?” 
Saw U: “Some of the young women, if they come to KYO some of the KYO leaders do not 
know what the women need at the township or district level and cannot look after them. 
Sometimes they come to join KNU but the security is not good for them and they [KNU 
leaders] don’t know how to take care of them so they just send them to KWO.” 
Interviewer: “I saw some young women in the KNLA.” 
                                                 
77 Interview with Saw U (Male, age 29),  a KYO central leader, 17th December 2008, Mae Sot 
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Saw U: “If women join the KNLA as soldiers they are just only medics. Most of them work 
as medic soldiers.” 
Interviewer: “So what happens if a young woman wants to join the KNU in a political 
role?” 
Saw U: “If they are interested in politics the [KNU] leaders send them to KWO if they are 
a woman and KYO if they are a man.”78 
Burgess’s (2002) study found that youth organisations in Zanzibar were important arenas 
for bridging ethnic divisions in society. However, in this case, the construction of a ‘youth’ 
category merely appeared to reinforce existing ethnic divisions. Observations of KYO 
activities showed that it perpetuated the promotion of a Karen youth category and 
attempted to unite youths from diverse Karen communities around a particular Karen 
identity as articulated by the KNU. Moreover, although KYO is involved in alliances with 
other political youth groups in Burma (through the umbrella groups SYCB and NY 
Forum), KYO leaders reported that ethnic distrust remains high among the youth groups. 
Indeed they were quite dismissive about the relevance of these groups as a political force, 
stating that they were merely ‘talking shops’ dominated by the exiled Burman students. 
b) Opportunities for youths to voice political opinions and influence KNU policy 
Although the KYO was re-formed in 1989 to address the need for political leadership 
development among the KNU’s youth cohort, it was not until the fall of the KNU’s 
headquarters at Manerplaw in 1995 and subsequent changes in the KNU’s internal 
practices that the youth cohort could claim greater political voice in the organisation. The 
following excerpt from Saw V’s life history illustrates the experience of being a youth in the 
KNU both before and after the fall of Manerplaw: 
Increasing opportunities for youths in the KNU 
Life history interview with Saw V1 
Interviewer: “When did you first join the KNU?” 
Saw V: I joined the KNDO since 1992 (aged 16) and became a soldier. At that time I had just finished 
middle school, Grade Eight, in Burma. When I joined KNDO in the Third Brigade area, firstly I had to 
attend the military training. I was very young so I should continue my further study, so later I was sent 
back to school to continue my studies and I continued to study until I finished Grade Ten. On the one side 
I was a student and on the other side in the military. In the summer time I served as a soldier. After I 
finished Grade Ten I went back and served there in the front line as a soldier for two or three years and 
then I asked permission from my leaders to get a chance to study further study and then I studied 
community management in the DEP [Distance Education Programme]. After finishing DEP…I went 
back to my battalion and worked there for two or three years and then later my leader sent me to come and 
work with Padow Htoo Htoo Lay as an intern to learn everything from him. Gradually I improved some 
of my education and I got more experience in working with other leaders in the central level so later I was 
appointed to serve as a Karen State Constitution Drafting Committee member.” 
                                                 
78 Interview with Saw U (Male, age 29),  a KYO central leader, 10th July 2009, Mae Sot 
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Interviewer: “How did you come to be working in KYO?” 
Saw V: “In 2008 I was elected to the district level committee of KYO. I already served as a member of 
KYO as a young man.” 
Interviewer: “Do the KNU allow youths in KYO to have much power or responsibility?” 
Saw V: “The KNU are good at giving responsibility to the youth. The situation has changed a lot. Before, 
it was a little bad when I first joined with KNU. I didn’t know exactly but most of the people talked about 
this and everyone said there is no more space for the young people… At that time, the KNU, most of the 
leaders are not quite old and they see that they can do everything but after that we left some of our areas and 
the leaders got older and older and the situation got worse and worse, so we could see that if there is no space 
for the young people to be involved in the movement, or if they are not empowered to get more experience or 
high education, one day there will be a gap between the young people and the old leaders. We saw some of 
our leaders one by one pass away.” 
Interviewer: “How do you know the situation for youths in the KNU has changed?” 
Saw V: “After the fall of Manerplaw I see the situation changed because myself I feel like that. Whenever 
we worked along with the leaders we could say whatever we wanted… The KYO tried to strengthen the 
youth movement and activities so now we see that the young people are more empowered and more involved 
in organisations and got more skills and education. At the same time the KNU try to encourage the youths 
to get empowerment.” 
Interviewer: “What do the KNU do to encourage the youths?” 
Saw V: “Only the KYO deal with the young people directly out of the KNU because some leaders are very 
old and they have a lot of experience and some young people are not experienced in any movement so they 
dare not approach the old people to work together. So later [there was] this gap and KYO tried to deal 
directly with the young people. Later, the young people got more encouragement and got more empowerment 
and they are more motivated and inspired to work and create their personal involvement.” 
Interviewer: “Are there many youths involved in the work that you do?” 
Saw V: “KSCB was formed from a load of Karen organisations. Seventeen people were selected to be 
members of the KSCB. Most of them are youth…sent by their organisations. They want to promote more 
youth involved in the organisation work or in the political movement. Otherwise most of the leaders are very 
old and they lead everything and do everything and sometimes they know everything. Later there is a gap 
between the youth people and the old people so they need to work together with the young people to train 
them to work together in the movement so later they will take the position of the old leaders.”  
Figure 7 Increasing opportunities for youths in the KNU: Life history interview with Saw V1 
As Saw V explained, patterns of youth participation and political leadership within the 
KNU appeared to change significantly after the fall of Manerplaw. The loss of significant 
territory and splintering among the KNLA resulted in a leadership crisis because it became 
clear that KNU leaders could neither protect its claimed constituency nor unite its 
members. As chapter five argued, the defeat reflected serious rifts in the military wing, 
particularly along sub-ethnic and religious lines, as well as grievances over corruption and 
abuse of authority by both civilian and military leaders. Thus, according to Zipporah Sein, 
while the KNU’s leadership was militarily skilled, politically it was weak.79 
                                                 
79 Interview with Naw Zipporah Sein, KNU General Secretary, Mae Sot, 11th December 2010 
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With the subsequent decline of Bo Mya’s influence in the KNU leadership and the rise of 
Ba Thein to the position of Chairman and Mahn Sha to the General Secretary position in 
2000 there was a noticeable change in the character of the KNU’s behaviour towards its 
youth cohort, according to many participants in this study.  A second generation of leaders 
took on powerful military and political roles at the 2000 and 2004 KNU elections and 
youths under the age of 35 became significantly better represented among the lower 
leadership levels. A KYO leader explained in a discussion about youth leadership training 
programmes: 
“Before, KNU had a good policy about youth roles, but in practice they didn’t implement and 
it didn’t really happen. Some districts now do leadership training. Under Mahn Sha, KNU 
central had a leadership training programme.  Now KNU sees it is not enough to have a 
good policy regarding youths, they also need to implement it practically with training, capacity 
building and transition to suitable roles. However there is lots more still to be done. They 
(KNU) need to be more open, more encouraging and put more youths in leadership 
positions.”80 
A number of youth participants argued that the implementation of youth political training 
and leadership development programmes was a direct result of the changed KNU 
leadership, in particular the increasing importance of Mahn Sha, who had long been a 
supporter of the youth cohort: 
“When Mahn Sha got the General Secretary position the youths grew up a lot, since 2002. 
We were lucky we had Padow Mahn Sha supporting us because the other leaders could not 
say anything, and now they see that the youth are active and they agree.”81  
Mahn Sha was General Secretary of the KNU from 2000 until his assassination in 2008 and 
possibly the most significant figure in the KNU during this period, especially after the 
death of Bo Mya in 2006. Several years before the KNU instituted a centrally-based youth 
leadership training programme, he established a one to two year training programme for 
youths at Lay Wah in Karen State, which fed politically-trained youths back into KNU 
structures. A number of participants spoke very highly about Mahn Sha’s young leadership 
training programme. Discussions with the leaders of several KNU-affiliated organisations 
revealed that Mahn Sha also nurtured the KYO, KWO and other youth-orientated groups 
(including the KSNG and KUSG), providing computers, assistance with office rental start-
up costs, organisational administration advice and mentoring to the young leaders. This 
was evident during my own work as a volunteer at the KYO headquarters in 2003-2004 
when Mahn Sha would come to the office approximately once a month to discuss current 
                                                 
80 Interview with a KYO district Chairperson / KNU district level organising department leader, Mae Sot, 1st 
December 2008 
81 Interview with Naw H (Female, age 34),  a KWO central leader, 25th July 2009, Mae Sot 
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Karen affairs with the KYO leadership. He was also a key supporter of independent Karen 
NGOs, such as KHRG. 
In 2008, Zipporah Sein was elected to the General Secretary position left vacant by Mahn 
Sha’s death. As well as being the first female, civilian General Secretary of the KNU, 
Zipporah was also a supporter of youth, particularly young women. At KWO, for example, 
she oversaw the institution of two leadership development training centres for young 
women.  
Young leaders interviewed as part of this study argue that a decline in the KNU’s coercive 
power has opened up the political space for youths to voice their opinions without 
retribution. The organisational style of the KNU also appears to have changed as a result of 
changed leadership, bringing about a greater tolerance of dissent in the KNU in general 
and political patronage of youths by powerful KNU leaders. Thus, as Clapham (1998) 
argues, organisational ethos and individual leadership styles are important factors in the 
behaviour of armed opposition groups. 
Many participants stated that these changes have resulted in more youths taking on 
leadership positions in its civilian structures since 2000 so the actual numbers of youths 
working in key non-military KNU departments and affiliated organisations, at both the 
leadership and general staff level was collected during the fieldwork period. Analysis of this 
data showed that at the district level of the KNU bureaucracy all departments contain 
youths working at leadership levels, particularly the fourth, fifth and sixth districts. The 
Standing Committee of the KNU also now contains many second and third generation 
KNU leaders, though none are aged under 35.82 The following table indicates the 
proportions of youths (as defined by the KNU) within different KNU-affiliated 
organisations at the leadership level and the general staff level. 
Youth (aged 15-35) participation in key non-military KNU organisations 
Organisation / Department 
Youths in leadership 
positions (as a 
percentage of all 
leaders) 
Youths in general staff 
(non-leadership) 
positions (as a 
percentage of all staff) 
KYO (Youth wing) 100 100 
KWO (Women’s wing) 20 80 
CIDKP (IDP relief) 13 77 
FTUK (Trade unions) 57 60 
Forestry department 40 66 
                                                 
82 Interview with a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 17th December 2008 
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Organising department 45-75 100 
Education department 11 52 
Health department 8 unknown 
Table 7 Youth (aged 15-35) participation in key non-military KNU organisations83 
According to Saw Hla Ngwe, Joint Secretary of the KNU, it is the second and third 
generation of KNU leaders, those between the ages of 35 and 60, who now wield effective 
power while the elderly first generation of KNU leaders are now primarily figure-heads, 
some of whom remain involved in policy-making, but in a reduced capacity: 
Interviewer: “Why are the senior KNU leaders so old?” 
Saw Hla Ngwe: “Most of the leaders over age 60 are not active, they are retired… Only 
five of the top leaders are over age 70. Old leaders are just policy makers, not practically 
active. The ’49 generation84 will reach their expiry date this term. They have a strong 
determination and are committed to the war so we let them work to their last breath. It’s not 
that we like so much the old leaders. For old leaders to lead their people is a great burden for 
them and for us. Between the ages of 35 and 60 we have many people. They are the middle 
aged people. Since 2004 [13th KNU congress] more and more younger generation have taken 
leadership roles in comparison to the past, in all spheres.” 
The degree of power youths under the age of 35 possess to influence KNU policies and 
strategic direction was difficult to gauge in this study, but it can partly be measured by 
analysis of the KNU’s internal voting system. In the four-yearly congress which sets 
policies, guidelines for working and strategies, official youth representatives are guaranteed 
seven per cent of the votes available on all decisions, however, in reality both KYO an 
KNU leaders stated that more youths than this are actually represented voting in their 
capacity as women representatives, district level representatives and other departmental 
representatives. The table below shows the vote allocations of the KNU at its four-yearly 
congress, according to the KNU’s central level organising department85: 
Vote allocations in the KNU Congress 
Organisation 
Number of 
votes 
Number of votes 
as a percentage of 
all votes 
Central Executive Committee 30 23% 
Standing Committee 15 11% 
District leaders 7 5% 
                                                 
83 These figures are based on my interviews with officials from each organisation during 2008-09. The 
percentage of youths in leadership positions is based on exact numbers in all organisations except the 
Organising department. The percentage of youths in staff positions is based on exact number in FTUK, 
CIDKP and KYO and estimates in the other organisations. 
84 The ’49 generation refers to people who joined the KNU in its early years when it first took up arms 
against the central government in 1949. 
85 Interviews with KYO central leaders and KNU central level organising department staff, July 2009, Mae 
Sot 
 179 
Township leaders 7 5% 
KNLA  30 23% 
KNDO 7 5% 
KYO 9 7% 
KWO 9 7% 
Education department 7 5% 
Health department 7 5% 
Overseas Karen 3 2% 
Total 131 100% 
Table 8  Vote allocations within the KNU’s four-yearly congress 
As the table indicates, the armed wings of the KNU continue to wield significant power, 
with the KNLA allocated 23 per cent of votes and the KNDO five per cent. Moreover, 
KNLA leaders are also represented in the Central Executive Committee and Standing 
Committee. The reason for their continued power in political decision-making, according 
to Saw B, is their remaining coercive power in Karen State and history of factionalism as 
this excerpt from an interview demonstrates: 
Interviewer: “Who has most power in the KNU?” 
Saw B: “The army are still the most powerful because they have the potential to give the most 
problems to the KNU.”86 
Despite the increased presence of youths in the KNU’s decision making structures, young 
leaders say that they still find it difficult at times to voice their opinions and concerns and 
have them received without suspicion or criticism, they have had to rely on key backers 
from within the KNU leadership to advance their interests and, in general, they are not the 
decision makers at the policy level. They are completely absent from the Central Executive 
body which makes day to day decisions and the extended Standing Committee which is 
involved in more strategic or politically significant decisions. Thus, while no longer as 
marginalised in the group as they appear to have been before, youths are still dominated by 
their elder counterparts in the KNU. 
c) Generational relations 
When KYO was re-formed, it was created as the ‘child’ of the ‘parent’ KNU and youths 
were expected to be politically subordinate to KNU leaders. This was presented and 
justified by reference to a culture of deference to elders in Karen society. In practice, older 
leaders are positioned to act as advisers to younger leaders within the KNU. Indeed, almost 
                                                 
86 Interview with Saw B (Male, age 33),  a KYO district leader and KNU Organising department leader, Suan 
Pueng, 18th November, 2010 
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every day a very elderly KNU leader, Saw Thamein Htun, would cycle over to the KYO 
office and spend a few moments talking with the staff at the office before taking a nap. 
Saw Dot Lay Mu explained how this advisory role works: 
“The older people become the leaders in their level. Those who are older age (not youth age) 
are not very active in the service, but usually they take the leadership role at their level and 
they take the training and become advisor of youth, whereas the youth do actively in their 
service. In the military older people become leaders and take guardianship of the youth.”87 
However, for an armed opposition group straddling a border, different structural and 
cultural conditions on each side of the border can cause a number of organisational 
difficulties. Participants in this study explained that youths in the KNU living and working 
in exile on the Thai side of the border are socialised in a very different political and cultural 
context from their elder counterparts.  In particular, they said that many youths working 
along the border have contact with Thai and Western political cultures (both in the refugee 
camps and outside the camps) as well as access to the internet, which has resulted in a great 
deal more open debate and critique of Burmese politics and the KNU. Saw Dot Lay Mu, 
KNU Joint Secretary 2, explained how this affects generational relations from the KNU 
leadership’s perspective: 
“When the youths have experience, sometimes they have different ideas, not like the KNU 
ideas. When they learn about things like democracy and freedom of speech they want to speak 
freely and it is not appropriate for them to speak like this. Even the Kwekalu (a Karen-
language news outlet) editor, he is educated and he wrote the article blaming the leaders. 
Sometimes there are different ideas between youths and elders and they write articles from 
different perspectives. Sometimes they fight each other on the internet (blogs). But we 
understand them, they want to express their opinion even though it is not appropriate. When 
we meet them we try to ask them not to write the letters that become the pleasure of the 
SPDC, try to avoid this. The appropriate way should be to discuss privately and negotiate 
and share our opinions together. When Mahn Sha was still alive, if KYO or KWO 
organised a workshop or seminar they invited us and if they had any questions they asked us 
or if they wanted to know something they asked us. But now we don’t do like this so much 
anymore.”88 
Youth leaders also confirmed that generational relations are sometimes tense among 
participants in Thailand due to differences in political socialisation, though they were keen 
to stress that this did not cause any great problems in the KNU. The KYO leader and 
Kwekalu news editor mentioned in the quote above argued that voicing criticism to KNU 
leaders can be very frustrating because of the organisation’s historical political culture and 
the influence of a wider culture of subordination to elders in rural Karen villages. However, 
he also stated that there are opportunities for youths to voice their opinions to some of the 
second generation of KNU leaders: 
                                                 
87 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
88 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
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“The Karen culture is that young people are inexperienced so when you are younger than an 
old man you have to listen to him and follow him. Also when you are young people today, 
some educated people try to speak out and make suggestions to the older people and the old 
people don’t understand. They think you got brainwashed by foreign culture. But if you really 
try to speak with them they understand.”89 
This case demonstrates the complexity of generational relations in an armed opposition 
group. While youths may be constituted as subordinate to elders and politically 
marginalised by some leaders, other leaders may have different attitudes towards the youth 
cohort and changes in leadership and organisational style can empower youths. 
Furthermore, an armed opposition group operates in a local and national context that is to 
a certain extent out of its control. Changes in this context can alter the balance of power 
among participants in the group. Following its exile in Thailand, for instance, the KNU’s 
coercive power declined resulting in greater freedom for the youth cohort to express 
political opinions and criticise the parent organisation, though there are some limitations to 
this. As a young KWO leader explained:  
Interviewer: “Can youths in the KNU criticise KNU policies or actions?” 
Naw H: “In practice, they [youths] can complain but not against the KNU policy. They can 
complain about leaders and put information on website or in media. Some Karen young 
people may criticise and the KNU are angry but they don’t give any punishment because it’s 
not against KNU policy. Now we are in Thailand the KNU cannot be active on their policy, 
they cannot do anything. It depends on the leader – their personality and their view, their 
background. Some old leaders are not up to date and cannot accept the situation, but some 
leaders support the young people.”90 
In Hirschman’s (1970:92-93) theory of exit, voice and loyalty in institutions, although 
loyalty-promoting organisations may promote an ideological agenda, they are not 
necessarily interested in the opinions of their members because their short-term interest is 
to act as they wish, unconstrained by complaints and desertions. Therefore, they often seek 
to repress members’ voices and aim to develop unconscious loyalty (Hirschman, 1970:92-
93).  However, instituting mechanisms for members to voice their opinions is actually in 
their long-term interest because it enables the group to respond and adapt to changing 
concerns as necessary (Hirschman, 1970:92-93). Hirschman’s theory suggests that greater 
youth voice within the KNU may signal a broader opening of political space within the 
KNU and may also enable the KNU to adapt and respond to the opinions of its members 
better. However, as yet there is no evidence to suggest that this will prevent factionalism or 
serve to reunite very disparate Karen communities. 
 
                                                 
89 Interview with Saw B (Male, age 33),  Mae Sot, 23rd June 2009 
90 Interview with Naw H (Female, age 34),  a KWO central leader, 25th July 2009, Mae Sot 
 182 
4 Conclusion 
a) Constructing ‘youth’ in an armed opposition group 
This chapter began by examining how and why a specific ‘youth’ category is created in an 
armed opposition group. It argued that a youth wing may be formed for political and 
organisational expediency as a result of internal and external pressures. In creating a 
politicised youth category, pre-existing narratives around youth roles in the community may 
be politicised to frame youth participation in the group. The construction of a youth 
category was also influenced in this case by the armed group’s organisational history of 
factionalism, gender norms and, since the exile of its headquarters to Thailand, contact 
with Thai and Western political culture. However, this case demonstrates that youths 
themselves are not passive in the construction of their cohort in an armed opposition 
group, they play a part in continually re-creating it according to the political and cultural 
climate of the time and space in which they live. Thus, while they have reproduced the 
group’s ethnonationalist discourse in the case studied here, they have also fought for 
greater political voice. Despite some efforts to alter the effect of gender norms on youth 
participation in the group, they have not significantly altered the gender bias in the KNU’s 
political leadership.   
Interestingly, this study found that multiple influences on the construction of a youth 
category in the KNU has resulted in multiple representations of the youth wing as an 
organisation, according to the political orientations of different stakeholders, and a broader 
array of activities than the purely political role the group anticipated when it created the 
youth wing. For a youth wing funded externally by INGOs, in order to qualify for external 
funding for their social projects, young leaders in the KYO are compelled to downplay 
their political affiliations and emphasise their social activities to international funding 
agencies. 
b) Claiming ‘youth’ political voice in the KNU  
This chapter examined generational relations and opportunities for youths to voice political 
opinions and influence KNU policy. It argued that the decline in the KNU’s coercive 
power and a change in leadership resulted in greater political voice for the youth cohort 
and opened up the civilian leadership structures of the KNU to younger generations. With 
patronage from senior leaders within the KNU, greater political voice for youths has been 
supported by the KNU’s executive and institutionalised by the transition of youths into 
more of the leadership positions within the bureaucratic and political structures of the 
organisation from the district level down since the KNU’s congress in 2000. 
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Sanctuary in Thailand has been a key factor in these changes, because the KNU has less 
coercive power in Thailand, youths have increased access to other political cultures and 
participants have more opportunities to leave the organisation if they feel their voices are 
not being heard. While youths in the KNU are arguably much less marginalised than they 
were before the re-creation of KYO, they are still subject to a degree of domination by 
their elder and military counterparts. They continue to struggle to present their opinions 
and those of the youth cohort whom they formally represent at the highest levels of the 
organisation and while they have some voting power in KNU’s decision making system, 
the armed wings of the KNU continue to retain the most internal power.  
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Chapter 7: Youth recruitment, progression and exit in the KNU 
The last chapter argued that youth participation and political leadership development 
became more important to the KNU in 1989, resulting in the creation of a ‘youth’ category, 
reformation of the KYO to act as its political youth wing and the establishment of 
leadership development processes for its defined youth cohort. This chapter seeks to 
understand how young people are mobilised and recruited into non-military roles in the 
KNU. Furthermore, it examines how they are matched to roles and the factors that 
influence their career progression. Finally, it seeks to understand why those categorised as 
‘youths’ stay in non-military roles or leave the KNU. 
As chapter five identified, the KNU is active in four areas with different patterns of 
governance and control: government-controlled ‘white zones’; partially-securitised areas 
controlled by multiple armed groups; KNU-controlled or influenced areas (‘black zones’) 
and exile space in Thailand. This chapter begins by examining recruitment from each of 
these areas. The second part of the chapter examines career progression patterns among 
youths in non-military positions in the KNU. The third part of the chapter examines youth 
exit patterns from the KNU. The fourth part of the chapter analyses the implications these 
findings have for theories of youth participation in armed opposition groups. 
1 Recruitment patterns in different zones of control 
Chapter five argued that since the decline of the KNU’s ‘liberated areas’ and the rise in 
ceasefire agreements between splinter factions from the KNLA and the Burma Army, 
patterns of sovereignty and control over land and resources in Karen State have become 
very complex. Four spaces of sovereignty and control were identified: government 
controlled ‘white zones’; partially-securitised areas with multiple, overlapping claims to 
authority by different armed groups; KNU-controlled areas; and exile spaces in Thailand. 
This chapter examines the different logics of youth recruitment and participation resulting 
from the different governance regimes in each of these four spaces. The following table 
summarises the different factors found to affect youth recruitment in this study. 
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Area Individual factors Political, economic and social structure factors KNU organisation factors 
Types of 
recruits 
State-
controlled 
- Revenge 
- Political ideology 
- Educational opportunities 
- Family links to the KNU 
- Poor quality state education 
- State exploitation of civilian resources  
- Local military malgovernance 
- Youth emigration for work in neighbouring 
countries 
- Rural, open villages have better connections to 
the KNU than urban or enclosed villages 
- Some villages have a recent cultural memory of 
KNU rule 
- Educational recruitment 
- Links with charismatic leaders 
- District office outreach work 
- Medium to 
high levels of 
education 
Partially-
securitised 
- Revenge 
- Political ideology 
- Educational opportunities 
- Family links to the KNU 
- Multiple authorities making demands on villagers 
resources 
- State-making projects of land and labour control 
and consolidation 
- Youth emigration for work in neighbouring 
countries 
- Local history of KNU governance 
- Multiple Karen armed groups claiming authority 
results in some villagers disengaging entirely 
- Educational recruitment 
- Links with charismatic leaders 
- District office outreach work 
- Villagers may choose political 
allegiances on the basis of armed 
group behaviour in the local area 
- Medium to 
high levels of 
education 
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Area Individual factors Political, economic and social structure factors KNU organisation factors 
Types of 
recruits 
KNU-
controlled 
- Revenge 
- Political ideology 
- Educational opportunities 
- Family links to the KNU 
- Personal security needs 
 
- High level of grievances around counter-
insurgency and state-making practices by the 
Burma Army  
- Increasing poverty reducing youth availability for 
recruitment 
- Long history of KNU governance 
- Participation may be considered akin to civil 
service 
- ‘Self-rule’ societies have ambiguous and 
conditional support for any public authority but 
may support the KNU in an alliance to drive the 
common enemy out of the land 
- Physical protection of ethnic kin 
- Grievance framing 
- Ethno-nationalism 
- Political ideology 
- ‘Heroic’ participation and 
community pride 
- Educational recruitment  
- ‘Serving the community’ 
rhetoric 
- KNU conscription practices 
- Low to 
Medium levels of 
education.  
- Youths with 
low education 
become soldiers, 
those with higher 
education 
become officers 
or admin staff 
Exile 
spaces 
- Lack of  recent 
experience of abuse 
diminishes grievances and 
motivation 
- Educational opportunities 
- Parental pressure not to 
participate out of security 
fears 
- Thai policies prevent recruitment from Thailand  
- Increased refugee resettlement opportunities 
- Thai youth gang culture 
- Influence of Western culture (particularly 
individualism) promoting free-riding  
- INGO influence prompts unviable salary 
demands 
- IDP exposure trips 
- Ethno-nationalist education in 
schools 
- High levels of 
education 
- Most become 
admin staff 
- High exit levels 
Table 9 Summary of youth recruitment patterns in KNU-affiliated organisations
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A map showing the different areas is not available and would be far too complex to 
produce because local patterns of armed group control are highly dynamic, have significant 
overlap and change seasonally. However, the following map of internal displacement gives 
some indication of where the different zones lie. Brown shaded IDP hiding areas in 
northern Karen State and Tenasserim Division indicate the areas the Burma Army is 
currently trying to penetrate to eliminate KNU control. Purple shaded areas indicate spaces 
that are partially-securitised and under the control of armed ‘ceasefire’ groups. Relocation 
sites tend to be in state-controlled ‘white zones’. There remain considerable areas un-
shaded on the map. Areas of Karen State and Tenasserim division closer to the Thai 
border are broadly more under the control or influence of the KNU, while areas towards 
the centre are more under state control.  
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Map 8 Map showing internal displacement of the civilian population in eastern Burma 
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a) Government-controlled areas 
 
Photo 7 Naw E working at KYO Central office in Thailand, February 2009 [Photo: author] 
Why does a young woman studying at a Burmese university join KYO? 
Life history interview with Naw E 
Naw E is a 23 year old Baptist female from a prosperous village in Thaton district where 
most people are farmers. Her family was relatively wealthy because they had a sawmill 
which her Father employed people to work on. Before her Mother married, she was a 
nurse in the KNU. The village used to be in the KNU’s ‘liberated zones’ but is now 
partially-securitised, coming under the control of both the DKBA and the Burma Army.  
As a result of the conflict, however, Naw E was sent to live in a boarding house in a 
government-controlled town so that she could continue her education. As she explains: 
“I just attended Grade One in my village then went to study in Thaton [town] because in my village we 
always had war. When we were children the war always happened but when we were not children (teenagers) 
the war just sometimes happened. I stayed in a boarding house until Eighth Standard then for Ninth and 
Tenth Standard I stayed at my Auntie’s home. I enjoyed school. I finished school in 2003 and started 
university directly for three or four months. Then I came back to my village and one of the KWO women 
said that KYO need one or two people to attend their school in Thailand. A lot of my friends and the young 
people joined KWO.” 
Although her village was controlled by the DKBA and Burma Army, Naw E explained that 
the KNU still retained a strong presence in the village and most families had members in 
either the KNU or DKBA. Despite the fact that many years previously a KNU soldier had 
killed her Grandfather, who was the village head at the time, Naw E’s family continued to 
support the KNU and her brother was a KNU soldier.  
When Naw E went back to visit her family in the village, a particular combination of 
factors led to her joining KYO. At the time, the DKBA were threatening and extorting 
money from her father because her brother was a KNU soldier. Her father became afraid 
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for his life and fled to Mae La refugee camp in Thailand, leaving her mother behind. The 
family already had a link to the refugee camp because another of Naw E’s brothers had 
already moved to the camp to attend school while Naw E was studying in Thaton town. 
Attending Burmese university costs a lot of money and the family’s wealth had dwindled so 
returning to her studies in Thaton became less viable for Naw E. Moreover, her mother 
had decided to join her husband in the refugee camp taking the remaining children with 
her, so Naw E decided to take the opportunity to study at the KYO school in Thailand. 
This marked the beginning of her career at KYO. 
Naw E attended the KYO’s leadership and management training school in Mae Sot for one 
year then attended Politics training organised by the KNU’s former General Secretary, 
Mahn Sha, in Lay Wah. After this, Naw E went back to Thaton district where she worked 
for KYO for one year. In 2005, she attended the KYO congress as a district representative 
and was asked to work at the KYO central office. She agreed and attended the 
Nationalities Youth Forum as the KYO representative for one year before returning to the 
KYO central office to take over the management of a peer support for youths in boarding 
houses project, which was funded by an INGO. She also then took responsibility for a 
multi-organisational adolescent reproductive health network, also supported by an INGO. 
Naw E explains her career ambitions:  
“I will work for an organisation and if we do [the work] better the people will respect [us]. I want to be a 
leader, a good leader. I don’t have plans to go to a third country [on the refugee resettlement programme].”91 
Figure 8 Why does a young woman studying at a Burmese university join KYO? Life history 
interview with Naw E 
 
Grievances 
As chapter five discussed, grievances among the civilian population in government-
controlled areas are widespread. Primarily, they concern forced labour, extortion, land 
confiscation and coercive assimilation under the ‘Burmanisation’ policy. In areas which 
have only recently come under consolidated state control, however, the local population 
often has a recent memory of more violent abuses conducted as part of ‘Four Cuts’ 
counterinsurgency tactics and state penetration strategies. Saw B, a KYO district leader and 
youth mobiliser in the KNU’s Organising department, explained that the high level of 
grievances is often the primary motivation for youths joining the KNU, despite the lack of 
pecuniary benefits the KNU can offer and often no real knowledge of what participation 
                                                 
91 Interview with Naw E, (female aged 23) a KYO central staff member, Mae Sot, 4th July 2009 
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will entail. Saw X’s stated reasons for joining the KNU are typical of many young people 
interviewed as part of this study who joined from these areas: 
“When I was aged eight or nine I saw ten villagers being tortured to death by SPDC 
soldiers. They put plastic bags on their heads and also dunked their heads into the river. My 
uncle was also killed by the SPDC. At 13 I left home in an SPDC-controlled village and 
joined the KNLA.” 
During life history interviews with participants, it was common for people to talk firstly 
and most vehemently about the grievances they felt against the Burma Army, however, I 
felt that this was not necessarily a good indication of the factors that compelled them to 
join the KNU at the time. The KNU has a strong discourse of grievance and many 
participants hear horrible stories of human rights abuses once they start working in one of 
its organisations. From my prior work at KHRG I found it was common for participants to 
talk about abuses they had heard about from others, even going back to events that 
occurred during the Second World War. Therefore, I probed extensively about what they 
knew about the KNU and the Burma Army at the time of their recruitment, what local 
living conditions were like and what their actual route into the KNU had been, step by 
step. 
What was clear from research elsewhere, was that although grievances are common, most 
aggrieved youths do not join the KNU and migration to a neighbouring country or to other 
parts of the country (including to hiding areas outside state control) is actually a far more 
common occurrence. As chapter five pointed out, there are an estimated 3.5 million 
migrants from Burma in neighbouring countries, 20 per cent of whom are young people 
between the ages of 15 and 17 (KHRG, 2009:2-3; Burma Human Rights Yearbook, 2006, 
in CPPCR, 2009:12). Considering there are estimated to be around nine million youths 
between the ages of 15 and 24 in the Burmese population, youth migration is clearly 
massive and a far more prevalent response to poor living conditions at home than 
participation in any kind of opposition politics. Among the young people interviewed in 
this study, more proximate factors, such as a personal link to the KNU or an event that put 
them in contact with the KNU, explained their actual recruitment path.  
Proximate factors 
In the case of Naw E, detailed above, family and village links to the KNU directly 
facilitated her recruitment. Naw D’s recruitment, however, came about through the KNU’s 
proximity in a neighbouring village. Naw D lived in a state-controlled village in Toungoo 
district and had never encountered the KNU before, although she was aware of the 
conflict. Upon a visit to a nearby village, the KNU’s department for health and welfare 
(KDHW) was conducting basic health training for the villagers. The opportunity arose for 
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Naw D to pursue further medical training with the KDHW at the Toungoo district 
headquarters. From there Naw D found further work at the KNU’s district office and with 
KYO, where she was then elected on to KYO’s central committee. She explained that 
although she had no prior knowledge of the KNU’s political goals, once she heard about 
them they resonated positively and she had no qualms about working for an organisation 
which was using armed force to contest the Burmese State. She explained that her only 
encounters with the Burmese State had been at school, seeing her father imprisoned for 
two years for suspected KNU involvement and being forced to labour on road 
construction by the Burma Army. Thus, she felt no loyalty towards the state.92 
Conversely, Saw AD explained that fewer youths join the KNU from trading areas, towns 
and enclosed villages because of the lack of proximity to KNU networks. Likewise in the 
Irrawaddy Delta, Karen youths are located far from KNU networks, thus a parent from 
Irrawaddy division, who was visiting the KNU headquarters in Thailand to investigate 
options for his sons to join the KNLA, said: 
“Many young people want to join KNU to make a revolution but they can’t come because it 
is very far away. If they come the SPDC know and will arrest them.”93 
Despite losing control of the delta area of Burma, much of the lowland plains areas and the 
towns, the KNU still has an underground presence in some of these areas and Karen 
youths can seek out the KNU through underground networks if they wish to join. 
However, underground networks to the KNU are partly mediated by ethnicity since 
political affiliation is assumed to be partly driven by ethnicity in an ethnically politicised 
context. The parent quoted above explained: 
“Many young people in my village join with KNU. SPDC control this area. If they want to 
join the KNU the villagers have to do it very secretly, it is not easy for them, but they are 
Karen also so it is easy to contact the KNU”94 
 
Education 
As chapter five highlighted, Burmese students have a history of political activism. The 
military regime has attempted to eliminate student protest by limiting the acquisition of 
political knowledge through heavy censorship of the curriculum, minimising the use of 
universities as organising spaces by closing universities and promoting distance learning 
courses instead, and pacifying students by giving out exam passes to anyone who attends 
                                                 
92 Interview with Naw D, (female aged 27) a KYO central staff member, Mae Sot, 26th June 2009 
93 Interview with Saw AE, (male) Mae Sot, 29th June 2009 
94 Interview with Saw AC, (male) Mae Sot, 29th June 2009 
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75 per cent of classes (Beatty, 2011:183; Aung Thet Wine, 2009). The Burmese education 
minister himself stated in 2009: 
“Education authorities hand out cheap degrees to daytime (regular) students as well as 
distant learning students, since they make it a policy of letting every student pass exams if 
they attend over 75 percent of their class hours. I say this even though it is belittling and 
embarrassing for our own education system" (Aung Thet Wine, 2009). 
Lack of political awareness among youths is a result of the censorship of education and 
news in Burma, but youths who migrate out of the country are able to access information 
leading some to become politically active (Beatty, 2011). One of the youths in this study 
had worked as a migrant labourer in Malaysia and Thailand and became politically aware 
after demonstrating outside the Burmese and Russian embassies with the NLD-LA and 
Burmese student groups. On his return to his village, he joined an underground branch of 
the KNU and began political campaigning work in SPDC-controlled areas.95 
Poor quality or non-existent education provided by the Burmese state96 is frustrating for 
some youths and those with links to the KNU may choose to access alternative education 
through KNU structures, or facilitate the access of others.  For example, Saw E was 
interested in teaching and working for the educational development of young people and 
joined KYO after graduating with a BA in Burmese at Pa-an university because he believed 
it offered an opportunity to work in this area:  
 Interviewer: “Why did you join KYO?” 
 Saw E: “So many youths who work in KYO have weak points and lower education, just 
only Fourth or Third Standard. I joined KYO to encourage and organise youths with lower 
education for the new generation to get higher education…I am most interested to be a 
teacher but if we look at the organisation it is not strong for the youth so I joined KYO.”97 
Accessing education provided by the KNU can then lead to a youth’s recruitment, although 
this may not have been their goal at the outset, as Saw U’s life history excerpt illustrates. 
Saw U was educated through the Burmese monastic tradition and finished Grade Ten in 
Pa-an town before starting university there, but he quickly became disillusioned with his 
studies and instead chose to attend a training course provided by the KYO. This then led 
to his recruitment: 
                                                 
95 Interview with Saw X, (male aged 32) a KYO district leader, Mae Sot, 14th July 2009 
96 The Burmese government’s spending on education is one of the lowest in the world at less than US$1 per 
person per year (KHRG, 2006:20) 
97 Interview with Saw E, (male aged 28) a KYO district leader, Mae Sot, 24th January 2009 
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Photo 8 Saw U at KYO Central office in Thailand, April 2009 [Photo: author] 
 
Disillusion with the Burmese education system 
Life history interview with Saw U 
Interviewer: “What did you do after you finished school?” 
Saw U:“I joined Pa-an college – part of Moulmein university. Pa-an college had only been set up for a few 
years, not a long time.”  
Interviewer: “What did you study?” 
Saw U: “I studied History.”  
Interviewer: “What did you do after you finished university?” 
Saw U: “I didn‘t finish it, I only finished second year and then I did not continue to the final year.” 
Interviewer: “Why didn’t you finish it?” 
Saw U: “At that time most of the students who finished university could do nothing and had no experience 
to work. The government worries about the students. If they do not pass the university they will protest 
against them, like that, so they just easily pass them, but it is not useful because they cannot get a job. The 
university has so many books but they just only teach two or three paragraphs and then in the examination 
they pass [the students]. When we finish university we don’t know anything. It is like corruption education, 
it is not good so I left.” 
Interviewer: “So what did you do after you left university?” 
Saw U: “When I stayed in Pa-an, I already decided if I got the MA [degree] I would join the KNU.” 
Interviewer: “Why?” 
Saw U: “Because in our village we saw often the SPDC come to catch the porters to go to forced labour.” 
Interviewer: “Did you know the KNU was fighting the SPDC?” 
Saw U: “When we stayed in the village we just only know we hate the SPDC and have to go to fight. 
Everyone who is young has strong thinking like that. They don’t know the real situation they just know 
 195 
that fighting is strong. I did not know of the NGOs and I never heard of the refugees. Most of the people 
who stay in the town have not heard of the refugees.” 
Interviewer: “So how did you contact the KNU to join them?” 
Saw U: “One of my friends told me if you go to Mae Sot you can learn more English and Computers for 
one year and after that you can go back to study your degree. So I followed my friend and came to 
KYLMTC. When I arrived at KYLMTC they taught the Politics and Karen history: why the Karen are 
fighting, why the revolution started. It was good for me and opened my mind.  
Interviewer: “What did you do after KYLMTC?” 
Saw U: “When we finished we just only know KYO and KWO and KNU and we are the youth so we 
need to join the KYO”98 
Figure 9 Disillusion with the Burmese education system: Life history interview with Saw U 
Discourses framing youth participation in the KNU 
As Saw U’s experience detailed above indicates, youths who access training or education 
provided by the KNU are not necessarily seeking to join KNU-affiliated organisations and 
many who go through education or training programmes provided by the KNU do not 
subsequently join. However, once young people are in the KNU’s education system, they 
encounter an alternative discourse of Karen ethno-nationalism and politics, which frames 
youth participation as a community service and encourages them to join. Furthermore, the 
KNU retains authority in some areas despite losing territorial control and some villages 
retain a cultural memory of KNU ethno-nationalism and KNU participation as a public 
service. Moreover, as the next chapter discusses, KNU organisations conduct considerable 
community outreach work explaining and building support for the KNU’s political goals. 
Saw D is from a government-controlled town in Dooplaya district. He joined KYO 
through his own underground links with KYO leaders in the area. His explanation of his 
reasons for joining KYO are typical of the discourses of many recruits once they are in the 
KNU. His responses also indicate the difficulty in interviews in getting beyond these 
discourses to a deeper understanding of why and how the participant actually came to be 
working in the KNU or one of its affiliated organisations. In this case, I did not know the 
participant well. This probably resulted in him being reticent during the interview, while I 
was reluctant to probe further. 
Interviewer: “Why do you work with KYO?” 
Saw D: “I came here to work for the people.” 
Interviewer: “Why didn’t you get a job in the town where you live?” 
Saw D: “If I choose the way in the town it will benefit only myself. KYO has to work for the 
Karen people for freedom, I know about that and came to join KYO.  
Interviewer: “Why didn’t you join DKBA?” 
                                                 
98 Interview with Saw U, (male aged 29) a  KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
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Saw D: “DKBA only work for income and have no policies and future plans for Karen 
people, they just only work for SPDC and follow their policies.” 
Interviewer: “But this work is very dangerous for you. Why didn’t you look for a safer job 
where you could live close to your family?” 
Saw D: “If we don’t do this work, the Karen people will disappear because the SPDC 
doesn’t allow them.” 99 
 
b) Partially-securitised areas 
In partially-securitised areas, grievances remain high and the KNU is in closer proximity to 
civilians in many areas. Interviews with participants revealed many of the same factors 
involved in recruitment as in government-controlled areas. However, the splintering of the 
KNU’s armed wing into multiple armed groups with overlapping zones and ceasefire 
agreements has heightened insecurity and complicated political allegiances as civilians face 
demands from multiple groups all claiming authority on the basis of ethnic allegiance. As 
chapter five discussed, some villagers appear to be disillusioned and attempt to disengage 
from the conflict, while others appear to support whichever group they perceive to be the 
most legitimate. There are indications that legitimacy and youth participation from 
partially-securitised areas may be decided by the relative behaviour of the Karen armed 
groups, as Saw X explains: 
Interviewer: “Why didn’t you join the DKBA?” 
Saw X: “When they [DKBA] came to stay in the village they implemented Buddhist law - 
none of the villagers can keep the animals in their house or eat them. At the time the DKBA 
told everyone to be vegetarian and the villagers didn’t like that...Nobody in my village joined 
the DKBA because they don’t like them. Now so many N--- villagers are in KNLA and 
KNU.”100 
In the absence of free and fair elections, it is impossible to say which, if any, group has a 
legitimate claim to public authority and this study does not seek to speculate. What is clear 
from independent human rights reports, however, is that the KNU is often seen as a more 
legitimate authority than the Burmese State as a result of villagers’ experiences of abuse by 
the Burma Army (Hull, in KHRG, 2010:85), Karen nationalism; or calculations about 
which group offers the best livelihood security (KHRG, 2010:85). Among the Karen armed 
groups, although all groups vary in their behaviour in different areas, the KNU is 
differentiated by its far greater longevity and at least partial reliance on continued voluntary 
civilian support. It is also differentiated by its political leadership, including a number of 
civilian leaders, under which its armed wing is at least nominally controlled. This does not 
mean that the KNU has not been involved in coercive recruitment. Prior to 1995, the 
                                                 
99 Interview with Saw D, (male aged 28) a KYO district leader, Mae Sot, 24th January 2009 
100 Interview with Saw X, (male aged 32) a KYO district leader, Mae Sot, 14th July 2009 
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KNU had a conscription policy, which some commanders reportedly continued to 
implement at the time of fieldwork. 
Although the KNU receives some support from other ethnic people, a small number of 
whom have become senior leaders in the group, it does not focus on mobilising support 
from members of other ethnic groups. For example, a KYO leader in Mutraw district said 
that he recruits ethnic Karen youths from partially-securitised areas but not youths from 
other ethnic groups because he fears they may be spies.101   
c) KNU-controlled areas 
KNU-controlled areas include the remaining ‘liberated areas’ of eastern Burma that are 
firmly under its control and experience relative stability as well as areas that were formerly 
within its liberated areas but are now conflict zones with most of the population internally 
displaced. 
 
Photo 9 Saw A at the KYO office in Ler Per Her IDP camp, Burma, February 2009 [Photo: author] 
 ‘Civil service’ in the KNU 
Interview with Saw A 
Saw A is a 25 year old Baptist male from Dooplaya district. His father is S’gaw Karen and 
worked as a Quarter-master in the KNLA. His mother is Pwo Karen and worked for 
                                                 
101 Interview with KYO Mutraw district chairperson, Ler Per Her, 26th May 2009 
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KWO. While Saw A was growing up, he moved around Dooplaya district following his 
parents’ work. His parents were based at KNU headquarters, but since the Burma Army 
frequently attacked, his parents moved around frequently until finally Manerplaw fell and 
the entire KNU headquarters relocated across the border. From then on, Saw A has been 
based in Noh Poe refugee camp, though much of his work is conducted inside Karen State.  
During the school holidays in the last years of his high school, Saw A stayed with the 
KNLA across the border in Burma because: 
“I had a mind to follow my father. I thought that I would be a soldier or a medic, but later I thought it is 
not good for me because if I do that I don’t have a chance for further study. When I got a chance to study at 
KYLMTC [Karen Youth Leadership and Management Training Course] I decided to work for KYO 
after I finished my studies.”102  
Saw A joined KYO in Dooplaya district then later also started working for Burma Issues 
and CIDKP because there is some overlap in the work and a KNU leader asked him to 
help those organisations. Many of his friends and family work in the KNU too. 
Figure 10 ‘Civil service’ in the KNU: Interview with Saw A 
Recruits from stable areas that are firmly under KNU control tended in this study to 
explain their participation in KNU-affiliated organisations as a normal career choice that is 
akin to governmental civil service. Saw P, for example, explained that he joined the KNU 
Customs department in Manerplaw as soon as he finished school at age 18 and has built a 
career within the department ever since.103 Since the KNU has essentially been the primary 
provider of governance in KNU-controlled areas for around sixty years, youths indicate 
that they view their participation within KNU-affiliated organisations as simply conformity 
to the labour needs and political aims of an internally legitimate public authority.  
Discourses framing participation 
In stable areas firmly under KNU control, a political consciousness and ‘Karen’ identity 
distinct from the ethnocratic Burman state are deliberately nurtured enabling the KNU to 
maintain control over the means of social reproduction and inculcate loyalty to the 
movement (Grundy-Warr et al, 1997:85). The portrayal of KNLA soldiers as heroes and 
martyrs appears to be a particularly strong influence on young people and Karen 
nationalism is encouraged. During the fieldwork period, famous Karen ‘martyrs’ who died 
in the KNU’s struggle against the Burmese state were remembered in speeches on Karen 
Revolution Day (January 31st) and Karen Martyrs Day (August 12th), and Karen youths 
(both male and female) were eager to have their photo taken with KNLA soldiers in 
                                                 
102 Interview with Saw A, (male aged 25) Mae Sot, 24th and 28th January 2009 
103 Interview with Saw P, (male aged 36) Ler Per Her, 26th May 2009 
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uniform during these commemorative occasions. Upon their return from such occasions, 
some male youths working in non-military roles in the KNU were particularly excited to 
show me photos of them donning soldiers’ uniforms and brandishing a gun while striking a 
macho pose. 
 
Photo 10 Photo showing KNLA soldiers honoured with garlands during Karen Revolution Day 
commemorative celebrations in Karen State, 31st January 2009 [Photo: author] 
A young participant explained how cultural framing of participation encourages youths to 
join the KNU. In this case, Saw C joined as an underage soldier in the KNLA before 
transferring into a non-military role with an independent NGO called Burma Issues: 
Interviewer: “Why did you join the KNLA?” 
Saw C: “If you are born in that area (KNU-controlled area) your environment supports you 
to join the struggle. When you see the soldiers in the uniform with a gun you feel like you are 
a man, very brave, smart so if I grow up I want to have a thing like that. If I cross in front 
of the girls I feel proud. You are proud of yourself for fighting to protect your country, you are 
like a hero.”104 
Not everyone joins the KNU, though. As chapter five argued, when the KNU controlled 
large areas unchallenged, and particularly during the leadership of Bo Mya, KNLA brigades 
operated autonomously and sometimes corruptly. An indicator of the difficulty which the 
KNU had with recruitment in the past was its conscription policy whereby one child in 
each family in KNU-controlled areas was obliged to join the movement in any capacity 
(teacher, soldier, medic or administrative staff, for example). Youth conscription into the 
KNLA in some areas was continuing in 2007, although recruits under age 18 have been 
banned altogether since 2000 (HRW, 2007:102-104). However, Saw AB, an independent 
human rights worker, notes that although abuses have decreased in KNU-controlled areas, 
                                                 
104 Interview with a Burma Issues coordinator / former KNLA soldier, Mae Sot, 28th January 2009 
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some Karen people continue to complain of KNU abuse and prevent their children from 
joining the organisation.105 
Internally displaced people (IDPs) in conflict zones influenced by the KNU 
In IDP areas, youths join the KNU for a number of reasons. Some IDPs are actually 
people who have chosen internal displacement over life in a state-controlled relocation site 
because they believe it offers better livelihood security (KHRG, 2010b). Often they 
describe grievances around very violent state-making practices perpetrated by the Burma 
Army. As chapter five argued, Karen people in the borderlands often support the KNU as 
part of a strategic alliance to prevent Burmese state-making and retain self-rule. The KNU’s 
goal of self-determination, combined with ethnically polarised politics and the violence of 
Burmese state-making continues to resonate in borderland areas according to Saw B, who 
stated that most recruits from these areas are unaware of the actual political aims of the 
KNU: 
Interviewer: “Do people support the KNU because they are the same ethnic group or 
because they agree with its political goals?” 
Saw B: “Ordinary people will support the KNU because they are Karen and they fight for 
the Karen, they don’t really know its goals and objectives.” 
Interviewer: “Are youths politicised as a result of joining the Karen revolution or did they 
join because they were already politicised?” 
Saw B: “They know about the Karen struggle because everyone is part of it, but when they 
join the KNU they learn about the structure, aim and objectives, regulations. When you have 
not joined you just know that you are fighting to defend yourself from Burmese oppression.”  
Interviewer: “Do they join other Karen organisations, like the DKBA?” 
Saw B: “It’s obvious, you join the organisation that treats you well. If the Burmese army 
treats the Karen people well and nicely they will follow them, but the issue is that they don’t 
treat them well so they (the villagers) are not stupid, they are more wise than us.”106 
Human rights reports indicate that in many cases there is co-operation between hiding 
villagers and the KNU with protection (or the means to build protection, such as through 
musket and landmine making techniques) exchanged for political, logistical or material 
support (KHRG, 2010).  The civilian population also manages its own security by forming 
their own village guard groups (KHRG, 2010). However, some youths appear to make a 
strategic choice that joining the KNU offers better security than not joining: 
Interviewer: “Why did you join the KNU?” 
Saw R: “I joined the KNU because the Burmese came to my village and I fled and didn’t 
eat for one day and one night, then I joined the KNU.” 
                                                 
105 Interview with a Burma Issues coordinator / former KNLA soldier, Mae Sot, 28th January 2009 
106 Interview with Saw B, (male aged 33) a district KYO and KNU Organising department leader, Mae Sot, 
23rd June 2009 
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Interviewer: “Why didn’t you go back to your village after the Burmese soldiers left?” 
Saw R: “I couldn’t go back to my village and I was separated from the other villagers so I 
joined the KNU for my security and because I hated the Burmese soldiers.”107 
The violence of Burmese state-making in the borderlands, combined with an ethnically 
polarised context, appears to be one of the most effective motivators of overt and covert 
support. IDPs bear the brunt of violent state-making, having been forced from their homes 
and in to ‘free fire zones’ where their lives and livelihoods are constantly under threat. 
According to the KNU’s Joint Secretary One, this group of people form the backbone of 
support for the KNU: 
“The IDPs in Karen State are our fundamental structure of the Karen revolution. Without 
their support there would be no Karen revolution. They are civilian freedom fighters. The 
people left behind [in Karen State] collect money, buy walkie-talkies and carry bundles for 
the KNU.”108  
However, a KYO youth leader stated in a group discussion in an IDP camp one evening 
that while it has traditionally been easy to recruit IDPs, who tend to be more willing to join 
the KNU than people living in other areas, the food crisis in northern Karen State 
following extensive Burma Army operations since 2006 has reduced the number of 
participants available to join the KNU.109 Naw B explained that since the KNU’s income 
has declined with the loss of territory, it cannot support the dependents of participants. 
Therefore, in Karen State, participants usually maintain their farming livelihoods in 
addition to their work within KNU structures, but the result is often impoverishment:  
Naw B: “..if you go to the township and district level, most of the soldiers families who work 
in the KNU, their families are poor because they cannot take care of the family”110  
The group then went on to explain that the economic imperative tends to force the poorest 
and landless into wage-labouring, often including migrant work in Thailand, rather than 
into the KNU. A KYO leader based in the KNU’s seventh Brigade area went on to explain 
about the situation among youths in his area: 
Saw L: “Now most of the youths have family problems about income and food so they just 
focus on family income, they cannot join KNLA or KNU. They want to join but their 
family situation is more important.”111 
This view was echoed by Saw K, who is the KYO district leader for the area encompassing 
the IDP camp where the discussion took place: 
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Saw K: “The real situation is it’s difficult to recruit the youths because they have to find 
income so they don’t have time to work for KYO or KNU. Some people are willing to work 
but we cannot support them, so many of them just try to find the way themselves.”112 
The food crisis among the KNU’s primary support base has culminated in a youth 
recruitment problem which Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, quantified in a 
surprisingly frank interview: 
Interviewer: “Do you face any problems recruiting youths for the KNU?” 
Saw Hla Ngwe: “We have many problems recruiting youths – we need more recruits. 
Yearly we want at least 500 recruits in all fields but we can’t get, maybe only 150-200. 
Some people participate part-time on a rotation basis because if they don’t do this they will 
have no condition to be alive. They may be students, teachers, staff in department and at the 
same time semi-militia.”113 
 
Education 
Although focus group discussions and interviews revealed a general pattern that the 
economic imperative to provide for the family drives the poorest recruits away from the 
KNU, this is not always the case. Some of the poorest young people (such as those for 
whom one or both parents were working for the KNU and were killed or died from natural 
causes) are educated and financially supported by the KNU and then join the movement 
through the KNU’s education structures. This is both a formal and informal recruitment 
strategy. Formally, the KNU has always had a policy that students directly supported by the 
KNU must repay the cost of their schooling through seven years service in any KNU-
affiliated organisation, not necessarily the army.  Saw V’s experience is typical of several 
male participants who explained how they had tried to join the KNLA (often underage) 
and been sent back to school first, while maintaining contact with a local KNLA unit: 
“I joined the KNDO since 1992 and became a soldier (aged 16). At that time I had just 
finished middle school, Grade Eight, in Burma. When I joined KNDO in the Third 
Brigade area, firstly I had to attend the military training. I was very young so I should 
continue my further study, so later I was sent back to school to continue my study and I 
continued to study until I finished Grade Ten. On the one side I was a student and on the 
other side in the military. In the summer time I served as a soldier. After I finished Grade 
Ten I went back and served there in the front line as a soldier.”114 
Discussions with both KNU leaders and young participants themselves revealed that 
informally, non-military students who attend any KNU school or further training provided 
by KNU-affiliated organisations, such as the KYO school, are encouraged, but not obliged, 
to work for a KNU-affiliated organisation. Saw R explained: 
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“Sometimes, the KNU organise the villagers and find educational opportunities for the 
youths. After they have finished the school or training they work for KNU.”115 
Not all ex-students join the KNU, though. The KNU has also traditionally recruited youths 
through specific political and leadership training courses. As Saw Dot Lay Mu, Joint 
Secretary 2 of the KNU explained: 
In Manerplaw we (KNU) recruited youths through political and leadership training courses, 
like me.  In different districts we also did like this…In the past Mahn Sha’s school (at 
Th’Bay Hta) recruited youths – 50 to 60 per year. We recruited for specific trainings, for 
example, computer, diplomacy and when they finished the training they came back to work. 
All were IDPs. The girl who got the Phan Foundation (young leadership) award attended 
Mahn Sha’s school. Now she is also elected to the KNU district committee at Nyaunglebin 
(as well as being KYO secretary in the district).”116 
However, with the loss of territory, a large number of KNU schools have closed and IDP 
youths seeking education are migrating to the refugee camps. Saw K explained that villages 
in Klerlwehtoo (Nyaunglebin) district in northern Karen State have been so decimated by 
the loss of their young people to refugee camps for education that the villagers have urged 
the KNU to re-form a high school with boarding facilities within the district so that their 
children can remain close by and return to work in the villages.117 Education migration also 
impacts upon KNU recruitment because, as many young and older leaders argued at the 
time of fieldwork, residents of the refugee camps tend not to join the KNU: 
Saw Hla Ngwe: “Before the fall of Manerplaw we had many high schools and middle 
schools but after these schools shifted to the refugee camps. The teachers, pupils and parents 
only come into the refugee life. Youths have an education problem and those who are in the 
camps don’t want to participate because it’s a very hard life.”118 
 
d) Exile spaces in Thailand 
“Very few [camp-based youths] join KNU, only about 1-3 per cent of recruits are from 
camp. Most camp youths work with NGOs, resettle or work in Thailand. KNU recruits 
are mostly from villages inside Burma and have lower education.”119 
In Thailand there is a very different context influencing youth participation in the KNU 
and as a result, very few youths are recruited from Thailand for most types of work within 
the KNU, though there continues to be some recruitment for teaching and health care 
work in the KNU’s welfare wings. This section examines recruitment patterns among 
Karen youths from Burma who live inside and outside the refugee camps. 
                                                 
115 Interview with Saw R, (male aged 27) Mae Sot, 28th June 2009 
116 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot, 12th June 2009 
117 Interview with Saw K, (male aged 35) a KYO district leader, Ler Per Her IDP camp, 22nd May 2009 
118 Interview with Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
119 Interview with a KYO district chairperson / KNU district level organising department leader on 30th 
November 2008 
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Youths living outside the refugee camps 
There are very high numbers of Karen migrant workers in Thailand, far more than in the 
refugee camps since the number of migrant workers from Burma is estimated to be up 
around 3.5 million people (KHRG, 2009:2-3). A report by KHRG argues that there is 
often little difference in the reasons migrant workers leave Burma and the reasons refugees 
leave, but the KNU (including the KYO and KWO) does not target them for recruitment. 
They state two reasons for this: firstly, the migrant workers are tired of the conflict and 
tired from working long hours to remit money back to families in Burma. A KYO central 
level leader who spends time talking to local migrant workers said: 
“Migrant workers don’t want to get involved in politics. It is not that they don’t support the 
KNU, in the past they support with one soldier per family, but the Karen revolution has been 
going on for so long, 60 years, that they are tired. So now they just want to get money for their 
family and fill their stomach.”120 
Saw Hla Ngwe confirmed that the KNU does not attempt to recruit from the ranks of 
migrant workers in Thailand: 
“The migrant workers are very tired. Their families are left behind in Burma and they are 
very poor. They are like ants having to survive each day. We don’t want to disturb them. 
Even in Thailand their lives are very hard, so we are not in touch with them.”121 
Secondly, KYO and KNU leaders state that KNU sanctuary in Thailand is conditional 
upon them not interfering with Thai business interests, which are heavily reliant upon 
Burmese migrant labour in the border areas. Moreover they are warned not to let the 
conflict in Burma extend in to Thailand or foster social unrest on Thai soil through 
political activism.122  
A further factor mitigating participation among teenage Karen youths in Thailand is the 
influence of Thai culture, especially the youth gang culture. This is prevalent both in the 
larger refugee camps and in the vicinity of Thai towns. Thus, although their parents may 
work for the KNU, children socialised in Thai culture rarely join: 
Interviewer: “Do Thai-Karen youths join the KNU or the KNLA?” 
Saw L: “Now the Thai-Karen youths don’t want to join KNU/KNLA because they have 
so much freedom and opportunity to find money…Some of the youths’ parents are 
KNU/KNLA but their children don’t want to join, they just join Thai gangs and fight 
each other.”123 
 
                                                 
120 Interview with a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 24th March 2010 
121 Interview with Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
122 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot,12th June 2009 and Interview with Saw 
Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
123 Interview with a township level KYO Secretary in the Pa-an district of Karen State, Mae Sot 22nd May 
2009 
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Youths living inside the refugee camps 
Although the Karen refugee camps in Thailand are influenced by the KNU, they are not 
directly controlled by them and KNU military recruitment from the camps or political 
campaigning is officially banned by Thai policies. Recruitment for the social welfare 
activities of KYO and KWO in the camps is generally unproblematic as participants do not 
leave the camps and the projects are separated from the more political work conducted 
outside the camps, however recruitment from the refugee camps for activities conducted 
inside Karen State is far more difficult. Youth recruiters say that many parents, including 
those who worked in the KNU themselves, dissuade their children from participating in 
KNU-affiliated work outside the refugee camps out of fears for their safety: 124 
Interviewer: “Why don’t many refugee youths join the KNU?” 
Saw C: “Their parents influence (refugee camp youths). They say “don’t join the revolution 
because if you join you will suffer poor food, stay in the jungle, get no pay”. They don’t want 
their children to suffer like they suffered.”125 
For female Karen youths, gender norms about their mobility and hardiness results in even 
greater worries for their safety and contributes to reduced female participation in the 
movement. As the participant above went on to explain: 
Saw C: “Even my sister wanted to go inside (Burma) for a short trip to teach but as a 
parent you worry about the fighting, disease, malaria for your children. She was not allowed 
to go.  
Interviewer: “But why were you allowed to go?” 
Saw C: “The difference was she was a woman. My mother didn’t want me to go to a 
troubled area inside Burma because all the news talks about fighting, landmines, dangerous 
things, disease, malaria, but I decided [and went].”126  
One of the key factors prompting recruitment inside Burma has long been thought to be 
the experience of human rights abuses by the Burma Army, but in the refugee camps many 
youths have little recent experience of such abuse. Discussions with KYO leaders during 
the fieldwork showed that they perceive this to be an obstacle to recruitment and try to 
overcome it by taking refugee youths on relief trips to IDP areas to expose them to the 
plight of the IDPs.  
However, a critical difference affecting youths in Thailand is their location in a different 
context. Many KYO and KNU leaders argue that the presence of Western INGOs in the 
refugee camps has greatly influenced the culture of the camps, promoting individualism, 
rather than communitarianism, which encourages youths to ‘free ride’ on the backs of 
                                                 
124 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot, 12th June 2009 
125 Interview with Burma Issues staff member / former KNLA soldier, Mae Sot, 28th January 2009 
126 Interview with Burma Issues staff member / former KNLA soldier, Mae Sot, 28th January 2009 
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active participants in the pursuit of a lasting resolution to the conflict. The structural 
context of enclosure in the camps, lack of self-reliant livelihood options and refugee aid is 
also perceived by both KNU and KYO leaders to be fostering apathy and dependency 
among youths. In an interview at his office, Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 
stated: 
We realise the NGOs are providing a different kind of knowledge…I want them (youths) to 
struggle to overcome their difficulty, not just stay in the refugee camp…We think if they want 
to work and serve they should try and do now not wait for the time of peace…Now the 
youths who grow up in refugee camps don’t have experience as youths before who were fighting, 
working together. They grow up easier than youths before and got good education.”127 
A KYO leader in Mae La camp also argued that the influence of NGOs and Western 
culture encourages youths to expect monetary salaries in return for work, which the KNU 
is unable to provide:  
Saw X: “Most of them [youths] are not interested to work in the [KNU-affiliated] 
organisations, just only in their minds they are interested in going to a third country so it is 
very difficult to organise them… They also know one day they need to get money so most of 
the youths don’t want to work for the organisation. They just compare with the NGO salary, 
so they ask for a salary like the NGOs pay.”128 
As Saw X indicates, resettlement to Western countries is now a primary concern of many 
refugee youths. Since the increase in resettlement to Western countries from 2003, 
recruitment from the refugee camps has all but ceased since youths are much less 
interested in joining the KNU. Moreover, as chapter six identified, KNU-affiliated 
organisations are not interested in training new recruits who will soon leave for 
resettlement to another country. 
2 Youth role allocation and career progression in the KNU 
a) Matching recruits to roles 
The KNU does not keep headcount records outside its armed wings and would not make 
these publically available if it did, but during the course of the fieldwork, interviews with 
representatives from each of the main departments and affiliated organisations gave a good 
estimation of the headcount. These indicate the spread of roles youths are recruited into.129 
                                                 
127 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot, 12th June 2009 
128 Interview with KYO replacement Chairperson in Mae La camp, Mae Sot, 14th July 2009 
129 Numbers in blue are estimated numbers of staff at all levels of the organisation by KYO central level staff 
and staff within KNU departments at the time of research in 2008. Numbers in black font are exact numbers 
at the time. Numbers do not include membership numbers of the KNU and its mass organisations. 
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KNU Organisation/Department Headcount 
KNU central, district and township leaders 74 
Departmental staff   
Education department (KED) 77 
KED-supported teachers in Karen State 3,503 
Health department (KDHW) 100 
KDHW Medics 248 
Karen Office for Relief and Development (KORD) 60 
Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People 
(CIDKP) 71 
Forestry department 30 
Organising department 108 
Agriculture department 30 
Treasury department 5 
Customs department 20 
Transport department 20 
Foreign affairs department 4 
Alliance Affairs department 4 
Justice department 30 
Fisheries department 10 
Interior department – Police force unknown 
Defence   
KNLA <3,000130 
KNDO 580-850131 
Mass Organisations  
KYO Approx. 2,946132 
KWO Approx. 2,946133 
Table 10 Estimated KNU headcount in 2009 
                                                 
130 Estimated by KNU leader, David Taw, in an interview with the Irrawaddy in 2009. 
131 KNDO headcount estimated by a KNDO officer during a fieldwork interview in Mae Sot on 11th July, 
2009 
132 See APPENDIX D for a breakdown of estimated KYO staffing levels in 2009. 
133 KWO staffing levels were estimated by KYO central leaders at the time of fieldwork to be roughly 
comparable to KYO staffing levels 
 208 
As the table indicates, with less than 3,000 soldiers in the KNLA, plus a further 580-850 in 
the KNDO, the KNU’s troops are matched by the number of KED-supported teachers in 
Karen State (3,503) (this does not include teachers in the refugee camps) and the estimated 
numbers of active staff in the KYO and KWO throughout its structures (around 3,000 
each). Furthermore, there are approximately 350 health department staff and medics, 
excluding medics in the refugee camps, and hundreds more non-military staff in other 
KNU non-military departments. Thus, it may reasonably be expected that more youths are 
recruited into non-military roles than into military ones. 
Once new recruits have joined the KNU, the role they are placed in appears to depend on 
their education and skills, their individual desire and local needs at the time. A KYO 
recruiter for the KNU explained the typical pattern of matching recruits to roles, which 
was confirmed in interviews with KNU recruiters in other areas: 
Interviewer: “How is it decided what a young recruit will do when he or she joins the 
KNU?” 
Saw U: “If the youth are interested in working for the revolution and they come to the 
revolution area, when they give their name the leader asks them ‘what do you want to do?’. 
Some of them say ‘I want to be a solider’, like that, but if the leader sees they have high 
education they ask them to work for the police or work another way.” 
Interviewer: “What if they don’t have high education?” 
Saw U: “If they have no school they send them to stay close to the leader like a bodyguard 
and the leader teaches them about politics. It depends on their interest.”134 
In its early days, the KNU leadership (the Central Executive Committee and the heads of 
all seven departments) was comprised of university-educated Karen elites, and since it had 
a strong presence in the towns and cities of Burma, it could draw from the ranks of 
educated youths, especially those around Insein, Rangoon and the Delta area.135 However, 
sixty years later the KNU has only a minor presence in urban areas and most of its support 
comes from rural farming communities with lower levels of education.  
This study found that recruits with higher levels of education are often diverted out of the 
military and into political or other non-military roles. Saw X’s experience is illustrative of 
this. Despite his request to join the KNLA at age 13, Saw X was deemed too young and 
was sent back to school as a military student until he finished Grade Ten. Then he was 
diverted into a political role with KYO: 
Saw X:“I did soldier training in summer school as a volunteer soldier, then I went to 
Mission school in Dooplaya district until I finished Tenth Standard. After finishing school, I 
                                                 
134 Interview with a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
135 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot, 12th June 2009 
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trained as a medic at Dr. Cynthia’s clinic. I worked for two years as a medic at the KNU 
health department in the district then was asked to work for KYO.” 
Although Saw X was supported through school by the KNU, most families have to finance 
their children’s education themselves and as a result, youths with higher levels of education 
than the norm are generally from families which can afford to educate their children rather 
than have them working on the family farm and then can further withstand the loss of 
labour by allowing one family member to join the KNU as unpaid staff. Although most 
participants in the KNU could hardly be described as wealthy, there are some who are 
from families with more resources than others and it is these youths who tend to attain 
higher levels of education. As well as being directed into non-military roles by KNU 
officials, more educated youths appear to self-select non-military roles. A KNLA 
commander explained the division of roles in the KNU’s fourth brigade: 
Interviewer: “What is the difference between educated and un-educated youths who want to 
join the KNU? Do they do different jobs or the same?” 
Saw AF: “The ones who join KYO are more educated that the youths who join KNLA. 
Also some educated people don’t want to join KNU at all. Most of the soldiers are people 
who have experienced atrocity and they want to fight back. Most people who join KYO seek 
more education and want to help their people.”136 
A KYO leader in Klerlwehtoo (Nyaunglebin) district estimated that only around five per 
cent of people in his district pass Grade Ten schooling and one per cent finish university. 
Although the official literacy rate is 84 per cent, as with all data generated by the Burmese 
government, it is an unreliable indicator and a report by HRDU (2006) argues that illiteracy 
in rural areas is increasing. UNICEF (in HRDU, 2006) estimates that only around 55 per 
cent of Burmese children nationwide ever enrol in school and a further fifty per cent then 
drop out before completing primary school (fourth standard) due to financial difficulties. 
Meanwhile, in Thaton district of Karen State, KHRG (2006 in HRDU, 2006) estimates that 
only seven per cent of children who finish primary school go on to middle school and only 
14 percent of middle school completers then go on to high school. KYO and KNU 
recruiters explained that the effect of such low levels of education among the population, 
especially those in rural areas, is that recruits from the KNU’s main recruiting grounds tend 
to have very low levels of education. 
b) Career progression 
Within the KNU’s non-military structures, young participants in this study argued that 
career progression is based on a meritocratic system. As a staff member within the Forestry 
department in Klerlwehtoo (Nyaunglebin) district explained: 
                                                 
136 Interview with Saw AF, (male) a KNLA commander from the KNU’s 4th Brigade, Suan Pueng, 20th 
November 2010 
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Saw R: “If someone is good at their job they get promoted or elected into higher positions. 
[For example] the head of the district forestry department was a township head of department 
prior to being district head.” 137 
This seemed surprising to me, considering the KNU’s history of nepotism and patronage, 
so I probed further. A number of participants explained that being good at one’s job would 
mean that someone is more likely to be chosen as a representative of their office at 
congress. They explained what this means in more detail. Every department and member 
organisation of KNU sends a quota of representatives to the township, district or central 
congress. From these people, some are nominated for certain positions – usually the people 
who have demonstrated that they work well according to youth participations interviewed 
in this study. They are then elected by the congress participants to be leaders of the 
department. In this way, one gets promoted up the administrative and party hierarchy. 
Conversely, Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2 said that participants who do not 
demonstrate leadership skills are not promoted: 
Saw Dot Lay Mu: “We don’t all have the same ability so those who do not have much 
ability at leadership stay at the low level in their work. Those who have ability in leadership 
take responsibility and are promoted to the upper position. Those who do not have more 
knowledge or education and face troubles or withdraw back they feel backward and don’t 
want to struggle (feel ashamed) and they went back to refugee camps. Some work and give 
assistance to their leaders but some are called back by their children to become house keepers 
and take care of their grandchildren.”138 
In terms of political leadership progression, as chapter six discussed, progression is not 
entirely based on merit. The youth and armed wings of the KNU have traditionally been 
the primary ‘feeder’ organisations for the regeneration of the KNU’s political leadership, 
resulting in a male bias and sidelining able young women in the women’s wing. Being 
sceptical that career progression within the KNU would be based entirely on merit, I 
probed further with life history participants and found that youths are also appointed into 
new roles which emerge. Since these are appointed rather than elected roles they are 
subject to some bias. A soldier in the KNDO described during his life history interview 
how his career progressed into political roles within the administrative apparatus: 
Saw V: “…I asked permission from my leaders to get a chance to study further study and 
then I studied community management in the DEP (Distance Education Programme). After 
finishing DEP…I went back to my battalion and worked there for two to three years and 
then later my leader sent me to come and work with Padow Htoo Htoo Lay139 as an intern 
to learn everything from him. Gradually I improved some of my education and I got more 
                                                 
137 Interview with Saw R, (male aged 27) Mae Sot, 28th June 2009 
138 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
139 Saw Htoo Htoo Lay was formerly Joint Secretary 1 of the KNU and temporary General Secretary after 
Mahn Shaw was assassinated. He retired from the leadership of the party after the 2008 congress due to ill 
health. 
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experience in working with other leaders in the central level so later I was appointed to serve 
as a Karen State constitution drafting committee member”140 
As Saw V’s personal experience demonstrates, military and non-military roles within the 
KNU are fluid. Several male youths in this study had moved from the KNLA into non-
military roles apparently quite easily.  
In the same way that recruitment is linked to wealth, with poverty preventing participation 
among recruits for whom the economic imperative means daily labouring for income or 
subsistence farming is essential, leadership progression is also linked to wealth, though this 
was not directly stated by participants. In discussions with young leaders at KYO, people 
felt that higher levels of education resulted in increased political knowledge and capacity to 
analyse situations, which resulted in better decisions and more effective work. It also 
generated more confidence at work. As a result, it was clear that KYO tended to recruit 
only the most educated youths into its political leadership training programmes (with the 
exception of refugee youths who had applied for resettlement), resulting in leadership and 
management positions being dominated by middle class Karen youths. This is less true for 
KWO because, as chapter six discussed, work experience and loyalty to the organisation are 
deemed more important than education level when selecting young women for political 
leadership training.  
The influence of religion 
As many commentators on the KNU have previously identified, progression into the 
highest leadership positions appears to be influenced by religious networks since Christians 
are disproportionately over-represented at the upper leadership levels. Conversations with 
both Buddhist and Christian KYO and KNU leaders suggest that since the DKBA split 
and the change in KNU leadership, the KNU has attempted to eliminate patterns of 
religious patronage in leadership progression. For example, officials and KNU staff, 
including teachers in KNU schools, are ordered not to proselytise at work or allow 
religious bias in work decisions.141 However, disproportionate numbers of Christians are 
likely to remain in the KNU’s leadership because of the primacy of education level in 
promotion and career progression patterns and the ongoing influence of religion in 
education networks in Karen State. In Karen State, many of the High schools producing 
more highly educated youths are private Christian mission schools. This was highlighted in 
an interview with the KYO Chairperson: 
                                                 
140 Interview with Saw V, (male aged 32) Mae Sot, 11th July 2009 
141 Interview with Naw Zipporah Sein, Mae Sot, 11th December 2010 and interview with KYO leaders during 
2009 
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“A lot of people who wanted to study further attended mission school so these people have 
knowledge more than others and they are Christian. In the congress they don’t discriminate 
about religion and they choose who will be the best and have more knowledge. The ones who 
attend the mission schools have more knowledge than Buddhists so that is why they become 
the leaders.” 
These comments reveal a complex intermingling of education, religion and ethno-
nationalism in Karen State in which American Baptist missionaries have left a legacy. Thus, 
although Christians comprise possibly only 25 per cent of the Karen population, they tend 
to have higher literacy rates, which explains their dominance in Karen politics (Freston, 
2004:100). Naw Zipporah Sein, General Secretary of the KNU argues that the Christian 
missionary legacy has resulted in a greater availability and continued prioritisation of 
education among Christian communities as well as ongoing campaigns of religious 
conversion through the Mission schools: 
Interviewer: “Why are there more Christians than Buddhists in the higher levels of the 
KNU?” 
Naw Zipporah Sein: “It depends on the election results. But I think one reason we can 
say is because they have more education they get elected in to the positions.” 
Interviewer: “Why do they have more education?” 
Naw Zipporah Sein: “The Buddhists have lower education because they are more 
interested in business and economics. The Christians are more organised and interested about 
education from when the American missionaries came. They are not so interested in business 
and economics. They have the mission schools and private schools. The Buddhists only have 
the monastery, not the high school. In Kawthoolei they can go to the government [KNU] 
school, but not the mission school, so the Christians have more opportunity to go to school. 
The missionaries send their teachers but they are also sometimes working in evangelism, so 
they convert the animists. This is the plan of the Christian church groups.” 
A further reason for the disproportionate numbers of Christian leaders in the KNU, 
according to Naw Zipporah Sein, is that the Christian churches place more emphasis on 
organising community projects than the Buddhist monasteries, which develops community 
mobilisation and organising skills among Christian youths. Since these are also deemed to 
be important skills for KNU work, Christian youths who participate in church community 
projects tend to have an advantage and are more quickly elected into leadership positions. 
Interviewer: “So if someone has a higher education level they are more likely to be elected to 
the EC?” 
Naw Zipporah Sein: “The EC come from the districts and elections – they are nominated 
by the district… People are elected based on their skills. It is related to education and 
community respect. Community respect is related to those who have higher education but can 
also be given to people who can organise the community well, regardless of their education 
level. The Christian Karen are more organised to do the community work and they get the 
funds from the church collection each week. We also try to promote the monasteries to do the 
social work. We try to find the funding for the monasteries to do this. We also try to support 
the monasteries to teach their members more about their religion. We see the Christians go to 
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church often and are very strong in their religion but the Buddhists don’t do much about their 
religion.” 
3 Youth exit from the KNU 
Investigations into why youths leave the KNU revealed that it appears to be a result of one 
or more of four issues: lack of energy and interest due to the need to work long hours and 
the length of time the conflict has been going on, poverty, staff poaching and refugee 
resettlement. All of these are directly related to the KNU’s loss of territory. The effect, 
according to KNU and KYO leaders is that the most educated participants, essentially the 
small Karen middle class, have tended to leave first.  
“Only uneducated people remain” 
Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, Joint Secretary 2 of the KNU’s Central Executive Committee142 
Interviewer: “Does this mean that it is usually the most educated people who work in admin roles?” 
Saw Dot Lay Mu: “Those who are educated usually come from the Delta region and gradually move step 
by step to the revolution area. The original KNU CEC were all university graduates and all heads of seven 
departments were uni graduates. Now in years gone by, the resistance struggle has faced suffering and many 
people lost their hope. Many of them do not believe we can gain (defeat) the military regime and they 
abandoned the revolution and left for third countries.  Even Htain Maung has been leading Seventh 
Brigade (KNLA) since the revolution erupted but now he gave up and made peace with the SPDC. Now 
very few KNU CEC are university graduates. Most of the KYO leaders who were elected in Manerplaw 
have now resettled to third countries… Uttaca, Australia! Due to the difficulties and because battle broke 
out in Manerplaw, many people, including youth leaders left here and resettled in third countries. 
…The educated people, when they have graduated they have spent a lot of money to become educated and 
they have to work very hard to look after their people. They just reside in the towns and cities and listen to 
the KNU struggle. Only the rural people can support KNU. Some educated people, when they face 
difficulty struggling with IDPs they run away to the towns and work for themselves. Only uneducated people 
remain!  During the Four Cuts, those who remained in difficult areas are only rural people. The rich people 
with buffalo and plenty of land left. We don’t blame them, the towns and cities are white areas so not more 
atrocities by SPDC…Now we just have IDP youths who only passed grade three or four join as soldiers 
but they cannot even read a map so it is difficult to fight against SPDC. So we still need capable people to 
join our force. Some of them, even if they want to join, their parents don’t want them to join even if they 
themselves worked in the military service. Now we want them to have political perspective.”  
Figure 11 “Only uneducated people remain” Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, Joint Secretary 2 of the 
KNU’s Central Executive Committee143 
According to KNU and KYO leaders, loss of territory continued to be the primary reason 
for youth exit from the KNU in Burma at the time of fieldwork. From 2006 to 2009 the 
KNU has lost large areas to SPDC and DKBA troops in districts two (Toungoo), three 
(Klerlwehtoo/Nyaunglebin) and five (Mutraw/Papun) in northern Karen state and district 
seven (Pa-an) in the border area with Thailand. However, just as recruitment levels have 
declined because of more pressing economic needs, KYO leaders argue that poverty is the 
                                                 
142 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
143 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
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primary reason for exit from these areas, although it is difficult to attribute causes directly. 
Saw O explained during a discussion one evening in Ler Per Her IDP camp: 
Interviewer: “Why do young people leave the KNU?” 
Saw O: “Some leave because they do not have salary so they don’t want to do [the job 
anymore]. They go to find money day by day.”144 
In a separate interview in Mae Sot, Saw R explained that following the loss of KNU-
controlled areas, many KNU staff have become displaced in the jungle or fled to KNU-
controlled IDP camps along the border or refugee camps in northern Thailand, which then 
often results in their exit from the KNU: 
Interviewer: “Why are young people leaving the KNU in the northern areas?” 
Saw R: “In 2006 many people left because of the SPDC offensive. Some people went to send 
their families to the border and never came back.”145 
In-depth discussions about the linkages between education, recruitment and participation 
with KYO leaders revealed that the decline in educated recruits was compounded when 
many of the KNU’s own schools closed after the fall of Manerplaw and the loss of 
significant territory. As a result, there has been increased ‘education migration’ among rural 
Karen youths to the refugee camps in Thailand. Many young people who leave their home 
in Karen State to seek education in a refugee camp in Thailand are unaccompanied by their 
parents and end up living with relatives or other foster carers in the refugee camps. A 
smaller number reside in youth boarding houses. In the seven Karen refugee camps in 
Thailand, there were 116 youth boarding houses registered by TBBC with 3,756 young 
residents (TBBC, 2011:61). Of these, 93 per cent stated that accessing education was their 
primary reason for moving to the camp, with over 90 per cent stating that there were no 
education opportunities where they lived in Burma (TBBC, 2011:61). Despite the proximity 
of the refugee camps to the KNU’s headquarters and remaining base camps, recruitment 
into KNU organisations from the refugee camps is low. Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint 
Secretary 1 confirmed this explanation stating: 
“Before the fall of Manerplaw we had many high schools and middle schools but after, these 
schools shifted to the refugee camps. The teachers, pupils and parents only come into the 
refugee life. Youths have an education problem and those who are in the camps don’t want to 
participate [in the KNU] because it’s a very hard life.” 
As chapter six discussed, exit from the KNU as a result of loss of territory and the 
migration of KNU staff to Thailand has been a common occurrence since the fall of its 
headquarters at Manerplaw in 1995. Partly this has been attributed to INGO poaching of 
highly educated Karen-speaking staff. However, when I worked at the Karen Human 
                                                 
144 Interview with KYO Mutraw district chairperson, Ler Per Her, 26th May 2009 
145 Interview with Saw R, (male aged 27) Mae Sot, 28th June 2009 
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Rights Group (KHRG) and was seeking to find highly skilled Karen staff to apply for 
vacancies in the organisation I found it remarkably difficult to persuade staff in KNU 
organisations to apply for any of the positions. Although KHRG was highly respected, 
many appropriately qualified staff in KNU organisations would not think of leaving their 
current post with little monetary income to work in an organisation outside the KNU that 
paid much more.  
Since the KNU’s income greatly declined after it lost control of the borderland economy, it 
could even less afford any kind of pecuniary remuneration of its staff. To maintain loyalty, 
participation in the KNU continues to be framed as ‘serving the community’, compared to 
a discourse which frames Karen staff working with INGOs as ‘selling out’ for individual 
gain.  This discourse continued during the course of the fieldwork in 2009, but while it 
appeared to increase loyalty and impede NGO poaching, it did not prevent exit entirely. 
One of the disadvantages of using Thailand as a base for the administrative centre of KNU 
operations is that upwardly mobile participants have access to much more lucrative 
opportunities and participants can opt out. Furthermore, since it is the most educated and 
skilled participants who tend to be found working at the highest level of KNU 
organisations in Thailand, the KNU’s most skilled staff gain more access to other 
opportunities and refugee resettlement programmes than its staff at the district, township 
and village levels.  Since 2003, refugee resettlement to Western countries of up to 17,000 
Burmese people per year, most from the Karen refugee camps, has, according to a number 
of staff from KNU-affiliated organisations, been the single biggest reason for exit from the 
KNU (IOM, 2009). 
Saw Dot Lay Mu: “Now the resettlement programme is the main challenge for us. Many 
capable and experienced youths already left for third countries with their families.”146 
A KWO leader explained that refugee resettlement has had a great impact on the staffing 
and capacity of KNU-affiliated organisations based in Thailand because despite being 
based outside the refugee camps, many staff maintained refugee status in one of the camps 
as a security strategy. 
Interviewer: “Is it easy to organise the youth to do the KNU work?” 
Naw H: “From 2002 to 2006 the youth and students were active a lot but when 
resettlement came a lot of young Karen people who were active in the Karen community 
resettled to third countries. Here [in Thailand] now it’s a little bit quiet, not like before. 
Now we want to do activities and have meetings, forum, discussion about them, but we cannot 
find people.”147 
                                                 
146 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot, 12th June 2009 
147 Interview with Naw H, (female aged 34) KWO Central leader, Mae Sot, 25th July 2009 
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The refugee resettlement process has affected the KNU’s non-military and civilian 
leadership staff disproportionately due to their higher levels of educated staff and the 
location of the central KNU offices in Thailand. A report by a consortium of NGOs found 
that 11.5% of refugees with a post-10 education had resettled compared to just 2.4% of 
those with no education (CCSDPT, 2007). Additionally, those working for NGOs have left 
in higher proportions than the rest of the population, which has a knock-on effect on the 
KNU (CCSDPT, 2007). Research on the impact of the resettlement process suggests that 
NGOs who search out the best qualified staff will increasingly turn to Karen CBOs 
(including the KNU’s mass organisations) and poach staff by offering far higher salaries 
(Banki & Lang, 2008). Both of these factors have resulted in a significant loss of skilled 
staff from KNU structures, according to a KNU official.148   
4 Youth participation patterns in the KNU 
The KNU is active in four areas of Burma and Thailand with different patterns of 
sovereignty and state-making in each. As this chapter illustrates, this results in different 
logics of youth participation in non-military roles in the KNU. However, a number of 
patterns are identifiable as a result of this study and are summarised in table nine, presented 
at the beginning of this chapter. 
a) Recruitment of youths into KYO 
In all areas of Burma, grievances over Burmese state-making practices are widespread, with 
many participants citing these as reasons for participating in the KNU. In IDP areas in 
particular, where state-making is at its most violent, high levels of serious human rights 
abuses (usually but not solely) perpetrated by the Burma Army combined with an 
ethnically-polarised political context have long been argued by KNU officials to be the 
primary factor driving youths into the KNU in any role. However, despite grievous living 
conditions throughout the country, grievances have been found to be far too widespread to 
explain micro-level youth participation in the KNU, as critics of grievance theories of 
conflict argue (Kahl, 2002). Most youths in all areas do not participate in the KNU, despite 
opportunities to do so as well as high levels of deprivation.  
As previous studies of conflict have found, only a small proportion (estimates range from 
five per cent to a third) of the population ever participate directly in armed opposition 
groups, even in cases of mass mobilisation (Lichbach, 1995:18 and Wood, 2003 in 
Mampilly, 2011:54). In Burma, a KHRG (2009) report indicates that migration is much 
                                                 
148 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2 and Chairperson of Agriculture department, Mae 
Sot, 12th June 2009 
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more common than participation. Youths are estimated to form 18 per cent of the 
population in Burma, which is a high proportion compared to Western countries but about 
average for Asia, however this case indicates a relative lack of propensity among youths in 
Burma towards contesting the state whether through violent means or non-violent 
participation in an armed opposition group. Therefore, in this case the ‘youth bulge’ thesis, 
grievances and relative deprivation theories of conflict, upon which much of the academic 
literature on youth participation in armed opposition groups has been based, hold little 
explanatory power. 
As Stavrou (2004) and Fithen and Richards (2005) note, a decline in educational 
opportunities provided by the state has been found to prompt youths to access education 
provided by armed opposition groups instead. The Burmese education system has decayed 
since the socialist period and now does not cover minimum societal needs (Lall, 2008:128). 
As a result, various forms of private supplemental education are accessed by the small 
Burmese middle class (Lall, 2008). However, this is only available to the small proportion 
of the population who have finances available for education. In this case, although most 
youth recruits come from KNU-controlled/IDP areas, some Karen youths who have 
managed to attain an unusually high level of education from state-controlled or partially-
securitised areas choose to access free further education or training provided by KNU-
affiliated organisations, such as KYO. This indicates that they may be motivated just as 
much, and possibly more so, by personal interests than political convictions, as Kalyvas’s 
(2003) study of political violence suggests. However, once they are in the KNU education 
system, youths are subject to an alternative discourse of Karen nationalism and the KNU’s 
political ideology, which frames participation in the KNU as a community service. The 
evidence presented here suggests that although these types of youths may not have 
intended to join the KNU, the context of their lives in Burma, their links to the KNU and 
discourses framing youth action within KNU-affiliated institutions influences their eventual 
course of action.  
As Jabri (1996:62) argues, conflict is an inherently social phenomenon which is affected by 
social discourses. But this does not mean that individual choice is entirely absent and youth 
behaviour is structurally determined; this study also found that some youths who access 
education through KNU-affiliated organisations do not subsequently join, thus external 
factors only influence youth behaviour, they do not entirely direct it. 
Scholars of terrorism have found that education provided by armed groups is an important 
means by which youths are socialised into the group’s values and groomed for violence 
(Levitt, 2004; Grynkewich, 2008; Flanigan, 2008; Laitin & Berman, 2008), however, this 
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case demonstrates that education may also be used to recruit and socialise youths for non-
violent roles in armed groups. In this study, 54 per cent of youth leaders interviewed 
received further education through KYO after finishing High school. This is not a 
representative sample, but taken together with evidence from interviews with KYO and 
KNU leaders, it indicates that the provision of educational opportunities is an important 
strategy to KNU recruitment and retention as well as crucial to the development of a 
skilled political leadership and managers to work on INGO-funded projects, as chapter six 
discussed.  
In KNU-controlled and influenced areas in the borderlands, chapter five argued that 
grievances over violent practices of state-making combine with political desires among 
communities long accustomed to self-rule to seek an alliance with the KNU in order to 
drive the common enemy out of the land. Thus, despite sometimes very little knowledge of 
the KNU’s political goals, Karen civilians in borderland areas have formed the backbone of 
support to the ‘Karen revolution’.  In terms of youth motivations in these areas, a 
statement by a military leader from the KNU’s Fourth Brigade area neatly summarised 
explanations also given by KNU and KYO recruiters: 
Saw AF:“The youth don’t understand (the KNU’s political goals) but they have hope that 
the KNU will work for their people to be free.”149 
What ‘freedom’ means to the youths who join the KNU may, of course, be quite different 
from the goals pursued by the KNU. The following chapter examines in more detail how 
civilians are socialised into the KNU’s political ideology by the youth wing. 
Humphries and Weinstein (2006:449 in Mampilly, 2011:218) argue that when individuals 
have community ties to a rebel group they are more likely to join. The findings of this study 
support their argument because in state-controlled and partially-securitised areas, more 
proximate factors explained the actual recruitment paths of youths, such as individual, 
family, friendship or village networks to the KNU. Beatty’s (2011:289-290) study of youth 
political activism in Burma also found that family links were important to recruitment in 
political opposition groups. There was evidence of this in this study, however, a family 
history of participation in the KNU was also found to preclude recruitment. For youths 
with links to the KNU or one of its affiliated organisations, framing processes and 
discourses in the KNU did appear to orientate some youths towards eventual participation, 
though not all.  
                                                 
149 Interview with Saw AF, (male) a KNLA commander from the KNU’s 4th Brigade, Suan Pueng, 20th 
November 2010 
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In areas under or recently under KNU control, proximity to the KNU and its discourses 
results in some youths from these areas viewing participation in the KNU as conformity 
and a normal career choice akin to civil service. However, this study found that refugee 
camps which have close proximity to the KNU and retain a strong grievance narrative do 
not actually produce many willing volunteers for work outside the refugee camps. This is 
surprising given the number of academic studies in the ‘refugee warriors’ literature arguing 
that refugee camps provide base camps and a pool of recruits to armed opposition groups 
(Lischer, 2005; Loescher et al., 2007). In the Karen case, the lack of refugee recruitment 
into the KNU appears to be due to a different context of youths’ lives, with the border 
playing a key part in the development of different conditions. Thai policies prevent open 
political campaigning, the context of refugee aid is perceived to increase apathy and 
dependency and the opening of resettlement opportunities to third countries has resulted 
in many refugees either thinking about leaving or actually going to third countries. 
Furthermore, youths face parental pressure not to join out of fears for their security, even 
among parents who worked for the KNU themselves. Finally, INGO influence on the 
culture in the camps is believed to be driving ‘free riding’ and youth demands for salaries 
that KNU-affiliated organisations cannot afford. The result, according to one KYO 
recruiter is that: 
Saw B: “Very few [camp-based youths] join KNU, only about one to three per cent of 
recruits are from camp. Most camp youths work with NGOs, resettle or work in Thailand. 
KNU recruits are mostly from villages inside Burma and have lower education.”150 
Even in areas controlled or closely influenced by the KNU, increasing impoverishment 
with the loss of territory and Burma Army attacks on civilian livelihoods as part of its state-
making campaigns has reduced the number of youths joining the KNU. Loss of territory 
has increased insecurity in the borderlands as the KNU’s former ‘liberated ‘areas’ have 
become conflict zones or partially-securitised areas. However, Kalyvas and Kocher’s (2007) 
suggestion that participation may be preferred in such a situation has, in general, not been 
borne out in this case, primarily because of the KNU’s inability to support the dependents 
of participants. KYO and KNU recruiters indicate that the immediate economic imperative 
to find food for family survival takes precedence over the desire to drive the Burma Army 
out of the area. Thus, this finding supports the argument that absolutely deprived people 
rarely participate in conflict because they are too preoccupied with merely surviving 
(Mason, 2004; Ghimire, 2002).  
                                                 
150 Interview with a KYO district chairperson / KNU district level organising department leader on 30th 
November 2008 
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As Migdal (1974) argues, civilians are often apolitical and primarily motivated by their own 
immediate survival and security needs. KYO recruiters in this study concur, explaining that 
youths in all of the areas where they recruit are more often than not disinterested in politics 
and the KNU’s ideology and too preoccupied with their daily survival to participate. This 
inhibiting factor in recruitment may also be known to the Burmese regime since 
impoverishment of the civilian population has previously been argued to be a deliberate 
strategy of the Burmese regime in state-controlled areas to prevent the organisation of 
political opposition to its rule (Beatty, 2011). 
Previous studies have argued that an armed opposition group’s declining coercive power 
will result in more predatory behaviour towards civilians (Wood, 2010). However, there 
was no indication in this study that the KNU’s declining territorial control and lack of 
recruits was resulting in increased forced conscription. Sporadic youth conscription was 
continuing in 2007 as a result of the KNU’s previous conscription policies (HRW, 
2007:103), but a more active conscription practice occurred when the KNU held extensive 
territory, up until 1995, not when it lost territory. Thus, this study indicates that declining 
power does not necessarily result in more coercive youth conscription by an armed 
opposition group. 
In all areas, non-participation is an option and the one pursued by most youths, but in 
areas where multiple Karen armed groups vie for political authority and claim allegiance 
based on ethnicity there is some evidence that youths may choose their allegiance based on 
the behaviour of each group towards the local community. As several scholars have already 
identified, behaviour may be judged by the provision of public goods which help to build 
the internal legitimacy of groups claiming public authority (Wood, 2010; Mampilly, 2011). 
This study found that the Burmese State’s lack of legitimacy and lack of provision of 
appropriate governance services occasionally results in youth participation in non-military 
roles in the KNU even when they have little previous awareness of the group. In this case, 
governance services, particularly education, offered by KNU-affiliated organisations 
appeared to be a factor in youth recruitment.  
Understanding non-military youth recruitment into the KNU is complicated by the variety 
of roles that they are being recruited into. This study was limited to a primary, though not 
exclusive, focus on youths joining KYO, although it included some who had first joined in 
other roles (soldiering, for example) then moved across to KYO or a Karen NGO. The 
findings are therefore limited and do not seek to represent all youths who join the KNU. It 
cannot be assumed that the same patterns of participation are present among youths who 
join as teachers or soldiers, for example. Even within KYO, youths are recruited to work in 
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a variety of roles, some more politically-orientated than others. As chapter six discussed, 
none are military roles, while social projects form a large proportion of KYO’s activities at 
the central level and almost the entirety of activities in the refugee camps. It is also limited 
to some extent by a reliance on the reasons that participants and recruiters offer 
themselves. Often, answers to questions posed were probed, rephrased and asked in a 
different way on later occasions in order to gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding 
of the actual steps participants took when joining the KNU and moving in to different 
roles. 
b) Matching recruits to roles 
This study illustrates the micro-level processes by which youth recruits are matched to non-
military roles in an armed opposition group, which have received little if any previous 
attention in academic studies. It found that in the KNU, the actual role a youth takes on 
depends on a number of factors including their education level, gender norms, individual 
interest and local organisational needs at the time. For example, gender norms tend to 
divert young women into KWO, health work and teaching and away from political 
leadership roles. 
The relative weight each factor has in determining a recruit’s role is not accurately known, 
however, in this study, the education level of each recruit appears to be very significant. 
Youths with lower levels of education join lower levels of the KNU and are directed into 
lower-skilled or soldiering work. More educated youths join higher levels and are directed 
into managing and leadership roles, political roles or work within the KNU’s welfare wings. 
As a result, youths from more stable areas and/or more wealthy family backgrounds 
dominate in non-military leadership roles while youths from conflict zones/IDP areas 
appear to be more prevalent in lower skilled and military roles, despite forming the majority 
of recruits. Essentially, this means that the KNU is led by the small Karen middle class 
supported by the larger peasant class. Since education and even community mobilising skill 
are connected to religion in Karen State, this has also been explained as the reason for the 
religious imbalance in the KNU’s leadership.  
c) Career progression 
The KNU has not been an economically-endowed armed group since it lost control of the 
borderland economy, thus, it cannot afford to pay participants and most effectively work as 
unpaid volunteers. Weinstein (2005) argues that armed groups which are more socially than 
materially-endowed tend to be staffed by participants with non-pecuniary motivations. In 
the KNU’s case, although some youths are initially incentivised by educational 
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opportunities, those who stay and participate in KYO employ the KNU’s discourse of 
participation as a community service when explaining their reasons for participation. This 
discourse appears to be reasonably effective in maintaining loyalty, at least among 
participants without refugee status and the chance to apply for refugee resettlement, 
because participants do not always leave when offered far higher salaries in NGOs. This 
finding supports Hirschman’s (1970:80-81) theory that generating loyalty is most critical in 
organisations which cannot provide benefits and compete for the loyalty of staff with other 
organisations or opportunities.  
Loyalty is partly rewarded in the KNU by opportunities for career progression, though this 
is mediated by a youth’s demonstrated skill, experience and popularity in the KNU’s 
internal elections. It is also partly influenced by education level. Youth recruiters and 
leaders in this study indicated that it is more common for youths with lower education 
levels to spend more years working at lower levels of the KNU, often as soldiers if they are 
male, rather than at the leadership levels. 
d) Exit 
This study found that youth exit from the KNU is primarily a result of one or more of four 
factors: lack of energy and interest and poverty were significant in explaining youth exit 
inside Karen State, while staff poaching and the refugee resettlement programme were 
more significant among youths exiting from Thailand. Thus, exit is fundamentally linked to 
territorial control, as Kalyvas (2006) argues. Exit levels have increased as the KNU’s 
territorial control decreases because participants become impoverished as a result of attacks 
on their livelihoods. Since the KNU are no longer able to offer protection, youths migrate 
to seek income, education or security elsewhere. The exile of the KNU’s headquarters 
across the border with Thailand has also prompted the exit of its more highly educated 
participants in particular because once they are in Thailand, exit on the refugee resettlement 
programme becomes an option, displacing loyalty. Thus, while an armed opposition may 
seek to prevent exit by increasing loyalty through the promotion of an ideological agenda, it 
cannot control exit without stringent territorial control. In the presence of other 
opportunities exit occurs even among the highest levels of an armed opposition group’s 
leadership. 
Exit and declining territorial control have been linked to a decline in the overall education 
level of the KNU’s management and leadership in this study. In the past, the KNU 
leadership was comprised almost entirely of university-educated people and had a strong 
presence in urban areas where it could draw on the ranks of educated youths for recruits. 
However, as it has lost control and influence in urban areas, the numbers of university-
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educated recruits have greatly declined and the KNU has long found that its more educated 
cadres are more likely to vacillate (Smith, 1991). Moreover, since exit for resettlement has 
disproportionately been taken up by more highly educated and skilled refugees, the KNU 
has likewise lost a disproportionately high number of its more educated and skilled staff, 
both to resettlement and work in INGOs. This makes the KNU’s political leadership 
training schools discussed in chapter six all the more important if, as they believe, being 
knowledgeable and skilled (in politics especially) is essential to effective leadership of the 
KNU and the ultimate achievement of its political goals. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed account of youth recruitment into the KNU for non-
military roles, primarily, but not exclusively, in the KYO. Discussion then turned to an 
examination of how non-military recruits are matched to roles and the factors that 
influence their career progression in the KNU.  Finally, this chapter examined exit patterns 
among young participants. Given the KNU’s declining territorial control and resultant 
problems recruiting and retaining participants, especially those with higher levels of 
education, it is interesting to question how its strategies of contesting Burmese state-
making may be changing. The next chapter seeks to illuminate some of the KNU’s 
changing strategies by focusing on the changing activities of youths in non-military roles.  
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Chapter 8: Non-military youth roles in the KNU amid changing 
strategies of  contestation 
When I worked at KYO in 2003, the central level of the organisation ran projects mainly 
inside the refugee camps. The majority were youth peer to peer social activities including 
HIV/AIDS awareness, drugs awareness, a newsletter project, youth notice boards, drawing 
and story writing competitions. It also ran a further education school outside the refugee 
camps, which trained youths in English language and computer skills, as well as teaching 
Karen history and politics as part of its political leadership regeneration programme.  By 
the time I returned in 2008, both the target group and the content of KYO’s activities had 
undergone some change. The target group had increasingly become Karen youths inside 
Burma instead of those in the refugee camps, while the activities were more humanitarian, 
such as IDP relief work, or politically orientated, such as political education and youth 
leadership skills development. While the KYO continued to be based in Thailand and 
continued to run its social projects in the refugee camps, its projects inside Burma 
increased, supported by INGO funding. Groups of youths regularly crossed between 
Thailand and Burma conveying political ideas and material assistance to civilian 
communities in hiding, in partially-securitised areas and in State-controlled areas.  
This chapter argues that this shift in KYO’s central activities is shaped by changes in the 
KNU’s political and strategic goals. By harnessing the funding power of INGOs familiar 
with working through KNU structures in the refugee camps, the KNU’s welfare wings 
have managed to compensate for the decline in their own revenue streams as a result of the 
KNU’s loss of territory. However, INGO funding has its own effects on the KNU-
affiliated organisations it funds. Moreover, with the loss of territory, welfare services 
cannot simply be delivered in fixed locations within the KNU’s ‘liberated zones’, they have 
to be delivered in a much more mobile way. By examining the changing nature of KYO’s 
activities in this chapter, as well as those of youths working in non-military roles in the 
KNU’s welfare wings, the roles of youths in the KNU are analysed in relation to the 
group’s changing political and strategic goals.  
The first part of the chapter examines three key non-military roles that the KNU’s youth 
cohort is involved in. The second part of the chapter analyses the significance of both the 
activities themselves and youth roles in their delivery. The third part summarises the factors 
that enable or constrain youth work in these roles. 
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1 Non-military youth roles in the KNU 
This study found three, key non-military roles that the KNU’s youth cohort are involved 
in: political leadership training of selected youths, political outreach and mobilising 
programmes among the broader Karen youth population, and social welfare roles within 
the KNU’s governance structures. 
a) Youth political leadership training in the KNU 
Chapter six discussed how the KNU re-formed its youth wing to regenerate its ageing 
political leadership. With a reformed leadership the KNU encouraged its youth and 
women’s wings to carry out political leadership training for the youth cohort.151 The KNU’s 
Joint Secretary 1, Saw Hla Ngwe, explained that the purpose of this is to develop a 
politically skilled future leadership to lead the KNU: 
“The KYO/KWO need to upgrade their awareness, their capacity so that they can 
understand what’s going on in the whole world, what kind of revolution is successful, what 
kind is failure, for example the Tamil Tigers. The KNU enhances and promotes those two 
organisations to train their leadership.”152 
This is deemed particularly important because the declining education level of recruits is 
perceived to be affecting the regeneration of the KNU’s political leadership. While 
discussing leadership regeneration processes in the KNU as part of this research, a KYO 
leader stated: 
“The Karen struggle for self-rule but to do this we need good leaders to lead the people to this 
goal. Leadership is very important for the struggle for self-rule. The main problem is that 
most who join (KNU) are not well educated and may not even have basic literacy. They 
(KNU) don’t have regular capacity building programmes and skills development so it takes a 
long time to develop leadership.”153 
During the fieldwork, I examined the ways in which KYO and KWO have attempted to 
develop young political leaders in practice, using discussions with teachers and leaders in 
each organisation, observation of lessons and analysis of curricula. 
Case study 1: Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO) 
Women have always been active in the KNU including its armed wing, the KNLA (usually 
as army medics), however they have been under-represented in the political structures of 
the group. According to Zipporah Sein, who was General Secretary of the KWO before 
resigning to take up the KNU position of General Secretary, KNU leaders encouraged 
                                                 
151 The student groups, KSNG and KUSG, are not part of KNU structures and are therefore not expected 
However, as yet, there is no common understanding of what constitutes appropriate political leadership 
training for the development of future KNU leaders.to produce the next generation of political leaders. 
152 Interview with Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
153 Interview with a KYO district Chairperson / KNU district level organising department leader, Mae Sot, 
30th November 2008 
 226 
KWO to re-form in 1985 to represent women in the KNU and work on socio-political 
issues affecting women arising as a result of the conflict in Karen State.154 While this has 
resulted in a number of social programmes for women, it has not resulted in many young 
women entering the political leadership structures of the KNU. 
Zipporah Sein and the General Secretary of the KWO at the time of research, Nan Dah Eh 
Kler, argue that the fundamental reason behind the lack of women in the KNU’s political 
leadership is a cultural norm that views political leadership as a man’s role. The way in 
which they have attempted to redress the domination of the KNU leadership by men is by 
campaigning for fixed quotas of leadership positions to be reserved for women, but this 
has not yet been approved by the KNU congress. Nan Dah Eh Kler explained in depth 
during an interview for this study: 
Interviewer: “Why aren’t there many women in the KNU’s political leadership?” 
Nan Dah Eh Kler: “In the world there are very small numbers of women participating in 
leadership and politics. When I was young, the head village leaders were men and only men 
did the leadership role. Traditionally people believe that the leadership role should be men, so 
we need to change that kind of thinking.” 
Interviewer: “What is the traditional role for young people in Karen villages?” 
Nan Dah Eh Kler: “In the village (it is a bit different from village to village), some have a 
young group of people to be involved in social ceremonies. We are not used to seeing youths 
involved in leading roles like Village Head. Very few numbers are Village Heads – at least 
they are forty years old. They don’t write down that the Village Head should be this age but 
it’s a kind of cultural thinking. If they are very young it’s difficult for people to believe and 
respect them and maybe they will see she or he has not much experience. But we do have 
women village chiefs now.” 
Interviewer: “How have traditional roles for young people changed?” 
Nan Dah Eh Kler: “For other organisations, not much has changed, but KWO has 
changed. For example, we train young women to take a leadership role but it’s very hard for 
them because sometimes they feel that people don’t respect their point of view. But they still 
struggle and young women try very hard.”  
Interviewer: “How has KWO tried to get more young women into leadership roles in the 
KNU?” 
Nan Dah Eh Kler: “For the draft Federal Constitution of Burma we asked for at least 
30 per cent of the people should be women in leadership positions. We also try to encourage 
women to be in the constitution drafting committee...For the KNU election, we also requested 
at least 30 per cent of women, but at that time we were not ready for 30 per cent at every 
level. They (KNU leaders) don’t completely agree with us, because although we asked for 30 
per cent, we are not ready to send our representatives, but we are in the process, that’s why we 
try to get our Emerging Leadership school.”155 
In addition to campaigning for quotas of female representatives in the KNU’s leadership 
structures, the KWO trains a small number of its most able female cadres in leadership and 
                                                 
154 Interview with Naw Zipporah Sein, KNU General Secretary, Mae Sot, 11th December 2010 
155 Interview with Nan Dah Eh Kler, KWO General Secretary, Mae Sot, 24th June 2009 
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management through two training centres. The Young Women’s Leadership and 
Management school is based in one of the refugee camps but recruits are sought both from 
the refugee camps and inside Karen State. When asked about youth representation in the 
leadership of KWO, Nan Dah Eh Kler explained that the school has been effective at 
increasing youth representation within KWO’s own management structures: 
“After 2004 there were more youth representatives on the Executive Committees (at all levels 
of the KWO) because in 2001 we started our young women’s leadership school so we trained 
more young women to work with the community and leadership. After they graduated they 
went home and were elected into positions.” 
However, Nan Dah Eh Kler also went on to say that the school was less effective at 
producing political leaders for the KNU, since the curriculum was more geared towards 
developing the skills needed for management of KWO’s INGO-funded social 
programmes. Thus, in 2008 KWO also set up its Emerging Leadership School to focus 
specifically on training young females in political leadership. Recruits for this school are 
primarily drawn from IDP areas in Karen State, not from the refugee camps because of the 
high loss of skilled KWO staff from the refugee camps to resettlement in a third country. 
As a result, KWO devotes its training resources to recruits from inside Karen State who are 
believed to be more likely to stay and actually become KNU leaders. Furthermore, KWO 
selects its recruits based on their experience and demonstrated aptitude in community 
organising work, rather than education level.   
Case Study 2: Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) 
 
Photo 11 Youths on graduation day at the KYO’s Karen Youth Development Centre in Ler Per Her 
IDP camp, February 2009 [Photo: author] 
From 2000 to 2007, KYO ran ten-month leadership and management training programmes 
close to its headquarters in Mae Sot. An examination of the stated curriculum of the KYO 
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school from 2003 to 2007 in funding proposals, as well as discussions with former teachers 
at the school, revealed that the KYO school was also focused more on building the skills 
necessary for work on INGO-funded social programmes than on developing political 
leadership for the KNU. Additionally, the school had an explicit aim to unify Karen youths 
from diverse backgrounds around the political project of the KNU and a single, pan-Karen 
ethnic identity (Kuroiwa & Verkuyten, 2008:397).156  Thus, the KNU’s version of Karen 
history and politics, as well as IT skills and English language training formed the main 
subjects in the KYO school’s curriculum. 
Like KWO, KYO found that its students from the refugee camps tended not to transition 
into work within the KNU’s administrative apparatus but instead found work or further 
education opportunities elsewhere. Saw U, who was quite disgruntled about this during the 
fieldwork period, said: 
“The youths learn office structure, office work, politics, then leave because if they can do (office 
work) they don’t want to come back to help. Those who go to university in Bangkok, like N-
-, KYO find the way and send them to the university, but they do not come back to work in 
KYO.”157 
By contrast, KYO leaders who organised the school argued that recruits sent from the 
districts inside Karen State were found to be more likely to go back to work with the KYO 
district office because they were already committed to the job, often having several years’ 
work experience in the area, as well as family and friendship ties to return to. In an 
informal group discussion one evening at KYO headquarters, KYO leaders were quite 
scathing about youths from the refugee camps, reserving their praise for IDP youths who 
they perceived to be the ‘real’ freedom fighters. 
The entire youth political leadership training programme at KYO underwent a significant 
re-design in 2008. The new programme aimed to be more focused on political leadership 
training and targeted towards the KNU’s primary support base among IDPs in Karen 
State. To this end, at the KNU congress in 2008, youth representatives pushed the KNU 
leadership to approve the creation of a youth leadership and management programme 
organised and supported by the highest levels of the KNU. The KYO central leader 
responsible for the creation of the school explained the new structure: 
“The New Generation KNU programme has two steps. One step is if the district can do 
[training] they will do, but some districts already started; Fourth Brigade, Dooplaya and 
                                                 
156 The school’s report from 2003-2004 (in Kuroiwa & Verkuyten, 2008:397) details its aims as follows: “(1) 
to provide educational opportunities for Karen youth; (2) to unify Karen youth of different backgrounds and 
coming from different regions such as the conflict zone, the refugee camps, and central parts of Burma; and 
(3) to educate future Karen leaders so that they can work for the Karen community and succeed the former 
generation of Karen nationalists”. 
157 Interview with Saw U (Male, age 29),  a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
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Mutraw [districts] started. This includes KYO and KWO training. It’s like a university; it 
is one or two years at the district level. If they pass, they send to the central level. At the 
central level we will have one or two further years. We will teach Politics, History, English, 
International Law and Constitution, Communication, Media and Management. When they 
have finished they will work in the Organising department at the central, district and 
township levels. Some may go to be soldiers or other things. If they finish they should work in 
the KNU.”158 
Since KYO’s New Generation school is geared towards building the capacity of young 
leaders and managers within KNU organisations inside Karen State, the selection of 
participants is based on demonstrated prior commitment to working within the KNU. This 
selection criteria aims to eliminate the problems of ‘brain drain’ that KYO have 
encountered in the past. A KYO central leader explained: 
“[For the] youth training centre we order youths from all seven districts to come. We have 
criteria about the youths who attend this training must have worked for KYO one year or 
two years already. At the annual meeting we have one reason [objective]: to make a school for 
capacity building because the townships and districts need more capacity. The ones who attend 
training must already work for the township or district.”159 
At the time of research, youths from the refugee camps were only admitted to any kind of 
training (KYO, KWO or KNU) if they had not applied for resettlement to another 
country. A KNU leader explained in more detail about the selection of participants for the 
school, indicating the priority given to those with higher levels of education and those from 
areas loyal to the KNU: 
“Now [we] aim for thirty students at the New Generation School. We want equal numbers 
of men and women, but we don’t get; usually one third are women. To choose the students, the 
district leaders select eligible people. We give criteria: aged 18 to 30, should have Eighth 
Standard education, men and women, usually equal numbers per district. Also Karen, 
Burmese and English languages...They need Burmese language because some of our former 
leaders speak only in Burmese…We cannot recruit from DKBA areas – we are careful 
because we don’t know what is in their mind [where their loyalties lie]. We inform leaders to 
give recommendation about only those who they trust to send to the training.”160 
KYO leaders explained that the New Generation school aims to be entirely funded by the 
KNU’s central treasury and run in KNU-held territory in its fifth brigade area of Mutraw 
(Papun) district. This is because KYO found that the running costs of its school were 50 
per cent lower on the Burmese side of the border. In the past, leadership schools run by 
Mahn Sha and the KYO were based in Thailand because of the superior communication 
and IT facilities, photocopying and stationery resources, access to trainers (both KNU and 
foreign volunteers) and physical security. However, informal discussions with KYO and 
KNU leaders and participant observation of KYO’s daily activities indicate that declining 
                                                 
158 Interview with Saw Z (Male, age 39), a KYO central leader, 29th July 2009, Mae Sot 
159 Interview with Saw H (Male, age 34),  a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 19th May 2009 
160 Interview with Saw Dot Lay Mu, KNU Joint Secretary 2, 12th June 2009, Mae Sot 
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security for the KNU in Thailand and more restrictions on the group’s activities by Thai 
authorities are diminishing the value of Thailand as an organising and training space. All 
forms of political training by KNU organisations conducted in Thailand are subject to local 
Thai policies and security arrangements. Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, explained 
that these are based on maintaining political stability and economic opportunities along the 
border. Thus, as long as the KNU does not interfere in Thailand’s domestic politics or 
economy, and provided they pay an appropriate bribe, they are usually permitted to run 
non-military trainings for KNU cadres: 
“If necessary, they [youths] attend training in Thailand: Mae Sariang, Mae Sot, Chiang 
Mai. Trainings about human rights, democracy, constitution, ICRC, Geneva Call… but 
military trainings are held in our own side. We can give the Thais tea money to organise 
trainings…The Thais want the whole world to belong to the market economy. They want to 
create stability for the benefit of the Thai people. Thais don’t want the fighting to spread to 
their soil and affect the stability of Thailand. Sometimes the DKBA enter Thai side so it’s a 
problem. We never interfere in Thai sovereignty. We educate our members: don’t comment, we 
must abide by Thai Law, Thai customs and the good will of the Thai people.”161 
Although youth training is theoretically allowed, participant observation showed that in 
practice it has to be negotiated with local Thai officials and is severely constrained by travel 
restrictions imposed on KNU organisations by the Thai Border Police. This greatly 
increases the transportation cost of students to the training venue due to the need to pay 
bribes162 for access.163 Throughout the fieldwork period in 2009, a complete travel ban 
made travel in KNU cars almost impossible for several months.164 Thus, despite the greater 
security risk posed to the location of the school in KNU-controlled territory, the reduced 
costs and greater political freedom to run the school as they wish are deemed by KYO 
leaders to outweigh the security problems they face.  
b) Youth Political Education and Community Organising 
A second, key role that the KNU’s youth wing is engaged in is building support for the 
KNU among Karen communities inside Burma. KYO had long been engaged in 
‘community organising’ work with youths inside Burma, but this activity became the 
primary focus of the organisation at the central level, more than doubling in size by 2008.  
                                                 
161 Interview with Saw Hla Ngwe, KNU Joint Secretary 1, Mae Sot, 13th June 2009 
162 Most difficult and expensive is travel from Suan Pueng, opposite the KNU’s fourth brigade, because it is 
so far south. For a young person to travel north to Mae Sot for trainings or meetings, the cost was around 
15,000 Thai baht for a one-way trip. 
163 Interviews with KYO leaders and observation of bribery transactions while travelling with KYO leaders in 
KNU cars along the Thai-Burma border area. 
164 For staff in KNU-affiliated organisations without a legitimate form of identification in Thailand (around 
95% of all staff) the only way of travelling safely around the border areas is in official KNU cars, usually with 
a travel permit issued by a local Thai official. A list of KNU cars is kept by Thai authorities and KNU travel 
in Thailand is regulated by liaison between KNU and Thai officials. 
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KYO states in its organisational mandate that “Community Organization and supporting 
community organizations are the most important work that KYO carries out” (KYO, 
2007), which does not necessarily mean political organisation and mobilisation for the 
KNU. However, when this work was discussed with the KYO’s community organisers and 
the organisation’s project plans for community organising projects analysed during the 
fieldwork period, it was clear that this primarily involves educating villagers about the 
KNU’s and the Burmese military’s political ideologies and strategies and encouraging 
youths to support the KNU.  
According to youth leaders within the KNU, educating and negotiating with the civilian 
support base is considered important for building support for the KNU’s political ideology 
and strategies. The Organising department of the KNU is formally tasked with this 
responsibility, but with a lack of staff, this work was often delegated to the armed wings of 
the KNU, the KNLA and KNDO, who tended to have the greatest reach and presence 
throughout Karen State.165 However, since the armed wings have now also declined in 
reach and size, and because of the age gap between KNU leaders and the grassroots Karen 
population, the KYO has taken on a large proportion of this work for the KNU.  
In-depth discussions with KYO leaders during the fieldwork revealed that community 
organisers from the KYO are responsible for reaching out to villagers inside Karen State 
(and in Thailand), representing the KNU and its political objectives to the younger 
generation, mediating the demands each group makes on the other and effectively building 
the KNU’s internal legitimacy among civilians. As one KYO leader succinctly put it: “We 
are a bridge”.166 Naw Zipporah Sein, the current KNU General Secretary, confirmed in an 
interview that this is how the KNU leadership also see the role of KYO: 
Interviewer: “How do you see the role of KYO?” 
Naw Zipporah Sein: “KYO prepares youths politically. They have a responsibility to 
organise and mobilise young people, to educate young people to take part in politics and the 
Karen struggle.”167 
The KNU coordinates its political ideology and some of its civilian outreach activities with 
umbrella alliance groups such as the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) and National 
Council for the Union of Burma (NCUB). As a result, KYO’s political education and 
community organising work has formally been coordinated within the framework of action 
agreed by the ENC since 2007. The background text to the Karen State Coordinating 
                                                 
165 Discussions with KYO leaders and Organising department district staff between 2003 and 2009 
166 Interview with a KYO leader, Mae Sot, 3rd April 2009 
167 Interview with Naw Zipporah Sein, Mae Sot, 11th December 2010 
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Body’s (KSCB) funding proposal for 2009 explains the new position of KYO’s political 
outreach and community mobilising activities:  
“‘The country’s youth needs to play a vital role in mobilizing the various 
stakeholders in the communities. The In- charge of Youth Affairs, under the 
Karen State Coordinating Committee, is also General Secretary of  the Karen 
Youth Organization and has come up with a program approved by the Karen 
State Coordinating Body to mobilize the community and help in implementing 
some the ENC’s objectives” (KSCB, 2008). 
The ENC objectives referred to above are the establishment of a democratic, federal union 
form of political system in Burma. KYO’s funding proposal to the National Reconciliation 
Program, through the KSCB, indicates the objectives of its youth political training 
programme: 
• “The majority of youth in Karen State will know and understand the ENC's 
structure, political agenda, policy and programs 
• To be able to participate in the political development in Burma and to be well 
prepared for Tripartite Dialogue which is the ultimate goal of ENC. 
• To understand the concept of federalism which has been supported by ENC 
• To organize of the youths to increase youth's participation on the ethnic 
movement. 
• To build up political knowledge, leadership and management skills among youths in 
Karen State. 
• To equip youths in Karen State to be able to mobilize and raise political awareness 
to grass-roots people community stake holders on the ENC political agenda” 
(KSCB, 2007) 
In-depth interviews with Saw U, one of the KYO leaders responsible for managing and 
delivering community organising programmes, reveal how this political education and 
organising of the civilian population is carried out in practice and how youth leaders from 
KYO mediate between the KNU leadership and the ENC in Thailand and young Karen 
villagers in Burma. 
Saw U explained that in each township within Karen state, KYO organises workshops for 
youths and explains the KNU’s political agenda and ideology, in particular the new KNU 
constitution for Karen State and how this fits within the Burma constitution written by the 
ENC. Essentially, Saw U said the goal is to mobilise political support for the KNU and its 
political agenda within alliance groups among the civilian population, but this chapter 
argues that this activity also serves a number of strategic purposes. Political support may be 
transferred into material support or direct participation in the KNU, while it also indicates 
the mobilising power of the KNU to the Burmese regime. Civilian support may also serve 
to increase the credibility of the KNU externally. Finally, increased political awareness 
among the civilian population can undermine Burmese state-making practices and claims to 
political authority.  
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During the fieldwork period I worked with KYO leaders on the writing of their community 
organising and political training project proposals and funding reports. During these 
processes, they explained that the objectives of KYO’s political training programme are re-
defined each year taking into account the current political context within Burma, political 
activities of the KNU and alliance groups in Thailand, objectives of external funders and 
any related training the KYO staff have received in the year. Thus, each youth workshop 
contains a number of different goals set by different stakeholders, whom KYO is funded 
by and/or accountable to. In 2008, with the ratification of a new Burmese constitution 
produced by the SPDC and the National Convention, and elections looming, the training 
also included explaining the Burmese election process and training youths on non-violent 
methods of political resistance. This last element is part of a broader programme of 
underground political resistance activities co-ordinated by a youth umbrella group in 
Thailand (SYCB) with INGO assistance.  
KYO’s Youth Political Training Programme: Contesting Burmese state-making and 
building support for the KNU 
Case study of Saw U 
Saw U is a young Sgaw Karen man, who is Buddhist, aged 30. He is a senior leader in 
KYO. Every year Saw U writes and submits a funding proposal to an INGO for a youth 
political education and community organising programme inside Burma. He then meets 
with the INGO staff in Thailand and negotiates funding for the programme. Once funding 
is received, the programme works on a ‘train the trainer’ principle, whereby a core team of 
KYO trainers train district KYO teams who then conduct roving workshops around their 
home districts.  Saw U conducts the training workshops and some of the village workshops 
in a series of trips. Each trip takes several months and involves long walks through the 
jungles and mountains to reach the villages where he holds workshops.  
In 2008, with a looming referendum on the new Burmese constitution, the focus of Saw 
U’s trips was explaining the Burmese constitution to local youths and comparing it with the 
alternative constitution drafted by the opposition groups through the ENC and the KNU’s 
constitution for Karen State. Saw U and his staff also explained the KNU’s political 
ideology and strategies and compared these with the Burmese military’s policies and 
strategies. This aimed to build support for the KNU’s political strategy and authority and 
undermine the Burmese military’s efforts to legitimise its political authority through the 
new constitution and elections.  
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During the training, the KNU’s flag was displayed and the KNU’s national anthem sung. 
To further undermine Burmese state-making, Saw U and his team shared with the young 
participants the non-violent resistance principles they had learnt through an INGO training 
in Thailand. Saw U also listened to the views of the civilian youth cohort on the KNU’s 
ideology and strategy, their complaints about the different armed and political groups in the 
local area and general difficulties the villages were facing in order to represent the civilian 
youth situation back to the KNU leadership.  
The problems Saw U said he encountered were political apathy and low levels of education 
preventing the grasping of more complex principles. In particular, he said there is a 
reluctance among civilians to let go of ethno-nationalism and secession in favour of the 
federal union principles now advocated by the KNU. He explained that although the 
political ideology of the KNU has theoretically transformed, ethno-nationalism remains the 
most convenient organising and recruiting principle among communities aggrieved by 
ethnocratic Burmese state policies. Many civilians then support the KNU because they 
believe it fights for ‘Karen freedom’ without fully understanding the group’s political 
ideology.168 
“Most of the Karen people, they stay not active. If they got enough food that is enough for them, they do not 
want to think about the politics and they do not want to think far into the future. If they got enough food 
and sleep well and stay well that is enough for their life… Our villagers, maybe seventy to seventy-five per 
cent have lower education so educating them is very difficult. Sometimes if we go to talk about and give the 
information for them, we need to explain very slowly and very detailed because they do not know nothing 
and they do not know firstly because they have lower education level. Sometimes we have no time to discuss 
with them if we stay in the jungle, just only we can take one hour, fifty minutes, like that, and we cannot 
explain all of it.”169  
The relatively easy aspects of conducting the workshops were organising the training venue 
and security with local support, even in areas not under KNU control, and mobilising 
civilian youth to attend the workshops. The villagers and KYO staff face severe penalties in 
partially-securitised and state-controlled areas for running political training programmes 
such as this but KYO’s local networks were able to organise workshops wherever the 
training team travelled and large numbers of youths reportedly attended.  
Figure 12 KYO’s Youth Political Training Programme: Contesting Burmese state-making and 
building support for the KNU: Case study of Saw U 
 
                                                 
168 Interview with a KYO central leader at KYO headquarters, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
169 Interview with a KYO central leader at KYO headquarters, Mae Sot, 10th July 2009 
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Photo 12 A KYO political training workshop in Kawkareik township, Pa-an district conducted 
from 10th-19th October 2007. The KNU’s Karen State flag is displayed above the banner. [Photo: 
KYO, 2007] 
 
Photo 13 The writing on the blackboard behind the speaker shows that KYO is teaching public 
defiance tactics in the workshop in Kawkareik township, October 2007. [Photo: KYO, 2007] 
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Photo 14 KYO central and district staff conducting peer support to boarding house youths during 
a political education and community organising trip. [Photo: KYO, 2007] 
 
Photo 15 KYO central and district staff taking a break while travelling through the jungle during a 
political education and community organising trip. [Photo: KYO, 2007] 
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c) Youth providers of governance services 
The third non-military role that the KNU’s youth cohort is involved in is the provision of 
social welfare programmes as part of a transformation of the KNU’s governance services. 
This chapter examines two case studies: KYO’s involvement in humanitarian assistance to 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and youth involvement in the transformation of the 
KNU’s welfare wings in eastern Burma. 
Case study 1: Youth assistance to IDPs 
As chapter five discussed, since 1995 the KNU has lost territory to the Burma Army and 
Karen splinter groups from the KNLA, resulting in over one million internally displaced 
people (IDPs) (UNDP, 2009; TBBC, 2008). In recent years, the humanitarian crisis has 
escalated. In one year from August 2010 to July 2011, TBBC (2011:18) estimates that at 
least 112,000 people were forcibly displaced in the border areas.  Many entered the refugee 
camps in Thailand but with Thai pressure not to allow any more new arrivals into the 
camps, a number of IDP camps were instead set up on the border line, but just inside 
Karen State. Some of these had been in existence for many years as civilians had moved 
and set up villages around KNLA base areas for better protection from Burma Army 
incursions. The IDP camps were heavily guarded by the KNLA but material assistance 
came from INGOs working in the nearby refugee camps.  
With the escalation in the humanitarian crisis and a new willingness among INGOs 
funding the refugees to fund relief programmes delivered inside Karen State from across 
the border with Thailand, KYO set up two social welfare programmes: distribution of IDP 
relief supplies and peer support to IDP boarding house students. Both of these 
programmes had previously been funded by the KNU as part of its social compact with the 
civilian population, but since the KNU’s income streams had greatly diminished with the 
loss of territory, funding was sought from INGOs instead. KYO central staff submitted a 
funding proposal to several INGOs for just under half a million baht to support seven IDP 
student boarding houses in six different IDP camps during 2009-10. Meanwhile, KYO’s 
IDP relief work was funded by a Thai NGO and run in co-ordination with the KNU’s 
relief department (KORD), an independent Christian relief agency (FBR) and KNU district 
leaders. 
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Photo 16 KYO central staff distributing IDP relief assistance in Karen State [Photo: KYO, 2009] 
KYO was not the only organisation affiliated to the KNU to seek INGO funding for the 
KNU’s social welfare programmes, the KNU’s education, health and relief departments 
operating inside Burma all successfully reformed their funding streams, becoming entirely 
funded by INGOs. They also developed new ways of delivering humanitarian aid and 
social welfare programmes in a changed context of declining territorial control by the 
KNU, as the next case study demonstrates. 
Case study 2: Youths and the transformation of the KNU’s governance services 
Chapter five discussed how cross-border aid funding for IDPs in Burma increased from 
2002 to 2005 but decreased from 2009 as donors preferred to give funding to less 
politically sensitive areas in central Burma. Part of the decline stems from donor concerns 
that assistance delivered through organisations affiliated to armed opposition groups may 
impact upon equity of access for all ethnic, religious and political groups (DfID, 2008:21). 
A senior staff member of the KNU’s education department (KED) explained in an 
interview in 2010 that KED struggled to source INGO funding because UNICEF and 
USAID did not want to support an organisation with links to the KNU. To mitigate this 
issue, two separate organisations were created from the KED to present themselves as 
operationally distinct from the KNU and its armed activities inside Karen State. The Karen 
Refugee Committee Education Entity (KRCEE) was created for education services in the 
refugee camps while the KED joined together with an independent NGO (KTWG) and an 
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international funder (Partners Relief and Development) to create the Karen State 
Educational Assistance Group (KSEAG) for an education service inside Karen State. This 
separation proved to be successful in gaining funding from INGOs for the KNU’s 
education service in Karen State.   
Youths in the KNU’s education department are involved in a number of roles delivering 
the education service in eastern Burma with INGO funding, but one of the key roles that 
they play as a result of the change in revenue streams is brokering the policies of the KNU 
and the local needs of schools inside Burma with international donors. 
Delivering the KNU’s education service in Burma with INGO funding 
Case study of Saw T 
Saw T is an Animist believer, aged 34, who works in the Education department of the 
KNU. He comes from an IDP area in which multiple armed groups are active and joined 
the Education department as an intern. He has worked his way up the organisation to 
become the IDP Education officer in the new consortium (KSEAG) which links the 
KNU’s Education department local and international NGOs. 
Saw T manages the KSEAG’s relationship with schools in Karen State including registering 
new schools, managing the distribution of stipends and resources and reporting upwards. 
He speaks excellent English and is adept at the technocratic project management necessary 
for working with INGOs, easily managing complicated spreadsheets, proposals and 
reports. He is also familiar with the politics of the KNU’s education department and the 
political sensitivities involved in delivering the KNU curriculum in partially-securitised or 
government-controlled areas of Karen state.  
Crucially, Saw T is able to interpret schooling situations to donors, funding realities to local 
schools and KNU education policies with both groups of stakeholders. He also negotiates 
the distribution of school materials with other armed groups in the local area, such as the 
DKBA and KPF. To do this, he adopts a strategic stance of independence and 
humanitarianism towards international donors, while being positioned as a KNU civil 
servant in his relationship with the KNU and the local population.  
Figure 13 Delivering the KNU’s education service in Burma with INGO funding: Case study of Saw 
T 
The transformed revenue stream for the KNU’s education service is remarkably successful 
despite the decline in cross-border aid since it enables KSEAG to deliver possibly the 
largest education service in a conflict zone in the world, covering 1,041 schools (96 per 
cent of the total schools in Karen State) and 93,842 students in Karen State, some of which 
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are mobile village schools in hiding (KSEAG, 2011:11-12). All school supplies (140,000kgs 
worth in 2010) are distributed from Thailand, some by road under cover of other Thai 
imports, but most by a large network of community volunteers who carry the supplies on 
their backs through the jungle (KSEAG, 2011). 
The KNU’s health department has also successfully transformed its revenue streams from 
the KNU treasury to INGOs. It is now entirely funded by INGOs and reaches around 
110,000 internally displaced villagers in Karen State through 37 semi-permanent health 
clinics, each staffed by approximately ten local health workers. It also co-ordinates its work 
with an indigenous NGO, the Backpack Health Worker Team, who provide mobile health 
services with over 70 health work teams (Lee et al., 2009:3; KDHW, undated). Meanwhile, 
mobile humanitarian relief is delivered by KORD and CIDKP (both KNU-affiliated 
organisations) in Karen State. Although CIDKP, KDHW, KED and KYO sources 
interviewed in this study acknowledged that the KNU provides armed protection of aid 
delivery, they explained that all other funding and resources are now sourced not from its 
treasury but from INGOs. 
Chapter five discussed how as a result of the transformed revenue streams for the KNU’s 
welfare services in Karen State, the entirety of the education, IDP assistance and health 
budgets now come from international donors, dwarfing  the KNU’s central treasury 
income from natural resource rents, small businesses and household tax. A young leader 
within the KNU’s Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) explained 
the organisation’s changed funding streams: 
Interviewer: “Does CIDKP get any funding now from the KNU?” 
Saw AG: “Funding comes from outside donations, like NGOs and a small amount from 
individuals like the Karen community abroad, not from the KNU.” 
Interviewer: “Is it a problem getting NGO funding if you are linked to the KNU?” 
Saw AG: “We operate as a humanitarian CBO even though we are linked to KNU. We 
have to sign agreements that aid will not be made conditional upon support for anyone and we 
will not be biased in our delivery. We also have to explain that we are not KNU and we 
wear our hats or T-shirts with our logo to show we are CIDKP.”170 
The following section analyses the implications of these changed funding streams among 
the KNU’s mass organisations and welfare wings and relates them to other academic 
findings. 
                                                 
170 Interview with Saw AG, (male) a young CIDKP leader, Mae Sot, 27th May 2009 
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2 The importance of youth roles in the KNU amid changing strategies of 
contestation 
This chapter examined three key roles that the KNU’s youth cohort is involved in. While 
training youths to regenerate the KNU’s political leadership was the role originally 
anticipated for the KNU’s youth wing, KYO has also built up its social activities to include 
IDP assistance with INGO funding. In addition, it has taken over a large part of the 
community mobilising work of the KNU’s Organising department, which is important for 
building and maintaining local legitimacy and support for the KNU in Burma. Youths in 
other KNU-affiliated organisations are also involved in delivering the KNU’s governance 
services which have transformed since the KNU has lost territory and financial resources.  
a) Youth political leadership training 
By examining actual practices of youth political leadership training and progression in the 
KNU, this chapter illuminated the micro processes of political leadership regeneration in 
an armed opposition group. Clapham (1998) argues that education is necessary for 
organisational effectiveness and formulation of the political agenda in an armed opposition 
group. However, this case demonstrates that putting education and training policies to 
improve political and organisational effectiveness in the group into practice are 
fundamentally dependent upon the skill and style of a group’s political leadership. Political 
training and incorporation of the youth cohort into the KNU was not centrally instituted 
until patrons of the youth cohort took on more powerful positions in the KNU’s central 
leadership (although some districts had instituted their own youth training processes). Even 
then, youth leadership and management training provided by KYO and KWO produced 
staff with skills more geared towards management of INGO-funded projects than political 
leadership, reflecting the operational needs of both organisations, rather than the needs of 
the ‘mother’ party. More recently, however, they have focused specifically on training 
youths in political leadership skills.  
In this case, a changing context of the armed group’s operations has affected the selection 
of youths for political leadership training as well as the content of the curriculum and the 
training location. High levels of exit among participants with refugee status in Thailand has 
led to a greater focus on training youths from inside Karen State who do not have refugee 
status, especially those with previously demonstrated loyalty to the group. With a perceived 
need for more highly educated participants in particular, KYO selects partly on the basis of 
education level (although KWO does not). There is also a bias towards ethnic Karen 
recruits from loyal KNU areas due to security considerations. 
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While sanctuary in Thailand has granted some advantages to the youth cohort in the NU, 
there are also disadvantages. Increased costs, difficulties negotiating travel with Thai 
officials and the refugee resettlement programme have all had negative impacts on youth 
political training programmes. As a result, the KNU’s New Generation school for youth 
political training aims to be run in KNU-controlled territory in Karen State to mitigate 
these problems 
b) Youths as ‘brokers of meaning’ in the KNU 
This study found that youths in KYO and other KNU-affiliated organisations have 
increasingly been involved in building the KNU’s internal political legitimacy among the 
civilian Karen population, undermining Burmese state-making processes and building the 
external legitimacy of KNU-affiliated organisations among their external donors. While 
youths are particularly suitable to an internal brokerage role, external brokerage is not 
necessarily a youth role.  
Building the KNU’s internal political legitimacy 
Boudreau (2002) and Winthropp and Graff (2010) argue that education is central to any 
effort to mobilise people to ‘national’ action and adapt local perceptions and those of 
armed opposition groups to each other. Maoist guerrilla warfare strategy also argues that 
devoting personnel to political mobilisation is essential to educate civilians about the 
group’s intentions and build local support (Mampilly, 2011:218). This is because relying on 
force alone is not a sustainable strategy in the long term, so groups aiming for longevity 
seek to build civilian consent (Mampilly, 2011:55). At the time of research, the KNU had 
been in conflict with the Burmese state for sixty years, thus, it is an exceptionally long-
running armed opposition group.  
As Mampilly (2007:31) argues, building internal legitimacy for an armed opposition group 
as a political authority serves to buttress its claims to represent a targeted population and 
builds its external legitimacy. This study found that youths are situated between the KNU 
and the local community when conducting political mobilising work and effectively manage 
the flow of political ideology and strategy between the KNU and its civilian support base. 
They also reproduce the political culture of the KNU and its representations of sovereignty 
through their use of performative symbols such as displaying the KNU flag during training 
and singing the KNU national anthem. Wickham-Crowley (1992) argued that the key 
benefit of people in this role is their ability to move through different social worlds 
communicating with different people, thereby reducing the ‘social distance’ between 
guerrillas and peasant supporters. They are usually rural born and bred people who have 
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received an unusually high level of education and can appeal more successfully to both 
mass peasant supporters and elites (Wickham-Crowley, 1992).  
In the KYO, at the time of the fieldwork period all of the community organisers and 
political trainers were youths born in rural, contested areas of Karen State who, very 
unusually, as Wickham-Crowley (1992) argues, have managed to finish secondary schooling 
either through the KNU education system or in Burmese state-controlled schools. They are 
also, usually as a result of their education, urbanised. They come from the S’gaw and Pwo-
Karen dialect communities and are either Christian or Buddhist. Predominantly, they are 
male, reportedly due to cultural proscriptions on female travel in dangerous areas, but some 
female KYO leaders also participate in the work at the district level. 
The importance of youths in internal brokerage roles 
During lengthy discussions with KYO community organising leaders who were resting and 
recuperating in the headquarters office, four factors were identified which made the KNU’s 
youth wing better suited to this work than the parent party. First is the scale and reach of 
KYO inside Burma. KYO is a large organisation with extensive networks throughout 
eastern Burma. In 2008 there were 40,911 KYO members throughout Karen State and 
Thailand, according to KYO’s membership list, and up to 3,000 active staff from the 
central level down to the village level.171 KYO staff travel around KNU-controlled areas, 
IDP areas, partially-securitised areas and government-controlled areas of Karen State, 
including Tenasserim division, assisted by the difficult terrain of the eastern borderlands 
and local support. Analysis of funding reports to donors and training attendance lists 
indicate that since 2000, KYO have conducted hundreds of political awareness and 
community organising workshops with INGO funding in school buildings, churches and 
temples, or in temporary training shelters in the jungle close to villages.  
Related to the scale and reach of KYO is the labour capacity and energy of its young staff. 
Youths without dependents are especially valuable in this role as the trips entail long 
periods away from home. Moreover, the trips are physically demanding requiring long, 
arduous treks on foot through the jungle to reach remote areas, which older KNU leaders 
say they find difficult.  
Thirdly, the delivery of politically sensitive programmes is facilitated by the pre-existing 
social role of youths in Karen State. As chapter six discussed, KYO’s role as a village social 
work group is maintained in conjunction with its political role as the nascent political 
                                                 
171 Interview with KYO Vice-Chairperson and KYO Joint Secretary 2, Mae Sot, 19th May 2009. A table 
showing KYO’s staffing levels is available in APPENDIX A 
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leadership of the KNU. Thus, KYO youth leaders often continue to work on social issues 
with youths at the same time as their political education workshops. Photographic 
discussions with KYO community organising leaders revealed that after the training 
sessions are finished for the day they often provide peer support to unaccompanied youths 
in boarding houses, discuss education opportunities outside the village with youths or 
distribute public health information provided by other Karen organisations based in 
Thailand. The multiple roles of KYO in Burma aids underground political mobilisation of 
Karen communities in Burma. Youth leaders in KYO stated that as long as youth groups 
are perceived by the Burmese government to have no name, hierarchy or organisational 
structure, and as long as they do not discuss politics, they are tolerated. Yet, at times, the 
political links of village youth groups to the KYO (and by extension, the KNU) are 
activated and they take part in organised political trainings, workshops and other 
necessarily underground activities.  
Fourthly, peer-to-peer political campaigning is deemed important by the KYO and the 
KNU because of the age disparity between youths and the KNU leadership. Most KNU 
leaders in the Central Executive Committee and Standing Committee are in their forties, 
fifties and sixties; thus, youths complain that KNU elders are out of touch and do not 
listen to them. 172 KYO is not the only organisation involved in political education and 
campaigning work among Karen communities. Karen University Students Group (KUSG), 
Karen Students Network Group (KSNG), KWO, Burma Issues and the Kwekalu news 
service are all involved in various aspects of political education, awareness-raising and 
campaigning (not always for the KNU) among the civilian Karen population inside Karen 
State, in Thailand and among the overseas diaspora. However, with the exception of 
KWO, these organisations are all led and staffed by youths. 
Building the external legitimacy of the KNU’s mass organisations and welfare 
wings 
In addition to negotiating the KNU’s internal legitimacy with its support base and 
undermining certain Burmese state-making practices, youth staff and leaders of KNU-
affiliated organisations such as KYO, KWO, KED and KDHW manage their 
organisation’s relationships with their external funding agencies. As such, they have also to 
build the organisation’s external legitimacy and manage flows of funds, reporting, 
accounting and representations of meanings. In essence, they are ‘brokers’. This is a term 
used by Mosse and Lewis (2006:16) to refer to people in the context of development 
                                                 
172 Interview with a KYO leader, Mae Sot, 3rd April 2009 
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programmes, usually situated between the state and the community, who read the meaning 
in a project into the different institutional languages of its stakeholder supporters.  In this 
case, youths can be considered as brokers when they negotiate between their home 
organisation and external funders, as well as when they negotiate between the KNU and 
the local community, as the following diagram indicates. 
 
Figure 14  Strategic positions of brokers 
Key staff responsible for brokering their organisation’s relationship with external funders 
report that they tend to adopt a stance of humanitarianism towards international donors, 
while continuing to be positioned as civil servants in their relationship with the KNU.  
Thus, these ‘brokers’ wear multiple hats, negotiate different stakeholder policies and 
priorities and attempt to build coherent projects out of this complexity.   
This study found that as the KNU’s mass organisations and welfare wings now rely on 
external funding for all of their operations, they have an increasing need for more staff able 
to work in brokerage roles with external donors. However, there are two factors which 
affect their ability to build their brokerage capacity: recruitment and retention of young 
participants with the right skills and travel restrictions on KNU-affiliated people in 
Thailand. 
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Recruiting and retaining youth brokers in KNU-affiliated organisations 
Discussions with staff involved in ‘external brokerage’ in externally funded KNU-affiliated 
organisations revealed that they need particular competencies to be able to do their jobs. 
They must be familiar with Western culture, aware of donor politics (particularly issues of 
political neutrality), English-speaking and IT literate173. A young female KYO leader who 
liaises frequently with INGO donors on an adolescent reproductive health project 
explained that the most difficult aspects of her work were communicating with donors in 
English and writing funding proposals. Supporting this finding, the KNU’s General 
Secretary, Zipporah Sein, stated that after political education, English language is the most 
important skill for youths in the KNU to learn now.174  
Refugee camp youths have the highest levels of education and English language skills 
among the Karen population in Burma and the Thai borderlands, but as chapter seven 
identified, they tend to be the least loyal participants and often leave for paid work 
elsewhere or resettlement to another country. Therefore, to build staff capacity, KYO and 
other KNU-affiliated organisations regularly run IT skills, financial management and 
INGO proposal and report writing training sessions for their staff in Thailand who have 
the most contact with external funders. This was an activity that I was often involved in as 
a trainer for KYO during my previous period of employment with the organisation. 
However, leaders in many of the KNU-affiliated organisations complained that staff who 
become adept at these skills are often in high demand and poached by other organisations, 
including INGOs themselves. A young leader from CIDKP explained that staff turnover is 
high among their offices on the Thai side of the border, while it is much more stable 
among staff based inside Karen State where very few INGOs operate: 
Interviewer: “Why do staff leave CIDKP?” 
Saw AG: “On the Thai side, staff leaving [CIDKP] have gone to AMI, HRDU, 
INGOs, other Karen NGOs or CBOs with a better stipend. Some staff, after they get 
married, they go to work with another organisation. In this situation it’s not easy for those 
who have a family to work because the stipend is low, for example, just 1,500 baht per 
month on the Thai side. Inside Karen State, I haven’t seen anyone from 2006 until now 
moving to another organisation. They are more stable.”175 
                                                 
173 Author observation of participants working in Karen organisations between 2003 and 2009. 
174 Interview with Naw Zipporah Sein, Mae Sot, 11th December 2010 
175 Interview with Saw AG, (male) a young CIDKP leader, Mae Sot, 27th May 2009 
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Negotiating sanctuary for brokers in Thailand 
Recruiting and retaining staff with the skills necessary for negotiating and managing 
externally funded projects appeared to be a continuing concern for KNU-affiliated 
organisations at the time of fieldwork. However, negotiating their sanctuary and freedom 
of movement in Thailand is becoming increasingly problematic, as a KYO leader who 
manages the organisation’s relationship with local Thai authorities explained: 
Interviewer: “What are the difficulties in your job?” 
Saw H: “We need more skill. We have but we need more. Not everyone, but just me 
especially. We need to find money, manage, we plan but the situation changes and is always 
flexible, it makes us very tired. If we want to go to Ler Per Her [IDP camp] tomorrow, but 
Thais don’t give permission, we cannot go. The time and situation don’t belong to us.”176 
A common feature of successful armed opposition groups is the availability of a sanctuary 
space for the group which offers a degree of protection from state force (Salehyan, 2007, 
2010). While studies such as Salehyan’s often focus on the military advantages of sanctuary 
spaces, which allow armed opposition group soldiers to re-group, house rear bases or move 
units along the border, there are also critical non-military advantages. Sanctuary in Thailand 
has been key to the longevity of the KNU because it offers organising space and facilities 
for the headquarters of the KNU’s constituent organisations.  
Operationally, Thailand has long provided a safe place for the KNU leadership to travel, 
conduct meetings, and bank its income, but Thailand’s excellent communication facilities 
(mobile phone coverage, inexpensive IT hardware and cheap broadband networks) also 
make sanctuary in Thailand especially important for contact with international 
organisations, which is impossible for the KNU in Burma. Externally funded KNU 
organisations depend on their Thai base for communicating with funders, banking 
revenues and purchasing supplies, but increasing restrictions on the mobility and activities 
of the KNU on Thai soil by Thai authorities are causing increasing difficulties.  
As chapter five examined, since Thailand re-engaged with the Burmese State economically 
after the communist threat in the region disappeared after the end of the Cold War, Thai 
policies towards Burmese opposition groups based in its territory have been based more on 
Thai business interests than geopolitical concerns, leading to increased pressure on the 
KNU by its Thai host (Irrawaddy, 2009b). Thus, as Salehyan’s (2010) study of rebels and 
sanctuaries aptly describes, sanctuaries come with strings attached and can be a mixed 
blessing. KNU-affiliated organisations are not registered in Thailand as charities and 
                                                 
176 Interview with Saw H, (male aged 34) a KYO central leader, Mae Sot, 19th May 2009 
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around 95 per cent of staff based in KNU-affiliated offices on the Thai side of the border 
had no form of identification other than a KNU membership card at the time of research. 
Holding a KNU membership card used to prevent arrest while travelling around the local 
town, but since the Thai authorities have been placing more pressure on the KNU, the 
card has become almost worthless. As a result, participants in this study report that they are 
dependent upon the changing whims of local Thai officials for security and permission to 
travel and conduct meetings. Thus, as the following young leader explained, for young 
brokers there are significant difficulties as well as advantages to sanctuary in Thailand: 
Interviewer: “Why is your office in Thailand?” 
Naw H: “Working in Thailand you can talk with visitors and journalists easier. You 
cannot bring foreigners inside Karen State. It’s easier to do networking and communicate with 
other CBOs and NGOs.  
Interviewer: “Do you have any office in Burma?” 
Naw H: “We don’t work in the (Burmese) military-controlled area because we cannot do 
anything. Also along the border is territory that is not completely controlled by the KNU so 
you cannot keep a stable office and it’s difficult to move lots of equipment.  
Interviewer: “Are there any problems with your office in Thailand?” 
Naw H: “Working in Thailand has a security problem, you cannot move. Most of our 
friends do not have a legal document so face some problems some times and it costs money [in 
bribes to Thai officials] for that.”177 
Being located in Thailand has also been identified as a source of generational tensions 
among KNU organisations, as chapter six discussed in more depth. Naw H went on to 
explain that the increasing importance of youths is changing the hierarchy of power within 
KNU organisations: 
Interviewer: “Are there ever any problems between the younger and older women in 
KWO?” 
Naw H: “The old women say now this century is like the papaya – the small ones are at the 
top (of the tree) and the big ones at the bottom. Sometimes the conflict happens and they 
[KWO staff] have a meeting and discussion and negotiate.”178 
The KWO General Secretary attributed generational tensions among its staff in Thailand to 
the availability of information from the internet and the greater ability of young staff to 
access this: 
Interviewer: “Are there ever any problems between the younger and older women in 
KWO?” 
Nan Dah Eh Kler: “Sometimes there are disagreements between older and younger women 
about political views, but not big problems. This is because people have not the same view. 
Younger people have more education and older people have learned from their experience. The 
                                                 
177 Interview with Saw C, (male aged 29) a Burma Issues co-ordinator, Mae Sot, 28th January 2009 
178 Interview with Naw H, (female aged 34) a KWO leader, Mae Sot, 25th July 2009 
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youngsters also get more fast-changing information in English from the internet and 
internationally but elders cannot read English so cannot get the information.”179 
Meanwhile, on the Burmese side of the border, KNU-affiliated organisations continue to 
make use of the difficult terrain of the borderlands while conducting activities outside the 
control of the Burmese State. Young brokers in the KYO explained that the terrain enables 
them to traverse areas uncontrollable by the Burma Army, mobilising support for the KNU 
and undermining Burmese state-making practices. This case therefore demonstrates that 
difficult terrain has important non-military advantages to an armed opposition group 
because it enables the group to conduct underground political outreach activities. 
c) Youths and the transformation of the KNU’s governance services 
Chapter five argued that while the KNU controlled large areas of eastern Burma, it 
effectively operated as a de facto state and provided a variety of governance services to the 
civilian population in its areas. However, as the KNU has lost territory and revenues since 
the 1990s, its budget for governance services has greatly decreased. In this case, the KNU’s 
welfare wings and mass organisations have managed to develop relations with INGOs in 
the refugee camps in Thailand and use these to generate funding for the provision of 
governance services to populations in Karen State. This does not appear to have been a 
purposely crafted strategy, rather it emerged as a result of a constellation of factors: the 
KNU’s decline in territorial control, the increase in conflict in its former ‘liberated zones’, 
an escalating humanitarian crisis as a result of internal displacement and attacks on 
villagers’ livelihoods, a lack of KNU resources to respond to the need for humanitarian aid, 
an increase in INGOs bearing witness to the humanitarian crisis and political lobbying by 
diaspora and Western pressure groups of Western governments. 
Transformation to mobile delivery of governance services 
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a decline in territorially-based insurgencies 
(Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Mampilly (2011:253) argues that this is because the cost of 
holding territory outweighs the value it provides today. However, as Kalyvas and Balcells 
(2010) suggest, this may mean that the ‘technology of rebellion’ has changed, rather than an 
overall decline in rebellion itself. Kriger (1992:169, in Mampilly, 2011:54) argues that 
“controlling territory allows insurgents to offer utilitarian benefits to civilians in ways that 
groups without territory could never do” and Mampilly (2007) agrees that territorial control 
is a pre-condition to the delivery of governance services. However, this case shows that 
despite a great decline in KNU-controlled territory, with transformed revenue streams the 
                                                 
179 Interview with Nan Dah Eh Kler, KWO General Secretary, Mae Sot, 24th June 2009 
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KNU’s welfare wings and mass organisations manage to provide extensive welfare services 
to the civilian population in Karen State, including in partially-securitised and government-
controlled areas.  
What is particularly interesting about this is the way they have adopted the key advantages 
of guerrilla warfare used by the KNU’s military wing – mobility, favourable terrain, 
relationships with the local population, support from international allies and safe base 
areas, or sanctuary (Guevara, 2001:58; Loveman & Davies, 2001:4) – and applied them to 
the delivery of governance services. These strategies are also long familiar to villagers in 
hiding in Karen State where mobile livelihoods are adopted to evade state authority 
(Malseed, 2008:496). Mobility, familiarity with the terrain and local support are essential to 
the provision of a variety of governance services by the KNU and the NGOs from across 
the border in order to evade Burma Army troops who attack services and staff provided 
outside its own structures, (BPHWT, 2004; Lee et al, 2009; KHRG; 2006; KHRG, 2007; 
Lee et al., 2007:38; Malseed, 2008:499). Like guerrilla soldiers, mobile health service 
providers avoid using roads and bridges that are patrolled by the Burma Army and move 
through jungle paths instead (Lee et al., 2007:40). Meanwhile KYO district offices are 
occasionally mobile too with office stationery carried in a backpack while bulkier items, like 
typewriters, are stowed in a safe place (such as a cave or relative’s house in a refugee 
camp).180  
Given the absence of appropriate state services or international responses to the 
humanitarian crisis in eastern Burma, this assistance is very valuable and often the only 
viable way of reaching vulnerable people in the borderlands (South, 2011:40). However, it 
also enables the KNU to continue contesting Burmese state-making. The fungibility of 
external revenue sources enables the KNU’s welfare departments to remit back to the 
KNU’s central treasury the five per cent of the budget they are each officially granted, 
enabling a greater proportion of income to be spent on the army, who continue to contest 
Burmese state-making practices through guerrilla warfare.181 As chapter five argued, the aim 
is not to defeat the Burma Army militarily, but to put pressure on it to negotiate with the 
KNU. Furthermore, the KNU’s military wings frequently serve more as armed guards for 
migrating IDPs, the delivery of humanitarian assistance inside Karen State and roving 
bands of youth political training groups, journalists, researchers and religious groups.182 
                                                 
180 Discussions with KYO district leaders from Dooplaya district in 2009 
181 Interviews with Education, Health and IDP Relief department leaders between October 2008 and August 
2009. 
182 Discussions with KYO, KEWU and KNLA leaders during 2003 to 2009. HRW (2005, p.23) also notes 
that KNLA regularly organises village evacuations to protect villagers from Burma Army incursions. 
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Contesting state-making through non-military strategies 
This case illustrates how the KNU’s technology of rebellion is changing in the post-Cold 
War geopolitical environment and in a context of increasing involvement by humanitarian 
actors. It also shows how an armed opposition group may contest central state-making 
through non-military means in peripheral areas. Messages transmitted through community 
education and outreach programmes undermine those transmitted by the Burmese state 
and allow the KNU to provide alternative information and ideas to the Karen population. 
The articulation of alternative cultures and histories also undermines the state’s 
Burmanisation campaign.  Furthermore, political outreach programmes allow the KNU to 
build support for its political ideology, recreate its political culture and signal sovereignty 
internally, which can then be used to build external legitimacy (Horstmann, 2002; 
Mampilly, 2011:56). As a result, the Burmese State’s attempts to generate a degree of 
consent from the civilian population are undermined, which may then facilitate the civilian 
population’s attempts to resist more coercive methods of Burmese state-making.  
Giving material support (such as IDP relief) to populations attempting to remain outside 
state control also undermines the state-making practices of the Burma Army in areas it has 
yet to establish control, in particular its attempts to starve the villagers out of the hills and 
into relocation sites (KHRG, 2007b). The Burma Army’s attacks on aid workers in this 
function serves to confirm that it perceives aid workers operating outside its control as a 
threat. The distribution of aid also serves to build the KNU’s internal legitimacy even while 
it is provided by other organisations, because civilians view the KNU positively by 
comparison with the Burma Army for even allowing aid to be delivered in the area, rather 
than attacking it. As Naw Zipporah Sein stated: 
“The people see if the KNU does not allow them [NGOs] they cannot go inside [Karen 
State].”183 
More directly, material support provided by organisations affiliated to the KNU can build 
its internal legitimacy among the civilian population as part of the social compact, even if 
they have not funded or provided the aid themselves (South, 2011:35). A KYO leader 
involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid to IDPs inside Karen State who was 
interviewed as part of this study reported that donors insist he always explains where the 
aid is coming from and that it is not from the KNU, but despite this, the aid still legitimises 
the KNU in the recipients’ eyes because the KNU have facilitated its delivery184.  
                                                 
183 Interview with Naw Zipporah Sein, KNU General Secretary, Mae Sot, 11th December 2010 
184 Interview with a KYO leader, Mae Sot, 3rd June 2009 
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“FBR (Free Burma Rangers) and other relief work is taken advantage of by the KNU 
to show they work for the Karen people.”185 
This last point has long been a politically sensitive issue for the KNU’s welfare wings and 
the international donors who fund them. It originated as an issue in the Karen refugee 
camps in the 1990s when the KNU was argued to be controlling the distribution of aid and 
using it to build its own legitimacy (Christopher, 1998 and Lee, 2001, in Thawnghmung, 
2008:22; Callahan, 2007:37). Some commentators also argued that the refugee camps in 
Thailand were KNU villages transplanted on to Thai soil, constituting a non-territorial 
basis of power for the organisation (Christopher, in Thawnghmung, 2008:22). Likewise, the 
provision of cross-border aid from Thailand by organisations affiliated to the KNU has 
been argued to provide material support and legitimisation to the KNU, although there has 
been very little actual ‘aid leakage’ (South, 2011:41).  
Whether external funding for governance services legitimises an armed opposition group 
or undermines it among the local population is dependent upon whether the group can 
continue to position itself between the local community and the provision of governance 
services (Mampilly, 2011:90). Although the KNU has been forced to partially sever its 
welfare wings in order to qualify for donor funding (they remain politically accountable to 
KNU leaders), the fact that the same staff continue to be present in the reformed 
organisations can also be seen as the effective insertion of KNU staff into NGO structures. 
Moreover, since Karen staff, not foreigners, continue to be responsible for the delivery and 
distribution of governance services inside Burma, to the local population there may be little 
difference in their perception of where aid comes from.  
Although this is politically contentious, the provision of governance services may be very 
valuable to the civilian population in a conflict zone because, as Mampilly (2011:232-240) 
argues, stable rebel governance may decrease the humanitarian crisis and number of civilian 
deaths resulting from war-induced famine or health risks. It is also important to recognise 
that INGOs may have even less accountability to the local population than armed 
opposition groups and can leave a governance void when they withdraw from a country. 
With Zipporah Sein as the current KNU General Secretary, the KNU has increasingly 
emphasised the role it plays not just as a defensive force for the protection of villagers in 
Karen State but as a conduit and provider of humanitarian aid to displaced populations. An 
open letter from Zipporah Sein to the US House of Representatives, Committee of 
Foreign Affairs demonstrates how the KNU attempts to build external legitimacy through 
its provision of governance services: 
                                                 
185 Interview with an NGO leader / KNU official / KYO leader. Mae Sot, 23rd June 2009 
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“The KNU controls and operates in significant territory in Karen State. We 
operate local services, including schools and clinics. We provide safety and 
security to people fleeing attacks by the Burmese Army. However, the United 
Nations and governments refuse to work with us in delivering humanitarian 
assistance, providing education and other assistance to the population, most of 
whom live in poverty. One reason given for this is that we are an armed group. 
However, the largest armed group in Burma is the dictatorship, and the United 
Nations and governments work with them, despite the fact that they are 
illegitimate and break international law. Our Army is to defend civilians, not 
attack them as the Burmese Army does. In addition, we respect human rights 
and support democracy, and are a democratic organisation. We have also 
offered to abide by monitoring rules and requirements set by the UN or other 
donors, and unlike the dictatorship, place no restrictions on the delivery of aid. 
It does not, therefore, seem logical to refuse to work with the KNU.” (KNU, 
2009)  
 
3 Factors affecting youths’ non-military work in the KNU 
Enabling factors 
By studying youth non-military activities in the KNU, this study indicates that there are at 
least five important factors enabling youths’ non-military work, which then help the KNU 
to achieve its political and strategic goals in Burma. First, the KNU’s externally funded 
organisations are reliant upon continued sanctuary in Thailand. As several scholars identify, 
where a neighbouring state is sympathetic, or unable to secure its borders, the presence of 
an international border can be crucial for an armed opposition group by providing a 
sanctuary space, enabling the group to develop and grow (Gates, 2002). It also alters the 
balance of power as armed opposition groups unconstrained by boundaries gain an 
advantage over government troops who must usually respect boundaries (Salehyan, 2007). 
However, this case shows that sanctuary is only advantageous to the non-military side of 
the KNU’s operations, as it is no longer allowed to bring weapons across the border or 
command its troops from Thai soil.  
Second, mobile providers of governance services and mobile political outreach and 
community mobilising teams are dependent upon local support for hosting, feeding and 
managing the security of their staff, as well as facilitating the delivery of governance 
services through areas the KNU does not control. As a result, although the KNU is less 
reliant upon local taxation for its changed revenue streams, it remains reliant on non-
material local support in the form of intelligence, recruits and legitimacy. This may explain 
why the KNU does not appear to be transforming into a more predatory group (judging by 
human rights reports from the region), despite its material reliance on external ‘rents’ from 
INGOs and the sale of natural resources for income.  
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Third, youth workers in the KNU are reliant upon the sanctuary granted by the difficult 
terrain of the borderlands for covert travel around Karen State. Fourth, they are reliant 
upon transnational funding and non-material organisational assistance (for example, IT 
training). Fifth, they appear to benefit from a relative lack of appropriate governance 
services provided by either the Burmese State or other groups claiming political authority in 
Karen State. 
Constraining factors 
This study found at least four factors constraining youths’ non-military work, which then 
make it more difficult for the KNU to achieve its political and strategic goals in Burma. 
First, increasing pressure on the KNU by their Thai host is starting to affect youths’ non-
military activities as well as the KNU’s military operations. The Thai government has an 
incentive to allow cross-border aid to continue from its territory in order to prevent more 
people migrating across its border, but it has also come under pressure from the Burmese 
regime to suppress the activities of the opposition groups on its soil, which may reduce 
cross-border activities in future (South, 2011:35; Fink, 2008:460). Second, declining 
territorial control and increasing poverty and displacement has resulted in a lack of 
educated youths joining the KNU, which makes the organisation and management of non-
military work more difficult. At the time of research, many youths worked in several non-
military roles concurrently with different organisations due to the lack of appropriately 
skilled recruits. Third, refugee resettlement has taken away a large chunk of the KNU’s 
most skilled and experienced young staff and leaders. Fourth, negotiating funding for KNU 
youths’ non-military work in Burma remains to some extent constrained by state bias 
among INGO donors.  
4 Conclusion 
While chapters six and seven analysed internal organisational issues of social categories, 
inter-generational relations, recruitment, retention and exit among the youth cohort in the 
KNU, this chapter situated youths’ non-military roles and activities in KNU-affiliated 
organisations within a context of changing strategies of conflict and state-making in eastern 
Burma. Analysis of the non-military roles that youths are involved in highlighted important 
political and social welfare roles of youths within an armed opposition group and 
demonstrated how the KNU’s changing political and strategic goals have affected these. It 
also pointed to the factors that constrain or enable youths’ non-military work and how 
these impact upon the achievement of the KNU’s goals. Clearly there are important 
political and practical implications of these findings, which are discussed in the following, 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and implications: Youth participation 
patterns and non-military roles in the KNU 
This study focused on the non-military roles of youths within an armed opposition group. 
It aimed to show how micro level processes and broader structural conditions interact to 
shape youth roles and non-military participation within the KNU, which have in turn 
played a role in shaping the strategic orientation and activities of the organisation in its 
struggle against the Burmese state. It set out to understand these issues by exploring the 
central research question:  
How and why do youths participate in non-military roles in the KNU, and what are the 
effects of their participation?  
This question was divided into a set of three sub-questions: 
1. How is ‘youth’ defined and understood in the KNU and why are they so defined? 
2. Why do youths take on non-military roles in the KNU and what factors influence their 
career trajectory within the movement?  
3. What is the purpose of youth non-military roles in the KNU and how are these roles 
shaped by the KNU’s political and strategic goals?  
The first part of the thesis focused on the broader literature on youth participation in 
armed opposition groups. Chapter two examined how the term ‘youth’ can be understood 
and how young people are involved in armed conflict. Although this study was concerned 
with youth involvement in a particular type of political armed opposition group, I drew on 
a broad body of literature concerned with young people’s participation in a variety of forms 
of collective violence.   It argued that youth participation in armed opposition groups is the 
product of a complex interplay of structural, organisational and individual factors which 
vary across time and space and are rooted in historical experiences of conflict in society. 
The chapter provided a tentative framework for analysing youth participation that aims to 
encompass the structural, organisational and individual dimensions of youth engagement, 
which also draws upon Hirschman’s (1970) ideas of exit, voice and loyalty in institutions. 
Chapter three focused in more detail on the nature of armed opposition groups, arguing 
that there is a need to appreciate the particular characteristic of opposition groups in the 
context of protracted peripheral conflicts. The starting point for this analysis was the 
nature of the central state and the dialectical relationship between centre and periphery, 
state and non state. An historical, political economy perspective on state formation and 
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state-making practices on the periphery yielded insights into how and why armed groups in 
the periphery violently contest the state and lay claim to public authority.  
Chapter four outlined the research methodology and argued that a mix of anthropology-
based research methods were most appropriate. The chapter then describes the fieldwork 
period, the challenges and limitations arising as a result of the methodology adopted and 
how they were met or mitigated. 
The focus shifted in chapter five to an analysis of the KNU and its conflict with the 
Burmese state. It explained the outbreak of conflict as the result of ethnocratic state-
making in the centre and a legacy of self-rule in the borderlands, resulting in marginalised 
Karen elites entering into an alliance with borderland peasants to repel Burmese state-
making. The chapter then examined changing modes of state-making and contestation 
between the Burmese state and the KNU. It argued that incomplete and fractured state-
making practices have resulted in a complex mosaic of sovereignty and control in the 
borderlands and examined the nature of conflict, control and youth political action in four 
different zones.   
Chapter six proceeded to address the first research sub-question: How is ‘youth’ defined 
and understood in the KNU and why are they so defined? It argued that a constellation of 
factors combined to induce the KNU to focus on regenerating its ageing political 
leadership through the creation of a youth wing. The chapter then analysed the effects the 
creation of a youth category has had on inter-generational relations and youth voice in the 
KNU.  
Chapter seven addressed the second research sub-question: Why do youths take on non-
military roles in the KNU and what factors influence their career trajectory within the 
movement? It built on the four different zones of governance and control identified in 
chapter five and the framework of participation factors developed in chapter two to 
examine youth participation patterns from recruitment to exit. 
Chapter eight addressed the third research sub-question: What is the purpose of youth 
non-military roles to the KNU and how are these roles shaped by the KNU’s political and 
strategic goals? By examining the KNU through the lens of youth programmes and 
activities, the research highlights the interaction between internal organisational dynamics 
and shifting structural conditions at the international, national and local levels. It shows 
how the growing significance of youth within the KNU has paralleled the growth of the 
welfare and humanitarian arms of the organisation, which in turn is a reflection of strategic 
adaptation in the light of shifts in the Burmese state’s own state-making practices. The 
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main findings are discussed in more detail after a brief summary of the background to the 
case. This is followed by the thesis’s contribution to the wider literature and policy 
implications. 
Background to the case 
The approach adopted in this study was an analysis of youth participation situated within a 
historical context of state-making and peripheral conflict. The analysis of state formation in 
Burma in chapter five argued that since independence from colonial rule, ethnic politics 
and violent practices of state formation have displaced pre-colonial power-holders, 
traditional agrarian relations and peasant control of land, contributing to conflict. The 
KNU is an exceptionally long-running, ethno-nationalist armed group with a degree of 
public authority in eastern Burma. After independence, it quickly became a significant 
power-holder, controlling large swathes of territory, resources and black market trade in the 
eastern borderlands, almost creating a de facto state in the process. However, after the Cold 
War ended, policies and priorities directed towards the borderland armed groups from the 
Burmese state and its neighbours changed. The Burmese state controlled and limited access 
to rents and used these to co-opt locally and regionally powerful armed actors, including 
elements of the KNU and its military wing.   
Since the early 1990s, the Burmese state has relied upon patrimonial politics to build its 
power base and militarisation and counter insurgency to strengthen its grip over the 
borderland areas. As a result, the KNU has declined in power and territorial control, 
splintered into competing armed militias and suffered from crises of leadership. 
Symptomatic of this decline is the division of areas where they operate into four different 
spaces of governance and control in eastern Burma and the Thai border area: government 
controlled ‘white zones’; partially-securitised areas with multiple, overlapping claims to 
authority by different armed groups; KNU-controlled areas; and exile spaces in Thailand. 
Facing a changing context of conflict and state-making, the KNU has been forced to adapt 
its strategies of reproduction and legitimacy-building. It’s political and governance activities 
are a key mode of contesting Burmese state-making practices with a number of important 
non-military roles for youths. 
1 Key findings and contributions of this thesis to the research literature 
a) Creating ‘youth’ in the KNU: the influence of history, geography and conflict 
This research project sought to understand why there was a specific ‘youth’ category in a 
context of armed opposition to a state, how it was constructed and how it is affected by the 
changing dynamics of conflict. Chapter six found that ‘youth’ in the KNU is a particular 
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construction referring to males and females between the ages of 15 and 35 which also 
interacts with other social categories including gender, religion, locale and language group. 
For example, being a youth in an ethno-nationalist armed group like the KNU means being 
an ethnic Karen youth. In practice, in the youth wing, it often also means being a male youth 
since female youths gravitate towards the women’s wing. Although the KNU uses a 
defined age range to refer to its youth category, as Durham (2000) argues, the term ‘youth’ 
is more an indicator of social relations than an absolute reference to a fixed age group. As 
explored in chapter six, youths are explicitly positioned by the KNU as nascent political 
leaders subordinate to elder political and military leaders until they transition into the 
parent party.  
As previous studies of youth in conflict have argued (e.g. McIntyre, 2006; Fithen & 
Richards, 2005; Parsons, 2004; Marks, 2001), this study found that the term ‘youth’ in an 
armed group is very much a social construction, which serve particular institutional and 
ideological functions.  However, it is also argued that the construction and positioning of a 
‘youth’ category is influenced by the organisational history of the group. Although the 
KNU had an identifiable ‘youth’ category at the time of research, in its early days a 
politicised and powerful youth wing posed a threat to the leadership resulting in the KNU 
operating without a youth wing for the next forty years. A number of factors coalesced to 
compel the KNU to reform its youth wing in the 1980s as a result of a changing 
international context, shifts in the state-making and counter-insurgency strategies of the 
Burmese state and political repression in urban areas. The crises that ensued in the KNU 
resulted in a leadership re-shuffle which worked in favour of younger generations as key 
patrons of the ‘youth’ cohort gained ascendance. However, when the KNU reformed its 
youth wing, fear of factionalism and the potential threat of a powerful ‘youth’ cohort 
influenced the way it positioned its ‘youth’ cadres, resulting in a particular construction of 
‘youth’ which politicised but did not militarise young people’s roles.  This effect is less well 
known because previous studies of armed groups have tended to consider how the 
category of youth is used to rally younger generations for violence (For example, Fithen & 
Richards, 2005; Parsons, 2004). 
Rather than simply being a defined age range, Durham (2000) argues that youth categories 
are socially constructed and relational constructs which serve to regulate social interaction 
by age. This is supported to some extent by the research but it presents a more nuanced 
picture which on the one hand shows how the KNU aims to regulate political actions of 
the 15-35 age cohort, and on the other, how a youth wing can negotiate some political and 
operational autonomy. Although the youth wing of the KNU is politically constrained by a 
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parent organisation that seeks to shape its behaviour, I have argued that there are a number 
of ways in which it operates with some political and operational autonomy. First, younger 
participants occupy positions of authority and influence in KNU structures in their own 
right. Second, the constitution of youths in the KNU as a nascent political leadership as 
well as representatives of their peers resulted in youth leaders being granted some voting 
power over KNU policies.  Third, since the KNU has used the youth wing to mobilise the 
local Karen population in eastern Burma, they have empowered youths to represent the 
organisation. This empowerment is negotiated within KNU structures as youth and elder 
leaders try to agree on the ‘proper’ degree of political voice and influence, maintaining a 
fine balance between youth autonomy and constraint. 
It is an area of particular concern for non-military KNU-affiliated organisations in Thailand 
because socialisation of youth participants in a different political and cultural context, 
increasing contact with Western INGOs and greater political and operational freedom has 
contributed to generational tension. Furthermore, youth organisations and activities have 
expanded outside those initially proscribed by the party leadership which has limited the 
KNU’s coercive power over its youth cohort. Thus, while youths may initially have been 
constituted as politically active but subordinate to the elder leadership, the changing 
context of conflict over time as well as differences in the geographic space of the KNU’s 
operations have changed inter-generational relations and the internal distribution of power 
such that those categorised as ‘youths’ also operate now as political agents in their own 
right. As a result, it is clear from this study that a ‘youth’ category constructed within an 
armed opposition group is dynamic and partly influenced by factors outside the group’s 
control. 
Where an armed opposition group operates in an area of INGO activity, INGOs 
themselves can be an influencing factor. This case demonstrated that the political and 
operational developments of youth organisations are not just shaped by the parent party 
but also by INGO donors and external interventions. Hence, although a youth wing may 
often appear to be subservient to party elders, this case supports Nolte’s (2004) and Leao’s 
(2004) argument that young participants may also have a fair amount of autonomy in their 
day to day operations. Non-military youth cadres within an armed opposition group should 
therefore be conceptualised as actors subject to hierarchical structures of control 
influenced by generational relations and the nature and organisational history of the group, 
but also as actors with some capacity for independent action. Or, as Jabri (1996:70) argues, 
while individuals may be purposive actors, they also act within institutions which constrain 
and legitimate decisions depending on the dynamics of the situation. 
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Besides organisational history, the changing dynamics of conflict and differences in the 
geographic space of the KNU’s operations, a range of other key factors shaped patterns of 
youth recruitment for non-military roles within the group. 
b) Mobilising youths from recruitment to exit 
Chapter two argued that much is now known about how young people are recruited into 
and participate in military roles in armed opposition groups but less is known about those 
participating in non-military roles. However, this thesis argues that non-military youth 
cadres are important participants in an armed opposition group because of the roles they 
play in building the group’s legitimacy and regenerating its political leadership.  As such, an 
armed opposition group needs to mobilise and manage the career progression of non-
military youth recruits. Since the KNU operates in multiple zones with differing patterns of 
governance and control, chapter seven examined patterns of youth recruitment and 
progression in each of the four zones previously identified. 
Youth recruitment into the KNU: the interplay of individual motivations, group 
needs and local conditions 
Life histories of young participants and interviews with KNU recruiters revealed that many 
participants cite grievances with agents of the Burmese state (usually the army) as reasons 
for joining the KNU (see page 190). Recruiters stated that grievances often combined with 
local political desires to pressure the state to reform or drive its armed forces out of the 
borderlands in order to regain self-rule (see page 200). However, interviews with recruiters 
and an examination of the secondary literature (cf: KHRG,  2009:191) suggest that most 
young people in areas close to KNU organisations do not join up and outmigration is a 
more common response.  
More compelling reasons for joining were local histories and links to the KNU, whether 
this was through close proximity to the group; family, friendship or community ties, or 
through outreach work by armed group recruiters. The context and history of the KNU’s 
territorial control were important factors because in areas where the KNU still retained a 
presence, its discourses framing participation were well-instituted and youths appeared to 
view their participation as akin to civil service. In other areas, village, family or individual 
links to the KNU facilitated youth participation. As Humphries and Weinstein (2006:449 in 
Mampilly, 2011:218) argue, when individuals have community ties to an armed opposition 
group they are more likely to join.  
Interestingly, close links to the group were found in this case to have little effect on young 
people in refugee camps resulting in very small numbers of recruits joining from the 
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camps. (pages 205-206). In this case, the lack of refugee recruitment into the KNU 
appeared to be due to differences in the governance regime of refugees’ lives in Thailand 
and the presence of resettlement opportunities. Constraints on political campaigning by the 
KNU in Thailand further inhibited recruitment both from the refugee camps and among 
migrant workers in Thailand. This finding is surprising given the number of academic 
studies of  ‘refugee warriors’  which highlight the role that  refugee camps play in providing 
base camps and a pool of recruits to armed opposition group (Lischer, 2005; Loescher et 
al., 2007). This research found that a very different local context of young people’s lives in 
the refugee camps, as well as the presence of resettlement opportunities effectively limited 
their voluntary participation in the group.  
This research also added a new insight into how armed group recruiters view refugees. 
Chapter seven argued that refugees are not necessarily the most desirable recruits for an 
armed group because, despite their higher levels of education, they may be the least loyal to 
the organisation, which results in high staff turnover and a loss of skilled workers. Thus, as 
Terry (2002) argues, the chief benefit of a refugee population to an armed group is not the 
pool of recruits they provide, but the legitimising function they serve. 
By examining how young people came to participate in the KNU from very different areas 
of Burma, this research indicated that localised histories and differences in governance and 
control significantly affect the way in which young people are recruited into and retained by 
armed opposition groups, as Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) and Humphreys and Weinstein 
(2008) suggest. As a result, for an armed opposition group which operates in multiple 
zones there are multiple patterns of participation among the youth cohort. However, 
individual motivations and life decisions were also significant. Thus, as Long’s (1992) actor-
oriented approach suggests, youth participation in an armed opposition group is best 
understood as a complex interaction between individuals, groups and social structures. 
Matching recruits to non-military roles: the importance of education 
In seeking to understand which youths were directed into non-military roles, this study 
found that education is closely linked to patterns of youth participation. Youths are 
incentivised to access alternative education opportunities provided by KNU-affiliated 
organisations as a result of the lack of appropriate education services provided by the 
Burmese state (pages 190-194). Chapter seven found that a youth’s education level was 
then instrumental in determining the eventual role they took on once recruited. More 
educated youths joined higher levels of KNU structures and were directed into 
management and leadership roles, political roles or work within the KNU’s welfare wings. 
As a result, youths from more stable areas and/or more wealthy family backgrounds 
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dominate in non-military and management roles while youths from conflict zones/IDP 
areas appear to be more prevalent in lower skilled and military roles, despite forming the 
majority of recruits. However, this was not the sole influencing factor; once again, Long’s 
(1992) positioning of actors as individuals whose behaviour is mediated by external 
conditions was demonstrated in this case as a young person’s education level also 
combined with their own interests, the institutional needs of the KNU and broader cultural 
norms concerning gender roles (pages 206-209).  
Who is selected for political leadership training? The influence of loyalty, ethnicity 
and education 
Education patterns are also significant in understanding the progression of recruits from 
military to non-military roles. Life histories with young, former soldiers and interviews with 
KNU recruiters indicated that since the organisation has a great shortage of highly 
educated recruits in non-military leadership and managerial positions, highly educated 
youths in the military were permitted and even encouraged to transition into non-military 
roles (see pages 174 and 208). 
Education was specifically used as a tool to recruit and train the KNU’s next generation of 
political leaders. This study revealed patterns of leadership regeneration and youth career 
progression in the KNU by examining youth leadership training process in chapter eight 
(pages 225-230). Key factors influencing which youths were directed into leadership 
training programmes were found to be loyalty, ethnicity and education. Youths resident in 
refugee camps were less likely to be admitted to leadership training through KNU 
structures because they were far more likely to exit on resettlement programmes, while 
youths living in areas which are not loyal to the KNU were less likely to be trusted by 
recruiters. Since ethnicity is believed to be one indicator of political allegiance, only ethnic-
Karen youths were accepted into leadership training programmes. Entry to political 
leadership training was also dependent on having a relatively high level of education, which 
perpetuates a pattern of middle class, Christian leadership due to the linkages of religion 
with schooling provision in eastern Burma. 
The interplay of exit, voice and loyalty among the youth cohort 
Chapter two found that few studies have considered how young participants exit an armed 
opposition group. This study aimed to address this gap in knowledge by examining non-
militarised youth exit from the KNU (pages 213-216). It found that differing political, 
economic and governance contexts in the multiple spaces of KNU operations resulted in 
different exit patterns. Poverty and a lack of energy and interest (due to long working hours 
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in occupations outside the KNU and the protracted nature of conflict) appeared to be 
significant in explaining youth exit in Burma, while exit for work in INGOs or to a third 
country though the refugee resettlement programme were more significant among youths 
in Thailand. These findings indicate that young recruits are not permanently tied to armed 
groups and that exit is fundamentally linked to territorial control. Without stringent 
territorial control an armed opposition group cannot control exit. 
The relationship between voice, loyalty and exit among younger generations of an armed 
opposition group is also under-theorised. By using Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit, voice 
and loyalty in organisations, this thesis argued that the presence of easy exit options can 
give youth cadres more voice in an armed opposition group.  However, this is likely only to 
be the case if the armed group tries to prevent exit by nurturing loyalty and allowing more 
voice so that members feel they have a stake in the group’s goals and direction. An armed 
group is likely to focus on nurturing loyalty if other, more coercive methods or material 
incentives to maximise retention are not possible. This was the case for the KNU because 
its coercive power and financial resources were in decline. As Hirschman (1970:92-93) 
argues, instituting mechanisms for members to voice their opinions is in a group’s long-
term interest because it enables it to respond and adapt to changing concerns, however, as 
yet there is no evidence to suggest that this will prevent factionalism in the KNU. 
c)  Non-military youth roles in the KNU: leadership regeneration and legitimacy 
building 
A non-militarised ‘youth’ category may be more important to an armed opposition group 
which dedicates greater resources to its non-military operations and internal bureaucracy. 
The internal organisation of armed opposition groups, including the skill and style of its 
leadership have previously been found to be important factors in determining when armed 
groups can mount and maintain an effective challenge to the state (Guevara, 2001; 
Weinstein, 2007; Clapham, 1998). However, chapter three found that relatively few studies 
focus on the internal management and organisational structure in such groups (Gates, 
2002).  
Chapter eight examined the purpose of youths’ non-military roles in the KNU and how 
they are shaped by the organisation’s political and strategic goals. It found that although the 
KNU’s youth wing was re-convened to regenerate its political leadership, the changing 
dynamics of conflict resulted in three key non-military roles for the KNU’s youth cohort: 
regenerating political leadership for the KNU; brokering the KNU’s internal and external 
legitimacy; and providing social welfare services linked to the KNU’s governance strategies. 
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Regenerating political leaders in practice: The influence of organisational 
leadership and history, gender norms and INGOs 
Some studies (for example, Twum-Danso, 2004; Leao, 2004; Nolte, 2004, Parsons, 2004) 
have found that armed groups regenerate themselves long term through their youth wings. 
This research added a new insight into the regeneration process by examining the factors 
that combine to induce an armed opposition group to focus on political leadership 
regeneration. It also added a detailed insight into how youth leadership training is 
conducted by an armed opposition group’s youth wing and women’s wing in practice.  An 
examination of the KNU’s leadership training programmes in this study found that while 
leadership regeneration is important to an armed opposition group seeking longevity, the 
skill and style of the group’s political leadership and outside sources of funding affect its 
youth training processes (see pages 225-230).  
Chapter eight argued that youth leadership training is affected by the presence of INGO 
funding streams. Competing training needs for young participants in KNU organisations 
funded by INGOs can result in youths developing the skills necessary for liaison with 
external donors but inadequate for political leadership. It also argued that leadership 
regeneration is likely to be affected by patterns of recruitment for youth leadership training 
programmes. In this case, these favoured educated, middle class youths from particular 
regions, religions and ethnicities. 
Despite these challenges, this study argued that incorporating young political leaders into 
an armed opposition group can result in increased political representation of younger 
generations. But it also pointed to how these advances are affected by institutionalised 
gender biases and organisational histories of military and elder domination in the group’s 
political leadership. 
Youths in political leadership training processes are important to the internal regeneration 
of an armed opposition group, but this study found that youths are also important in roles 
related to building the armed group’s legitimacy. 
Youth brokers of an armed opposition group’s legitimacy 
A specific ‘youth’ category may have initially been created to regenerate the political 
leadership of the KNU, but this study found that the changing dynamics of conflict over 
time have resulted in its youth wing taking on roles as brokers of the organisation’s internal 
and external legitimacy. 
Youth as internal brokers of legitimacy 
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Chapter three argued that groups aiming for longevity who are reliant on a form of local 
taxation and support (whether cash or in kind) must build both their legitimacy and a 
public fear of penalties should people refuse to pay their taxes (Naylor, 2004). They have to 
distinguish their legitimacy from that of the state, with whom they compete for territory, 
populations and resources (Naylor, 2004). As Mao and Guevara argued, an important way 
to build legitimacy is to communicate the goals of the group to the civilian population and 
mobilise support for the group’s political agenda (Boudreau, 2002; Winthropp and Graff, 
2010; Mampilly, 2011:13).  
The role of youth cadres in shoring up grassroots support for armed opposition groups is 
well known (for example, Leao, 2004; Nolte, 2004). Wickham-Crowley’s (1992) study of 
revolutions finds that the way in which armed groups often do this is by using the skills of 
unusually well educated participants from rural areas who can move through many social 
worlds communicating with different people, thereby reducing the ‘social distance’ between 
guerrillas and peasant supporters.  
Chapter eight argued that as the KNU’s armed wings and organising department have 
declined in size and reach, its youth wing has taken on many of their community mobilising 
functions, especially among younger generations (see page 230-236). Youth community 
organisers traverse large areas of eastern Burma conducting political training workshops for 
youths and managing the flow of political ideology and strategy between the KNU and its 
civilian support base. They also reproduce the political culture of the KNU and its 
representations of sovereignty, for example, by singing the KNU’s ‘national anthem’ and 
displaying the KNU’s ‘national’ flag at training events. Effectively they are ‘brokers’ of the 
KNU’s internal legitimacy. 
This study found four factors which made the KNU’s youth cohort more suited to 
mobilising youth cadres within the grassroots community than their elder counterparts: the 
scale and reach of youth networks; the greater strength and energy of youths, as well as 
their lack of dependants; the existence of social roles for village youth groups, which can 
act as a cover for political training; and their ability to liaise with civilian youth as peers. 
Youths as external brokers of legitimacy 
Chapter three argued that in Terry’s (2002) analysis of humanitarian aid, the primary benefit 
of a refugee population to an armed opposition group is the external legitimacy function 
they serve, raising the profile of a ‘victimised’ population and attracting both sympathy and 
aid. Chapter five found that the KNU’s welfare wings have not only attracted external aid 
for services to refugee populations but have also managed to extend this to deliver 
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governance services to populations inside eastern Burma. Critical to this process is the role 
of ‘external brokers’ who mediate between INGO donors, the KNU and the recipient 
population. 
This is critical to the KNU because INGO funding is important for the continued 
provision of governance services by armed opposition groups with limited resources of 
their own. However, organisations affiliated to armed opposition groups struggle to build 
their legitimacy among external funders as a result of their political ties. This study showed 
how the KNU’s youth and welfare wings have largely been reformulated as local NGOs or 
CBOs in order to qualify for INGO funding (see page 246). External brokers then manage 
funding relationships with external donors and welfare service provision relationships with 
the local population, but also remain politically accountable to the KNU. This situation 
requires brokers to represent their organisation in different ways to different stakeholders.  
This study builds on Mosse and Lewis’s (2006:16) concept of ‘brokers’ in development 
projects, discussed in chapter three by showing how youth brokers manage relationships 
with external donors and the legitimacy of organisations affiliated to armed opposition 
groups. External brokers manage flows of funds and services and negotiate representations 
of meanings, policies and priorities in order to build coherent projects. 
 
Figure 155  Strategic positions of brokers linked to an armed opposition group 
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Chapter eight found that depending on whether they are brokering internal or external 
legitimacy, different skills are required of these young brokers, but both are reliant upon 
the participation of highly educated recruits. Internal brokers need to convey political ideas 
and be able to relate both to the armed group’s leadership and the local population, thus, 
participants drawn from the local population but who have received a high level of 
education are ideal. External brokers need to be able to communicate with external funders 
in English, using the language of INGOs and through the medium of IT. As a result, an 
armed opposition group may devote significant resources to recruiting and training non-
military youths in these skills. 
The significance of this role may be demonstrated by examining an armed opposition 
group’s funding streams. Chapter five found that the KNU’s education, health and IDP 
departments received combined INGO funding more than four times the revenue of the 
KNU’s central treasury (page 148). Furthermore, the headcount of non-military KNU-
affiliated staff is many times that of its military wings (page 207). The youth wing itself has 
approximately the same number of active youth workers as the KNU’s army (KNLA). This 
indicates that many more youths are needed to participate in non-military than military 
roles. 
Governance and Legitimacy: Youth providers of an armed group’s governance 
services 
External brokers of an armed opposition group’s legitimacy are particularly important in 
situations where the group is reliant upon external funding for part of its operations. In this 
case, the KNU is reliant upon INGO funding for its governance services. Chapter three 
argued that secessionist and ethno-nationalist armed groups intent on securing regional 
autonomy were found to be particularly likely to establish governance systems. This is 
because they have to rely on and convince a specific ethnic or national group that they 
offer a better alternative than the state (Mampilly, 2007:31; Weinstein, 2007). Entire 
administrative systems may be established in addition to the military as power-holders seek 
to prove their capacity for governance and provide collective benefits to their supporters in 
order to build legitimacy (Weinstein, 2007).  
Even when an armed group no longer funds these services itself and partially severs its 
welfare wings to allow them to qualify for INGO funding, this study found some 
indications that it can continue to accrue legitimacy among the civilian population just by 
facilitating the provision of services. This can buttress an armed opposition group’s claims 
to represent the population, thereby building its external legitimacy (Mampilly, 2011:31).  
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This study examined how youths are involved in the provision of education and 
humanitarian relief services. While it did not find any particular advantage to having youths 
in this role, it gave a detailed picture of how the provision of governance services builds an 
armed opposition group’s legitimacy. Chapter eight argued that young people involved in 
the provision of governance services effectively challenge central state-making practices by 
transmitting alternative information, narratives, symbols and ideas and providing assistance 
that helps local populations to live outside the reach of the state (see pages 251-253).  
This study added a new insight into how an armed opposition group can change its modes 
of governance provision as it loses territorial control. Naylor’s (2004) study showed how 
armed opposition groups bureaucratise and expand their non-military activities as they 
progress from roving bandits to fully established governance regimes, but it did not explain 
what happens as an armed group loses territory. This study found that although the KNU 
has declining territorial control its governance services have not contracted. Instead, it 
showed how an armed opposition group’s governance services may continue despite the 
loss of territory and resources by adapting to the international aid agenda and partnering 
with INGOs. As Zahar, (2001, in Mampilly, 2011:89) argues, armed opposition groups 
with a more limited resource base have a strong incentive to develop relations with 
transnational actors in order to generate revenues. As a result, chapter three argued that 
many armed opposition groups rely to an extent on external aid for the funding of their 
governance services (Bob, 2006, in Mampilly, 2007:37). 
While armed opposition groups and INGOs may work together to deliver governance 
services in conflict-affected areas they have different intentions. INGOs seek to provide 
welfare and humanitarian services to a civilian population and may inadvertently undermine 
the state in the process, while armed opposition groups intentionally seek to undermine 
certain aspects of state-making by providing alternative welfare and humanitarian services 
(and the messages they contain) to the civilian population. As Mampilly (2007) argues, the 
provision of governance is a strategic decision to garner civilian consent for rebel rule. 
Youths (and INGOs) involved in the provision of these services are, therefore, involved in 
processes which monopolise the social, political and economic inter-relations of a defined 
community (Mampilly, 2011:237). 
Mampilly (2011) argues that armed opposition groups have sought to claim legitimacy by 
mimicking state sovereignty, but this study found that changing theoretical approaches to 
state sovereignty as state capacity to meet the human needs of its population, rather than 
political independence are also mimicked by armed groups adapting to new ‘technologies 
of rebellion’ (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). Armed opposition groups may claim legitimacy, 
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even sovereignty, on the basis that their governance services meet the obligations of a state 
to its civilian population in the state’s absence or neglect. This case therefore demonstrates 
the argument made in chapter three that a reified and absolutist understanding of the state 
and sovereignty in unhelpful in understanding conflict and power in the peripheries of 
developing states since armed opposition groups may be intimately involved in the 
provision of alternative forms of rule and regulation.  
Although it has previously been assumed that territorial control is essential to the provision 
of governance services by armed groups (Mampilly, 2007:245), this case demonstrates that 
territorial control is not essential. The KNU’s governance services were delivered as mobile 
services when territorial control made fixed services impossible by adapting methods of 
guerrilla warfare already familiar to the KNU and local populations (pages 250-251). This 
reduced the need for fixed positions in Burma, however, it is dependent upon a relatively 
stable sanctuary and delivery routes from Thailand. This finding adds an important new 
dimension to understanding the ‘geography of conflict’ (Herbst, 2000). The military 
benefits of difficult terrain and sanctuary in neighbouring countries are already well known 
(Herbst, 2000; Salehyan, 2010; Gates, 2002), but this case demonstrates that they have 
important non-military advantages to an armed opposition group too. It showed how they 
are critical to internal processes of leadership regeneration, management and organisation 
of the group’s bureaucracy (especially INGO revenue raising and reporting processes) and 
the delivery of governance services. 
2 Policy implications 
The numbers and significance of youths working in non-military roles in this case suggests 
that militarised youth should not be the only focus in theory and policies concerned with 
armed opposition groups. Sustaining and regenerating the organisation through long-term 
external and internal changes are just as important as the armed war, as is building the 
legitimacy of the group in order to signal its strength to the state and win non-military 
concessions. Youths working to achieve these goals are, therefore, at the nexus of 
processes of contestation over state-making. Where this work is funded by INGOs there 
are important policy implications.  
INGOs, governance services and armed opposition groups 
By becoming involved in the provision of governance services with armed opposition 
groups, INGOs are directly involved in processes of political contestation. This is a 
politically contentious point because of state bias in external approaches to armed 
opposition groups (Mampilly, 2011:243). The political nature of providing external funding 
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to organisations linked to armed opposition groups has been discussed at length in the 
humanitarian aid literature and has previously arisen as a source of concern among 
organisations providing aid to Karen refugees in Thailand (Thawnghmung, 2008:22; 
Callahan, 2007:37). However it is also important to recognise that the political ramifications 
of subverting armed opposition groups’ political authority or providing aid through a 
predatory form of state are examined in much less detail. As Mampilly (2011) argues, one 
way to deal with this issue is to prioritise the welfare and viewpoints of civilians and 
recognise the politics of all humanitarian interventions, rather than approaching the subject 
with a bias towards the state. 
It may be more problematic to ignore the political origins of humanitarian interventions 
and social problems that organisations affiliated to armed opposition groups work to 
address because, as this case found, it can lead organisations to mask the political side of 
their operations to donors. Such organisations may themselves prefer to work with INGOs 
to address the political causes of social problems, not just its effects. 
INGOs may be in a unique position to influence political processes in armed opposition 
groups. This study found that INGOs working with such groups have opportunities to 
support the political empowerment of youths and effect positive social and political 
change, for example by advocating gender equality. In the Burmese context, the same 
approach could be taken to address ethnic divisions. Publically challenging ethnic divisions 
remains difficult for youth leaders in the KNU, even while they privately express 
recognition of the problem. In this respect, they effectively reproduce the ethno-nationalist 
political culture of the group, however, this should not be taken to mean they blindly 
follow the parent party. As Jeffrey (2012:250) points out, “young people’s involvement in 
reproducing and deepening established structures of power is never a consequence of their 
being simply brainwashed…political action always involves compromise”. In working with 
youths affiliated to armed opposition groups, however, it is important for INGOs to 
recognise that there are unavoidable political hierarchies and relationships to the parent 
party which youth leaders must negotiate as part of their operations. In a highly militarised 
and politicised context of conflict it is very difficult for any organisation to operate 
independently of political and military power holders. This may be of concern to INGOs 
but the operational and political limitations of work in conflict zones need not necessarily 
preclude outside support.  
Youth in war to peace transitions in Burma 
Currently in Burma there is an unprecedented level of political change. The political 
capacity of a youth wing like the KYO can have both positive and negative implications for 
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any imminent war to peace transitions. First, political cadres need different types of 
programmes from the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes directed 
towards military cadres. Second, they can affect fragile political processes because of their 
high levels of political awareness and experience in political campaigning and community 
mobilising. They have the capacity to be a force for positive change, but as McEvoy-Levy 
(2006) points out, they are often neglected in political agreements at the elite level. They are 
also often expected to return to pre-war inter-generational relations, but as this case 
demonstrates, young participants working for the KNU in exile in Thailand have 
experienced a substantial increase in political freedom and may be unwilling to give these 
gains up. These issues could usefully be addressed in multi-party discussions around how 
peace processes both affect and are affected by young participants in armed opposition 
groups.  
In the post-conflict period the skills and experience of participants in armed opposition 
groups like the KNU could usefully be transformed for peace-building and state-building 
purposes. The KNU may transform into a recognised political party and retain a youth 
wing in a purely political role. Alternatively its youth and women’s wings, as well as its 
social welfare wings, could transfer into sub-state governance structures or become fully 
independent NGOs.  
In the meantime, this case shows how improving bilateral relations between host and home 
countries can put increasing pressure on an exiled armed opposition group. While host 
pressure may force it to the negotiating table, the Burmese case indicates that without a 
political settlement it is unlikely to stem the flow of refugees and migrant workers. Host 
policies preventing political campaigning and recruitment appear, in this case, to be quite 
effective at preventing the recruitment and retention of youths into armed opposition 
groups. The provision of education in refugee camps may also divert youths away from 
armed groups. This case found that young people access education provided by the KNU 
to fill the gap in state provision in Burma. This indicates that if the state or another 
provider were to provide more appropriate and accessible education services, there may be 
less of an incentive for youths to seek education through armed opposition groups. 
3 Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a corrective to mainstream accounts of youth participation in 
armed opposition groups which have focused primarily on their violent actions to the 
detriment of understanding their participation patterns in non-violent roles and the effects 
these have. It used a case study of youths working in the youth and welfare wings of an 
armed opposition group to analyse the complex interactions shaping individual decision 
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making. These include the changing nature of conflict, processes of state formation, violent 
non-state resistance, and evolving organisational adaptation by the KNU and its leadership. 
It also took in to account local histories of conflict and state-making, as well as the nature 
of the central state in ethno-nationalist peripheral conflicts. By studying the non-military 
activities of an armed opposition group, this research highlighted how micro level 
processes and broader structural conditions interact to shape youth roles and non-military 
participation within the KNU, which have in turn played a role in shaping the strategic 
orientation and activities of the organisation in its struggle against the Burmese state. 
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APPENDIX A. Guideline Life History Questions for participants 
Name, age, occupation, parents occupations, region of origin, village/town, highest level of 
education, number of siblings, religion (and parents religion), ethnicity (and parents 
ethnicity) 
Who is a ‘Karen’? Explore 
Who is a ‘youth’? Explore 
Why did you join this organisation? 
 What did you do prior to joining the organisation (e.g. other organisational job, 
work, school etc.) – Explore individual characteristics and situation 
 (What was the structural context they were living in? – Explore number of times village 
had been attacked or displaced, frequency of attacks, village and family wealth, location of village and 
proximity to armed groups) 
 Did your parents or anyone in your village work for the Karen movement?  - 
Explore cultural faming of participation 
 Did your friends join the movement? (If so, what did they join? If not, why not?) – 
Explore peer influence 
What job do you do in this organisation? 
 What tasks does the job entail?  
 What else do you do/are you responsible for? 
 How did you come to do this job in particular? 
 Why is this job done by ‘youths’ (compared to adults)? 
 What difficulties do you encounter when carrying out your work? 
 What do you enjoy about your work? 
What jobs have you done in the past? 
What do you think you will do in the future? (Next year, after 4 years, after 10 years) 
What is your ambition? 
Which aspects of your work are conducted in Thailand and which in Burma and why? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing your work in Thailand/Burma? 
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APPENDIX B.  Biographical data of life history or in-depth 
interviews with youths 
Number of youths who participated in life history interviews or in-
depth interviews 35  
Ethnicity   
Number of interviewees who identified as S'gaw Karen 28 80% 
Number of interviewees who identified as Pwo Karen 3 9% 
Number of interviewees who identified as mixed S'gaw and Pwo 
Karen 4 11% 
Gender   
Number of male youths interviewed 26 74% 
Number of female youths interviewed 9 26% 
Age   
Average age of all youths interviewed 29  
Average age of all youths interviewed at the time they were first 
recruited in to a KNU-affiliated organisation 21  
Education level   
Number of youths interviewed who had finished Grade Ten schooling 32 91% 
Number of youths interviewed who had finished a post-ten further 
education programme 19 54% 
Number of youths interviewed who had a post Grade-Ten Diploma 1 3% 
Number of youths interviewed who had a Bachelors degree 3 9% 
Number of youths interviewed who had a Masters degree 1 3% 
Number of youths interviewed who had received further education at 
KYO school (KYLMTC/KYDC) 7 20% 
Religion   
Number of youths interviewed who identified as Christian - Baptist 22 63% 
Number of youths interviewed who identified as Christian - Seventh 
Day Adventist 1 3% 
Number of youths interviewed who identified as Christian - Catholic 5 14% 
Number of youths interviewed who identified as Buddhist 4 11% 
Number of youths interviewed who identified as Animist 1 3% 
Personal connections to the KNU prior to recruitment   
Number of youths interviewed who had a family member also working 22 63% 
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in the KNU at the time of recruitment 
Number of youths interviewed who had friends working in the KNU 
at the time of recruitment 28 80% 
Experience of serious political abuse   
Number of youths interviewed who had experienced their home being 
attacked 18 51% 
Number of youths interviewed who had a family member who had 
been killed/tortured by an armed group 9 26% 
Number of youths interviewed who had been internally displaced 15 43% 
Military experience   
Number of youths interviewed who had ever been a soldier 3 9% 
Number of youths interviewed who had done military training with 
the KNLA 7 20% 
Occupation   
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for KYO 23 66% 
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for KUSG 2 6% 
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for KWO 1 3% 
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for FTUK 1 3% 
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for KNU 
(departments) 13 37% 
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for 
CIDKP 2 6% 
Number of youths interviewed who were currently working for Burma 
Issues 3 9% 
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APPENDIX C. Ethnic composition of Burma in 1911 
 
Ethnic composition of Burma in 1911 (Data from the 1911 British India census, His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1922) 
 
Burmese (Burman) 
Karen 
Shan 
Arakanese 
Bengali 
Chin 
Mon, Talaing, or Peguan 
Kachin or Singpho 
Palaung 
Western Hindi 
Chinese 
Intha 
Khun 
Akha (Kaw) 
English 
Taungyo 
Danu 
Lahu (Muhso) 
Chinbok 
Khami, Khweymi or Kumi 
Taungtha 
Wa 
Lu 
Kadu 
Lisu (Lisaw) 
Siamese 
Others 
Karen 
8.8% 
Burmese 
(Burman) 
65% 
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APPENDIX D. KYO Staffing Levels in 2008 
District Number of KYO Committee 
members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Level Total 
Doothahtu 
(Thaton) 
Tawoo 
(Toungoo) 
Klerlwehtoo 
(Nyaunglebin) 
Mergui-Tavoy 
(Tenasserim) 
Mutraw 
(Papun) 
Dooplaya 
(Dooplaya) 
Pa-an 
(Hpa-an) 
Central 11        
District 63 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Refugee camp 49    14186 14187 14188 7 
IDP camp 14     7  7 
Camp section 225    25189 115190 70191 15192 
Townships 84 10 10 10 4 15 20 15 
Villages193 2500 250 250 375 250 500 500 375 
Total 2946        
                                                 
186 Two refugee camps with 7 KYO committee members each 
187 Two refugee camps with 7 KYO committee members each 
188 Two refugee camps with 7 KYO committee members each 
189 Five camp sections between two refugee camps in the district with 5 KYO committee members each 
190 23 camp sections between two refugee camps with 5 KYO committee members each 
191 14 camp sections between two refugee camps with 5 KYO committee members each 
192 3 camp zones in one refugee camp with 5 KYO committee members each 
193 Estimated approximately 500 villages with 5 staff each  
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Refugee camps:      Tham Hin Mae Ramoe Umpiem Mai Mae La 
     Don Yang Mae La Oo Noh Poe  
IDP Camps:       Ei Thu Hta  Ler Per Her 
KYO Membership in 2008: 40,911 
Numbers in blue iare estimated numbers by KYO central level staff at the time of research in 2008. Numbers in black font are exact numbers at the time, according 
to KYO and KNU staff. 
 
